Heaven Harper v. Dontae Green

Rel: October 24, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
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may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0433
_________________________

Heaven Harper

v.

Dontae Green

Appeal from Marshall Circuit Court
(DR-25-104)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

Heaven Harper ("the mother") appeals from a judgment of the

Marshall Circuit Court ("the circuit court") dismissing her child-custody

case based on its determination that a court in Lucas County, Ohio ("the

Ohio court"), retained jurisdiction over a child-custody proceeding
CL-2025-0433

involving the same parties pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-

3B-101 et seq. We reverse the judgment and remand the case with

instructions.

Background

The limited record shows that, on April 8, 2025, the mother filed a

letter requesting that the circuit court transfer from the Ohio court a

child-custody proceeding relating to her four-year-old daughter with

Dontae Green ("the father"). The mother attached to her letter a

memorandum to support her request to transfer the Ohio child-custody

proceeding to Alabama. In the memorandum, the mother asserted that

she and the child had moved from Ohio to Alabama in July 2024. In

August 2024, the father had filed in the Ohio court a complaint seeking

custody of the child, and, in January 2025, the mother had filed a

counterclaim in the Ohio court seeking custody of the child. The mother

contended that, in February 2025, she and the father participated in

mediation and that she had agreed to a settlement of the Ohio child-

custody proceeding, which agreement she had later attempted to rescind.

The mother argued that the Ohio court had lost jurisdiction over the

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child-custody proceeding in January 2025 because, she said, Alabama

had become the home state of the child at that time. The mother

requested, among other things, that the circuit court take jurisdiction

over the child-custody proceeding, award her custody of the child, and

establish a visitation plan for the father.

The circuit court treated the letter as a complaint and ordered the

mother to serve the father. The case-action-summary sheet indicates

that the father was served on April 23, 2025, but he did not appear before

the circuit court. On April 25, 2025, the mother filed a motion requesting

that the circuit court confirm its jurisdiction over the case. The circuit

court scheduled a hearing on the motion for May 29, 2025. However, on

May 20, 2025, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the case. The

dismissal order provides: "On May 6, 2025[,] the undersigned conducted

a teleconference pursuant to UCCJEA with Hon. Linda Knepp of Lucas

County, Ohio. After said teleconference, the Court finds that Lucas

County, Ohio[,] retains jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, case closed

and costs waived." The case-action-summary sheet indicates that the

case was "disposed" based on that order.

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On June 9, 2025, the mother filed a notice of appeal and a motion

requesting that the circuit court enter findings of fact and conclusions of

law explaining its reasoning for dismissing the case. The circuit court

did not rule on the motion.

Issues

On appeal, the mother argues that the circuit court erred in failing

to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and in declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the case. 1 We find the first issue dispositive.

Analysis

Generally, a trial court does not have to make findings of facts and

conclusions of law to support its dismissal of a child-custody case based

on its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See

Hensley v. Kanizai, 143 So. 3d 186, 197 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). However,

in her postjudgment motion, the mother argued: "On May 6, 2025, the

Judge of [the circuit c]ourt conferred with the Judge in [the] Ohio [court].

No record or transcript of this communication has been made available

1The mother also seeks appellate review of a judgment entered by

the Ohio court, which she claims was entered without due process and
without jurisdiction. This court cannot review that judgment, which is
outside the scope of our appellate jurisdiction.
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to the [mother]. No hearing was held to allow the [mother] to respond or

address the substance of this discussion." The mother requested that the

circuit court amend the final judgment to recite the factual and legal

bases discussed in the intercourt communication that led to the

dismissal. We construe the postjudgment motion as requesting a record

of the communication between the circuit court and the Ohio court

pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-110.

Section 30-3B-110 provides:

"(a) A court of this state may communicate with a court
in another state concerning a proceeding arising under [the
UCCJEA].

"(b) The court may allow the parties to participate in the
communication. If the parties are not able to participate in the
communication, they must be given the opportunity to present
facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is
made.

"(c) Communication between courts on schedules,
calendars, court records, and similar matters may occur
without informing the parties. A record need not be made of
the communication.

"(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a
record must be made of a communication under this section.
The parties must be informed promptly of the communication
and granted access to the record.

"(e) For the purposes of this section, 'record' means
information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is

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stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form."

