Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: James Godwin v. Penn National Security Insurance Company) (Dallas Circuit Court: CV-24-900303).

Rel: September 19, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2025
_________________________

SC-2025-0152
_________________________

Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: James Godwin

v.

Penn National Security Insurance Company et al.)

(Dallas Circuit Court: CV-24-900303)

BRYAN, Justice.

Penn National Security Insurance Company ("Penn National")

petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Dallas Circuit
SC-2025-0152

Court to transfer the underlying action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court.

Penn National argues that the transfer is required for the convenience of

the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under § 6-3-21.1,

Ala. Code 1975. We deny the petition.

Background

The claims in this action arise from an automobile accident that

occurred in rural Tuscaloosa County on January 3, 2024. According to

the complaint, James Godwin was employed by Talton Communications,

Inc. ("Talton"), and was driving a vehicle owned by Talton in the line and

scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The accident

occurred when a vehicle driven by Desi Bernard Peoples struck the

vehicle driven by Godwin from behind. An Alabama Uniform Traffic

Crash Report ("the accident report") was prepared by an officer of the

Alabama Law Enforcement Agency. No emergency-medical-services

personnel were called to the scene. No evidence suggests that Godwin

received any medical treatment in Tuscaloosa County.

Godwin is a resident of Dallas County. Peoples is a resident of

Fayette County. Talton's principal place of business is in Dallas County.

Talton provided insurance coverage for its employees, including

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uninsured-/underinsured-motorist benefits, through a policy with Penn

National, a foreign company authorized to do business in Alabama.

On October 23, 2024, Godwin filed a verified complaint against

Peoples, Penn National, and Talton in the Dallas Circuit Court ("the trial

court"). He sought relief based on claims of negligence and wantonness,

the uninsured-/underinsured-motorist provisions of the Penn National

policy, and the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq.,

Ala. Code 1975. Godwin amended his complaint on November 5, 2024,

seemingly to clarify that the only claim asserted against Talton was for

workers' compensation benefits.

Penn National answered the complaint and filed a separate motion

to dismiss, to sever, or to transfer. The motion sought to sever Godwin's

workers' compensation claim against Talton from his other claims. The

motion also sought to transfer the claims against Penn National and

Peoples to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on both the convenience of

the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice. Penn National

supported its motion to transfer with only Godwin's complaint and the

accident report. Peoples joined the motion but provided no argument or

evidence of his own.

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Godwin opposed Penn National's motion. As to a severance, he

stated that he had no objection to bifurcating the workers' compensation

claims for trial so that the workers' compensation claim would be tried

separately. Godwin, however, did not want the claims severed, asserting

that that would require the creation of an entirely new action with the

imposition of a new filing fee and increased costs associated with

separate discovery related to the same events.

As to a transfer, Godwin argued that Dallas County was more

convenient than Tuscaloosa County and that Dallas County had a strong

connection to the action. Godwin provided an affidavit from Eric

Jackson, the director of the facility where Godwin had received physical

therapy for treatment of injuries he alleged he had suffered as a result of

the accident. Jackson stated that the physical-therapy facility is in

Dallas County. Thus, Jackson and other staff of the facility who provided

care to Godwin all worked in Dallas County. Jackson stated that, if they

were called as witnesses, it would be highly inconvenient and

burdensome for him or his staff to travel to Tuscaloosa County. He stated

that it would be more convenient for them to travel to the Dallas County

courthouse and that they would spend significantly less time away from

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work if they had to testify in Dallas County rather than Tuscaloosa

County.

Godwin also provided an affidavit from his wife, Stephanie, whom

he expected to call as a witness to testify about his injuries and his

limitations before and after the accident. She lives and works in Dallas

County. Stephanie stated that it would be highly inconvenient for her to

travel to Tuscaloosa County and that it would be more convenient for her

to travel to the Dallas County courthouse. Thus, she stated, leaving the

action in Dallas County would result in her spending less time away from

work.

