Arundhati Sawant v. Gurudatta Anand Naik

Rel: February 13, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

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_________________________

Arundhati Sawant

v.

Gurudatta Anand Naik

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(DR-19-901807.01)

EDWARDS, Judge.

Arundhati Sawant ("the former wife") appeals from a judgment

entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") that awarded

Gurudatta Anand Naik ("the former husband") physical custody of the

parties' child, A.G.N. ("the child"), who was born on August 26, 2019, and
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found the former wife in contempt of a September 2021 divorce judgment

entered by the trial court. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Procedural Background

On September 7, 2021, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing

the former husband and the former wife; that judgment incorporated a

settlement agreement entered between the parties. Pursuant to the

divorce judgment, the former husband and the former wife were awarded

joint legal custody of the child, with the former wife exercising "primary

physical custody" of the child,1 subject to the former husband's visitation,

which was to occur on the first, third, and fifth weekends of each month,

as well as on specified holidays and during the summertime. The divorce

judgment also contained the child-custody language required by Ala.

Code 1975, § 30-3-166, which is a part of the Alabama Parent-Child

Relationship Protection Act ("the Act"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-160 et seq.

In April 2025, the former wife, pursuant to the Act, provided the

former husband with written notice of her intent to relocate with the

1"Such an award is properly termed an award of 'sole physical
custody' of a child. § 30-3-151(5), Ala. Code 1975." Ja.T. v. N.T., 353 So.
3d 558, 559 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).

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child to Jackson, Mississippi, effective June 10, 2025. See Ala. Code

1975, § 30-3-163 (providing that a person who has the right to establish

the principal residence of a child shall provide notice to every other

person entitled to custody of or visitation with the child of a proposed

change of the child's principal residence). On April 23, 2025, the former

husband filed a complaint in the trial court objecting to the relocation of

the principal residence of the child. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-169

(providing that "[t]he person entitled to determine the principal residence

of a child may change the principal residence of a child after providing

notice as provided herein unless a person entitled to notice files a

proceeding seeking a temporary or permanent order to prevent the

change of principal residence of a child within 30 days after receipt of

such notice"). The former husband's complaint also sought to modify the

physical custody of the child and to hold the former wife in contempt

because of her alleged violations of various provisions of the divorce

judgment.

On May 14, 2025, the former wife filed a response to the former

husband's complaint in which she confirmed her intent to relocate with

the child to Jackson. The former wife denied all other allegations made

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by the former husband in his complaint. On May 28, 2025, the trial court

entered a pendente lite order that incorporated a temporary agreement

of the parties. Pursuant to the pendente lite order, the former wife was

temporarily restrained from changing the child's principal residence.

The pendente lite order further temporarily modified the parties'

custodial times with the child such that the former husband and the

former wife would exercise alternating custodial periods every two

weeks.

A trial on the former husband's complaint was conducted on July

23, 2025. On July 24, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment that, in

pertinent part, awarded the former husband "primary legal and physical

custody of the child";2 awarded the former wife "secondary custody" of the

child; awarded the former wife visitation with the child to occur on the

first, third, and fifth weekends of each month, as well as on specified

holidays and during the summer; held the former wife in contempt of

court for "failing to allow the [former husband] to exercise his 5th

weekend visitation as court-ordered"; and denied all other requested

relief. The judgment did not contain any findings of fact but stated

2See note 1, supra.

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expressly that the former husband had established "[t]hat there has been

a material change in circumstances so substantial that the welfare and

best interest of the child would be promoted by a modification offsetting

the disruptive effect of uprooting the child."

On August 8, 2025, the former wife filed a timely notice of appeal

to this court. On August 11, 2025, the former husband filed a

postjudgment motion, pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting

that the trial court amend its judgment to allow him to claim the child as

a dependent for state- and federal-income-tax purposes. The former

wife's appeal was held in abeyance until November 9, 2025, when the

former husband's postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law.

See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P.

The Evidence

The former husband, who hails from India, testified that he had

resided in the Birmingham area for approximately 17 years, with Hoover

having been his home for approximately the last 9 of those years. At the

time of the trial, the former husband was employed as a "Scientist 1" by

the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB"). Since 2020, he had

worked remotely from home five days a week. In addition to his work

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obligations, the former husband was a student at UAB, where he was

pursuing his Ph.D. in health-services research. He expected to graduate

in December 2025. According to the former husband, his work and

educational obligations had not prohibited him from exercising the

visitation with the child that he had been awarded in the parties' divorce

judgment.

