Frank Thomas Shumate, Jr. v. Berry Contracting L.P., d/b/a Bay, Ltd.

Rel: December 12, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

_________________________

SC-2025-0424
_________________________

Frank Thomas Shumate, Jr.

v.

Berry Contracting, L.P., d/b/a Bay, Ltd.

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-20-900089)

SELLERS, Justice.

Frank Thomas Shumate, Jr., appeals from the Baldwin Circuit

Court's order denying Shumate's motion, filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5),
SC-2025-0424

Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking relief from a judgment in favor of Berry

Contracting, L.P., d/b/a Bay, Ltd. ("Bay Ltd."), which was entered by a

Texas state court and later domesticated by Bay Ltd. in the Baldwin

Circuit Court. We affirm the circuit court's order.

The business relationship of Shumate and Bay Ltd. has resulted in

what Shumate describes in his brief to this Court as "a long history of

complicated litigation" in Texas. Shumate's brief at 12. In 2012, Bay

Ltd. sued Shumate in Texas, seeking a judgment against Shumate

awarding Bay Ltd. compensation and punitive damages for what Bay

Ltd. alleged was fraud committed by Shumate and other parties. After a

jury trial, Shumate was found liable to Bay Ltd., and a judgment was

entered against Shumate awarding Bay Ltd. $871,090.47 in actual

damages, $4,480,452.35 in punitive damages, $602,253.60 in attorney

fees, and prejudgment and postjudgment interest at a rate of 5.5% per

annum ("the Texas judgment").

Shumate appealed from the Texas judgment and, pursuant to

Texas procedure, posted a bond in the amount of $1,000,000 to stay

enforcement of the Texas judgment pending Shumate's appeal. In

January 2020, while Shumate's appeal was pending in Texas, Bay Ltd.

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filed a "notice of filing of foreign judgment" in the Baldwin Circuit Court,

which requested the clerk of that court to make note of the Texas

judgment in a docket reserved for domesticating foreign judgments. See,

generally, § 6-9-230, et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (Alabama's version of the

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act) ("the UEFJA"). The

Baldwin Circuit Clerk subsequently issued a certificate of judgment

certifying that Shumate was liable to Bay Ltd. for the above-referenced

amounts. 1 Evidence of the domesticated judgment was placed in the

records of the Baldwin Probate Court. Thereafter, Shumate requested

the circuit court to stay enforcement of the domesticated judgment while

Shumate's appeal was pending in Texas, but the circuit court denied that

request. 2

1There has been no dispute that the procedures for domesticating a

foreign judgment under the UEFJA were properly followed and that the
Texas judgment has been domesticated under that act.

2Section 6-9-234(a), Ala. Code 1975, which is part of the UEFJA,

provides:

"If the judgment debtor shows the circuit court that an appeal
from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that
a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay
enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is
concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution
expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has
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A Texas intermediate appellate court affirmed the Texas trial

court's judgment. Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., 693 S.W.3d 23

(Tex. App. 2021). However, in April 2024, the Supreme Court of Texas

issued an opinion in the matter, Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., 688

S.W.3d 872, 873 (Tex. 2024), stating that it was "revers[ing] the court of

appeals' judgment" and remanding the matter to the Texas trial court to

determine whether and how a "settlement credit" arising from a

settlement between Bay Ltd. and an alleged coconspirator of Shumate

should be deducted from the judgment against Shumate. The Texas

furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment
required by the state in which it was rendered."

Although Shumate had posted an appeal bond sufficient under Texas
law, the circuit court nevertheless denied Shumate's request for a stay,
apparently relying on subsection (b) of § 6-9-234. That portion of § 6-9-
234 provides that a stay on enforcing a domesticated judgment shall be
entered "[i]f the judgment debtor shows the circuit court any ground upon
which enforcement of a judgment of any circuit court of this state would
be stayed" and the judgment debtor provides "the same security for
satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state" (which
Shumate did not do). In any event, whether the circuit court should have
entered a stay is not an issue in this appeal. We do note that the parties
have represented that there have been no attempts to collect on the
domesticated judgment, other than the domestication itself and the filing
of evidence of the judgment in relevant probate records.
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Supreme Court also directed the Texas trial court to "render a new

judgment." Id. at 874.

