Fadi Alaudhi v. Stacey Marie Davis (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: DR-21-900091).

Rel: July 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2024
_________________________

CL-2023-0881
_________________________

Fadi Alaudhi

v.

Stacey Marie Davis

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(DR-21-900091)

LEWIS, Judge.

Fadi Alaudhi ("the husband") appeals from a judgment entered by

the Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial court") on July 6, 2023, that, among
CL-2023-0881

other things, divorced him from Stacey 1 Marie Davis ("the wife"), divided

the parties' property and debts, and awarded the wife periodic alimony.

The husband's sole challenge on appeal is the trial court's award of

periodic alimony. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Procedural History

On January 25, 2021, the wife filed in the trial court a complaint

seeking a divorce from the husband, as well as child support, periodic

alimony, alimony in gross, and an equitable division of all the assets and

the debts of the marriage, such as the husband's businesses and the

marital home. She also filed a motion for emergency relief in the form of

a restraining order and an ex parte order awarding her possession of the

marital home and custody of the parties' children. The wife's motion was

granted on January 26, 2021. The trial court entered a pretrial order on

January 27, 2021, requiring the parties to refrain from harassing each

other; to preserve their assets and each other's access to their assets; and

to "maintain the status quo as it existed during the marriage and prior

1In his notice of appeal, the husband spelled the wife's first name

as "Stacy." However, according to the wife's complaint and the wife's
brief, the wife's first name is spelled "Stacey." Therefore, we have used
the latter spelling in this opinion.

2
CL-2023-0881

to the decision to file for divorce to the extent possible" by paying

expenses and using their automobiles as they had before.

On February 15, 2021, the husband filed an answer to the wife's

complaint and to her emergency motion. On March 30, 2021, the wife,

having served discovery on the husband, moved to compel the husband

to respond to her discovery requests. Her motion was granted that same

day. Two months later, the wife moved for sanctions against the

husband, alleging that he had failed to comply with the order compelling

him to respond to her discovery requests. The trial court thereafter

ordered the husband to comply with the order within seven days and to

appear at the trial of the divorce action to show cause as to why he should

not be held in contempt, at which time, the trial court ordered, it would

determine what sanctions to impose.

On October 18, 2021, the wife moved to compel the husband to

respond to her discovery requests concerning, among other things, his

income, businesses, and property ownership. Her motion was granted

that same day. Less than one month later, however, the wife again

moved for sanctions against the husband, alleging that he had failed to

comply with the October 18, 2021, order. After a hearing, the trial court

3
CL-2023-0881

entered an order allowing the husband 45 days to respond to the wife's

discovery requests. Nearly 3 months later, the wife moved for sanctions

and an order finding the husband in contempt, alleging that he had failed

to comply with the 45-day deadline. The trial court set the wife's motion

to be considered at a scheduling conference to be held on May 17, 2022.

On May 6, 2022, the wife moved for an order of contempt against

the husband for his failure to maintain the status quo in accordance with

the trial court's pretrial order. The wife's motion averred that the

husband had failed to pay the mortgage on the marital home and that

she had been forced to meet financial obligations for which she had not

been responsible before filing the complaint for a divorce, including

paying for the cost to repair her automobile.

After a scheduling conference, the trial court ordered the husband

to pay a past-due mortgage payment on the marital home and to arrange

for payments of the mortgage to be automatically withdrawn from his

accounts. The trial court also appointed a special master to determine

whether the parties had complied with the Alabama Rules of Civil

Procedure throughout the discovery proceedings. Additionally, the trial

court gave the parties' counsel until July 8, 2022, to file a status report

4
CL-2023-0881

regarding an outstanding tax return. Thereafter, the trial date was

continued several times due to the failure of the husband's accountant to

prepare the husband's tax returns. Eventually, the trial court ordered

the special master to investigate the accountant's delays.

On December 20, 2022, the wife moved a second time for an order

of contempt against the husband based on his failure to maintain the

status quo, now seeking to hold the husband in contempt for his

continued failure to pay the mortgage, as well as his failure to pay several

other bills that he had been paying before the divorce action. The trial

court set the motion to be heard on the trial date. After a scheduling

conference, the trial court ordered the husband to provide to the wife

"copies of all bank statements, checks and other documentary evidence"

showing the revenue and expenses of each of the husband's businesses,

specifically including the tax returns that had not yet been produced. On

May 18, 2023, the wife again moved for an order of contempt against the

husband based on his continued failure to maintain the status quo by

failing to repair her automobile. The trial court set that motion to be

heard on the trial date.

5
CL-2023-0881

A trial was held on June 13 and 14, 2023. On July 6, 2023, the trial

court entered a judgment that, among other things, divorced the parties,

divided the parties' property and debts, and awarded the wife periodic

alimony. Specifically, the trial court's judgment awarded the parties the

financial accounts in their individual names and the items of personal

property in their individual possession; it also directed the parties to pay

the debts in their individual names and the debts associated with the

respective properties they were awarded. The judgment further

provided:

"11. [The husband] shall pay the [wife] the sum of $683.00
per month as child support.

"….