On February 2, 2025, the trial court denied Penn National's motion

to sever but ordered that the workers' compensation claim would be tried

separately. The trial court also denied Penn National's and Peoples'

motions to transfer. On March 7, 2025, Penn National petitioned this

Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant its motion

to transfer the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Penn National

does not seek relief from the trial court's denial of its motion to sever.

Peoples has not joined Penn National's mandamus petition.

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Standard of Review

"We have held that ' "[t]he proper method for obtaining
review of a denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus." ' Ex parte
Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371,
373 (Ala. 2012) (quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727
So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998)). Nevertheless, the standard for
obtaining mandamus review before this Court is a high one:

" ' "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, and it will be 'issued only when there is:
1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent
to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4)
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex
parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501,
503 (Ala. 1993). A writ of mandamus will issue
only in situations where other relief is unavailable
or is inadequate, and it cannot be used as a
substitute for appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv.
Co., 590 So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1991)." '

"Ex parte Wilson, 854 So. 2d 1106, 1108-09 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d
893, 894 (Ala. 1998)). Moreover, '[w]e apply the abuse-of
discretion standard when considering a mandamus petition
challenging a venue ruling, and we will not issue the writ
unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.' Ex parte Brookwood Health Servs.,
Inc., 781 So. 2d 954, 956-57 (Ala. 2000). ' "Our review is ...
limited to those facts that were before the trial court." ' Ex
parte Jim Burke Auto., Inc., 776 So. 2d 118, 120 (Ala. 2000)
(quoting Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d at 789)."

Ex parte J & W Enters., LLC, 150 So. 3d 190, 193 (Ala. 2014).

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Analysis

Penn National bases its petition on § 6-3-21.1. That statute

provides, in relevant part:

"(a) With respect to civil actions filed in an appropriate
venue, any court of general jurisdiction shall, for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, or in the interest of
justice, transfer any civil action or any claim in any civil
action to any court of general jurisdiction in which the action
might have been properly filed and the case shall proceed as
though originally filed therein. …"

The parties do not dispute before this Court that venue would be proper

in both Dallas County and Tuscaloosa County. See § 6-3-7, Ala. Code

1975; and Rule 82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. "When venue is appropriate in more

than one county, the plaintiff's choice of venue is generally given great

deference." Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 312 (Ala.

2003). Thus, the "burden of proof in seeking a transfer under [§ 6-3-21.1]

rests squarely on the shoulders of the defendant." Id.

Penn National argues that the trial court should have transferred

the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court based on both grounds of § 6-

3-21.1: for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the

interest of justice. As to both grounds, Penn National, citing Ex Parte

Indiana Mills & Mfg, Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 542 (Ala. 2008), argues that the

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legislature's use of the word "shall" in the statute makes transfer

mandatory. .

Certainly, this Court in Indiana Mills noted: " '[T]he Legislature, in

adopting § 6-3-21.1, intended to vest in the trial courts, the Court of Civil

Appeals, and this Court the power and the duty to transfer a cause when

"the interest of justice" requires a transfer.' " Id. at 541 (quoting Ex parte

First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 660 (Ala. 1998)). In First

Family, this Court explained: "The trial judge has a degree of discretion

in determining whether the factors listed in the statute, i.e., 'the

convenience of the parties and witnesses' and 'the interest of justice,' are

in favor of transferring the action." 718 So. 2d at 660. Thus, this "Court

will reverse the trial court's ruling in this regard only up on a showing of

an abuse of discretion." Id. We will consider the application of each

ground and the trial court's exercise of discretion in turn.