In November 2024, Shumate filed his Rule 60(b)(5) motion in the

circuit court, seeking relief from the domesticated judgment. Shumate

pointed out in his motion that Rule 60(b)(5) allows a court to relieve a

party from a judgment if "a prior judgment upon which it is based has

been reversed or otherwise vacated," and he asserted that the Texas

judgment had been reversed on appeal.

After multiple continuances, the circuit court set Shumate's

60(b)(5) motion for a hearing on April 4, 2025. The circuit court, however,

entered an order denying Shumate's motion on March 12, 2025, without

holding the scheduled hearing. Shumate timely appealed.

The parties agree that this Court's standard of review is limited to

determining whether the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying

Shumate's Rule 60(b)(5) motion. See, e.g., Pollard v. Etowah Cnty.

Comm'n, 539 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 1989) ("Whether to grant or deny relief

under Rule 60(b)(5) … is within the discretion of the trial judge, and the

trial court's decision will not be reversed except for an abuse of that

discretion."). Accordingly, we will apply that standard of review.

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"[T]he purpose of the UEFJA 'is to give the holder of a foreign

judgment the same rights and remedies as the holders of domestic

judgments.' 30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcements of Judgments

§ 778 (2005)." Pope v. Gordon, 922 So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 2005). A foreign

judgment that has been domesticated under the UEFJA "has the same

effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for

reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court of this

state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." § 6-9-232, Ala.

Code 1975. "Therefore, once the judgment is domesticated, [the party

resisting enforcement of the domesticated judgment] must resort to

procedures applicable to any other judgment originally entered by a

circuit court in order to set it aside." Greene v. Connelly, 628 So. 2d 346,

350 (Ala. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte Full Circle

Distrib., L.L.C., 883 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 2003).

Bay Ltd. has argued that Shumate cannot demonstrate reversible

error on the part of the circuit court in this case because, Bay Ltd. says,

a Rule 60(b)(5) motion is not the proper procedural vehicle for addressing

a domesticated judgment that has been reversed on appeal in the foreign

jurisdiction. Granted, this Court has "recognized that filing a Rule 60(b)

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motion is the proper procedure for challenging the validity of a foreign

judgment that has been domesticated in Alabama." Ex parte Lyon Fin.

Servs., Inc., 775 So. 2d 181, 183 (Ala. 2000). But, in support of the above-

quoted statement, the Court in Lyon Financial Services pointed to

Greene v. Connelly, supra, in which this Court indicated that a motion

filed under Rule 60(b)(4), which allows a party to seek relief from a "void"

judgment, was the appropriate procedural vehicle to challenge the

validity of a domesticated foreign judgment based on an allegation that

the foreign tribunal that entered the judgment lacked personal

jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. Greene, 628 So. 2d at 350-51. See

also Afassco, Inc. v. Sanders, 142 So. 3d 1119, 1122 (Ala. 2013)

(suggesting that a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) is the appropriate

procedural vehicle for challenging a domesticated foreign judgment on

the ground that the foreign tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the

judgment debtor); Ex parte Trinity Auto. Servs., Ltd., 974 So. 2d 1005,

1009 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) ("Both our Supreme Court and [the Alabama

Court of Civil Appeals] have held that the appropriate procedural

mechanism by which to collaterally attack a foreign judgment on the

basis that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction is by a motion filed

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pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)."). The parties have not pointed the Court to

any precedent indicating that Rule 60(b)(5), upon which Shumate relied

in his motion seeking relief from the domesticated Texas judgment,

provides the appropriate procedural mechanism to address a

domesticated judgment that, after domestication, has been reversed or

vacated by the foreign tribunal.