"14. The [wife] shall maintain medical insurance for the
benefit of the minor child. The parties shall split equally
any uncovered medical, dental, orthodontic, vision,
counseling/therapy and/or other reasonably necessary
medical expenses. …

"15. The Court finds that the husband is in contempt of court
in that he has failed to comply with the Court's Pre-Trial
Order [by failing to pay expenses, transferring his
property without the trial court's approval to decrease
his income, and impeding the wife's access to the
$200,000, which was a marital asset]. …

"16. The wife is awarded a judgment against the husband in
[the] amount of $121,693.54 (the Court calculated this

6
CL-2023-0881

amount as follows: the wife's 50% share of the
$200,000.00 cash in the possession of the husband, plus
$14,693.54 for unpaid status quo expenses, plus
$7,000.00 as a contribution towards a reasonable
attorney's fee incurred herein).

"17. The wife is awarded all right, title, and interest in and
to the marital residence[.] … The wife shall pay and be
responsible for any mortgage indebtedness due on the
marital residence[.] … The Court finds that it is
equitable to award the wife all of the equity in the
marital residence in light of the husband's contribution
to the breakdown of the marriage, the length of the
parties' marriage, and the fact that the Court is
awarding all of the husband's business interests to him
hereinbelow.

"18. The husband is awarded all right, title, and interest in
and to any interest he may have in Select Auto, LLC,
Select Auto Group, LLC, and Select Luxury, LLC. …

"19. The wife is awarded the 2015 GMC Yukon and the
husband is awarded the 2018 Lexus LS500.

"….

"23. Having considered all of the factors set out in Alabama
Code [1975,] Section 30-2-57, the Court expressly finds
that the wife's separate estate is insufficient to enable
her to acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent
possible, the economic status quo of the parties as [it]
existed during the marriage, that the husband has the
ability to supply those means without undue economic
hardship, and [that] the circumstances of this case make
it equitable. Additionally, the Court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible to allow the wife to
maintain the economic status quo as it existed during
the marriage or to acquire the ability to do so.

7
CL-2023-0881

Accordingly, the Court does order the husband to pay
periodic alimony to the wife in the amount of $2,000.00
per month[.] … The husband's obligation pursuant to
this paragraph shall terminate upon the … wife's
remarriage, the wife's cohabitation as that term is
defined in Alabama Code [1975,] Section 30-2-55, or
upon the death of either party."

Finally, "[t]he Court denie[d] any other relief requested by either party."

On July 31, 2023, the husband timely filed a motion to alter, amend,

or vacate the judgment, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to

support three aspects of the judgment: (1) the trial court's finding of

contempt, (2) the award of $121,693.54 to the wife, and (3) the award of

periodic alimony to the wife. After a hearing, the trial court entered an

amended judgment on October 27, 2023. The amended judgment, though

it offered additional reasoning, affirmed all aspects of the original

judgment except for the award of periodic alimony, which it reduced from

$2,000 per month to $1,315 per month. The husband timely filed a notice

of appeal to this court on December 7, 2023.

Evidence

The wife testified that the parties had been married on August 25,

2000, and clarified that her complaint, which stated that the parties had

been married on September 23, 2000, was incorrect. Two children were

8
CL-2023-0881

born of the parties' marriage: one who had attained the age of majority

by the date of the trial and one who was born on July 27, 2012, and

remained a minor. The wife testified that both children were living with

her at the time of the trial.

The wife testified that the husband had opened his first used-car

dealership, Select Auto, LLC, in 2009, and that, in the same year, she

had graduated from college and earned her license to teach. The husband

later opened two other used-car dealerships, Select Auto Group, LLC,

and Select Auto Luxury, LLC. The wife stated that she had been

employed as a teacher since 2009 and that, at the time of the trial, she

was employed by the Mobile County public-school system.

According to the wife, the marriage had failed "because of [the]

husband's physical and verbal abuse towards [her], his physical and

verbal abuse towards [her] in front of the children, his drug use, his

alcohol use, infidelity, [and] his controlling behavior." The wife testified

that the marriage "started to go downhill in 2009." She stated that, in

2009, the husband had begun "this pattern of going out all night, turning

off his phone so that [the wife] couldn't get in touch with him and just

coming in the early morning hours without … telling [the wife] where he

9
CL-2023-0881

was at or what he had been doing." The wife testified that the husband

had used cocaine from 2009 to 2021.

The wife testified about a specific instance in which she had

received a text message from the husband's sister containing a mugshot

of the husband that had been taken after he had been arrested for

patronizing a prostitute. The wife stated that, when she had confronted

the husband about the mugshot, he had told her that, while he had been

at work after hours, "a woman had come in and he thought she was

homeless and he gave her money to make her leave, but it was a sting

and [law enforcement officers] came in and arrested him for it."

The wife testified that the arrest had never come up between them

again. However, she stated that it

"started a string of events [from 2009 to 2012] of the same
thing, not coming home, turning off his phone. If I were to ask
[the husband] about where he was at[,] he would start to go
into a rage and start throwing things off the counter, throwing
food, like, just punching holes in the wall. And if I would go
into the bedroom to get away[,] he would just bust in the door
and he would spit on me."

According to the wife, during that period, the husband "damaged the

[marital home]."

10
CL-2023-0881

The wife testified that "the next major event was in 2013." She

stated that, one early morning after the husband had arrived home

intoxicated, she had confronted him with a photograph of a woman she

had found on his phone and makeup that she had found on his clothes,

and "he became enraged and pushed [her]." According to the wife, when

she was pushed, she fell backwards onto her left hand, which got "bruised

and swollen," and when she went to an Urgent Care for treatment, she

learned that her ring finger had been broken. The wife testified that she

had had surgery on her finger but that she still had problems with it.

The wife stated that "[t]hat was the first time [the husband] had

physically assaulted [her]."