I. The Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses

As to the convenience of the parties and witnesses, Penn National

was required to present evidence showing that Tuscaloosa County was a

significantly more convenient forum than Dallas County. This Court has

explained the showing required by § 6-3-21.1 as follows:

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"[T]his Court has recognized that

" ' "[a] defendant seeking a transfer based on § 6-3-
21.1 has the burden of proving to the satisfaction
of the trial court that the defendant's
inconvenience and expense in defending the action
in the venue selected by the plaintiff are so great
that the plaintiff's right to choose the forum is
overcome. Ex parte New England Mut. Life, 663
So. 2d [952,] 956 [(Ala. 1995)]; Ex parte Townsend,
589 So. 2d [711,] 715 [(Ala. 1991)]. For a transfer
to be justified, the transferee forum must be
'significantly more convenient' than the forum
chosen by the plaintiff. Ex parte Townsend, 589
So. 2d at 715. See also[ ] Ex parte Johnson, 638
So. 2d 772, 774 (Ala. 1994)." '

"Ex parte Blair Logistics, LLC, 157 So. 3d 951, 955 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497,
500 (Ala. 1995) (emphasis added)). Thus, a trial court should
not grant a motion for a change of venue under the
convenience-of-the-parties prong unless the new forum is
shown to be 'significantly more convenient' than the forum in
which the action was filed. See Ex parte First Tennessee
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 909 (Ala. 2008).

"In cases in which this Court has found that the
'convenience of the parties and witnesses' warrants a transfer
of the action, evidence was provided demonstrating that the
proposed transferee forum was 'significantly more convenient'
than the transferor forum. Such evidence included affidavits
from parties and witnesses stating that the incident
underlying the action occurred in the transferee forum,
affidavits from the parties stating that they lived in the
transferee forum, and evidence indicating that requiring the
parties and/or the witnesses to travel to the transferor forum
would be a significant burden. See, e.g., Ex parte Kane, 989
So. 2d 509, 511, 512-13 (Ala. 2008) (noting affidavits
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submitted by the movant in support of the motion for a change
of venue in holding that the transferee forum would be a
'substantially more convenient' forum than the transferor
forum). In contrast, in cases in which the party moving for
the transfer has failed to present evidence demonstrating that
the transferee forum is 'significantly more convenient' than
the transferor forum, this Court has declined to order a
transfer. See, e.g., Ex parte Gentile Co., 221 So. 3d 1066, 1069
(Ala. 2016) (noting that the petitioner failed to present any
evidence in support of its motion for a change of venue under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in declining to order a
transfer of the case)."

Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc., 291 So. 3d 477, 480-81 (Ala. 2019).

Penn National relies almost exclusively on the fact that the

accident, and thus Godwin's injury, occurred in Tuscaloosa County and

that the accident was investigated there. It also makes a general

statement that "litigating this suit in Dallas County would be vexatious

and oppressive to not only Penn National, but most importantly, to

Peoples." Penn National, however, presented no affidavits or other

evidence from its own representatives or witnesses showing that there

would be any burden on them in attending proceedings in Dallas County.

It likewise presented no affidavit from Peoples stating that he would be

burdened by proceedings in Dallas County. "The arguments of counsel

are not evidence." Deng v. Scroggins, 169 So. 3d 1015, 1028 (Ala. 2014).

See also Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745, 749
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(Ala. 2010) (" '[S]tatements of counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments'

… cannot be considered 'evidentiary material' and thus will not be

considered by this Court." (citation omitted)).

The only evidence Penn National presented to support its motion to

transfer is Godwin's verified complaint and a copy of the accident report.

In pertinent part, the complaint merely states the parties' places of

residence and principal places of business. It shows that venue is proper

in Dallas County but does not show that litigation in Dallas County

would be inconvenient for any party or witness. The accident report

states the location of the accident and the residences of Godwin and

Peoples. It does not state the investigating officer's place of residence or

primary workplace. The accident report provides no evidence indicating

that it would be inconvenient for the officer to travel to Dallas County.

Moreover, it is not certain that he would even be a witness at trial.

In opposition to the motion to transfer, Godwin presented affidavits

from two witnesses who explained that they would be inconvenienced by

attending proceedings in Tuscaloosa County. The director of the

physical-therapy facility in Dallas County where Godwin received

treatment stated that it would be inconvenient and burdensome for him

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or any of his staff to travel to Tuscaloosa County. He explained that

travel to the Dallas County courthouse would result in any witness from

the physical-therapy facility spending less time away from work than

they would if they had to travel to Tuscaloosa County. Godwin's wife

likewise explained in her affidavit that she lived and worked in Dallas

County and that it would be inconvenient for her to travel to Tuscaloosa

County. She stated that she would spend less time away from work if

she had to travel to the Dallas County courthouse rather than Tuscaloosa

County.

