Nicholas Hoffman v. City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System and the Board of Managers of the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System

Rel: October 10, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

_________________________

SC-2025-0147
_________________________

Nicholas Hoffman

v.

City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System and the
Board of Managers of the City of Birmingham Retirement and
Relief System

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-23-900802)

STEWART, Chief Justice.
SC-2025-0147

Nicholas Hoffman appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit

Court ("the circuit court") denying his mandamus petition against the

City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System ("the System") and

the Board of Managers of the System ("the Board") (collectively referred

to as "the respondents"), in which he sought review of the Board's decision

to deny his applications for extraordinary and ordinary disability

benefits. For the following reasons, that judgment is affirmed in part and

reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2009, Hoffman was hired by the City of Birmingham as a

firefighter and became a participant in the System. In 2022, Hoffman

applied to the Board for both extraordinary and ordinary disability

benefits, contending that he had developed hypertension that prevented

him from performing his job as a firefighter. On December 28, 2022,

Hoffman was notified that his applications for both extraordinary and

ordinary disability benefits had been denied by the Board.

On March 10, 2023, Hoffman sought review of the Board's decisions

by filing a petition for the writ of mandamus in the circuit court, pursuant

to § 45-37A-51.139(a), Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson County

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Municipalities) ("Any decision of the [B]oard denying a benefit claimed

may be subject to review by the circuit court" by "filing therein a petition

for mandamus."). He attached to his petition certain occupational

medical standards applicable to his employment with the Birmingham

Fire Department that recognize that hypertension "compromises [a

firefighter's] ability to safely perform essential job tasks." Those

standards also limit the use of certain antihypertensive agents, including

"beta-blockers," to control blood pressure, because they "compromise [a

firefighter's] ability to safely perform essential job tasks … due to risk for

dehydration, electrolyte disorders, lethargy, and dissident equilibrium."

He further noted that § 11-43-144(a)(5)a., Ala. Code 1975, defines

"firefighter's occupational disease" as a condition of impairment caused

by, among other things, hypertension.

In his petition, Hoffman alleged that he had not had high blood

pressure at the time his employment with the Birmingham Fire

Department began in 2009 but that he had developed and had been

diagnosed with hypertension during his employment. Hoffman's petition

detailed his doctors' attempts to control his hypertension without

resorting to beta-blockers:

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"During the course of Mr. Hoffman's employment with
Birmingham as a firefighter and paramedic, he developed and
was diagnosed as having hypertension. At first, hypertension
control was attempted using a medication known as
Hydrochlorodthiazide (HCTZ). … It is useful as medication
for high blood pressure in firefighters as it does not contain
beta-blockers and other agents which firefighters cannot take.
This medication did not work for Mr. Hoffman.

"Mr. Hoffman was then placed on Lisinopril[;] however,
during the course of taking Lisinopril, Mr. Hoffman had an
allergic reaction and experienced excessive weight loss
dropping from 200 pounds down to 163 pounds and impacting
his stamina. … Mr. Hoffman's physician advised him to stop
taking Lisinopril and placed him back on HCTZ. ... However,
the medication still failed to properly control Mr. Hoffman's
blood pressure. He discussed this with his physician.

"Mr. Hoffman attempted to perform his job without
taking blood pressure medication for a time, relying more on
diet and exercise. … His blood pressure [became]
dangerously high. His supervisors informed him he must get
his blood pressure under control. …

"Mr. Hoffman was prescribed a calcium channel blocker
(Norvasc) to control his blood pressure again, but without
long-term success. Eventually he was prescribed a beta-
blocker, Bystolic[,] in addition to Norvasc. Mr. Hoffman
resisted this and requested to change medications in April
2022. Mr. Hoffman was then prescribed Valsartan an
angiotensin 2 receptor blocker in addition to Norvasc.
However, this medication caused Mr. Hoffman to have
another allergic reaction due to its relationship to ACE
inhibitor medications. Reluctantly, Mr. Hoffman was placed
back on a beta-blocker and a calcium channel blocker to
control his hypertension.

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"Mr. Hoffman discussed this matter with supervisors
and ascertained from these conversations that he could not
perform his duties as a firefighter due to high blood pressure
and the only means of controlling the high blood pressure was
with beta-blocker medication. The Safety Division provided
standards to him verifying this. Taking this medication was
contrary to firefighting occupational standards ….