The former husband and the child enjoyed various activities during

their time together. The child had toys and books at the former

husband's house for days that inclement weather prohibited outdoor

activities. When weather permitted, they visited parks and engaged in

other outdoor activities, such as visiting the Birmingham Zoo.

The former husband remarried shortly before the trial, and he and

his current wife moved into a five-bedroom, two-and-one-half-bath house

approximately one month before the trial. The former husband said that

he had introduced the child to his current wife in August 2024 and that

the child and his current wife had developed a good relationship since

their introduction. His current wife did not have children of her own.

The former husband testified that the former wife, who also hails

from India, had engaged in a pattern of denying him the fifth-weekend

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visitation that he had been awarded in the September 2021 divorce

judgment. According to the former husband, in 2021, 2022, and 2023, he

had requested to visit with the child on the fifth weekend of those months

that had a fifth weekend, but, he said, those requests had been largely

denied by the former wife. The former husband estimated that, during

that two-plus-year period, of the months that had fifth weekends, he had

visited with the child approximately three times.

The former husband and the former wife struggled to come to a

consensus on decisions regarding the child's education. Regarding the

selection of the school that the child would attend, the former husband

said that he had wanted the child to attend public school but that the

former wife had preferred that the child attend a private school.

According to the former husband, he and the former wife had participated

in an interview at Highlands School, a private school located in Irondale,

but, he said, they both had agreed that travel to that campus would be

inconvenient because of the length of the drive.

Thereafter, the former wife informed the former husband that she

was also considering Prince of Peace, a private Catholic school, and that

she intended to tour that school's campus. The former husband testified

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that he had informed the former wife that he would be unable to join her

in touring that campus. According to the former husband, approximately

one month later, the former wife had informed him that the child was

starting school at Prince of Peace the following day.

The former husband testified that the former wife had failed to

consult with him in any meaningful manner before she unilaterally

selected which school the child would attend. The former husband

testified that he objected to the child's attending Prince of Peace because

he had concerns that the school was "faith based" and was "not diverse

enough." He also said that he was concerned about the cost of the school,

which, he said, the former wife had never discussed with him. At the

time of the trial, the child was scheduled to begin his second year at

Prince of Peace in the fall of 2025. The former husband testified that he

had the flexibility to transport the child to and from school.

In April 2025, the former wife provided the former husband with

written notification of her intent to relocate, along with the child, to

Jackson, Mississippi. In her notice, the former wife, who was a medical

student pursuing her M.D., indicated that her proposed relocation was

due to her having been assigned to a medical-residency program at the

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Mississippi Baptist Memorial Hospital in Jackson. According to the

former husband, Jackson is located approximately 250 miles from his

residence. He estimated that it takes him approximately three and one-

half hours to drive to the former wife's residence in Mississippi if he is

unaccompanied by the child. If accompanied by the child, the former

husband estimated that the drive time increases by one and one-half

hours to account for necessary travel breaks.

The former husband objected to the child's relocation to Jackson

and opined that the proposed relocation was not in the child's best

interest. He expressed concerns about the former wife's ability to parent

the child considering the obligations of her medical residency. The

former husband said that medical-residency programs obligate

individuals to be on-call for 12-hour periods and to work in rotations,

which include overnight shifts as well as weekend shifts. According to

the former husband, in addition to the work-schedule rotations, medical-

residency participants are subject to board exams, which, he said, further

obligate residency participants to time for studying for those exams. The

former husband testified that the former wife did not have family in

Jackson and that he was not aware of any other support network that

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the former wife might have in that area. By contrast, the former husband

said that Birmingham has a large Indian community that can provide

the child with a cultural connection to his heritage. Also, the former

husband opined that the child would benefit if the child remained in the

Birmingham area because the child could maintain his relationships

with his friends.

Both the former husband and the former wife are immigrants to

this country. The former husband said that he has a "green card" that

allows him to stay in this country legally. He further testified that his

immigration status is not dependent upon his maintaining employment.

The former husband said that he will be eligible for United States

citizenship in 2026.

At the time of the entry of the September 2021 divorce judgment,

the former wife was in the United States on an H1 visa, which, according

to the former husband, was a work permit that allowed the former wife

to legally work in this country. However, the former husband said that

the former wife had informed him that she was working under a J1 visa

with her current employer. A J1 visa, according to the former husband,

is a training visa that is mainly used for scholars and students who come

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to this country to study. The significance of the J1 visa, according to the

former husband, is that the former wife would "by default" have to leave

this country for two years after she finishes her residency program in

Jackson. On cross-examination, the former husband was presented with

a copy of the former wife's green card. He conceded that his concerns

regarding her immigration status were alleviated by that information.