Additionally, Godwin's residence was in Dallas County, as was the

principal place of business of his employer and separate defendant,

Talton. Talton has neither joined Penn National's motion to transfer nor

sought transfer on its own motion. Thus, it seems to have consented to

venue in Dallas County. Penn National has not sought relief from the

trial court's denial of its motion to sever Godwin's claim against Talton.

Thus, another defendant in the case has its principal place of business in

Dallas County.

Penn National points to this Court's decision in Ex parte Kane, 989

So. 2d 509 (Ala. 2008), for the proposition that transfer is required when

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the only connections to the plaintiff's chosen forum are that it is the

plaintiff's place of residence and that an automobile-liability insurer does

business there. This Court's decision in Kane, however, does not apply

as Penn National suggests. In that case, the movants presented evidence

from several witnesses indicating that that they resided in Lee County

and would be inconvenienced by litigating in the plaintiff's chosen forum,

Clay County. The acts and omissions made the basis of the case all

occurred in Lee County. The only connections to Clay County were that

the plaintiff resided in Clay County and that the insurance carrier did

business there.

In this case, Godwin resides in Dallas County and Penn National

does business there. However, regarding the location of witnesses, which

was key to this Court's analysis in Kane, the witnesses in this case reside

and work in Dallas County and testified that it would be inconvenient for

them to travel to Tuscaloosa County. Further, Dallas County has

connections to the case beyond those suggested by Penn National.

Godwin received medical treatment there for his alleged injuries.

Additionally, his claims against Talton relate, at least partially, to his

employment, which was based in Dallas County. In fact, the only

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connection of Tuscaloosa County to the case is that it was the location

where the accident occurred.

Penn National argues that the location of Godwin's injury is

"dispositive." However, the cases it cites and the analysis it urges us to

consider all discuss the location of injury as it relates to the interest-of-

justice ground under § 6-3-21.1. See Ex parte Quality Carriers, Inc., 183

So. 3d 937 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d 295 (Ala. 2014); Ex

parte Manning, 170 So. 3d 638 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Indiana Mills, 10 So.

3d 536; Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 So. 3d 1082 (Ala.

2014). We thus will further consider these arguments in their proper

context in our consideration of the interest-of-justice ground set out

below.

Regarding the convenience of the parties and witnesses, however,

Penn National presented no evidence showing that the inconvenience or

expense of litigating in Tuscaloosa County would be significantly less

burdensome than litigating in Dallas County. It failed to identify any

witness who would be inconvenienced by proceedings in Dallas County.

It failed to identify any witness or party for whom proceedings in Dallas

County would be vexatious or oppressive. It failed to show the location

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of any evidence in Tuscaloosa County that would not also be readily

available in Dallas County. Penn National has not met its burden of

showing that Tuscaloosa County is a significantly more convenient forum

than Dallas County. See Ex parte Sanders, 314 So. 3d 1226, 1231 (Ala.

2020). "Without more, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to transfer the action to [Tuscaloosa] County based

on" the convenience of the parties and witnesses under § 6-3-21.1. Ex

parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 925 (Ala. 1994).

II. The Interest of Justice

Penn National argues that the action must be transferred to the

Tuscaloosa Circuit Court in the interest of justice, primarily because that

is where the accident occurred. This Court has held that the "interest of

justice" ground under § 6-3-21.1 requires "the transfer of the action from

a county with little, if any, connection to the action, to the county with a

strong connection to the action." Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.