"Mr. Hoffman consulted with a treating cardiologist, Dr.
John Eagan of Cardiovascular Associates, on these matters in
hopes that a resolution could be reached which preserved his
occupation …. His cardiologist advised that he should
continue on his current regimen utilizing beta-blockers as he
was perfectly stable and that he had exhausted all other anti-
hypertensive regimens. In particular, his cardiologist found
that it was in the patient's best interest to remain on the
current regimen of Norvasc, a calcium channel blocker[,] and
Bystolic, a beta-blocker.

"Mr. Hoffman also consulted with his primary care
physician, Dr. James Casey, who had been treating him for
several years. Dr. Casey noted efforts to try Mr. Hoffman on
numerous different blood pressure medications without
success and that his blood pressure was only able to be
controlled with a beta-blocker medication."

Hoffman alleged that, after he had filed his applications for

disability benefits, he had been briefly examined by a doctor selected by

the Board, Dr. Bruce Romeo. According to Hoffman, Dr. Romeo

incorrectly concluded that Hoffman had not exhausted all other

antihypertensive regimens, and the Board subsequently denied his

applications. Hoffman alleged that the Board's decisions to deny his

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applications for extraordinary and ordinary disability benefits were

incorrect and sought an order from the circuit court awarding him such

benefits.

On September 26, 2023, the circuit court dismissed Hoffman's

action with prejudice on the basis that he had not obtained service on the

respondents. In Hoffman v. City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief

System, 411 So. 3d 1195 (Ala. 2024), this Court reversed that judgment,

with five members of this Court agreeing that the circuit court had

exceeded its discretion by dismissing the action with prejudice, and we

remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. On

remand, the circuit court set aside its judgment of dismissal. Hoffman

obtained service on the respondents on or about September 30, 2024, and

on October 15, 2024, he served written discovery requests to the

respondents.

On October 29, 2024, the respondents filed a "response to plaintiff's

petition for mandamus." In their response, the respondents included the

following statement of the facts:

"Nicholas Hoffman … was employed as a firefighter by
the City of Birmingham. [Hoffman] applied for both
extraordinary disability benefits and ordinary disability
benefits from the System. In his application for benefits, he
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explained that he was suffering from hypertension and
treating his hypertension with a beta-blocker and a calcium
channel blocker.

"At its October 12, 2022, meeting the Board considered
[Hoffman's] applications for extraordinary disability benefits
and ordinary disability benefits. The Board also heard a
statement from [Hoffman]. The Board went into executive
session to consider [Hoffman's] application[s], his statement
to the Board, and to review the medical findings of Dr. Bruce
Romeo, the Board's medical expert who had examined
[Hoffman] and reviewed his medical history and records. The
Board continued [Hoffman's] applications to its November
meeting for further research and review. At its November
meeting, the Board considered additional information
provided by Dr. Romeo and [Hoffman], including a letter with
attached medical records and documentation dated by
[Hoffman] on October 27, 2022. Finally, at its December
Board meeting, the Board again went into executive session
to consider [Hoffman's] applications. At its December
meeting, the Board denied the extraordinary disability
application and the ordinary disability application, based
upon the opinion of its medical expert that [Hoffman] had not
exhausted all other antihypertensive regimens, when there
had been no trial of alpha-blockers and treatments with
calcium blockers."

The respondents argued that Hoffman's claim for extraordinary

disability benefits was due to be denied as a matter of law because his

alleged disability -- hypertension -- was not "received as a result of an

accident arising out of and in the course of his … employment in the

service and occurring at a definite time and place," as required by § 45-

37A-51.226(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson County
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Municipalities). The respondents also contended that the Board's

decision as to Hoffman's claim for ordinary disability benefits was not

"manifestly wrong" considering Dr. Romeo's opinion that Hoffman had

not exhausted all antihypertensive regimens. The respondents, however,

did not file any affidavits or evidentiary material to support their factual

assertions. Additionally, the circuit court was not provided any materials

considered by the Board in making its decisions to deny Hoffman's

applications for disability benefits.

