ECLI:EU:T:2026:400

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JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

17 June 2026 (*)

( Civil service – Members of the contract staff – Remuneration – Refusal to grant social assistance – Commission staff members employed in Luxembourg – Legal basis of the action – Implied decision of rejection – Obligation to state reasons – Complete lack of reasoning – Regularisation after the action has been brought – Circumscribed powers – Liability )

In Case T‑121/25,

Asma Gharbi, residing in Steinfort (Luxembourg), represented by L. Levi and S. Rodrigues, lawyers,

applicant,

European Commission, represented by O. Dani and L. Hohenecker, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber, sitting with five Judges),

composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, I. Reine, R. da Silva Passos, H. Cassagnabère (Rapporteur) and T. Pavelin, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular the questions put by the General Court to the applicant and the Commission and their answers, lodged with the Registry of the General Court on 13 and 11 November 2025, respectively,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By her action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, Ms Asma Gharbi, seeks (i) annulment of her salary slip for the month of May 2024 (‘the salary slip’) in so far as it reflects the decision of the European Commission not to make the social assistance payment provided for staff members employed in Luxembourg, whose net pay calculated in accordance with the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) or the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) is lower than that of a qualified employee being paid the minimum wage in Luxembourg; and (ii) that the Commission be ordered to pay a symbolic EUR 1 in respect of the non-material harm which she claims to have suffered.

Background to the dispute and events subsequent to the bringing of the action

2 On 16 April 2024, the applicant joined the Office for Infrastructure and Logistics (OIL) in Luxembourg as a member of the contract staff on a part-time basis (80%) and was classed in function group II, grade 5, step 1.

3 On her first salary slip, sent on 5 May 2024, the applicant noted that she had not received the monthly social assistance payment provided for by Commission Decision C(2015) 4907 final of 22 July 2015 on a payment of social assistance to some Commission staff members employed in Luxembourg (‘the 2015 decision’) for staff members whose net pay is lower than that of a qualified employee being paid the minimum wage in Luxembourg (‘the social assistance payment’).

4 As is stated in recital 4 of the 2015 decision, the measure provided for by that decision is to be based on a detailed comparison, which the Commission is required to make, between the personal situation of each staff member employed in Luxembourg and a hypothetical situation in which the same staff member is employed under Luxembourg law and receives the statutory minimum wage for a qualified worker. That comparison is to take account of the various deductions applicable and allowances granted in both scenarios.

5 In accordance with Article 1 of the 2015 decision, the Director-General in charge of human resources prepared an exhaustive list of the factors to be taken into account when calculating the net pay for each staff member and the corresponding statutory minimum wage in Luxembourg, in an annex to the decision of the Director-General of Human Resources and Security adopted on 22 February 2017 specifying the elements to be taken into account when calculating the reference amount for each staff member and the corresponding statutory minimum wage in Luxembourg for the purposes of the comparison provided for in the 2015 decision (‘the 2017 decision’).

6 On 1 January 2024, the statutory minimum wage in Luxembourg received by a qualified worker over the age of 18 years was EUR 3 085.11 gross per month for full-time work (that is, 40 hours per week). The salary slip at issue refers, however, to a ‘reference amount’ of EUR 2 749.58.

7 Taking the view that she ought to have received the social assistance payment, the applicant submitted a complaint on 10 July 2024 under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, requesting the annulment of the salary slip.

8 Since no express response was received within the time limit of four months after the complaint was submitted by the applicant, an implied decision of rejection arose on 10 November 2024 (‘the implied decision of rejection’).

9 Despite numerous exchanges with the Commission in which the applicant sought an express response from that institution, an express decision confirming the rejection of her complaint (‘the express decision’) was only taken on 19 February 2025 – that is, the date on which the present action was brought – of which the applicant was notified only the following day.

Forms of order sought

10 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the salary slip and, in so far as is necessary, the implied decision of rejection;

– order the Commission to pay a symbolic EUR 1 in respect of the non-material harm which the applicant claims to have suffered;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

11 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs.

Law

The legal basis for the action

12 On the first page of the application, it is stated that the latter is brought ‘under Articles 263, 268 and 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’.

13 In the body of the application, the applicant expressly and repeatedly refers to Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, which implement Article 270 TFEU (see judgment of 10 September 2015, Review Missir Mamachi di Lusignano v Commission, C‑417/14 RX-II, EU:C:2015:588, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). Further, the applicant followed the procedures set out in those articles in so far as concerns the submission of a prior complaint and compliance with the various time limits prescribed.

