Mary Ellen Williams v. Thomas M. Williams, Jr.

Rel: May 1, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0567 and CL-2025-0568
_________________________

Mary Ellen Williams

v.

Thomas M. Williams, Jr.

Appeals from Lauderdale Circuit Court
(DR-21-900294.01 and DR-21-900294.02)

FRIDY, Judge.

Mary Ellen Williams ("the mother") appeals from custody-

modification judgments of the Lauderdale Circuit Court ("the trial court")

that awarded Thomas M. Williams, Jr. ("the father"), sole physical

custody and sole legal custody of the parties' children, J.W., E.W., and

W.W ("the children"). For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the
CL-2025-0567 and CL-2025-0568

judgments and remand the causes for the trial court to enter new

judgments.

Background

In March 2022, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing the

parties. The divorce judgment incorporated an agreement of the parties

and awarded them joint legal and joint physical custody of the children.

The agreement required the mother to relocate to within a twenty-five-

mile radius of the father's residence in Florence on or before April 30,

2022. It provided that, until the mother relocated within that radius, she

would have visitation with the children the first and third weekends of

each month from Friday at 5:00 p.m. until Sunday at 5:00 p.m., together

with holiday visitation as provided in a joint-physical-custody holiday

schedule. If the mother relocated within the required twenty-five-mile

radius, the agreement provided that the parties would exercise physical

custody on a rotating schedule, with the father exercising custody from

Sunday at 7:00 a.m. until Wednesday at 6:00 p.m., and the mother

exercising custody from Wednesday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00

a.m. The divorce judgment also provided for holiday custody according to

an attached holiday schedule and allowed each parent one uninterrupted

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summer custodial period of up to ten consecutive days, with notice

requirements alternating by year.

On December 28, 2023, the mother filed a verified petition for a rule

nisi and modification. In her petition, she alleged that the father had

willfully refused to confer with her regarding decisions affecting the

children, had refused to comply with the divorce judgment by unilaterally

enrolling the children in activities affecting her custodial time, had failed

to provide her access to school information, and had threatened or

intimidated her in attempts to force changes to the custodial

arrangement. She asked the court to hold the father in both civil and

criminal contempt and to order him to pay her attorney's fees and court

costs.

The mother also alleged that material changes in circumstances

had occurred since the entry of the divorce judgment, and she sought

several modifications to the parenting provisions in that judgment.

Specifically, she requested defined birthday visitation, more uniform

exchange times and locations, limits on direct interaction between the

parties, a requirement that the parties communicate through the Our

Family Wizard application, clarification of a provision permitting

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"occasional nights with a grandparent," and removal of the provision

requiring her to reside within a twenty-five-mile radius of the father's

residence.

The father filed an answer denying the allegations of the mother's

petition. He later amended his answer and asserted counterclaims

seeking to hold the mother in contempt and a modification of the divorce

judgment. He alleged that the mother had refused to comply with

provisions of the divorce judgment and had failed to cooperate with him

regarding the children's schedules and activities. He further alleged that

material changes in circumstances warranted modification of the

existing custody arrangement and asserted concerns regarding the

mother's communications with the children and her failure to keep him

informed of her residence. He also alleged that the children had reported

to him that the mother had suggested there was "something off in her

brain," had joked about inappropriate adult matters with the children,

had failed to comply with the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship

Protection Act ("the relocation act"), § 30-3-160 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,

and had refused to keep him informed of the primary address where she

lived and exercised custody. Despite the fact that the parties were

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exercising joint physical custody of the children, the father asked the trial

court to order the mother to abide by the portion of the divorce judgment

providing her with visitation rights, which applied only if she did not

reside within twenty-five miles of the father's residence. The mother

answered the father's counterclaim on February 14, 2024, denying the

allegations.