On January 28, 2025, without conducting a hearing, the circuit

court entered a judgment summarily denying Hoffman's mandamus

petition. The circuit court's judgment states:

"This cause of action came before the Court on the
petitioner's Request for Writ of Mandamus after having
received an adverse decision from the [Board] denying his
request for Extraordinary Disability Benefits as well as
Ordinary Disability Benefits. After full and fair consideration
of said petition and the defendants' response, this Court finds
that the petitioner does not meet the statutory requirements
to qualify to receive Extraordinary disability allowance as set
out in Alabama Code § 45-37A-51.226(b) or (c), neither does
he met the statutory requirements to qualify to receive
Ordinary disability allowance as set out in Alabama Code §
45-37A-51.225 as he failed to meet the burden of proof
required as set out in Alabama Code § 45-37A-51.227.

"Pursuant to Alabama Code § 45-37A-51.139 this Court
finds that there is no indication that the decisions of the board
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were plainly and manifestly wrong. WHEREFORE the
decisions of the board are hereby sustained. WRIT DENIED."

(Capitalization in original.)

On February 10, 2025, Hoffman filed a postjudgment motion in

which he argued that the circuit court's sua sponte denial of his

mandamus petition without notice, a hearing, or any evidence before it

was error. Furthermore, Hoffman noted that discovery was ongoing and

that his discovery requests to the respondents remained unanswered.

The circuit court denied Hoffman's postjudgment motion that same day,

and this appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, Hoffman contends that the circuit court erred in denying

his mandamus petition without notice or a hearing and without providing

Hoffman the chance to present evidence in support of his petition. We

agree, in part. Section 45-37A-51.139, which authorizes the circuit court

to review a decision of the Board by way of a petition for the writ of

mandamus, provides, in relevant part, as follows:

"(a) Any decision of the board denying a benefit claimed
may be subject to review by the circuit court, in the manner
and subject to the limitations herein provided. An employee
may secure a review of a decision of the board by mandamus
proceedings in the circuit court, which proceedings the
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employee shall institute, … by filing therein a petition for
mandamus. … In the proceedings in the circuit court, any
evidence relevant on any issue involved in the review shall be
admissible, subject to the ordinary rules of evidence. If the
submission in the mandamus proceedings is solely upon the
proceedings before the board, the decision of the board upon
all matters of fact shall be final and conclusive, unless it
affirmatively appears that its decision is plainly and
manifestly wrong.

"(b) If in the circuit court evidence is received, in
addition to that considered by the board, the decision of the
board upon all matters of fact, nevertheless, shall be final and
conclusive, except to the extent limited by the next following
sentence. If the circuit court, after hearing all the evidence
offered, determines that had the decision rendered by the
board been rendered after hearing such evidence that such
decision would not have been manifestly wrong, then the
circuit court shall sustain the decision of the board; and if the
circuit court, after considering all the evidence offered,
determines that the decision rendered by the board would
have been manifestly wrong had such decision been rendered
after considering all the evidence considered by the circuit
court, then in that event the circuit court shall render the
decision which that court concludes should be rendered on all
the evidence considered by that court. …"

In Peters v. Board of Managers of City of Birmingham Retirement

& Relief System, 624 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1993), this Court discussed the

standard of review to be applied to a Board decision by the circuit court

under § 45-37A-51.139, and we adopted the Court of Civil Appeals'

interpretation of that statute set forth in Brewer v. City of Birmingham

Retirement & Relief System, 585 So. 2d 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990):
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"[Section 45-37A-51.139] allows the circuit court to review the
Retirement Board's decision based solely on the evidence that
was presented to the Retirement Board, or to consider
additional evidence that was not before the Retirement Board
when it made its determination. From [§ 45-37A-51.139], the
[Brewer] Court distilled the following standard of review for
cases where the trial court does hear additional evidence that
was not presented to the Retirement Board: First, the trial
court should determine whether the decision of the
Retirement Board is manifestly wrong in light of the evidence
that was presented before the Retirement Board; the trial
court should then determine whether the additional evidence
presented would render the board's decision manifestly
wrong."

624 So. 2d at 1370.

Here, however, the circuit court could not have engaged in a review

of the Board's decision as contemplated by § 45-37A-51.139 because it did

not yet have before it the evidence that had been presented to the Board,

and Hoffman was not provided with an opportunity to present additional

evidence not considered by the Board. That is not to say, however, that

a circuit court must necessarily review such evidence when it appears

from the face of the petition that the petitioner can prove no set of facts

that would possibly entitle the petitioner to relief. See Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.