Rule 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: …
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application …."

(Emphasis added.) In his motion for relief from the domesticated

judgment, Shumate relied on the above-emphasized language. For its

part, Bay Ltd. asserts in its brief to this Court that the use of that

particular portion of Rule 60(b)(5) is "especially rare" and that it applies

primarily, if not exclusively, to a judgment that is based on the res

judicata or collateral-estoppel effect of a prior separate judgment that is

later reversed or vacated. Bay Ltd.'s brief at 17. See, generally, Othni

Lathram & Anil A. Mujumdar, Lexis Nexis Practice Guide: Alabama

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Civil Procedure § 12.39 (Matthew Bender 2025) (stating that Rule

60(b)(5)'s reference to relief from a judgment that is based upon another

judgment "refers principally, if not exclusively, to a judgment effectively

predetermined by the preclusive effect of a prior judgment"). See also 11

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice & Procedure § 2863 (3d ed. 2012) (stating that the analogous

portion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "is limited to cases in

which the present judgment is based on the prior judgment in the sense

of claim or issue preclusion"); NHS Mgmt., LLC v. Wright, 24 So. 3d 1153,

1156 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (citing Marshall v. Board of Educ. of

Bergenfield, N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 1978), which quoted 11 C.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2863 (1973), for the

same proposition).

In its opposition to Shumate's Rule 60(b)(5) motion, Bay Ltd.

argued to the circuit court as follows:

"By the plain language of Rule 60(b)(5), there must be two
judgments (one based on the other) and the earlier one must
have been reversed or otherwise vacated. [The circuit court]
has before it a domestication of a foreign judgment. It does
not represent a separate judgment. See Wright[ v. Trust Co.
Bank, 219 Ga. App. 551, 552, 466 S.E.2d 74, 75 (1995)] (a
domestication proceeding 'is not a new action'). So,

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necessarily, there is no 'prior judgment upon which [the
domesticated judgment] is based.' "

(Footnote omitted.) The circuit court denied Shumate's Rule 60(b)(5)

motion, suggesting that the court agreed with Bay Ltd.'s reasoning that

there must be two separate judgments, one based on the other, and its

assertion that the domestication of a foreign judgment does not create a

second judgment independent of the foreign judgment.3

On appeal, Shumate does not convincingly refute Bay Ltd.'s

assertion that, to obtain relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(5), there

necessarily must be two separate judgments. Rather, he appears to

suggest that a domesticated foreign judgment is indeed a "second

judgment" for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5). Shumate's brief at 22. But he

3We acknowledge Bay Ltd.'s alternative position that the Texas
judgment was not actually "reversed or otherwise vacated" as that
language is used in Rule 60(b)(5) because, Bay Ltd. asserts, the Supreme
Court of Texas's opinion did not expressly address the portion of the
Texas judgment finding Shumate liable and instead discussed only the
possibility of applying a settlement credit to reduce the amount of the
award against Shumate. See, generally, Everson v. Everson, 494 Pa. 348,
431 A.2d 889 (1981) (refusing to strike a domesticated judgment that,
after domestication, was reversed in the rendering jurisdiction as to the
monetary award but affirmed as to liability). Because of this Court's
rationale in affirming the circuit court's order denying Shumate's Rule
60(b)(5) motion, there is no need to consider that argument further.

10
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does not point to any authority, from Alabama or any other jurisdiction,

construing a provision like Rule 60(b)(5) in the context of obtaining relief

from a domesticated foreign judgment, and he does not offer a compelling

argument that, in general, procedures for domesticating foreign

judgments in Alabama or elsewhere suggest that a "second" judgment is

created upon domestication. "[I]t is not the function of this Court to …

address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general

propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument." Dykes

v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994).