The former wife testified that the residency-matching program is a

confidential process pursuant to which a residency program and a

candidate are matched. Neither the residency program nor the candidate

has any control over the selection process other than the candidate's

having listed his or her preferred geographic location during the process.

The former wife said that she had requested to complete her residency in

Birmingham, but, she said, that request was not honored. According to

the former wife, her only match was in Jackson.

The former wife disputed the former husband's testimony regarding

the time obligations her residency would require. The former wife's work

hours for the first year of her residency, which she said were outlined in

her employment contract, obligated her to work Monday through Friday

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from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.3 She denied that her work requirements

obligated her to work later than 5:00 p.m. She also denied that she would

be obligated to work weekends for the first year of her residency. She,

however, admitted that she was unaware of what her work schedule

would be in the second and third years of her residency. The former wife

opined that the continuation of her education would be in the best

interest of the child. She testified that, upon the completion of her

residency program, she would become a medical doctor and that the

income she would receive as a medical doctor would provide her with the

financial resources to elevate the child's standard of living and to pay for

his education.

Regarding the former husband's visitation with the child, the

former wife refuted the former husband's testimony indicating that he

had been denied his fifth-weekend visitations with the child. She

conceded that she and the former husband had experienced some

disagreements about the fifth-weekend visitations, but, she said, during

2021, she either had allowed those visits to occur as ordered or had

3The former wife did not introduce her employment contact as an

exhibit to substantiate her assertions.
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agreed to makeup visitation to occur at a later date. The former wife also

denied the former husband's assertion that she had unilaterally enrolled

the child at Prince of Peace. She testified that she and the former

husband had engaged in multiple discussions about Prince of Peace. She,

however, conceded that the former husband had objected to the child's

attending Prince of Peace because the school is faith-based.

Regarding the former husband's complaint seeking a modification

of the child's custody, the former wife opined that it would be harmful or

would cause a disruption to the child if he were to be removed from her

physical care. To support her assertion, the former wife observed that

she had been the child's primary caregiver since his birth, that she had

provided for the child's schooling, that she had provided for his daycare,

that she had established the child's eating habits as well as his sleeping

habits, that she had assisted with the child's homework, and that she had

provided for the child's extracurricular activities. She also expressed

concern that removing the child from her physical care would disrupt the

child's stability and would result in the child's experiencing confusion

from no longer residing in her home.

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At the time of the trial, the former wife, along with her parents ("the

maternal grandparents"), were residing in a three-bedroom single-family

home in Jackson. According to the former wife, the maternal

grandparents could provide assistance in caring for the child, but, she

said, they do not transport the child in an automobile. The neighborhood

that the former wife and the maternal grandparents were residing in at

the time of the trial has a community swimming pool, as well as a

playground. According to the former wife, the child had made friends in

the neighborhood.

Discussion

On appeal, the former wife makes arguments directed to those

portions of the trial court's judgment modifying the child's custody as well

as finding her in contempt. Regarding the modification of the child's

custody, the former wife argues that the trial court erred in awarding the

former husband physical custody of the child because, she says, the trial

court failed to apply the factors set forth in Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-169.3,

which is part of the Act, and because, she says, the former husband failed

to present evidence sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Ex parte

McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984) (requiring that the movant prove,

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in addition to a material change of circumstances, that the child's best

interest will be materially promoted by a change of custody and that the

benefits of the change will more than offset the inherently disruptive

effects resulting from the change of custody). See Clements v. Clements,

906 So. 2d 952 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).

We initially note that the former wife's contention that the trial

court failed to apply the factors set forth in § 30-3-169.3 was not raised

in the trial court. "This court cannot consider arguments raised for the

first time on appeal. Our review is restricted to the evidence and the

arguments considered by the trial court." S.K. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of

Hum. Res., 990 So. 2d 887, 895 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). We further note

that because the trial court did not allow a change of the child's principal

residence, the factors set forth in § 30-3-169.3 are inapplicable. See

Henderson v. Henderson, 978 So. 2d 36, 41-42 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)

(determining that § 30-3-169.3 only requires the trial court to consider

those factors when determining whether a change of the principal

residence should cause a change in custody). Thus, we decline to consider

the former wife's arguments on this issue.

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Regarding the former wife's contention that the former husband

failed to present sufficient evidence to meet the standard set forth in Ex

parte McLendon, we note that, in her brief to this court, the former wife

concedes that, in its judgment, the trial court "did not make specific

findings of fact." The former wife's brief, p. 25. In New Properties, L.L.C.

v. Stewart, 905 So. 2d 797, 801-02 (Ala. 2004), our supreme court held

that,

"in a nonjury case in which the trial court makes no specific
findings of fact, a party must move for a new trial or otherwise
properly raise before the trial court the question relating to
the sufficiency or weight of the evidence in order to preserve
that question for appellate review."