The wife testified that, throughout 2013, 2014, and 2015, the

husband had spit on her, "throw[n] tables over, TV stands over, flip[ped]

couches, throw[n] things at [her]," including bottles, cups, and a TV

remote, and punched walls. During the trial, the wife introduced several

images of bruises, scratches, and other marks on her body that she

testified had been caused by the husband. She testified about two specific

instances, both of which had occurred on early mornings in 2015 while

the husband had appeared intoxicated. On the first occasion, the

11
CL-2023-0881

husband had shoved her into a hard corner of the couch, grabbed her by

the neck, put her on the floor, and kicked and hit her, bruising her in the

process. On the second occasion, when she had gotten up from the floor

after being kicked and hit by the husband, he had "slammed [her] against

the wall," hit her "in the side of the head," and "hit [her] in the face with

his fist," resulting in a visit to Urgent Care, a "major headache," and

"constant ringing in [her] ear" for "a couple of days." The wife also

testified that, on one night in October 2020, after the husband had

arrived home at "about four o'clock in the morning," he had attacked the

wife while she was in bed with their then seven-year-old son, "almost

hitting" the child with his fist and "waking [the child] up."

The husband, on the other hand, denied having ever caused injury

to the wife and specifically denied having caused the marks shown in the

wife's exhibits and the injuries about which she testified. He stated that

all of the wife's photographs purporting to show her injuries and marks

on her body were "fabricated."

The husband testified that the wife had attacked him with a knife

on several occasions. He stated that, in one instance, after he had arrived

home late at night and intoxicated, the wife had instigated a fight with

12
CL-2023-0881

him, thrown furniture at him, and chased him with a knife. He stated

that he had broken his arm during that altercation and that he had gone

to the hospital as a result. The wife denied that that incident had ever

taken place.

The wife introduced a photograph of two broken laptops; she

testified that the laptops had belonged to her and that the husband had

broken them. She also introduced a photograph of her closet with her

clothes ripped up and strewn across the floor and testified that the

husband had ripped the clothes. She further testified that, on several

occasions "over the course of the years," the husband had put her ripped

clothes in the toilet and had urinated on them. She introduced what

appeared to be screenshots of text messages exchanged between her and

the husband, which included a photograph she was sent by the husband,

which she testified showed "[her] torn clothing in the toilet."

The wife also introduced a photograph of the drawers in the parties'

bathroom broken off of their hinges; a photograph of numerous personal

items, which she testified had belonged to her, broken and piled in a

corner of the parties' bathroom; a photograph of a broken television that

she testified had belonged to one of the parties' children; a photograph of

13
CL-2023-0881

the parties' living room with the lamps and rugs thrown about; and a

photograph of the parties' kitchen cabinets broken off of their hinges and

with the words "white trash" written on them in her makeup. The wife

testified that the husband had caused all the destruction depicted in

those photographs. With respect to the aforementioned property

damage, the husband generally testified that he could not recall whether

he had caused the damage.

The wife testified that the husband had been convicted of driving

under the influence. According to the husband, the charge for driving

under the influence had been dismissed after he had participated in a

diversion program. The wife introduced into evidence a photograph,

which she testified she had taken sometime between 2010 and 2015, of

the husband, who had "passed out, couldn't walk[,] and just flopped onto

the floor." The husband admitted that he had come home and had passed

out from drinking and drug use "a couple of times" throughout the

marriage. He also admitted that, after abstaining from drinking alcohol

for a few months, he had begun drinking "occasionally" again. The

husband testified that his alcohol use had contributed to the problems in

the marriage. Although he admitted that he had used cocaine "for a year,

14
CL-2023-0881

maybe year and a half," he testified that, at the time of the trial, he was

not using any drugs.

The wife stated that the husband had made "demeaning" remarks

towards her and had called her "vile names." She introduced what she

testified were screenshots of text messages exchanged between her and

the husband, in which he called her, among other things, a "whore,"

"stupid," and "garbage." The wife testified that the husband had told

their younger child that the wife was "a bitch" and that the younger child

"deserve[d] a better mom." The wife also testified that the husband had

once told her that, if she ever filed for divorce, she would be "sucking

[expletive omitted] … for money" and told the children to "get ready to

watch your mom on her knees."

According to the wife, the husband had not complied with the trial

court's pretrial order and had continued to harass her since she filed for

a divorce. The husband admitted that he had "[s]ometimes" yelled,

screamed, or cursed at the wife. He stated that, "[m]aybe out of anger,"

he had told the wife that "dog shit" is worth more than her.

The wife testified that she had stayed with the husband because

she was afraid of him. She stated that her stepfather had murdered her

15
CL-2023-0881

mother and that the husband had "always said [the wife] would end up

like [her mother]" and that the wife's mother had "deserved it."

According to the wife, the husband "would say you're lucky it's not you

yet," and "[y]ou Davis women know how to make men mad." The wife

also testified that, in reference to the wife's mother, the husband had once

said, "there was one less bitch in the world."

The wife testified that she had telephoned the police once, in 2015.

According to the husband, the police once came to one of his car

dealerships and arrested him, but the wife eventually dismissed the

charge.

The wife testified that, in January 2021, the husband had told her

that he had been patronizing prostitutes for 23 years. The husband

admitted that he had made that statement. The wife introduced

photographs of the husband with other women, which she testified were

posted by the husband to "Facebook," a social-media platform, in

December 2020. The husband admitted that he had appeared in

photographs with women besides the wife, stating, "I wasn't happy in

[the] marriage."