Section 30-3B-110 governs communications between the courts of this

state and the courts of other states regarding jurisdictional matters in

child-custody proceedings. Section 30-3B-110(d) states that a record

must be made of any substantive discussion between the courts. In her

postjudgment motion, the mother basically requested that the circuit

court summarize the communication between it and the Ohio court

explaining why the case was dismissed. On appeal, the mother argues

that the circuit court erred in denying her request.

In B.N. v. Madison County Department of Human Resources, 151

So. 3d 1115 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014), this court reversed a judgment entered

by the Madison Juvenile Court and remanded the case because no record

had been made of the communications between the juvenile court and a

Mississippi court upon which the juvenile court had based its

jurisdictional determination. See also B.B. v. L.W., 163 So. 3d 1042, 1051

(Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (reversing a judgment that did not contain a record

of communications between a court of this state and a foreign court and

remanding the case to the trial court). In this case, the circuit court

entered an order memorializing that it had held a jurisdictional

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conference with the judge presiding over the Ohio child-custody

proceeding, see Kee v. Gilbert, 32 Neb. App. 1, 16, 992 N.W.2d 486, 498

(2023) (holding that an order memorializing the substance of a

communication between courts is sufficient to comply with the UCCJEA),

but it did not make a record of the substance of that communication. See

Ex parte N.B., 66 So. 3d 249, 254 (Ala. 2010) (indicating that a record of

a communication under § 30-3B-110 should include the substance of the

communication); T.R. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-

2024-0381, Nov. 22, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (noting the

absence of a record of a jurisdictional hearing describing the substance of

the conversation between courts); see also In re H.M.A., 563 P.3d 312,

321 (Okla. Civ. App. 2024) (holding that handwritten note indicating that

in-state judge had conferred with judge of foreign court without any

further details was insufficient to comply with the UCCJEA). Thus, the

circuit court erred by failing to comply with § 30-3B-110.

In Hensley, supra, this court held that the failure of an Alabama

trial court to comply with § 30-3B-110 was harmless error because the

facts were undisputed and those facts supported the legal conclusion that

the Alabama trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the

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UCCJEA. In this case, the record does not disclose the facts or the law

that informed the decision of the circuit court to dismiss the case. Hence,

we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the circuit court properly

dismissed the case.

Section 30-3B-206(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"(b) Except as otherwise provided in [Ala. Code 1975, §]
30-3B-204, a court of this state, before hearing a child custody
proceeding, shall examine the court documents and other
information supplied by the parties pursuant to [Ala. Code
1975, §] 30-3B-209. If the court determines that a child
custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another
state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [the
UCCJEA], the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and
communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of
the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with
[the UCCJEA] does not determine that the court of this state
is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall
dismiss the proceeding."

Without a record, however, we cannot determine that the circuit court

followed § 30-3B-206(b). We do not know the facts underlying any

determination that the Ohio court had jurisdiction under its version of

the UCCJEA, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3127.01 et seq., and we do not

know whether the Ohio court even considered whether the circuit court

was a more appropriate forum, much less decided that it was not. See

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3127.21(A) ("A court of this state that has

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jurisdiction under [Ohio's version of the UCCJEA] to make a child

custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time

if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances

and that a court of another state is a more convenient forum. The issue

of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court's

own motion, or at the request of another court."). The record does not

explain why the Ohio court decided to retain jurisdiction over the child-

custody proceeding.

Conclusion

As the mother correctly points out in her brief to this court, by

failing to comply with § 30-3B-110, the circuit court has deprived her of

a right to meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment, and we remand the case for the circuit court to make a record

of the communication upon which it based its decision to dismiss the case.

To ensure full compliance with § 30-3B-110, we instruct the circuit court,

after making a record of the communication between it and the Ohio

court, to grant the mother access to the record pursuant to § 30-3B-110(d)

and to afford the mother an opportunity to present facts and legal

arguments regarding the jurisdictional issue before making a final

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jurisdictional determination pursuant to § 30-3B-110(b). See Justice v.

Guerrero-Justice, 403 So. 3d 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025) (holding that

failure of courts to comply with procedural rules contained in UCCJEA

governing communication before making a jurisdictional determination

deprives parties of due process).

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

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