On June 18, 2024, the father filed a motion for a rule nisi alleging

additional violations of the divorce judgment. On August 5, 2024, the

mother moved to dismiss the father's motion for a rule nisi, asserting that

the allegations were separate from and unrelated to the allegations in

her petition and, therefore, constituted a new action without the filing of

a counterclaim or the payment of a filing fee. On August 7, 2024, the

father filed a petition for a rule nisi, and the record reflects that the

mother was served at a residence in Madison and that Andrew Nay, her

current husband, accepted service on her behalf, identifying himself as

the mother's husband and coresident. In the petition, among other

things, the father alleged that the mother had relocated to Madison,

which, he said, is approximately sixty-five miles from his residence in

Florence, in violation of the divorce judgment's twenty-five-mile

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residency restriction. He further alleged that the mother had made

unilateral decisions concerning the children's schooling, extracurricular

activities, counseling, and religious activities without notifying him, had

withheld the children from him during his custodial time, and had

arranged for one child's baptism without consulting him. The father also

alleged that the mother had unilaterally placed the children in

counseling in Madison, which he believed the children did not need

because they were typical boys, were "happy and healthy," and were

doing "well in school and at home."

On August 9, 2024, the father moved to consolidate the related

actions, asserting that both matters involved the same parties and issues

relating to modification and contempt. The trial court consolidated the

mother's and the father's actions on August 15, 2024. On October 16,

2024, the mother filed an answer denying the allegations in the father's

petition.

On August 15, 2024, the father filed a verified objection to

relocation, asserting that the mother should not be permitted to relocate

the children outside the divorce judgment's twenty-five-mile residency

restriction because doing so would not be in the children's best interests.

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He cited § 30-3-169.4, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the relocation act, which

establishes a rebuttable presumption that a change in a child's principal

residence is not in the child's best interests and places the initial burden

of proof on the party seeking relocation. The father alleged that the

children had strong ties to Lauderdale County, including their schools,

extended family, and community, and that relocation to Madison -- where

the mother's husband resided -- would significantly reduce the father's

ability to exercise custodial time because the children had lived minutes

from him but would live approximately two hours away if the relocation

occurred. He further alleged that relocation would disrupt the children's

established relationships and make the existing custodial schedule

impracticable. Based on those assertions, the father requested that the

trial court prohibit the mother from relocating with the children outside

the twenty-five-mile radius and, alternatively, that, if the mother

relocated, the trial court modify custody of the children by awarding him

sole physical custody.

The trial court conducted a trial on the parties' petitions over three

days in October and November 2024. The mother testified that her

current address was in Killen and that her secondary address was in

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Madison with her husband. She testified that she stayed at the Killen

residence four to five nights each week and stayed at the Madison

residence "a couple of nights each week." She further testified that she

did not consider herself to be living in "two different places" and that the

divorce judgment required her to live within twenty-five miles of the

father's residence.

The mother testified that she had moved from an apartment in

Muscle Shoals to the Killen residence in May 2023, before she had

married her husband. She acknowledged that the lease term for the

Killen residence ran from June 4, 2024, through December 3, 2024,

meaning it was set to expire the month after the trial, and she

acknowledged that the lease listed both her and her husband as

residents. She denied, however, that she had commenced the action

because she had intended to leave Killen and move to Madison. She

testified that, although she would prefer for her family to live together in

one home, she and her husband had agreed to maintain two homes for as

long as possible so that she could maximize her time with the children.

She testified that she intended to continue the same arrangement by

entering into another lease and maintaining two homes; however, as of

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the second day of trial on November 1, she had not signed a new lease.

She later testified, on the last day of trial on November 12, that her lease

for the Killen residence had been renewed, but she acknowledged that

she would like to move to Madison, while maintaining that her desire to

move had not been the sole reason she had commenced the action.

The mother testified that she had filed her petition because of

concerns she had observed regarding the children and because she

wanted to improve coparenting and communication with the father. She

acknowledged, however, that the petition had specifically requested

removal of the twenty-five-mile residency restriction. She testified that

she sought removal of that restriction because it could be helpful and

because she believed it might benefit the children if they could live in one

household with her, her husband, and their stepsiblings when they were

in her care. She testified that she believed that having a single home

would provide additional stability for the children. Even so, she also

testified that she and her husband had married with the understanding

that the existing residency restriction might remain in place and that

they were prepared to comply with that restriction if necessary.