16
CL-2023-0881

The wife testified that the husband had told her "[m]any, many,

many times" that, if she filed for divorce, he would "draw it out as long

as he could, … make it last seven years, … make sure it looks like he has

nothing … make sure we get nothing … [and] make our lives miserable."

The wife testified that the husband had kept $200,000 in cash in a

freezer in their home. According to the wife, the husband "would hand

[her] the money, say here's another ten thousand, add it to the savings,

and [she] would count it and wrap the ten thousand in foil and put it with

the rest of the savings in the freezer." The wife introduced a video and

still images taken from the video, which she testified depicted the

$200,000 in cash and the husband moving the cash from its usual location

shortly after she filed for a divorce. The husband denied that he had ever

possessed $200,000 in cash at one time.

The wife testified that the marital home belonged to her, and that

the title and the mortgage were solely in her name.2 She requested that

the home be sold and that she be awarded all of the equity of the home,

approximately $126,000 per the wife's testimony, stating, "[b]ecause of

2The wife testified that the husband had claimed no ownership of

the marital home. The wife introduced a discovery response, in which
the husband stated that he "ha[d] no ownership [of] any properties."

17
CL-2023-0881

everything he has put us through, I feel like that's the least that I

deserve." The husband also testified that he wanted the marital home to

be sold but requested that the equity be split equally between the parties

because he had paid the mortgage payments and all the household

expenses.

The wife testified that, when she had separated from the husband,

he had owned two used-car dealerships: Select Auto, LLC, and Select

Auto Group, LLC. Records kept by the Alabama Secretary of State and

introduced into evidence by the wife reflect that the husband and his

business partner, Mohanned Sultan, opened a third car dealership,

Select Luxury, LLC, in June 2022. The wife testified that the husband's

income from the three car dealerships was millions of dollars per year.

Therefore, she stated that she wanted a property settlement in the

amount of $250,000 representing her share of the value of the businesses.

The wife testified that the husband had transferred part of his

ownership of the two original businesses to his partner, Sultan, during

the pendency of the divorce, without permission from the trial court.

Although the husband did not admit to transferring his interest, the

parties stipulated based on the tax records admitted into evidence that,

18
CL-2023-0881

at the time of the filing of the complaint for a divorce, the husband owned

100% of Select Auto Group, LLC, but that, at the time of the trial, he

owned only 49% of that business, and Sultan owned 51%. The husband

admitted that Sultan had not compensated him financially for that

interest, saying that the consideration was Sultan's work and effort. The

parties also stipulated that the husband's ownership of Select Auto, LLC,

before 2022 was 100%; that it was, at the time of the trial, 49%; and that

Sultan had been given 51%. As to Select Luxury, LLC, the third business,

the parties stipulated that the husband had always owned 50% of that

business and that Sultan had always owned the other 50%.

The wife stated that she owned a 2015 GMC Yukon automobile and

that the husband owned a 2018 Lexus LS automobile. According to the

wife, she had a retirement account with a balance of $48,000, and the

husband did not have a retirement account. The husband requested half

of the wife's retirement account.

The wife admitted that the husband had paid roughly $125,000 of

her expenses over the year and a half since she filed the complaint for a

divorce. However, she stated that, although she had provided copies of

the bills to the husband's attorney every month since filing for the

19
CL-2023-0881

divorce, the husband, in violation of the trial court's pretrial order to

maintain the status quo, had failed to pay certain bills that he had paid

during the marriage. The wife testified that she had been able to pay

some bills, but that the bills for two services, one provided by Dish

Network and the other provided by AT&T, had not been paid, and that

these services had been suspended as a result of the nonpayment. The

wife also testified that the husband had failed to reimburse her for any

of the expenses for which she had sent him receipts, which included the

cost of repairing the damage to their home that, she testified, the

husband had caused; the cost of repairing her car; the cost of replacing

the household washer and dryer; and the cost of orthodontic treatment

for the minor child.

The wife stated that, from the date she filed the complaint for a

divorce until the date of the trial, the husband had given her "a total of

$3,500" in cash, mainly towards the beginning of the process. According

to the wife, the total amount in reimbursements that she had not yet been

paid (as of the date of the trial) was $55,427.10. When the husband's

attorney pointed out that the expenses for which the wife had requested

reimbursement included the cost of her gasoline and hair and nail care,

20
CL-2023-0881

the wife maintained that these expenses had been paid by the husband

during the marriage. The wife further testified that she was eventually

unable to have her nails done because she could not afford that service.

According to the husband, however, the wife

"used to pay for her own stuff. She used to make money. She
had a job. She made $2700. I paid the grocery, I pa[id] all the
utilities, the rent, the major stuff, but I never paid her money
for her to do her hair for instance or the nails, gas money from
time to time but it wasn't a habit because she work and she
makes money. So she used to spend her money too from time
to time."

With respect to how her income was spent during the marriage, the wife

testified as follows: "My money could go for … whatever I want[ed],

clothing, whatever. If I was out with the kids[,] I got them fast food."

The wife testified that, as of the date of the trial, her net monthly

income from her employment as a teacher was $3,382.95. She stated that

she had earned less during the marriage but that she had taken on

additional work since filing the complaint for a divorce. 3

3The wife's paystub for her paycheck dated May 31, 2023, confirmed

her net pay as $3,382.95. The paystubs for her paychecks in January,
February, and March 2021 indicated net monthly pay in the amount of
$2,702.24.