Shumate also points out that, in addition to allowing for relief from

"judgments," Rule 60(b)(5) allows parties to seek relief from

"proceedings." In turn, he points to Black's Law Dictionary 1459 (12th

ed. 2024) for the proposition that a "proceeding" can be an act or step that

is part of a larger action, including the enforcement of a judgment, and

he asserts:

"This domestication action, together with the attendant
Baldwin County court filings and recordations, is part of a
larger action (the Texas litigation) and of the execution or
enforcement of the Texas judgment, and it is thusly a
proceeding that is based upon the Texas trial court judgment
that has been reversed."

11
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Shumate's brief at 23. Accordingly, he suggests that Rule 60(b)(5)

entitles him to relief from the present "proceedings."

First, Shumate did not clearly articulate this "proceedings"

argument to the circuit court until he filed what he claimed was a Rule

59, Ala. R. Civ. P., postjudgment motion after the denial of his Rule

60(b)(5) motion for relief from judgment.4 In the prayer for relief in

Shumate's Rule 60(b)(5) motion, he asked the circuit court to set aside

the domesticated "judgment." Relevant to that point, Shumate notes that

the circuit court denied his Rule 60(b)(5) motion before the date set for

the hearing and that, therefore, he did not have an opportunity to

"supplement" his motion to include his argument regarding

4The trial court did not rule on this motion. We note this Court's
holding that, "[a]fter a trial court has denied a postjudgment motion
pursuant to Rule 60(b), that court does not have jurisdiction to entertain
a successive postjudgment motion to 'reconsider' or otherwise review its
order denying the Rule 60(b) motion …." Ex parte Keith, 771 So. 2d 1018,
1022 (Ala. 1998). See also Ex parte Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 344 So.
3d 326, 329 (Ala. 2021) (indicating that a trial court cannot consider a
motion to "reconsider" that is essentially the same as a previously denied
Rule 60(b) motion). Regardless, even assuming the trial court could
consider Shumate's second motion, he has not demonstrated that the
trial court erred in failing to grant it.

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"proceedings." But, in his postjudgment motion, Shumate did not

seriously object to the circuit court's ruling on his Rule 60(b)(5) motion

without holding a hearing, and he did not assert that, considering the

circumstances, he should be allowed to supplement that motion. Rather,

his postjudgment motion concentrated primarily on the merits of his

argument that the judgment upon which the domesticated judgment is

allegedly based has been reversed. Moreover, Bay Ltd. filed its

opposition to Shumate's motion for relief from judgment, in which Bay

Ltd. argued that Rule 60(b)(5) requires two judgments, in December

2024, and the final hearing date set was April 4, 2025. The circuit court

entered its order denying Shumate's Rule 60(b)(5) motion on March 12,

2025. At no point in the interim did Shumate seek to supplement his

motion to respond to Bay Ltd.'s "two-judgments" argument. Although

Shumate claims in his brief to this Court that he understood that he

would have a chance to make additional arguments "at any time prior to

[the scheduled] hearing" or at the hearing itself, Shumate's brief at 27,

he does not point to anything in the record to support that understanding.

Finally, Shumate does not present much in the way of precedent from

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Alabama or other jurisdictions that would support his argument

regarding Rule 60(b)(5)'s reference to "proceedings." 5

Shumate also asks the Court to apply Rule 60(b)(4) or (6), as

opposed to Rule 60(b)(5), as a basis for reversing the circuit court's order.

Respectively, those rules allow for relief from a judgment if it is void or if

there is "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment." But, in his motion for relief from the domesticated judgment,

5Shumate relies on Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 58 N.Y.2d 179,