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The trial-court judge explained that, even if the twenty-five-mile

restriction in the divorce judgment were removed, the mother still could

not relocate more than sixty miles from the father's residence without

court involvement if the father objected. The trial-court judge asked the

mother whether she understood that distinction and noted that she had

repeatedly stated that she was not asking to move to Madison. The trial-

court judge further explained that relocation limits exist to address

practical problems in joint-custody cases, including school attendance,

transportation, and the burden created when a parent moves a

substantial distance away. The mother testified that she understood.

When asked whether she had determined the distance between the

Madison address and the father's residence, the mother testified that she

believed that it was approximately fifty-eight miles. The trial-court judge

observed that, if that estimate were correct, the Madison residence would

fall within the sixty-mile statutory limit but would still violate the

twenty-five-mile restriction in the divorce judgment, and the mother's

counsel agreed with that understanding.

The trial-court judge addressed the uncertainty over whether the

Madison residence was within sixty miles of the father's home. The trial-

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court judge described the distance issue between the father's residence

and the Madison residence as a "conundrum" because the mileage varied

depending on the route used. The trial-court judge explained that the

most direct route -- straight along Highway 72 -- appeared to be about

fifty-eight miles between the residences, which would fall within the

sixty-mile statutory limit. The trial-court judge further explained,

however, that the fastest route appeared to be about sixty-five miles and

thus exceeded the sixty-mile limit. During that discussion, the father's

counsel referenced a Google Maps (a widely used mapping website)

calculation showing a distance of approximately sixty-five miles and a

travel time of about one hour and fifteen minutes between the two

residences' driveways, while the trial-court judge reiterated that the

sixty-five-mile calculation reflected the fastest route, and the father's

counsel conceded that she had also seen the fifty-eight-mile route. The

trial-court judge further noted that, although the fifty-eight-mile route

would likely take longer because of traffic through Athens and Madison,

it was shorter and would place the distance under the sixty-mile limit.

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On March 10, 2025, the trial court entered identical final judgments

in both cases. In a section of the judgments titled "Primary Issue

Requiring Modification," the trial court wrote, in pertinent part:

"Since the original divorce decree, which was an
uncontested divorce and agreement of the parties, both
parties re-married. Additionally, from the evidence at trial,
the mother's new husband resides in Madison County,
Alabama, [at a residence] which is over sixty (60) miles away.
However, the mother testified that this was not a relocation
matter, yet she was equivocal about whether she intended to
maintain two residences. One residence is in Killen,
(Lauderdale County) Alabama, ... so that she may maintain
compliance with the original divorce decree and agreement,
which requires her to maintain a residence within 25-miles of
the father. …

"….

" While other issues were pled, as well as litigated, in the
cross-petitions for Rule Nisi, cross-petitions for
Modification/Counterclaim(s) (e.g. issues labeled and argued
by the parties as 'parenting issues'), the critical issue
nonetheless appears to this Court as the 'relocation' matter,
though the [mother] testified that she did not inten[d] to
relocate the children. Yet other evidence indicated that she
spent much of her time at the Madison County residence.
Moreover, when specifically questioned by the Court
regarding the relief she was requesting, the mother
emphasized to the Court that she wanted the 25-miles
residency restriction lifted, which then further serves to
impeach her denials that she does not intend to relocate the
children."

(Emphasis added.)

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After considering the evidence, the trial court determined that

material changes in circumstances had occurred and that a modification

of custody was necessary to serve the children's best interests. The trial

court awarded the father sole legal custody and sole physical custody of

the children. The trial court also vacated the twenty-five-mile residency

restriction contained in the divorce judgment and provided that the

mother may reside wherever she chooses.