21
CL-2023-0881

The wife introduced a document, which she had prepared, listing

the monthly expenses that the husband had paid prior to her filing the

complaint for a divorce. The monthly expenses total $4,659.71 and

include the following: a mortgage payment in the amount of $1,803.51;

electricity expenses in the amount of $296.82; other utility expenses in

the amount of $83.72; pest-control expenses in the amount of $59.50; a

bill from the Dish Network in the amount of $167.47; cellular-telephone

expenses in the amount of $453.25; water-delivery expenses in the

amount of $400; storage in the amount of $175; internet charges in the

amount of $80.49; security charges in the amount of $36.95; sanitation

expenses in the amount of $23; credit card bills in the amount of $500;

and lawn-care expenses in the amount of $120. The exhibit also lists

monthly expenses for childcare in the amount of $520.

The exhibit states that the list does not include the cost of the wife's

groceries, gasoline, clothing, and "day to day living expenses," which she

testified that the husband had paid during the marriage. The wife

further testified that the list did not include her monthly expenses for

automobile insurance, and that, during the marriage, the husband had

also paid for her nail care, hair care, and cosmetics. The wife testified

22
CL-2023-0881

that she could not maintain the economic status quo without financial

assistance from the husband. The wife requested $4,600 per month in

alimony.

According to the husband's tax returns, his total income was

$135,732 in 2020; $168,908 in 2021; and $73,060 in 2022. 4 The wife

introduced into evidence the husband's Schedule C "Profit or Loss

Statements" from 2020 and 2021 for each of his businesses. The 2020

Profit or Loss Statement for Select Auto, LLC, reflected gross receipts in

the amount of $3,774,166, gross income in the amount of $225,344, and

net profits in the amount of $92,033. The 2020 Profit or Loss Statement

for the business Select Auto Group, LLC, reflected gross receipts in the

amount of $2,311,461, gross income in the amount of $128,568, and net

profits in the amount of $43,699. The 2021 Profit or Loss statement for

Select Auto, LLC, reflected gross receipts in the amount of $4,835,417,

gross income in the amount of $313,218, and net profits in the amount of

$117,439. The 2021 Profit or Loss Statement for Select Auto Group, LLC,

4The husband's 2020 and 2021 tax returns reflected a filing status

of married filing separately.

23
CL-2023-0881

reflected gross receipts in the amount of $4,447,596, gross income in the

amount of $274,920, and net profits in the amount of $51,469.

In contrast, in 2022, on a Schedule E form for "[r]ental real estate,

royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc.," the husband

reported his total income from all three of his businesses as $23,060. To

explain the drastic drop in his business income in 2022, the husband

testified: "It was a bad year." The only other income the husband

reported in 2022 was on a Schedule C "Profit or Loss Statement." He

reported that he had earned $50,000 from a business named "Fadi A

Aludihi," a "used car broker auto sales" business. No further details were

provided at trial about this business. Notably, however, the husband

testified that he had received $50,000 in profits from Select Auto, LLC,

in 2022.

The husband admitted that his partner, Sultan, had sold

automobiles internationally; however, he stated that Sultan had made

those sales "[f]or himself" through the name "Transatlantic Shipping,"

and that he had not loaned Sultan any money for the venture nor had he

profited from the sales. However, the husband answered "yes" when

24
CL-2023-0881

asked whether Sultan was "using [the husband's] company" to make the

international sales.

The husband testified that he was "not sure" whether income from

Sultan's international sales had been reported in the husband's tax

filings. The wife introduced a check in the amount of $1,700 from Select

Auto, LLC, to Sultan dated November 6, 2015, and labeled "For Loan,"

as well as a check in the amount of $25,950 from Sultan's sister to Select

Auto, LLC, dated November 6, 2015, and labeled "For Vin #" and listing

several VIN numbers.

The wife testified that, during the parties' marriage, she had

completed the taxes for Select Auto, LLC. According to the wife, Select

Auto, LLC, had not paid taxes on its employees, and the husband had

spent $8,000 from a business account on gambling. Additionally, the wife

testified that the husband had used the business checking accounts for

all of the parties' expenses (including gasoline, the wife's makeup, and

purchases on the Web site amazon.com), as well as for the parties'

vacations. At the trial, the wife introduced a discovery response

submitted by the husband, in which he admitted that he had no personal

bank accounts.

25
CL-2023-0881

The husband testified that he had "[s]ometimes" paid his personal

expenses with his business accounts, but he denied having paid all of his

expenses from his business accounts. He also testified that four or five

months before the trial, he had opened a personal checking account.

The husband testified that his rent at the time of the trial was

almost $1,800 and that, with utilities, he paid approximately $2,300 or

$2,400 per month. The husband testified that, as of the date of the trial,

his income was $800 per week, totaling approximately $3,400 per month,

or $41,600 per year.

Standard of Review

" 'In reviewing a trial court's judgment in a
divorce case where the trial court has made
findings of fact based on oral testimony, we are
governed by the ore tenus rule. Under this rule,
the trial court's judgment based on those findings
will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is plainly and palpably wrong.
Hartzell v. Hartzell, 623 So. 2d 323 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993). Matters of alimony and property division
are interrelated, and the entire judgment must be
considered in determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion as to either of those issues.
Willing v. Willing, 655 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995). … Moreover, in Kluever v. Kluever, 656 So.
2d 887 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), this court stated,
"[a]lthough this court is not permitted to
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court,
this court is permitted to review and revise the

26
CL-2023-0881

trial court's judgment upon an abuse of
discretion." Id. at 889.'