2d 788, 790 (Ala. 1998). The factors to be considered in determining

which county has a strong connection to the action and which county has

a weak connection include factors related to the convenience of the

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parties and factors related to the public interest. This Court has

explained:

"Some courts have described the interest of justice in
terms interchangeable with the convenience of the parties. In
First Family, supra, this Court quoted the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947):

" ' " 'Important considerations are the relative ease
to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be
appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive.' " '

"First Family, 718 So. 2d at 661 (quoting Ex parte Gauntt, 677
So. 2d 204, 221 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting), quoting
in turn Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S. Ct. 839). First Family
also quoted Gilbert (by way of Justice Maddox's dissent in
Gauntt) concerning considerations that are less directly
related to the convenience of the parties and witnesses:

" ' " 'Factors of public interest also have place
in applying the doctrine. Administrative
difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled
up in congested centers instead of being handled
at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not
to be imposed upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation. In cases
which touch the affairs of many persons, there is
reason for holding the trial in their view and reach
rather than in remote parts of the country where
they can learn of it by report only. There is a local

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interest in having localized controversies decided
at home.' " '

"First Family, 718 So. 2d at 661 (quoting Gauntt, 677 So. 2d
at 221 (Maddox, J., dissenting), quoting in turn Gilbert, 330
U.S. at 508-09, 67 S. Ct. 839).

"The key factors concerning the interest of justice that
clearly apply in this case are the burden of piling court
services and resources upon the people of a county that is not
affected by the case and, perhaps most basic of all, the interest
of the people of a county to have a case that arises in their
county tried close to public view in their county."

Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 489-90 (Ala.

2007).

This Court has stated often that consideration of these factors is not

a simple balancing test. See Ex parte J & W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196

(holding that this "analysis has never involved a simple balancing test").

The party seeking transfer must show not only that the requested forum

has a strong connection to the action, but also that the current forum has

only a weak connection to the action. See, e.g., Ex parte Sanders, 314 So.

3d at 1230; Ex parte KKE, LLC, 295 So. 3d 26, 332-34 (Ala. 2019) (holding

that movants did not show that transferor county's connection to case

was weak and thus did not demonstrate that the trial court had exceeded

its discretion by denying transfer); Ex parte Tyson Chicken, 291 So. 3d

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at 482-83 (holding that movant's burden had not been satisfied when both

counties had strong connections to the action). "This inquiry" regarding

the strength of the transferee county's connection and the weakness of

the transferor county's connection "necessarily depends on the facts of

each case." J & W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196.

Penn National argues that this Court "has unequivocally held that

the location where the cause of action arises and the location where the

injury occurs are the dispositive factors to be considered under the

interest of justice analysis." Penn National's petition at 8-9. This

argument misstates our holdings and distorts the proper analysis under

§ 6-3-21.1. This Court has never held any one factor to be dispositive of

the interest-of-justice analysis. The cases Penn National cites each

consider multiple factors involved in the particular circumstances as part

of our normal analysis of the interest-of-justice ground of § 6-3-21.1

described above. See Ex parte Quality Carriers, 183 So. 3d at 943-44; Ex

parte Manning, 170 So. 3d at 644-45; Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d at 301-

02; Ex parte State Farm, 149 So. 3d at 1087-88; Ex parte Indiana Mills,

10 So. 3d at 540-42.

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This Court has "assign[ed] 'considerable weight' " to the location of

the injury, but "it is not, and should not be, the sole consideration for

determining venue under the 'interest of justice' prong of § 6-3-21.1." Ex

parte J & W Enters., 150 So. 3d at 196-97. See also Ex parte Elliott, 254

So. 3d 882, 886 (Ala. 2017). In J & W Enterprises, an accident between

two tractor-trailer rigs occurred on Interstate 10 in Mobile County. The

plaintiff sued in the Clarke Circuit Court, and the defendant driver's

employer sought a transfer to Mobile County, the location where the

accident occurred. The plaintiff alleged claims of negligence and

wantonness against the defendant driver. Against the defendant driver's

employer, he alleged claims of negligent entrustment and negligent

hiring. The plaintiff was a resident of Texas. The defendant driver was

a resident of Clarke County. His employer's principal place of business

was in Clarke County. There were no witnesses to the action. The

plaintiff did not receive any medical treatment in Mobile County. The

Mobile police officer who had investigated the accident stated by affidavit

that it would not be inconvenient for him to travel to Clarke County to

testify. 150 So. 3d at 192.