As for the mother's visitation rights with the children, the trial

court provided that she should have as much parenting time "as

practicable and as mutually agreed to by the parties." It further provided

that if the parties could not agree on the mother's visitation rights, "then

they should try to adhere to the Lauderdale County Standard Visitation

Guidelines … for weekly visitation," except for visitation relating to

holidays or special events, which, the trial court wrote, should remain as

set forth in the divorce judgment. The trial court wrote that, if the

Lauderdale County weekly visitation guidelines "prove[d] too much of a

hardship on the children as they are travelling too much between

Madison/Huntsville and Florence … during any given school week," the

mother was to have visitation with he children during the first and third

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weekends of every month while school was in session, with the exception

that,

"[i]f the mother's weekend falls on a weekend where there is
a significant extracurricular event, for example, school
events, then the mother is to ensure that the children make
these schedule[d] events, or alternatively, the parties are to
adjust weekends with the father getting the children to their
events/activities and the mother exercising her weekend on
another weekend without conflicts. However, it is the
intention of this modification that the mother and [her
husband] … get the children to their events on their
prescribes weekends."

As to parenting time during the summer, the trial court wrote that

the parties could agree between themselves with whom the children

would reside, taking into consideration the children's needs and

activities. The trial court expressed its preference that the parties would

exercise "week-on-week-off" visitation during the summers "while the

children [were] still young enough," especially if the mother's visitation

was limited to two weekends a month during the school year. In addition,

the trial court provided that each party was entitled to exercise a

visitation period of at least ten consecutive days with the children each

summer.

The trial court concluded that, in light of the custody modification,

any other relief requested by the parties was either moot or denied.

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Finally, it held that all provisions of the divorce judgment not expressly

modified would remain in effect.

The mother moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgments,

arguing that they were contrary to the evidence and constituted an abuse

of discretion. The trial court held a hearing on those motions, during

which the mother's counsel argued that the trial court had erred in

treating the case as a relocation matter. The mother's counsel asserted

that the only request related to relocation had been the mother's request

that the twenty-five-mile residency restriction be modified and

maintained that the mother had not invoked the relocation act. The

mother's counsel further asserted that, had the residency restriction been

removed, the mother would still have been required under the relocation

act to notify the father if she planned to relocate more than sixty miles

away and, if he objected, to bring the matter before the court at that time.

The trial-court judge responded that he had "taken everything the father

did as an objection to the relocation" and that the issue was "presently

being litigated." When the mother's counsel again argued that there had

been no request to move and no invocation of the relocation act, the trial-

court judge stated that the evidence reflected that the mother had

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established a second residence in Madison "right on the edge or right

outside of the sixty-mile radius." The trial-court judge further stated that

he "had to make a decision, and [had] decided it was a relocation case."

The father's counsel then argued that the matter was a relocation case,

stating that the father had filed an objection and that the trial court had

followed the relocation act and had acted in the best interests of the

children.

The trial court denied the mother's postjudgment motions. The

mother thereafter filed timely notices of appeal in both cases, and this

court consolidated the appeals ex mero motu.

Standard of Review

Our standard of review is well settled. We presume that a trial

court's judgment based on ore tenus evidence is correct, and we will not

reverse it absent a showing that the trial court acted outside its discretion

or that the judgment is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly

and palpably wrong. Henderson v. Henderson, 978 So. 2d 36, 39 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2007). However, when we are presented with an issue of law, we

review the judgment of the trial court as to that issue de novo. Id.

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Analysis

The mother contends that the trial court erred in treating this case

as a relocation dispute governed by the relocation act. She argues that

the relocation act was not triggered because the Madison residence was

within sixty miles of the father's residence. In his appellate brief, the

father argues that, although the mother contends that the Madison

residence is less than sixty miles from his residence, the evidence at trial

indicated that the distance between the residences exceeds sixty miles

depending on the route taken. He acknowledges that an alternative route

of approximately fifty-eight miles was discussed, but he asserts that the

trial court determined that that route would take longer because it

required travel through Madison and Athens and involved heavier

traffic. According to the father, that longer travel time would negatively

affect the children's travel to school and activities; therefore, he

maintains that relocating to Madison would violate the sixty-mile

limitation under the relocation act.