446 N.E.2d 768, 460 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1983), an opinion of the Court of
Appeals of New York. In that case, a Texas judgment creditor
domesticated a Texas judgment in New York. But, when an intermediate
appellate court in Texas reversed the judgment, the judgment creditor
voluntarily filed a motion requesting that the New York trial court vacate
the domestication of the Texas judgment, which was granted. When the
Texas judgment was later reinstated by the Texas Supreme Court, the
creditor sought to domesticate the judgment again in New York, but to
have it backdated to the date of the original domestication (in an effort
to gain priority over other creditors). That effort failed, and the Court of
Appeals of New York affirmed, holding that the vacatur of the original
domestication rendered that domestication a nullity. Mansfield is of
little or no help in this case. It has nothing to say about whether a Rule
60(b)(5) motion is the appropriate procedural vehicle to utilize when a
domesticated foreign judgment is reversed in the jurisdiction in which it
was entered. At one point in his brief, Shumate asks the Court to "treat
[his] Rule 60 Motion as a Motion to Vacate (as suggested in the Mansfield
ruling)." Shumate's brief at 26. But even if the Court was inclined to do
so, the vacatur in Mansfield was done with the consent of all the parties,
including the judgment creditor. That is not the case here.

14
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Shumate relied exclusively on the portion of Rule 60(b)(5) dealing with

the reversal of a judgment upon which another judgment is based.

Although, as noted, Shumate claims that he did not have an opportunity

to supplement his motion to include additional arguments because the

circuit court denied the motion without holding the hearing it had

scheduled, his claim that additional arguments should be entertained

now for that reason is, considering the circumstances, not persuasive.

Moreover, even in his postjudgment motion, Shumate noted only that

Rules 60(b)(4) and (6) exist. He did not expand on those provisions and

instead concentrated on Rule 60(b)(5).

Even assuming that Shumate may argue "at any time" that the

domesticated judgment is "void," See, e.g., Person v. Person, 236 So. 3d

90, 100 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (stating that "[a]n objection that a judgment

or order is void may be raised for the first time on appeal"), we are not

convinced that a domesticated judgment automatically becomes "void,"

as that term is used in Rule 60(b)(4), if the judgment is reversed in the

foreign jurisdiction. Even Shumate's brief to this Court suggests that a

"void" judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) is one that was entered by a tribunal

without jurisdiction, and that is not the case here. See Shumate's brief

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at 29 ("Alabama case law addresses subsection (4) [of Rule 60(b)]

primarily, if not exclusively, in the context of a challenge to the

underlying judgment on jurisdictional grounds (lack of service, etc.).").

Finally, Shumate asserts that the United States Constitution's Full

Faith and Credit Clause, which Shumate notes is embodied in the

purpose and spirit of the UEFJA, required the circuit court to grant

Shumate relief from the domesticated judgment. However, it does not

appear that this particular argument was actually developed in the

circuit court. As far as this Court can tell, the term "full faith and credit"

does not appear anywhere in the record.

We cannot say that Shumate has demonstrated that the circuit

court exceeded its discretion in denying Shumate's Rule 60(b)(5) motion

for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is due

to be affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Wise and Mendheim, JJ., concur.

Shaw and McCool, JJ., concur in the result.

Bryan, J., dissents.

Cook, J., dissents, with opinion, which Stewart, C.J., joins.

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COOK, Justice (dissenting).

A judgment from a sister state that has been reversed should not

be enforceable in Alabama. To conclude otherwise would go against

constitutional, statutory, and procedural rules that are designed to

protect parties from such inequitable outcomes. Thus, for the reasons

stated below, I must respectfully dissent from our Court's decision today.

To summarize the complicated facts of this case, Bay Ltd. secured

a significant judgment in 2019 against Shumate in a Texas court for

$5,953,796.42, excluding interest ("the Texas judgment"). While

Shumate's appeal from that judgment was pending in a Court of Appeals

of Texas, Bay Ltd. filed a "notice of filing of foreign judgment" in the

Baldwin Circuit Court pursuant to Alabama's version of the Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("the UEFJA"), § 6-9-230 et seq.,

Ala. Code 1975. The Baldwin Circuit Clerk subsequently issued a

certificate of judgment certifying that the Texas judgment against

Shumate had been domesticated and was, thus, enforceable against him

in Alabama. Around that time, the Texas appellate court affirmed the

Texas trial court's judgment. See Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P.,

693 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. App. 2021).