More recently, this court has had occasion to consider the

application of New Properties and to decide whether certain judgments

contained sufficient findings of fact such that the filing of a postjudgment

motion was not necessary to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the judgment. See K.M. v. S.R., 326 So. 3d 1062

(Ala. Civ. App. 2020).

In K.M., the judgment at issue was a juvenile court's judgment

finding a child to be a dependent child. 326 So. 3d at 1063. Although the

juvenile court's judgment determined that the child was a dependent

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child, that judgment did not make specific findings regarding the

circumstances giving rise to the child's dependency. Id. We explained

that "a mere adjudication of dependency does not equate to a specific

finding of fact that will excuse the filing of a postjudgment motion raising

the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of

dependency." Id. at 1064. We have since reiterated that, consistent with

New Properties,

"when a juvenile court makes the legal determination in a
final judgment that a child is dependent, without further
specifying the factual grounds for that determination, a party
claiming that the dependency determination is not supported
by sufficient evidence must file a postjudgment motion raising
that issue to the juvenile court in order to preserve the issue
for appellate review."

A.R. v. T.R., 375 So. 3d 1259, 1262 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).

However, we have not always applied the principle set out in New

Properties consistently. In Adams v. Adams, 21 So. 3d 1247 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2009), this court considered the application of New Properties to a

child-custody judgment that contained language similar to the language

used by the trial court in the judgment entered in the present case. Like

the present case, Adams concerned postdivorce litigation between two

parents. The mother in Adams petitioned to modify the parties' divorce

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judgment, and the father counterclaimed, seeking custody of the parties'

children and other relief. 21 So. 3d at 1248. Following ore tenus

proceedings, the Elmore Circuit Court entered a judgment that, among

other things, awarded sole physical custody of the children to the father.

21 So. 3d at 1249.

The judgment at issue in Adams provided:

" 'The [c]ourt heard numerous witnesses and observed
their demeanor and also received documentary evidence. The
[c]ourt finds that the [mother's] testimony was not credible.
The [c]ourt further finds that domestic violence was
committed by both parties during the marriage. Thus, any
presumptions against either party created by the domestic
violence statutes (§[§] 30-3-130 through -136, Ala. Code 1975)
cancel each other out so that no presumption either against
the [mother] or against the [father] is in place or if in place
offset each other.

" 'The [c]ourt finds that there has been a material and
substantial change of circumstances since the final [divorce
judgment], and that the positive good brought about by a
change of custody will more than offset any disruptive effect
caused by the change in custody. The [c]ourt thus finds that
the [father] has met his burden of proof under
the McLendon standard.' "

21 So. 3d at 1252 (footnote omitted). A majority of this court concluded

that the above-quoted portion of the Elmore Circuit Court's judgment

"contain[ed] sufficient factual findings to render unnecessary the filing of

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a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

pertaining to the custody modification." 21 So. 3d at 1253.

In a special writing dissenting to the rationale in the majority

opinion addressing the sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, Judge

Thomas stated:

"The main opinion holds that New Properties is
inapplicable and, therefore, that no postjudgment motion
challenging the sufficiency or weight of the evidence was
necessary in this case because, it concludes, the trial court did
make specific findings of fact with respect to whether the
father met his burden of proof under the McLendon standard.
According to the main opinion, those findings of fact were (1)
that the mother's testimony was not credible; (2) that both
parties committed domestic violence during the marriage but
that any presumptions against either party arising from the
domestic-violence statutes cancel each other out; and

"(3) 'that there has been a material and
substantial change of circumstances since the final
[divorce judgment], and that the positive good
brought about by a change of custody will more
than offset any disruptive effect caused by the
change in custody. The Court thus finds that the
[father] has met his burden of proof under
the McLendon standard.' "

21 So. 3d at 1257 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment but dissenting

from the rationale in part). Judge Thomas opined that "[i]tems (1) and

(2) do constitute 'findings of fact,' but neither is responsive to the

sufficiency issue that the mother raises on appeal. Accordingly, items (1)

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and (2) are not 'specific findings of fact' within the meaning of New

Properties." Id. Regarding item (3), Judge Thomas surmised:

"Item (3) -- which is a mere recitation of
the McLendon standard and a statement that the father had
met his burden of proof under McLendon -- is not a finding of
fact, but a legal conclusion representing an application of the
law to the facts, or a holding -- that the party with the burden
of proof had satisfied the appropriate evidentiary standard
and had thus met his burden. The trial court's legal conclusion
that the father met his burden did not set out any of the
factual underpinnings for that conclusion.