Although the final judgments do not expressly state that the trial

court applied the relocation act, or any particular provisions of that act,

it held that the Madison residence was more than sixty miles away and

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described the mother's asserted relocation to Madison as the "critical"

and "primary" issue requiring a custody modification. The record likewise

reflects ongoing references to the relocation act. At the postjudgment

hearing, the mother's counsel argued that the mother had sought only

removal of the twenty-five-mile residency restriction and had not invoked

the relocation act, and the trial-court judge rejected that argument,

stating that he had treated the father's actions as an objection to

relocation, that the issue was being litigated, and that the evidence

showed that the mother had established a second residence in Madison

near or outside the sixty-mile radius. The father's counsel likewise

argued that the case involved relocation and that the trial court had

properly followed the relocation act. Despite these repeated references,

the final judgment does not explicitly indicate whether the trial court

applied the relocation act -- or the burdens and presumptions it creates -

- in resolving the parties' claims.

The purpose of the relocation act is to "promote[] the general

philosophy in this state that children need both parents, even after a

divorce …." § 30-3-160, Ala. Code 1975. The relocation act places certain

obligations on parents who are relocating; for example, a parent "who has

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the right to establish the principal residence of [a] child" must notify

"every other person entitled to custody of or visitation with a child of a

proposed change of the child's principal residence," § 30-3-163, Ala. Code

1975, and every person entitled to custody or visitation with a child must

provide notice to any other such person of his or her intention to change

his or her residence, § 30-3-164, Ala. Code 1975. Any person entitled to

notice of a change of a child's principal residence may, within thirty days

of receiving such notice, seek a temporary or permanent order preventing

the change of the child's principal residence. § 30-3-169, Ala. Code 1975.

Section 30-3-169.4, Ala. Code 1975, which is part of the relocation

act, provides that, in resolving an objection to the change of a child's

principal residence, "there shall be a rebuttable presumption that a

change of principal residence of a child is not in the best interest of the

child." Section 30-3-169.3(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "a court may

consider a proposed change of principal residence of a child as a factor to

support a change of custody of the child." Importantly, however, except

in circumstances not relevant here, neither § 30-3-169.3 nor § 30-3-169.4

"apply to a change of principal residence of a child to a residence which

is 60 miles or less from the residence of a non-relocating parent who is

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entitled to custody of or visitation with the child …." § 30-3-162(b), Ala.

Code 1975. Thus, if the Madison residence was sixty miles or less from

the father's residence, the provisions of the relocation act relating to

custody modification and the presumptions and burdens attendant

thereto, namely § 30-3-169.3 and § 30-3-169.4, among others, do not

apply. The trial court concluded that the Madison residence was more

than sixty miles from the father's residence. We disagree.

It was undisputed at trial that the Madison residence could be

reached by a route of approximately fifty-eight miles from the father's

residence. The trial court acknowledged that the most direct route

between the residences appeared to be about fifty-eight miles, and the

father's counsel conceded during that discussion that she also had seen

the fifty-eight-mile-route calculation. Although it was argued that this

shorter route might take longer because of traffic through Athens and

Madison, the distance nonetheless placed the residences within the sixty-

mile statutory threshold.

The inquiry under § 30-3-162(b) concerns the distance between the

father's residence and the Madison residence. We need not determine, in

this case, whether the distance between those residences should be

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measured by a straight line (i.e., "as the crow flies") or by the roads one

would travel between the residences, although we note that at least one

court has concluded that, "[i]n the absence of any statutory or contractual

provision governing the manner of measurement of distances, the general

rule is that distance should be measured along the shortest straight line,

on a horizontal plane and not along the course of a highway or along the

usual traveled way." See Tucker v. Liebknecht, 86 So. 3d 1240, 1242 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2012). Here, whether measured by a straight line or by a

traveled route, it was undisputed that the distance between the father's

residence and the mother's husband's residence in Madison was less than

sixty miles.1

The fact that a quicker driving route between the residences may

exceed sixty miles does not alter the agreed fact that a route of

approximately fifty-eight miles exists between the father's residence and

the Madison residence. Because that distance falls within the sixty-mile

limit set out in § 30-3-162(b), the plain language of the statute indicates

1Although there was no evidence at trial about the straight-line

distance between the father's residence and the mother's husband's
residence, the fact that there was a route of travel between the two
residences of less than sixty miles means, necessarily, that a straight line
between the two residences would be less than sixty miles.
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that the provisions of the relocation act governing the parties' relative

burdens regarding the children's best interests and whether a proposed

change of residence can serve as a factor supporting a change of custody

-- § 30-3-169.3 and § 30-3-169.4 -- would not apply in these cases.

