Ex parte Jason Slayton PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS:

Rel: January 27, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
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Ex parte Jason Slayton

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Kari Nichole Slayton

v.

Jason Lee Slayton)

(Etowah Circuit Court, DR-22-88)

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

Kari Nicole Slayton ("the mother") and Jason Lee Slayton ("the

father") were divorced pursuant to a March 2020 judgment ("the Georgia

divorce judgment") of the Superior Court of Cherokee County, Georgia.
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The Georgia divorce judgment incorporated the terms of a settlement

agreement and specified that the mother was awarded "primary physical

custody" of the parties' child and that the father was awarded visitation

with the child. The Georgia divorce judgment also required the father to

pay child support, to pay certain amounts as part of the parties' property

division, and to contribute to the payment of the mother's attorney fee.

On March 8, 2022, the mother filed in the Etowah Circuit Court

("the trial court") a petition in which she sought, among other things, to

modify the visitation and child-support provisions of the Georgia divorce

judgment and to have the father held in contempt for his alleged failure

to comply with certain payment provisions of the Georgia divorce

judgment. The mother submitted a copy of the Georgia divorce judgment

in support of her petition. In addition, in her petition, the mother sought

emergency relief. In that part of her petition in which she sought

emergency relief, the mother alleged that the father was abusing illegal

drugs, asked that the father be required to submit to drug screens, and

sought to suspend the father's visitation based on her concerns about his

ability to properly care for the child during visits if he was abusing illegal

drugs.

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On March 8, 2022, the trial court entered an order requiring the

father to submit to a drug screen and suspending his visitation with the

child pending the submission of the results of that drug screen to the trial

court. The materials submitted to this court show that, in response to

questioning by the trial court during a hearing on July 26, 2022, the

father's attorney made certain representations concerning the father's

compliance with the March 8, 2022, order. Among those representations

was that the father had submitted to the court-ordered drug screen, that

the results of that drug screen were positive for the father's use of

cocaine, and that the father had not visited with child since the entry of

the March 8, 2022, order. The arguments of the parties' attorneys during

the July 26, 2022, hearing and during a later hearing on a purported

postjudgment motion also support the assertions of the father's attorney

with regard to the results of the drug screen that the father took in

compliance with the trial court's March 8, 2022, order.

On April 26, 2022, the father moved the trial court to vacate "any

orders" entered by the trial court until the trial court had considered the

father's allegation that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The

comments of the trial court during the two hearings conducted in this

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matter indicate that the only order entered by the trial court at the time

the father filed his motion was the March 8, 2022, order, and no other

orders dated before April 26, 2022, were included in the materials

submitted to this court by the parties. See Rule 21(a)(1)(F), Ala. R. App.

P. In his April 26, 2022, motion, the father did not expressly seek to

dismiss the mother's action, but he argued that the trial court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The materials submitted to

this court indicate that, three months later, on July 26, 2022, the father

filed a motion to dismiss the mother's petition.

Regardless, the trial court treated the father's April 26, 2022,

motion as a motion to dismiss, and it conducted a hearing on July 26,

2022, at which the parties presented evidence on the issue of the trial

court's subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), § 30-3B-101 et seq.,

Ala. Code 1975. During the July 26, 2022, hearing, the father testified

that he had moved to Alabama in 2019 and had been working and living

in Alabama since that time. The mother testified that she had moved

with the child to Alabama in May 2020 and that she and the child had

lived in Alabama since that time.

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It is undisputed that when the mother filed her petition, the mother

had not sought to register the Georgia divorce judgment in the trial court

pursuant to § 30-3B-305, Ala. Code 1975. In his July 26, 2022, motion,

and during the July 26, 2022, hearing, the father argued that the

mother's entire action should be dismissed based on her failure to register

the Georgia divorce judgment in the trial court.

On July 28, 2022, the trial court entered an order finding that, in

entering its March 8, 2022, order, it had exercised its emergency

jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204, Ala. Code 1975, of the UCCJEA. The trial

court also found in that order that the parties had lived in Alabama for a

sufficiently long period to confer the trial court with subject-matter

jurisdiction over the mother's modification action under the UCCJEA.

The trial court ordered the mother to register the Georgia divorce

judgment in the trial court, and it denied the father's motions to dismiss.

The father filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider its July

28, 2022, order, and the trial court conducted a hearing on that motion.

On August 5, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying the motion

to reconsider but specifying that "[t]he emergency relief granted by the

court by virtue of the court's emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA

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pursuant to the [mother's] petition for emergency ex parte relief shall

remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) days from the date of this order."

On September 8, 2022, the father filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus in this court. We note that the father's motion to reconsider

did not extend the time for the father to file a timely petition for a writ of

mandamus from the July 28, 2022, order. See Ex parte Troutman

Sanders, LLP, 866 So. 2d 547, 550 (Ala. 2003) (noting that a motion to

reconsider, i.e., a purported postjudgment motion, filed in reference to an

interlocutory order does not toll the time for filing a timely petition for a

writ of mandamus). Regardless, the father's petition for a writ of

mandamus was timely filed, having been filed within a presumptively

reasonable time after the entry of the July 28, 2022, order, i.e., within 42

days of that order. See Rule 21(a), Ala. R. App. P.; Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.

App. P.; and Ex parte Murray, 267 So. 3d 328, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)

("A petition for a writ of mandamus must be filed within a reasonable

time, which has been held to be the same time for taking a timely

appeal.").