"Langley v. Langley, 895 So. 2d 971, 973 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
'Trial judges enjoy broad discretion in divorce cases, and their
decisions are to be overturned on appeal only when they are
"unsupported by the evidence or [are] otherwise palpably
wrong." ' Ex parte Bland, 796 So. 2d 340, 344 (Ala. 2000)
(quoting Ex parte Jackson, 567 So. 2d 867, 868 (Ala. 1990))."

Cottom v. Cottom, 275 So. 3d 1158, 1163 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).

Discussion

Upon granting a divorce, a trial court may award rehabilitative or

periodic alimony to a party to "enable the party to acquire the ability to

preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as

it existed during the marriage." Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(a)(1).

However, a court may only do so if it makes three express findings: (1)

that "[a] party lacks a separate estate or his or her separate estate is

insufficient to enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the

extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it existed during

the marriage"; (2) that "[t]he other party has the ability to supply those

means without undue economic hardship"; and (3) that "[t]he

circumstances of the case make it equitable." Ala. Code 1975, §§ 30-2-

57(a)(1)-(3).

27
CL-2023-0881

Here, the trial court made each of those findings; however, the

husband argues that those findings were not supported by the evidence.

He also argues that, even if alimony is warranted and equitable, the trial

court erred in awarding periodic alimony instead of rehabilitative

alimony, and that, even if periodic alimony were justified, it should have

been limited by the length of the marriage.

I.
We first address the husband's argument that the wife's property

settlement is sufficient to enable her to maintain the economic status quo

without alimony. Section 30-2-57(d), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"In determining whether a party has a sufficient separate
estate to preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status
quo of the parties as it existed during the marriage, the court
shall consider any and all relevant evidence, including all of
the following:

"(1) The party's own individual assets.

"(2) The marital property received by or
awarded to the party.

"(3) The liabilities of the party following the
distribution of marital property.

"(4) The party's own wage-earning capacity,
taking into account the age, health, education, and
work experience of the party as well as the
prevailing economic conditions.

28
CL-2023-0881

"(5) Any benefits that will assist the party in
obtaining and maintaining gainful employment.

"(6) That the party has primary physical
custody of a child of the marriage whose condition
or circumstances make it appropriate that the
party not be required to seek employment outside
the home.

"(7) Any other factor the court deems
equitable under the circumstances of the case."

After the trial court's property division, the wife's property

consisted of the following: the marital home, which was encumbered by a

mortgage; the 2015 GMC Yukon automobile; her retirement account with

a balance of approximately $48,000; an award of $14,693.54 in unpaid

status quo expenses; and $100,000 representing her 50% share of the

$200,000 that the husband kept in cash. According to the wife's exhibit

36 ("the expense exhibit"), her monthly expenses total $4,659.71.

Subtracting the $520 in childcare expenses that are listed, her expenses

total $4,139.71. 5 Considering those listed expenses alone and the wife's

5We have not considered the childcare expenses in the wife's
expenses because those expenses relate solely to the parties' minor child
and would be more appropriately addressed in the award of child support.
See, e.g., Kean v. Kean, 189 So. 3d 61, 66 n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (stating
that the award of child support would address some of the childcare
costs). Moreover, we note that the Form CS-42 prepared by the trial court

29
CL-2023-0881

net monthly income in the amount of $3,382.95, the wife will have a

monthly deficit in the amount of $756.76. Moreover, in addition to the

expenses listed on the wife's expense exhibit, she testified that, to

maintain the standard of living that existed during the marriage, she

incurs expenses for groceries, gasoline, clothing, automobile insurance,

nail care, hair care, and cosmetics. The wife requested periodic alimony

in the amount of $4,600 per month, which approximates the amount of

monthly bills that, she testified, the husband had paid during the

marriage. The trial court awarded her $1,315 per month.

The wife has been a public-school teacher since 2009, and the

evidence indicated that she had taken on additional job duties to increase

her net monthly income to the amount of $3,382.95. However, even with

the increase in income, her income is insufficient to maintain the

standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage. Without

alimony, the only assets the wife has to cover her monthly deficit are the

equity of the home, the value of her automobile, her retirement account,

and the cash award of $100,000. However, this court has held that "[t]he

indicated that the parties do not incur work-related childcare costs. We
will not discuss child support because it is not at issue in this appeal.

30
CL-2023-0881

wife should not be compelled to consume the principal of her property-

distribution award in order to maintain the lifestyle to which she had

become accustomed during the marriage." Kean v. Kean, 189 So. 3d 61,

67 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).

Considering the foregoing evidence as it relates to the statutory

factors, we conclude that the trial court's specific finding that "the wife's

separate estate is insufficient to enable her to acquire the ability to

preserve, to the extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as

[it] existed during the marriage" was supported by the evidence.

II.

The husband also argues that the alimony award exceeds his ability

to pay. We initially note that, within this section of argument in his brief,

the husband focuses on his contention that, considering the awards of

child support and alimony, the wife's income is higher than his income.

This argument misses the mark. Once it has been determined that a

party requires alimony, the next question posed by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-

2-57(a), is whether the other party can afford to pay alimony; the statute

does not task the trial court with comparing the parties' incomes.

31
CL-2023-0881

Section 30-2-57(e), Ala. Code 1975, addresses a spouse's ability to

pay alimony as follows:

"In determining whether the other party has the ability to pay
alimony, the court shall consider any and all evidence,
including all of the following:

"(1) His or her own individual assets, except
those assets protected from use for the payment of
alimony by federal law.