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Later, however, the Supreme Court of Texas "reverse[d] the [Texas]

court of appeals' judgment, and remand[ed] the case to the trial court,"

after concluding that Shumate was entitled to a settlement credit against

the jury's verdict based on a prior agreement between the parties.

Shumate v. Berry Contracting, L.P., 688 S.W.3d 872, 873 (Tex. 2024)

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Texas also ordered the trial

court to "render a new judgment." Id. at 874.6 According to the record

before us, the Texas trial court has not yet rendered a new judgment.

To emphasize the point, the Texas judgment is currently not

enforceable in Texas. Yet, as a result of our decision today, the Texas

judgment is enforceable in Alabama.

As explained below, allowing this domesticated judgment to stand

when the Texas judgment has been reversed is illogical and is

inconsistent with the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, the

UEFJA, and Rule 60(b)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P. It is for this reason that I would

6In particular, the Texas Supreme Court ordered the trial court to

consider whether the settlement credit had any effect on Bay Ltd.'s
award, stating: "On remand, the trial court should determine the
appropriate amount of the settlement credit to be applied; consider the
parties' arguments regarding the settlement credit's effect, if any, on the
remainder of the relief to which Bay may be entitled; and render a new
judgment." Id. at 873-74.
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reverse the Baldwin Circuit Court's order denying Shumate's Rule

60(b)(5) motion.

I. Today's Decision is Contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution and the UEFJA

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution

provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the

public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."

United States Const., Art. IV, § 1. Our Court has previously recognized

that this provision "requires courts in Alabama to give full faith and

credit to the judicial proceedings of every other State." Ex parte Space

Race, LLC, 357 So. 3d 1, 4 (Ala. 2021) (citing United States Const., Art.

IV, § 1)).

One way in which courts in Alabama do this is through

domestication of foreign judgments pursuant to the UEFJA. "[T]he

purpose of the UEFJA 'is to give the holder of a foreign judgment[7] the

same rights and remedies as the holders of domestic judgments.' " Pope

7A "foreign judgment" under the UEFJA is " 'any judgment, decree,

or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is
entitled to full faith and credit in this state.' " Package Express Ctr., Inc.
v. Maund, 957 So. 2d 1137, 1140 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (quoting § 6-9-231,
Ala. Code 1975).
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v. Gordon, 922 So. 2d 893, 897 (Ala. 2005) (quoting 30 Am. Jur. 2d

Executions and Enforcements of Judgments § 778 (2005)) (emphasis

added).

Our Court has previously explained that " '[t]he validity and effect

of a foreign judgment, of course, are to be determined by the law of the

state in which it was rendered.' " Orix Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 9 So.

3d 1241, 1244 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Morse v. Morse, 394 So. 2d 950, 951

(Ala. 1981)) (emphasis added). Thus, to determine whether the Texas

judgment in this case is enforceable in Alabama following its "reversal"

by the Supreme Court of Texas, we must look to Texas law.

The Supreme Court of Texas has made clear that

"[w]hen we have reversed a trial court's original judgment,
that judgment is ineffective and unenforceable; this is no more
or less true whether we then render judgment ourselves or
remand the case to the trial court to render judgment in
accordance with our opinion. It is the reversing of the
judgment, rather than the rendering of a new judgment or the
remanding of the case, that makes the original judgment
ineffective."

Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 240 (Tex. 2013) (emphasis added).8

8This statement arose in the context of a discussion on when
postjudgment interest accrues. Even though a reversal nullifies the
original judgment, Texas law provides that interest continues to accrue
from the date of that original (though erroneous) judgment, because the
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See also Min v. H & S Crane Sales, Inc., 472 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex. App.

2015) (noting that "[a] reversed judgment is ineffective and

unenforceable"); cf. Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv.