14 When questioned about the legal basis of her action by way of a measure of organisation of procedure of 29 October 2025, the applicant confirmed that that action is to be regarded as having been brought under Article 270 TFEU. It is, moreover, on the basis of that article that the Commission responded to the action ‘on account of the material content of the application’.

15 Accordingly, the present action must be regarded as having been brought under Article 270 TFEU.

The claim for annulment

The subject matter of the dispute in so far as it relates to the claim for annulment

16 The applicant has directed her action against both her salary slip and the implied decision of rejection.

17 According to settled case-law, an administrative complaint, such as that referred to in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and its rejection, whether express or implied, constitute an integral part of a complex procedure and are no more than a precondition for bringing the matter before the judicature. Consequently, an action before the judicature, even if formally directed against the rejection of the complaint, has the effect of bringing before the judicature the act adversely affecting the applicant against which the complaint was submitted, except where the scope of the rejection of the complaint differs from that of the measure against which that complaint was made (see judgment of 8 July 2020, WH v EUIPO, T‑138/19, not published, EU:T:2020:316, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

18 In the present case, the implied decision of rejection confirmed the salary slip disputed by the applicant. The applicant’s claim for annulment directed against the implied decision of rejection therefore lacks any independent content, and is thus to be regarded as formally directed against the salary slip.

The plea in law, raised of the Court’s own motion, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons

19 As has been stated in paragraph 9 above, the applicant brought the present action against the salary slip by way of an application lodged with the Registry of the General Court on 19 February 2025.

20 Also on 19 February 2025, the Commission adopted the express decision stating, for the first time, the reasons for which the salary slip did not include the social assistance payment. The applicant was only notified of that decision the following day.

21 It is settled case-law that an inadequate statement of reasons or a lack of such a statement constitutes an infringement of essential procedural requirements and a plea involving a matter of public policy which must be raised by the Courts of the European Union of their own motion (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 October 2021, Simpson v Council, T‑646/16 P RENV-RX, not published, EU:T:2021:692, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

22 The obligation to state reasons is a fundamental principle of EU law, laid down by Article 296 TFEU and provided for in Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. As regards officials more specifically, the obligation to state reasons is enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations and, in so far as concerns decisions made following a complaint, in the second subparagraph of Article 90(2) of those regulations.

23 It should be recalled that the obligation to state the reasons is intended, on the one hand, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to allow him or her to ascertain whether or not the decision is well founded and to enable him or her to decide whether to bring an action to challenge its legality, and, on the other, to enable the Courts of the European Union to conduct their review (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2002, Mavromichalis v Commission, T‑263/01, EU:T:2002:194, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). In those circumstances, the statement of reasons for a decision of an EU institution, body, office or agency is particularly important in so far as it is a requirement for ensuring that the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is effective (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2023, Commission v Italy and Spain, C‑635/20 P, EU:C:2023:98, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

24 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressee may have in obtaining explanations (see judgment of 13 March 2025, PKK v Council, C‑72/23 P, EU:C:2025:182, paragraph 142 and the case-law cited).

25 Whilst it is true that the appointing authority is not, in general, required to reply to a complaint, the position is different where the decision that is the subject of that complaint is not reasoned. The reasons must be stated not later than the rejection of the complaint (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2002, Mavromichalis v Commission, T‑263/01, EU:T:2002:194, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).

26 The total lack of a statement of reasons before an action is brought cannot be remedied by explanations provided by the appointing authority after the action has been brought (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 September 2004, Hectors v Parliament, C‑150/03 P, EU:C:2004:555, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, and of 28 February 2008, Neirinck v Commission, C‑17/07 P, EU:C:2008:134, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited), at the risk of blurring the division of powers between the administration and the Courts of the European Union, weakening the review of legality and jeopardising the exercise of the right of appeal (judgment of 11 June 2020, Commission v Di Bernardo, C‑114/19 P, EU:C:2020:457, paragraph 58). Indeed, at that stage, such explanations would no longer serve their twofold function, recalled in paragraph 23 above.

27 Moreover, the possibility of regularising the total lack of a statement of reasons after an action has been brought might prejudice the rights of defence because the applicant would be denied the possibility to set out his or her pleas contesting the reasons which he or she would not know until after he or she had lodged his or her application. The principle that parties should be equal before the Courts of the European Union would thus be undermined (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 October 2008, Barbin v Parliament, F‑81/07, EU:F:2008:125, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited, and order of 8 March 2012, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑126/11 P, EU:T:2012:115, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

28 It should be added that, in the case of an implied rejection, which thus lacks formal reasoning, of a complaint made against a decision which lacks formal reasoning, it is the conduct of the administration which is a decisive factor in the origin of a dispute in as far as the person concerned feels obliged, in the absence of any response to his or her complaint within the time limit laid down in Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, to bring an action before the General Court in order to obtain a statement of reasons in due form for the decision adopted with respect to him or her. That is all the more regrettable since compliance by the administration with its duty to state reasons during the pre-litigation phase is intended to enable the person concerned to understand the scope of the decision taken with respect to him or her and, where appropriate, may persuade him or her that it was well founded and, therefore, not to commence legal proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 September 2005, Casini v Commission, T‑132/03, EU:T:2005:324, paragraph 34, and of 26 October 2017, Paraskevaidis v Cedefop, T‑601/16, EU:T:2017:757, paragraph 42).