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In light of our prior cases, this Court concluded: "In the present

case, the facts before this Court do not indicate that Mobile County has

a particularly strong connection to this lawsuit. … In light of the facts

before us, Mobile County's nexus to the action is purely fortuitous -- the

place on the interstate where the accident occurred." 150 So. 3d at 196.

Thus, although the location of the accident was given considerable

weight, it was not the sole consideration. This Court held that the

defendant driver's employer had not shown that Mobile County had a

"particularly strong connection" to the lawsuit.

Additionally, the facts did not show that Clark County's connection

to the action was markedly weak. Both defendants were located there,

and evidence related to the plaintiffs' claims of negligent entrustment

and hiring would be located there. Thus, this Court concluded that the

defendant driver's employer had not met its burden. "Given the specific

facts of this case, we cannot say that Mobile County has a significantly

stronger connection to this case than does Clarke County so that the

interest of justice will be offended by trial in Clarke County." 150 So. 3d

at 197. Thus, this Court held, the trial court had not exceeded its

discretion in refusing to transfer the action.

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In Ex parte Elliott, the movant insurer requested a transfer from

the county where the accident occurred, thus presenting similar, but

differing, specific facts and burdens than those in J & W Enterprises. In

Elliott, an automobile accident occurred in Lowndes County and was

investigated by City of Hayneville police in Lowndes County. The

plaintiff was a resident of Montgomery County and sought treatment for

her injuries there. She sued her automobile insurer in Lowndes County,

seeking uninsured-motorist benefits under her policy, which was issued

in Montgomery County. The insurer was a foreign corporation. On the

insurer's motion, the trial court transferred the case to Montgomery

County. 254 So. 3d at 883-84.

On those specific facts, this Court determined that both counties

had strong connections to the case. Thus, the movant insurer had not

met its burden of showing that the transferor county had only a weak

connection and that the transferee county had a significantly stronger

connection to the action. Thus, this Court held, the trial court had

exceeded its discretion in transferring the action. 254 So. 3d at 887.

In considering J & W Enterprises, on which the movant insurer had

relied, this Court in Elliott explained:

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"This Court's decision in J & W Enterprises should not
be read as undermining location-of-injury as the foremost
factor in the interest-of-justice analysis. To the contrary, J &
W Enterprises reaffirmed our assignment of ' "considerable
weight" to the location where the accident occurred.' 150 So.
3d at 196. Instead, we merely recognized in J & W
Enterprises that the location of the accident is not the sole
factor to be considered in the interest-of-justice analysis and
that there will be circumstances, as was the case in J & W
Enterprises, where the interest of justice will not compel the
case to be heard in the venue where the accident occurred."

254 So. 3d at 887.

Penn National argues that, by this statement in Elliott, "any

relevancy Ex parte J & W Enterprises might have had to this case was

extinguished … when this Court, in revisiting its decision in [J & W

Enterprises,] returned the focus of the interest-of-justice factor … to the

location where the accident occurred." Penn National's reply brief at 8.

By this argument, Penn National once again misstates our holdings and

distorts the proper analysis under § 6-3-21.1. In Elliott, this Court by no

means overruled, departed from, or changed the interest-of-justice

analysis, as stated in J & W Enterprises. Consistent with one another,

both opinions focus the analysis on the specific facts presented in each

case considered in light of the movants' burdens. The location of the

injury is to be given considerable weight, but in some circumstances it

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may present a strong connection to the action and in some circumstances

it may not. It is the movant's burden to show with appropriate evidence

that the relative strength and weakness of the transferee and transferor

counties is sufficient to override the plaintiff's choice of forum given the

specific circumstances of each case.