Because the mother's potential relocation to Madison did not

trigger application of the presumptions and burdens created by § 30-3-

169.3 and § 30-3-169.4, any analysis of the father's request to modify

custody under those provisions would have been erroneous. However, we

cannot discern from the trial court's judgments whether it applied those

provisions in determining whether to modify custody. On the one hand,

the trial court plainly applied the standard from Ex parte Couch, 521 So.

2d 987, 989 (Ala. 1988), when it concluded that there had been a material

change in circumstances and that it was in the children's best interests

to modify custody. That was the correct standard, because the parties had

joint physical custody of the children. See L.B. v. V.T.W., 387 So. 3d 1157,

1161 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) ("The Couch 'best interests' standard is …

applicable to the modification of a judgment that awarded joint physical

custody of a child to the parents."). However, the trial court determined

that the mother's relocation was "the critical issue," and it made an

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explicit finding of fact that the distance relating to the relocation

exceeded sixty miles, a finding that, it appears to us, would have been

unnecessary were the trial court not applying the burdens and

presumptions set forth in § 30-3-169.3 and § 30-3-169.4. Because we

cannot determine whether, in deciding to modify custody, the trial court

applied those presumptions and burdens or, instead, relied solely on the

Ex parte Couch standard without reference to those presumptions and

burdens, and because we cannot conclude that the trial court would have

reached the same conclusion regardless of whether it presumed that the

relocation of the children brought about by the mother's relocation to the

Madison residence was not in their best interests, we are constrained to

reverse the judgments and remand the cases for the entry of new

judgments that inform the parties whether the trial court applied those

portions of the relocation act that we have concluded have no application

in resolving the father's custody-modification request. See Turner v.

Denney, 899 So. 2d 1016, 1017-18 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (reversing

judgment modifying custody and remanding case when appellate court

was "unable to determine what standard the trial court applied in

modifying custody").

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In remanding these actions, we do not suggest that the evidence

was insufficient as a matter of law to support an award of sole legal and

physical custody to the father under the best-interests standard. To be

sure, the evidence concerning the mother's living arrangements and the

possibility (or actuality) of her move to Madison was not irrelevant. The

trial court was entitled to consider those facts, along with the evidence

regarding travel to school, the feasibility of the existing joint-physical-

custody arrangement, and the parties' ongoing coparenting disputes.

However, a change in a custodial parent's residence, standing alone, does

not necessarily justify a change in custody; rather, it is only one factor to

be considered in determining whether a material change in

circumstances has occurred. Means v. Means, 512 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1987).

Accordingly, the judgments are reversed and the cases remanded

for the trial court to clarify the standard it applied. If the trial court

applied the burdens and presumptions set out in § 30-3-169.3 and § 30-

3-169.4 of the relocation act, it must reconsider the parties' claims under

Ex parte Couch's best-interests standard without applying those burdens

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and presumptions. If it did not apply those burdens and presumptions,

the new judgments should say so.

In addition, we note that the school-year visitation provisions in the

final judgments are unclear, making it difficult to determine whether

they comply with Alabama law. Specifically, it is uncertain whether the

final judgments establish a definite, enforceable minimum visitation

schedule independent of the custodial parent's discretion. See Pratt v.

Pratt, 56 So. 3d 638, 644 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).

For example, regarding the mother's school-year visitation, if the

parties are unable to agree on the mother's visitation between

themselves, they are to apply the Lauderdale County Standard Visitation

Guidelines unless the guidelines prove to be too much of a hardship on

the children. However, the judgments do not set forth which party

determines whether the guidelines prove to be too much of a hardship or

whether the parties are to mutually agree as to that issue.