29 In the present case, the salary slip, by its nature, lacks a statement of reasons. Furthermore, it is common ground that the Commission failed to notify the applicant of its reply to her complaint within the time limit prescribed by the Staff Regulations, which amounts to an implied decision of rejection.

30 It is apparent, moreover, from the information before the Court that, in numerous email exchanges between the applicant and the Commission, the latter claimed that ‘owing to exceptional circumstances, the [authority competent to conclude contracts of employment] [had] not been able to respond to the complaint’ but that ‘as this [had been] undertaken, [the applicant] [would] receive a response before 19 February’, that is to say, the penultimate day of the time limit available to the applicant for bringing an action before the General Court. However, it is clear that, in spite of that undertaking, the Commission only adopted that decision at 23:10 on 19 February 2025.

31 It is obvious that the adoption of the express decision at so late an hour on 19 February 2025, when the time limit for bringing an action was to expire the following day and the Commission had expressly undertaken to send a response before that date, compelled the applicant, in the absence of any explanation on the part of the administration, to bring her action before the General Court against the salary slip and the implied decision, both of which lacked any statement of reasons.

32 Moreover, it should be recalled that, while the authority competent to conclude contracts of employment is authorised to adopt a reasoned decision in response to the complaint within the period of three months prescribed in Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations, that possibility is afforded only for as long as the applicant has not brought an action (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2002, Mavromichalis v Commission, T‑263/01, EU:T:2002:194, paragraph 27, and of 12 February 1992, Volger v Parliament, T‑52/90, EU:T:1992:12, paragraph 40).

33 The Commission’s attitude is all the more regrettable in that it was sufficient, in the present case, for it to communicate to the person concerned a simple screenshot of the simulations carried out using the IT tools available to it so that she might, on the one hand, ensure that the comparison referred to in paragraph 4 above had indeed been conducted and, on the other hand, know and understand the reference amounts relied upon for the purposes of that comparison.

34 In that sense, by performing, in the context of an express response to the complaint, one of its most basic duties vis-à-vis its newly employed member of the contract staff, the Commission would also have had the opportunity to ascertain, at a pre-trial stage, whether its decision was in conformity with EU law.

35 It follows from the foregoing that the Commission infringed its obligation to state reasons, with the result that the salary slip must automatically be annulled.

36 Nevertheless, it should be recalled that it has been held that the applicant did not have an interest in having the contested decision annulled where, on account of its circumscribed powers, the administration would have been led to adopt a new decision identical in substance to the contested decision had the latter been annulled (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 July 1983, Geist v Commission, 117/81, EU:C:1983:191, paragraph 7; of 18 December 1992, Díaz García v Parliament, T‑43/90, EU:T:1992:120, paragraph 54; and of 20 September 2000, Orthmann v Commission, T‑261/97, EU:T:2000:212, paragraph 33).

37 However, it is apparent that the defects in question in the precedents to which paragraph 36 above refers were not such as to have consequences for the action brought before the General Court, since they did not deprive the applicant of the possibility of understanding the criterion that that party had failed to meet and, accordingly, the decision taken against him or her.

38 In those circumstances, it is appropriate to determine the situation as to the Commission’s circumscribed powers to adopt the contested decision, and the consequences to be drawn from that situation as to the outcome of the present action.

39 The social assistance payment was introduced by the 2015 decision and, as has been recalled in paragraph 5 above, the methods for calculating the salaries to be compared were fixed by the 2017 decision, which applies to Commission staff members only.

40 The 2015 and 2017 decisions provide that the administration is to take into consideration the personal and family situation of the staff member and list, specifically, in the annex to the 2017 decision, each of the elements to be taken into account in calculating the reference amount for each staff member and the statutory minimum wage in Luxembourg.

41 Thus, having regard to the exhaustive nature of the list referred to in paragraph 40 above, it must be held that the Commission did not, in the present case, have discretion but was instead in a situation where its powers were circumscribed, as it was required to grant the social assistance payment since the net pay of a staff member working full-time was lower than the pay received by a qualified employee being paid the minimum wage in Luxembourg, and not to grant that payment otherwise.