The only evidence Penn National has presented to satisfy its burden

is a copy of the accident report. This evidence alone is insufficient to

prove both that Tuscaloosa County has a strong connection to the matters

giving rise to the action and that Dallas County has a weak connection

to the matters giving rise to the action. Penn National points to the

"considerable weight" given to the location of the injury and notes that

the accident, injuries, and investigation all occurred in Tuscaloosa

County. It cites Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC,

94 So. 3d 371 (Ala. 2012), and Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d

570 (Ala. 2011). In each of those cases, the location of the injury was not

automatically determined to have a strong connection to the case. The

inquiry was whether anything material to the case happened in each

county. Southeast Alabama Timber, 94 So. 3d at 376; Wachovia Bank,

77 So. 3d at 573-74. See also Ex parte Reed, 295 So. 3d 38, 43 (Ala. 2019)

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(holding that "nothing material to the action transpired in" transferor

county).

In response to an argument similar to Penn National's, this Court

recently explained that our cases consider facts in addition to the location

of the accident or injury to justify a transfer. See Ex parte Burgess, 298

So. 3d 1080, 1083-84 (Ala. 2020) (considering Ex parte Tier 1 Trucking,

LLC, 222 So. 3d 1107 (Ala. 2016); Ex parte Southeast Alabama Timber,

supra; Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, supra, 58 So. 3d 745 (Ala.

2010); Ex parte Indiana Mills, supra). See also Ex parte State Farm, 149

So. 3d at 1087-88. Because the movant in Burgess had failed to provide

any evidence beyond the accident report, this Court held, it had failed to

show that the transferor county had a weak connection to the case. 298

So. 3d at 1083-84.

Here, the accident report shows only that the accident occurred in

Tuscaloosa County. Certainly, the citizens of that county have an

interest in seeing that motorists on their roads act responsibly. Even if

we accept that that is enough to show a strong connection to the case,

Penn National has not met its burden of showing that Dallas County has

only a weak connection to the matters giving rise to the action. Certainly,

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events material to Godwin's claims occurred in Dallas County. All of his

medical treatment occurred there, most of the witnesses reside there and

will testify about events that occurred there, his employment on which

his workers' compensation claim rests is based there, and Penn

National's policy was issued there. Under these circumstances, we

cannot say that nothing material to the action occurred in Dallas County

or that Dallas County has only a weak connection with the case.

Penn National argues that our cases have held that the plaintiff's

place of residence, employment, medical treatment, and insurance are

not enough to outweigh the location of the injury. It references Ex parte

Sanders, supra; Ex parte Manning, supra; and Ex parte Kane, supra;

and it relies most heavily on Ex parte Elliott, supra. However, there was

more to each of those cases than the type of balancing Penn National

suggests. See Sanders, 314 So. 3d at 1230-31 (holding that transferee

county, the place of residence of one defendant and one eyewitness,

without more, had insufficiently strong connection to override plaintiff's

choice of forum in county where accident occurred and closer to where

medical treatment was received); Manning, 170 So. 3d at 644-45 (holding

that the county where accident occurred was also location of

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hospitalization and place of residence of another party and that only

connection to other county was that one party resided there); Kane, 989

So. 2d at 512-13 (noting that, in addition to being location of accident, all

witnesses but plaintiff resided in transferor county and providing no

discussion of where medical treatment occurred).

We do find Elliott persuasive. There, both counties had strong

connections to the action. "The accident, injuries, and police

investigation occurred in Lowndes County. On the other hand, Elliott

resides in Montgomery County, where she sought treatment for her

injuries resulting from the accident and where the parties' contractual

dealings arose." 254 So. 3d at 887. Because the defendant did not show

that the transferor county had only a weak connection to the action, this

Court held that the trial court had erred in ordering a transfer. Id.

Similarly, here, Godwin resides in Dallas County, where he sought

treatment for his injuries and where the policy giving rise to his claim

against Penn National arose. Penn National therefore has not met its

burden of showing that Dallas County has only a weak connection to the

action. Therefore, it has not shown that the trial court exceeded its

discretion in denying its motion to transfer. Because Penn National has

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no clear legal right to an order transferring the action to Tuscaloosa

County and has failed to show any duty on the part of the trial court to

grant its motion to transfer, it is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.

Therefore, we deny its petition.

PETITION DENIED.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, Cook, McCool, and

Lewis, JJ., concur.

Sellers, J., concurs in the result.

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