R. Civ. P., and Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (noting

that "a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper … when it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that
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would entitle the plaintiff to relief"); accord Lawson v. Swift, 280 Ala.

227, 230-31, 191 So. 2d 379, 382 (1966) (stating the common-law rule

that, when facts alleged in a petition for the writ of mandamus do not

show a right to relief, the petition should be denied regardless of whether

the petitioner's averments are controverted or denied).

Indeed, it appears that the circuit court in this case may have

treated the response to Hoffman's petition as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. In that document, the respondents argued that Hoffman's claim

for extraordinary disability benefits failed as a matter of law because

Hoffman's purported disability was not alleged to have been caused by

an accident occurring at a definite time and place -- a statutory

requirement for entitlement to extraordinary disability benefits. See §

45-37A-51.226(b) (providing that, to receive extraordinary disability

benefits, a claimant's disability must result from "an accident arising out

of and in the course of his or her employment in the service and occurring

at a definite time and place"). Rather, Hoffman alleged that he had

"developed" hypertension "[d]uring the course of [his] employment with

Birmingham." The respondents also directed the circuit court to Renfrow

v. Board of Managers of City of Birmingham Retirement & Relief System,

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579 So. 2d 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990), a case in which our Court of Civil

Appeals held that a claimant was not entitled to extraordinary disability

benefits because his hearing loss was caused by repeated exposure to

workplace noise over a period of years and was not attributable to an

accident "occurring at a definite time and place." Id. at 1349. The circuit

court in this case agreed with the respondents and held that Hoffman did

not meet the statutory requirements to receive extraordinary disability

benefits under § 45-37A-51.226. Hoffman, however, did not address the

circuit court's reasoning in his postjudgment motion; moreover, he has

not directly addressed that issue in his briefing to this Court. We,

therefore, decline to reverse the circuit court's judgment as it relates to

Hoffman's claim for extraordinary disability benefits.

Turning to Hoffman's claim for ordinary disability benefits, we

conclude that the circuit court's judgment was entered in error. As to

that claim, the respondents argued that, based on the evidence presented

to the Board, the Board's decision was not manifestly wrong, and the

circuit court concluded that Hoffman had not met his burden of proof

before the Board to establish his entitlement to ordinary disability

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benefits. 1 However, the allegations in Hoffman's mandamus petition

indicate that there is at least a possibility that he could prevail on his

claim for ordinary disability benefits, and, as Hoffman correctly argues,

(1) the circuit court did not have the materials presented to the Board

before it and (2) Hoffman was not provided the opportunity to present

additional evidence that could potentially render the Board's decision

manifestly wrong. See § 45-37A-51.139(b) and Peters, 624 So. 2d at 1370.

Accordingly, as to Hoffman's claim for ordinary disability benefits, the

judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Finally, Hoffman contends that the circuit court's rulings in this

case are evidence of bias against him by the circuit-court judge, and he

requests that this Court exercise its supervisory authority to order that,

on remand, the case be reassigned to a different circuit-court judge.

1Section 45-37A-51.225(a), Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson

County Municipalities), provides, in pertinent part: "In the event a
participant … shall become totally disabled to perform his or her
customary duties … and not be entitled to an extraordinary disability
allowance, he or she shall … be entitled to a monthly ordinary disability
allowance …."
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Whether to order a reassignment is a prudential question that depends

on a variety of factors, including:

" '(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected
upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of
his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings
determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be
rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve
the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment
would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any
gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.' "

State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 373 So. 3d 809, 814 (Ala. 2022) (quoting United

States v. Robin, 533 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977)). Based on the limited

materials in the record before us, however, we cannot say that those

factors weigh in favor of reassignment of the circuit-court judge. 2

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the circuit court to the extent that it

denied Hoffman's mandamus petition as to Hoffman's claim for

extraordinary disability benefits. We reverse the judgment denying

Hoffman's mandamus petition as it relates to his claim for ordinary

2Hoffman also asks this Court to provide "declaratory relief"
affirming his right to conduct discovery on remand. Nothing in the record
indicates that the circuit court precluded Hoffman from conducting
discovery after he had obtained service on the respondents or that it will
preclude discovery on remand. Accordingly, that issue is not before us
and we decline to address it.
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disability benefits, and we remand the cause for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Wise, Sellers, Cook, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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