42 The fact remains that the peculiarity of the present case lays in the multiplicity of the figures to be added or subtracted from the salaries to be compared in the comparison exercise referred to in paragraph 4 above, which would not enable the applicant to make, with sufficient certainty, the necessary calculation to understand and ascertain whether or not she is eligible for social assistance. Indeed, the difficulties that a staff member – a fortiori when, like the applicant, he or she takes up his or her post – may encounter, on receiving his or her first salary slip, in calculating exactly not only the full-time net pay to which he or she is entitled, but also the – purely hypothetical – salary that he or she would have received had he or she been employed under Luxembourg law, cannot be disregarded.

43 This is all the more true in that, for the purposes of determining the two salaries that are to be compared, as mentioned in paragraph 4 above, the 2017 decision does not simply rely on gross salaries, but also provides for the taking into account of multiple tax deductions, social contributions (sickness, old age, dependence) and allowances (including family, additional special allowances, back to school) which apply to both the Commission and Luxembourg.

44 Admittedly, an official who is in receipt, or who believes he or she should be in receipt, of a financial benefit needs to reflect or check the payment he or she receives or wishes to receive (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 May 2023, AL v Commission, T‑714/21, not published, EU:T:2023:282, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

45 It is, however, clear that in the present case, that is precisely what the applicant undertook to do, in vain, by means of her complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. The statement of reasons for the response to that complaint was, in those circumstances, essential to enabling the applicant to understand the reasons why she had been regarded as ineligible for social assistance.

46 Thus, it must be observed that, in the complete absence of reasoning, the applicant was not afforded the opportunity to check, first, that the administration had indeed conducted the comparison referred to in paragraph 4 above; next, that the calculations that such a comparison comprised were correct; and, lastly, the lawfulness of the 2015 and 2017 decisions, the illegality of which could have been pleaded.

47 In that connection, it must be recalled, first, that the staff member is solely entitled to bring an action contesting the salary slip which reflects, for the first time, the position taken by the administration as regards the allowance at issue, inasmuch as subsequent salary slips are acts that simply confirm that position and cannot be challenged by way of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 February 2019, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, T‑487/16, not published, EU:T:2019:66, paragraphs 38 to 41 and the case-law cited) and, second, that as the case-law currently stands, it was not certain that the applicant could have relied, for the first time, on new arguments at the reply stage, which, in any event, would not have been satisfactory in the light of the principles recalled in paragraphs 26 and 28 above.

48 In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the comparison was, as has been observed in paragraph 42 above, of such complexity that it was not possible for the applicant to understand the decision made in respect of her situation, the defect stemming from the complete lack of reasoning is likely, in the specific circumstances of the present case, to have had consequences on the exercise of the right to an effective remedy.

49 Had the applicant obtained, in a timely manner, a statement of reasons for the non-payment of social assistance, she would have been in a position not only to understand the decision not to make the social assistance payment to her, but also to assess both the appropriateness of bringing legal action – against her new employer, moreover – and the relevance of the pleas in law, including objections of illegality, that could have been raised in support of that action.

50 It follows from all of the foregoing that the contested decision must be annulled, without there being any need to examine the other pleas in law.

The claim for compensation

51 The applicant asks that the General Court order the Commission to pay a symbolic EUR 1 in respect of the non-material harm which she claims to have suffered.

52 In that connection, it is settled case-law that the annulment of an unlawful act may constitute, in itself, appropriate and, in principle, sufficient compensation for any non-material harm which that measure may have caused, unless the applicant shows that he or she has sustained non-material harm that cannot be compensated in full by that annulment (see, to that effect, order of 3 September 2019, FV v Council, C‑188/19 P, not published, EU:C:2019:690, paragraph 26, and judgment of 28 April 2021, Correia v EESC, T‑843/19, EU:T:2021:221, paragraph 86).

53 In the present case, suffice it to observe that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the non-material harm allegedly suffered cannot be compensated in full by the annulment of the contested decision.

54 In those circumstances, the Court considers that the annulment of the contested decision must be regarded as constituting, in itself, appropriate and sufficient compensation for the non-material harm alleged.

55 It follows from the foregoing that the claim for damages must be rejected.

Costs

56 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Commission has, in the main, been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

hereby:

1. Annuls the salary slip of Ms Asma Gharbi prepared in respect of the month of May 2024;

2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

3. Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

Kowalik-Bańczyk

Reine

da Silva Passos

Cassagnabère

Pavelin

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 17 June 2026.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: French.

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