Comm'n, 254 Ala. 119, 127, 47 So. 2d 449, 454 (1950) (collecting cases

dating back to 1845, including Dupuy v. Roebuck, 7 Ala. 484, 486 (1845)

(dictating that a reversed judgment " 'becomes mere waste paper' "), and

Barringer v. Burke, 21 Ala. 765, 771 (1852) (opining that a reversed

judgment is "of no more force or virtue than if it had never existed" and

"is regarded as a mere nullity")).

In this case, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Texas

judgment.9 Because Texas caselaw makes clear that such a reversal

judgment entered on remand is treated as the judgment that should have
been entered in the first place.

9Itis immaterial whether the Supreme Court of Texas included
instructions for the trial court to potentially modify the damages
calculation in its decision, and Bay Ltd.'s argument to the contrary is
illogical. What if Bay Ltd. now collects the full amount of the reversed
judgment through enforcement of the Alabama judgment -- but the Texas
trial court eventually computes the damages at 50% of what was awarded
in the reversed judgment? Would Bay Ltd. voluntarily refund the excess
to Shumate? Would it owe interest on the value of any improperly seized
assets and funds? What if the damages are reduced by 50% by the Texas
trial court and there has been no collection, would Bay Ltd. still insist
upon collecting the full amount of the reversed judgment in Alabama?
Would it, at least then, consent to a reduction of the Alabama judgment?
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renders the "original judgment … ineffective," Phillips, 407 S.W.3d at

240, there is no longer any "foreign judgment" to recognize and enforce

in Alabama. This conclusion is consistent with both the Full Faith and

Credit Clause, which obligates Alabama courts to honor only valid

judgments from sister states, and the UEFJA, which presupposes the

existence of an enforceable foreign judgment before domestication of such

a judgment. As our Court has previously explained, the purpose of the

UEFJA " 'is to give the holder of a foreign judgment the same rights and

remedies as the holders of domestic judgments,' " not greater rights and

remedies. Pope, 922 So. 2d at 897 (emphasis added). Without a valid

foreign "judgment," the Baldwin Circuit Court currently has nothing to

enforce here.

II. Relief from a Domesticated Foreign Judgment is Permitted
under Rule 60(b)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P.

Because the Texas judgment was reversed and, under Texas law, is

no longer deemed enforceable, Shumate properly sought relief from the

related, domesticated judgment in Alabama. As explained in the main

What if the damages are reduced to $0 by the Texas trial court? Bay Ltd.
does not consider any of these questions in making its argument.

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opinion, Shumate filed a Rule 60(b)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion in the

circuit court seeking an order "VOIDING the Judgments and/or

Abstracts" in light of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion "revers[ing]" the

Texas judgment and "remand[ing] … for further proceedings and a new

judgment." In support of his motion, Shumate pointed out that Rule

60(b)(5) allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment if "a prior

judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated."

Rule 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: …
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application …."

(Emphasis added.)

Although the main opinion acknowledges that our Court has

previously recognized that " 'filing a Rule 60(b) motion is the proper

procedure for challenging the validity of a foreign judgment that has been

domesticated in Alabama,' " ____ So. 3d at ____ (quoting Ex parte Lyon

Fin. Servs., Inc., 775 So. 2d 181, 183 (Ala. 2000)), it notes that our Court

has never expressly applied this principle in the context of a Rule 60(b)(5)

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motion. Further, echoing the arguments of Bay Ltd., the main opinion

holds that the Texas judgment is not really a "prior judgment upon

which" the Alabama judgment "is based" because it is, in effect, the same

judgment as the Alabama judgment and therefore cannot be a "prior

judgment." ____ So. 3d at ____.

The plain language of Rule 60(b)(5) refutes this position.10

10Rule 60(b)(5) provides that an Alabama judgment can be vacated

when a "prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed." The
"prior judgment" here is the Texas judgment. The Alabama judgment was
"based" "upon" that prior judgment, and the Texas judgment "has been
reversed." I see nothing in the text of Rule 60(b)(5) that draws the
distinction that is drawn by the main opinion.