"(2) The marital property received by or
awarded to him or her.

"(3) His or her liabilities following the
distribution of marital property.

"(4) His or her net income.

"(5) His or her wage-earning ability,
considering his or her age, health, education,
professional licensing, work history, family
commitments, and prevailing economic conditions.

"(6) That he or she has primary physical
custody of a child of the marriage whose condition
or circumstances make it appropriate that he or
she not be required to maintain employment
outside the home.

"(7) Any other factor the court deems
equitable under the circumstances of the case.

After the trial court's property division, the husband's property

consisted of the following: his entire interest in the three used-car

32
CL-2023-0881

dealerships, his 2018 Lexus LS500 automobile, and $100,000 in cash.

The trial court's judgment ordered the husband to pay $14,693.54 to the

wife in unpaid status quo expenses, $7,000 towards the wife's attorney's

fees, and $1,500 to the guardian ad litem. The judgment also required

the husband to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $1,315 and

monthly child support in the amount of $683; he was also required to

maintain a subscription to a Soberlink "Monthly Monitoring Plan" at the

cost of approximately $100 to $150 per month, which will monitor his

intoxication levels during his visits with the parties' minor child. The

husband testified that his rent and utility expenses totaled $2,300 or

$2,400 per month.

The husband states in his brief that his monthly income is $6,0886

(presumably based on his 2022 tax return, in which he claimed that his

income that year totaled $73,0607) and argues that he cannot afford to

comply with the trial court's alimony award. The husband points out

that, with respect to his income, the trial court, in its amended judgment,

6The husband appears to have abandoned his testimony that he

earns only $800 per week, totaling approximately $3,400 per month.

7$73,060 divided by 12 months equals $6,088 per month.

33
CL-2023-0881

stated that it had "used the $73,060 that the [husband] claimed as his

2022 income in calculating the child support guidelines." However, we

note that the trial court also explained that

"[t]he Court found the [husband's] testimony about his income
to be wholly without credibility. The Court note[d] that the
[husband] disposed of approximately half the ownership
interest of his various car dealerships while this case was
pending and in violation of this Court's pretrial Order. That
amount of income [reported in 2022] is also roughly half of the
income he showed in 2021. The Court f[ound] that the
[husband] was intentionally attempting to reduce or obfuscate
his income in order to reduce the amount of support this Court
might Order him to pay."

In light of those findings, the trial court's amended judgment noted that

it "reaffirm[ed] child support in the amount of $683 per month even

though the Court f[ound] this amount lower than called for under Rule

32[, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.], if based on the [husband's] actual income,"

because, it reasoned, the husband's actual income is "a figure that is

extremely difficult to pinpoint with specificity in light of the evidence

presented."

"In determining the weight to be accorded testimony, the trial
court, as sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, considers
the demeanor and apparent candor or evasiveness of the
witnesses, and the trial court may disbelieve and disregard
portions of testimony and should accept only that testimony
it considers worthy of belief."

34
CL-2023-0881

Bunn v. Bunn, 628 So. 2d 695, 697 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993). In Meehan v.

Meehan, 249 So. 3d 1120, 1130 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), we stated that "[t]he

trial court, having received ore tenus testimony from the husband, could

have concluded that the husband was not forthcoming with his true

financial situation and that he had the ability to pay the ordered

alimony." Similarly, in the present case, the record supported the trial

court's finding that the husband's income, and thus his wage-earning

ability, was higher than he had claimed, and the trial court "could have

concluded that the husband was not forthcoming with his true financial

situation." Id.

The drastic, conveniently timed, and inexplicable decrease in the

husband's income in the year before the trial (reflected on tax returns

that were significantly delayed in being prepared), combined with the

husband's contemptuous transfer of assets during the pendency of the

divorce (altering two of his businesses from sole proprietorships to

partnerships, lessening his interest in them) and the husband's

immediate removal of the $200,000 in cash from where the wife could

access it upon the divorce filing, support the trial court's finding that the

husband's evidence of his income was unreliable. Therefore, the trial

35
CL-2023-0881

court did not err in awarding alimony based on a different income figure

than the husband had claimed on his 2022 tax return, even though the

court had based its child-support calculation on the tax return.

According to the husband's tax returns, his annual income was

approximately $135,000 in 2020 and $168,000 in 2021, which translates

to a monthly income of $11,250 in 2020 and $14,000 in 2021. The trial

court, in finding that the husband had deliberately reduced his income

after the divorce filing, could have determined that the amount of income

reported on the husband's 2020 and 2021 tax returns more accurately

reflected his income and wage-earning ability than the 2022 return or the

husband's testimony at the trial. Even considering the lesser amount of

$11,250 per month from 2020, the husband would still be left with $6,702

per month after paying his rent, utilities, Soberlink subscription cost, and

periodic-alimony and child-support obligations (assuming the husband's

highest estimations of those costs are correct).

Considering the foregoing evidence as it relates to the statutory

factors, we conclude that the trial court's specific finding that the

husband could afford the alimony award is supported by the evidence.

36
CL-2023-0881

III.

Turning to the issue of whether the award of periodic alimony is

equitable, § 30-2-57(f), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"In determining whether the award of rehabilitative or
periodic alimony is equitable, the court shall consider all
relevant factors including all of the following:

"(1) The length of the marriage.

"(2) The standard of living to which the
parties became accustomed during the marriage.

"(3) The relative fault of the parties for the
breakdown of the marriage.

"(4) The age and health of the parties.