"Reciting the burden of proof that the father was
required to meet per McLendon and '[s]aying that the [father]
ha[d] sustained the burden of proof ... is not an adequate
finding of the matters of fact involved in that issue .... It is in
the nature of a legal conclusion rather than a finding of the
underlying facts ....' United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg.
Co., 291 U.S. 386, 408-09, 54 S.Ct. 443, 78 L.Ed. 859 (1934).
When a trial court's decision is conclusory and does not detail
or analyze the predicate facts upon which it is based, it is not
a specific finding of fact. Cf. Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 26
Ark. App. 51, 759 S.W.2d 578 (1988) (holding that Workers'
Compensation Commission did not satisfy its statutory
obligation to make 'specific findings of fact' by simply
declaring in conclusory fashion that claimant failed to meet
the burden of proof); Ellis v. Dravo Corp., 97 Idaho 109, 111,
540 P.2d 294, 296 (1975) (statement that claimant did not
sustain his burden of proof 'is not a finding of fact at all but a
conclusion of law')."

21 So. 3d at 1258 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment but dissenting

from the rationale in part).

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Like in Adams, the trial court in the present case simply recited in

its judgment the burden of proof that the former husband was required

to meet under Ex parte McLendon and did not set out any of the factual

underpinnings for that conclusion. As previously stated, the judgment

specifically provides, in pertinent part: "That there has been a material

change in circumstances so substantial that the welfare and best interest

of the child would be promoted by a modification offsetting the disruptive

effect of uprooting the child." Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the

former husband met the Ex parte McLendon standard is much like the

dependency finding in the judgment at issue in K.M.

Although the opinion in K.M. did not explain its rationale in detail,

the conclusion in K.M. rests on the distinction between a factual finding

and a statement of a legal conclusion. Stating that a child is a dependent

child is a statement of legal conclusion, as is a statement that a parent

seeking a modification of a child's custody has met the Ex parte

McLendon standard or that he or she has demonstrated a material

change in circumstances and that the child's welfare and best interest

would be materially promoted by a change in custody. The factual

findings upon which either of those conclusions rest would include,

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among other things, findings about the parent's circumstances and

fitness for custody and how the child might be impacted by the actions of

the parent or parents. In light of the application of New Properties in

cases decided since the release of Adams, and, specifically, the

application of New Properties in K.M. and its progeny, the conclusion in

Adams that the judgment in that case, which did not contain any factual

findings regarding the basis for its conclusion that the father had met the

Ex parte McLendon standard, is no longer viable, and we therefore

overrule Adams to the extent that it holds that a judgment containing

language that merely mirrors the language of the Ex parte McLendon

standard is a finding of fact that obviates the need to preserve the issue

of the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a postjudgment motion.

As previously noted, the former wife concedes in her brief on appeal

that the trial court did not make any findings of fact in its judgment in

the present case. The former wife did not file a postjudgment motion.

Thus, the former wife failed to properly preserve the issue of the

sufficiency of the evidence, and we cannot consider the former wife's

argument relating to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial

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court's judgment modifying custody of the child. New Props., 905 So. 2d

at 801-02; K.M., 326 So. 3d at 1063.

Lastly, the former wife contends that the trial court erred in finding

her in contempt of court because, she says, that finding is unsupported

by the evidence. In its judgment, the trial court held the former wife in

contempt for "failing to allow [the former husband] to exercise his 5th

weekend visitation as court-ordered." Even if we assume that the trial

court erred in finding the former wife in contempt for denying the former

husband his fifth-weekend visitation with the child, the trial court

imposed no sentence or sanction upon the former wife, and, therefore,

any error in its determination would be harmless error. See Adcock v.

Fronk, 289 So. 3d 1244, 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (quoting Cheek v.

Dyess, 1 So.3d 1025, 1031 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)) (concluding that any

possible error in a contempt finding was harmless error when the

" 'contempt judgment ... imposed no sanction upon the [appellant], nor

were the [appellant's] person, property, or rights adversely affected by

the judgment' "); Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. ("No judgment may be reversed

or set aside ... for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless

in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is

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made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the

error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights

of the parties."). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar

as it determined that the former wife was in contempt of court for denying

the former husband his fifth-weekend visitation with the child.

Conclusion

Because the former wife has failed to raise an argument on appeal

that merits reversal of the trial court's judgment, that judgment is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

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