A contrary reading of this rule is circular and illogical. The actions
in Texas and in Alabama are not literally the same action. They are two
separate legal proceedings and bear two separate civil-action numbers.
If they were literally the same civil action, there would be no need for a
Rule 60(b) motion. And, why would Rule 60(b)(5) apply between separate
civil actions in Alabama but not between separate civil actions in
Alabama and Texas?

More fundamentally, why would Rule 60(b)(5) apply only in
situations when there are two separate judgments but not in situations
when the judgment itself has been reversed? In my view, the application
of Rule 60(b)(5) is stronger when the judgment itself has been reversed.

Moreover, conceptually, Rule 60(b) should have some mechanism
for setting aside a domesticated judgment when the rendering state has
reversed its judgment. This wording of Rule 60(b)(5) naturally fits this
procedural situation. If our Court were to hold that no part of Rule 60(b)
has such a mechanism, I would strongly advocate for amending the rule.
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However, we do not need to reach this question because there is, at least,

one other prong of Rule 60(b)(5) that justifies relief here.

The text of Rule 60(b)(5) states that relief is available when "it is no

longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."

(Emphasis added.) Our Court has previously explained that "Rule

60(b)(5) permits a trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment

'when new facts or new law arises after the original judgment is entered,

rendering prospective application of the judgment inequitable.' " Ex parte

Huntingdon Coll., 386 So. 3d 28, 35-36 (Ala. 2023) (quoting Satterfield v.

Winston Indus., Inc., 553 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ala. 1989)).

In the present case, the reversal of the Texas judgment created a

new circumstance in which the domesticated judgment could no longer

be deemed effective. In my view, the extraordinary circumstance of

reversal falls within the equity prong of Rule 60(b)(5), and it would be

"inequitable" to permit the continued enforcement of a domesticated

judgment in Alabama that is based on a judgment from a sister state that

has been expressly reversed. 11 It is for these reasons that I believe that

11Such a result could also have broader implications on other
enforcement measures Bay Ltd. Might employ. Those enforcement
measures could include garnishments, executions against property, and
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Shumate is entitled to relief from the domesticated judgment here

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). 12

III. Conclusion

In sum, enforcing the now-reversed Texas judgment in Alabama is

contrary to the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit

Clause, which requires states to honor only valid and enforceable

judgments from sister states. It also undermines the purpose of the

UEFJA, which was never intended to continue to enforce a domesticated

foreign judgment that is no longer enforceable in the rendering state.

Based on the foregoing, the continued enforcement of the domesticated

foreign judgment in this case would be inequitable, and Shumate

imposition of liens. Each of those measures would rest on a foreign
judgment that has been reversed and nullified in Texas.

12I need not reach the question of whether the Texas judgment has,

in effect, been "discharged," which could be another textual basis for
relief under Rule 60(b)(5). A discharge is "[a]ny method by which a legal
duty is extinguished; esp., the payment of a debt or satisfaction of some
other obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 581 (12th ed. 2024). It is likely
that the reversal of the Texas judgment extinguished the legal duty
created by that judgment and that only a new judgment from the Texas
trial court could impose a new obligation against Shumate. As the
Supreme Court of Texas explained, when it "reverse[s] a trial court's
original judgment, that judgment is ineffective and unenforceable."
Phillips, 407 S.W.3d at 240 (emphasis added).

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properly sought relief from that judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). It is

for these reasons that I respectfully dissent.13

Stewart, C.J., concurs.

13I note that Shumate's failure to receive relief on this Rule 60(b)

motion does not foreclose his right to seek relief again under Rule 60(b)
in the future (or his ability to file an independent action collaterally
attacking the domesticated judgment), especially if Bay Ltd. should
attempt to enforce the reversed Texas judgment in Alabama or if the
Texas courts alter or vacate the damages award in any way.
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