Assuming the parties agree that application of the guidelines do, in

fact, create too much of a hardship, the mother's school-year visitation is

to be every first and third weekend; however, if the children had a

"significant extracurricular event" on one of the mother's weekends, then

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the mother and her husband are to ensure that the children get to the

event, or the parties must switch weekends. However, the judgments do

not define when an extracurricular event is "significant," and they

provide no guidance as to how the parties are to resolve any conflict

resulting from the parties' inability to agree on a make-up weekend for

the mother. Because the father, as sole legal and physical custodian,

necessarily controls the children's schedules, he appears to hold the

practical authority to make those determinations.

Finally, it is entirely unclear with whom the children will live -- and

who will decide with whom the children will live -- during the summers.

The judgments simply express a preference that the parties will exchange

the children on a weekly basis, but there is nothing in the judgments that

requires such an exchange. The only certainty with regard to summers is

that each parent is entitled to one visitation period of at least ten

consecutive days. Again, other than the consecutive-day visitation, it

appears that the father, as the children's sole custodian, may be able to

exercise unfettered control over the mother's summer visitation rights

with the children.

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The judgments' lack of clarity regarding visitation rights raises a

substantial question whether the final judgments provided the mother

with a sufficiently definite visitation schedule upon which she may rely,

as required under Alabama law. See Pratt, 56 So. 3d at 643-44 (holding

that a visitation award must provide a "sufficient, specified visitation

schedule" independent of the custodial parent's discretion and that a

grant of broad discretion that could effectively eliminate visitation is

improper). Although the final judgments appear to contemplate a

fallback schedule -- i.e., the first and third weekends of each month -- the

undefined "significant event" exception and the absence of any identified

decision maker or objective standard leave uncertain whether that

schedule is actually guaranteed or may be displaced in practice. As well,

the judgments' provision for summer visitation lacks almost any specific,

enforceable visitation rights for the mother. Alabama courts have

recognized that visitation provisions lacking definite parameters are

unduly vague and likely to generate continued disputes. See K.F. v.

Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 78 So. 3d 983, 991 (Ala. Civ. App.

2011) (concluding that a visitation award that fails to specify when

visitation occurs may lead to additional litigation); R.K.J. v. J.D.J., 887

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CL-2025-0567 and CL-2025-0568

So. 2d 915, 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (reversing judgment that failed to

establish a definite visitation schedule). Likewise, even when cooperation

between the parties is encouraged, a custody judgment must include a

concrete minimum visitation schedule. A.B. v. A.A., 334 So. 3d 223, 228-

29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (requiring that a baseline schedule be set

notwithstanding discretionary or agreed visitation), overruled on other

grounds by J.M.L. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 402 So. 3d 832

(Ala. Civ. App. 2024).

Here, because the final judgments leave too much unresolved

regarding the mother's visitation rights, the visitation provisions are too

vague to determine whether they satisfy Alabama law and create a

significant risk of continued litigation over visitation rights. To be sure,

we do not suggest that the trial court may not require the mother to

ensure that the children attend extracurricular or school events during

her visitation periods; rather, the concern is that the final judgments do

not clearly establish a definite, enforceable visitation schedule

independent of the father's discretion. On remand, in the interest of

judicial economy, we direct the trial court, if its new judgments again

award the father sole physical custody of the children and the mother

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visitation rights, to reconsider the parameters of the visitation

arrangement so that the mother is provided a specified visitation

schedule that is independent of the father's discretion.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgments modifying

custody are reversed, and the cases are remanded for the trial court to

enter new judgments and, in so doing, (1) to clarify whether it applied the

burdens and presumptions deriving from § 30-3-169.3 and § 30-3-169.4

in resolving the father's request to modify custody; (2) if it did so, to

reconsider its resolution of the father's request; and (3) should it award

the father sole physical custody and the mother visitation rights in its

new judgments, to ensure that the visitation award provides a specific

schedule free of any doubt or ambiguity as to the mother's visitation

rights with the children and that is independent of the father's discretion.

CL-2025-0567 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0568 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

29