"(5) The future employment prospects of the
parties.

"(6) The contribution of the one party to the
education or earning ability of the other party.

"(7) The extent to which one party reduced
his or her income or career opportunities for the
benefit of the other party or the family.

"(8) Excessive or abnormal expenditures,
destruction, concealment, or fraudulent
disposition of property.

"(9) All actual damages and judgments from
conduct resulting in criminal conviction of either
spouse in which the other spouse or child of the
marriage was the victim.

37
CL-2023-0881

"(10) Any other factor the court deems
equitable under the circumstances of the case."

The parties had been married for over 20 years when the complaint

for a divorce was filed. The evidence indicates that, up to that point, the

parties had enjoyed a comfortable standard of living, with most of the

parties' expenses, including the wife's hair care and nail care expenses,

having been covered by the husband's income. With respect to the fault

in the marriage, the record was replete with detailed testimony and

documentary evidence concerning the husband's physical and verbal

abuse, the husband's alcohol and drug use, and the husband's infidelity,

all of which, the wife testified, had contributed to the breakdown of the

parties' marriage.

Though there was no evidence presented at the trial concerning the

parties' ages, there was no evidence indicating that either party was in

poor health. Both parties are employed, but the husband has a higher

earning capacity as a business owner than the wife as a public-school

teacher.

With respect to the factor concerning the "destruction, concealment,

or fraudulent disposition of property," the trial court found that the

38
CL-2023-0881

husband had "transferred his interest in Select Auto, LLC and Select

Auto Group, LLC after the divorce was filed. … Further, … the husband

removed $200,000.00 cash from the marital residence and … such cash

[wa]s a marital asset subject to division by [the trial court]."

Based on the foregoing evidence as it relates to the statutory

factors, we conclude that the trial court's finding, that the award of

periodic alimony is equitable considering the "circumstances of this case,"

is supported by the evidence.

IV.

The husband argues that the trial court "failed to find facts

justifying deviation from the default award of rehabilitative alimony" to

award periodic alimony instead. We note, however, that the trial court

expressly made each of the findings required by the statute, and there

was evidence to support each finding.

Pursuant to § 30-2-57(b)(2), Ala. Code 1975, after the requirements

of § 30-2-57(a) are met, periodic alimony may be awarded only

"[i]n cases in which the court expressly finds that
rehabilitation is not feasible, a good-faith attempt at
rehabilitation fails, or good-faith rehabilitation only enables
the party to partially acquire the ability to preserve, to the
extent possible, the economic status quo of the parties as it
existed during the marriage."

39
CL-2023-0881

The trial court's judgment stated: "the Court expressly finds that

rehabilitative alimony is not feasible to allow the wife to maintain the

economic status quo as it existed during the marriage or to acquire the

ability to do so." That finding is supported by the evidence discussed

previously concerning the wife's need for periodic alimony, the husband's

ability to pay periodic alimony, and the equitability of the periodic-

alimony award.8 We specifically note that, despite the wife having a

teaching degree and having taken on additional duties since she filed the

complaint for a divorce, the wife was still unable to maintain the

standard of living that she had enjoyed during the 20-year marriage with

her income alone. Therefore, we conclude that the husband's argument

on this point has no merit.

8We note that the husband's brief addresses the equitability of the

periodic-alimony award in the same section as his argument concerning
whether rehabilitative alimony is feasible. Because this opinion has
already addressed the equitability of the periodic-alimony award, we will
not repeat an analysis of that issue here.

40
CL-2023-0881

V.

Lastly, the husband argues that the duration of the trial court's

alimony award exceeds the statutory limit. Section 30-2-57(g), Ala. Code

1975, provides:

"Except upon a finding by the court that a deviation from the
time limits of this section is equitably required, a person shall
be eligible for periodic alimony for a period not to exceed the
length of the marriage, as of the date of the filing of the
complaint, with the exception that if a party is married for 20
years or longer, there shall be no time limit as to his or her
eligibility."

The trial court specifically found that, at the time of the filing of the

divorce complaint, the parties had been married for 20 years and 5

months (since August 25, 2000). The husband concedes in his brief that

the parties have been married for over 20 years. 9 However, the husband

argues that periodic alimony, if warranted, should have only been

awarded for 244 months (20 years and 4 months), to correspond with the

length of the marriage at the time of the filing of the divorce complaint.

9Although the husband's brief states that the parties were married

on September 23, 2020, it also states that "this marriage barely exceeds
[20 years]." We thus assume that the husband intended to write "2000"
and that "2020" was a typographical error. Also, whether the marriage
date was August 25 or September 23, 2000, the divorce complaint was
still filed over 20 years later, on January 25, 2021.

41
CL-2023-0881

We note, though, that such an extrapolation is not contemplated by § 30-

2-57(g). Because the parties had been married for more than 20 years,

there was no statutory time limit. As discussed previously, the evidence

supported the trial court's findings that the wife established a need for

periodic alimony, that the husband had the ability to pay periodic

alimony, and that the periodic-alimony award was equitable.10

Therefore, we conclude that the husband's argument on this point is

without merit.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment

awarding periodic alimony to the wife.

AFFIRMED

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

10We note that the husband's brief addresses the equitability of the

periodic-alimony award and his ability to pay periodic alimony in the
same section as his argument concerning the duration of his periodic-
alimony obligation. Because this opinion has already addressed the
equitability of the periodic-alimony award and the husband's ability to
pay periodic alimony, we will not repeat an analysis of those issues here.

42