The father argues in his petition for a writ of mandamus that the

trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the mother's action for

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lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The father contends that the trial

court erred in entering that part of its July 28, 2022, order in which it

directed the mother to register the Georgia divorce judgment in the trial

court. The materials submitted to this court contain no indication that

the mother had sought to register the Georgia divorce judgment in the

trial court. In fact, in his petition for a writ of mandamus filed 42 days

after the entry of the July 28, 2022, order, the father argues that the

mother has not amended her petition as directed by the trial court in its

July 28, 2022, order. Accordingly, any ruling by this court on whether the

trial court erred by directing the mother to register the Georgia divorce

judgment would be premature, and we deny the petition as to that issue.

The father also argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss with regard to that part of the mother's petition in

which she sought to modify the visitation provisions of the Georgia

divorce judgment. The father points out that the mother did not register

the Georgia divorce judgment in Alabama in compliance with the

UCCJEA. He contends, therefore, that based on the holding of Hummer

v. Loftis, 276 So. 3d 215 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018), the trial court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction over that part of the mother's petition in

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which she sought to modify his visitation rights. In Hummer v. Loftis,

276 So. 3d at 221-22, this court explained:

"The UCCJEA requires that a foreign custody judgment be
registered in an Alabama trial court before that court may
enforce or modify the terms of the custody or visitation award
contained in the foreign judgment. …

" '….'

"… [A]n Alabama trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a
foreign child-custody judgment if that judgment has not been
properly registered pursuant to § 30-3B-306[, Ala. Code 1975,]
of the UCCJEA. See 30-3B-306(b), Ala. Code 1975 ('A court of
this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify,
except in accordance with Article 2 [of the UCCJEA], a
registered child custody determination of a court of another
state.')."

See also Boston v. Franklin, [Ms. 2200249, Oct. 29, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___,

___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).

In this case, the mother did not register the Georgia divorce

judgment in the trial court pursuant to the requirements of the UCCJEA.

Therefore, given the father's argument and the foregoing precedent, we

hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over that part of the mother's

petition in which she sought to modify the visitation provisions of the

Georgia divorce judgment. We therefore grant the petition for a writ of

mandamus to the extent that the trial court denied the father's motion to

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dismiss that part of the mother's petition in which she sought to modify

the visitation provisions of the Georgia divorce judgment.

The father argues in his petition for a writ of mandamus that the

trial court also lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider that part of

the mother's petition in which she sought the relief that the trial court

granted in the March 8, 2022, order. As we noted earlier in this opinion,

the trial court indicated that it had exercised its emergency jurisdiction

in entering its March 8, 2022, order. The UCCJEA addresses the

emergency jurisdiction of a court as follows:

"(a) A court of this state has temporary emergency
jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child
has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of
the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or
abuse.

"(b) If there is no previous child custody determination
that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA] and a child
custody proceeding has not been commenced in a court of a
state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through
30-3B-203[, Ala. Code 1975], a child custody determination
made under this section remains in effect until an order is
obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction under
Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203. If a child custody
proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a
state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through
30-3B-203, a child custody determination made under this
section becomes a final determination, if it so provides and
this state becomes the home state of the child.

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"(c) If there is a previous child custody determination
that is entitled to be enforced under [the UCCJEA], or a child
custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state
having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-
203, any order issued by a court of this state under this section
must specify in the order a period that the court considers
adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an
order from the state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-
201 through 30-3B-203. The order issued in this state remains
in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within
the period specified or the period expires.

"(d) A court of this state which has been asked to make
a child custody determination under this section, upon being
informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced
in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court
of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201
through 30-3B-203, shall immediately communicate with the
other court. A court of this state which is exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-
203, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has
been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been
made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to
this section shall immediately communicate with the court of
that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the
parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration
of the temporary order."

§ 30-3B-204.

The father contends that the trial court could not exercise

emergency jurisdiction in this matter without first registering the

Georgia divorce judgment. However, the August 5, 2022, order specified

that the trial court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction was effective for

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only 60 days from the date of that order, i.e., until October 4, 2022. After

the parties submitted briefs in support of their positions on the father's

petition for a writ of mandamus, this matter was submitted to this court

for a decision on October 3, 2022. One day later, the August 5, 2022, order

expired by its own terms, and neither party has informed this court of

any extension of the trial court's exercise of emergency jurisdiction.

Accordingly, because of the expiration of the trial court's August 5, 2022,

order, the issue is now moot because "there is no effective remedy upon

which relief can be granted." AIRCO, Inc. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n,

360 So. 2d 970, 971 (Ala. 1978). " '[A]s a general rule, [this court] will not

decide questions after a decision has become useless or moot.' "

Underwood v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 127 (Ala. 2009)

(quoting Arrington v. State ex rel. Parsons, 422 So. 2d 759, 760 (Ala.

1982)). We therefore dismiss that part of the father's petition for a writ

of mandamus pertaining to his arguments concerning the trial court's

exercise of emergency jurisdiction as moot.

The father has demonstrated that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

over that part of the mother's petition in which she sought to modify the

visitation provisions of the Georgia divorce judgment because that

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judgment has not been registered in the trial court pursuant to the

requirements of the UCCJEA, and we grant the petition for a writ of

mandamus as to that issue and direct the trial court to dismiss that part

of the mother's petition. We dismiss as moot that part of the father's

petition for a writ of mandamus in which the father seeks to dismiss the

mother's claim for emergency relief, and we deny that part of the father's

petition for a writ of mandamus in which the father alleges that the trial

court erred by directing the mother to register the Georgia divorce

judgment.

The father has made no argument in his petition for a writ of

mandamus regarding any claims that the mother asserted under the

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("the UEFJA"), § 6-9-23

et seq., Ala. Code 1975, or under the Uniform Interstate Family Support

Act ("the UIFSA"), § 30-3D-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. In the absence of

an argument regarding the UEFJA and the UIFSA, and particularly

when the interested parties have not addressed the issue of whether

there was a substantial compliance with the requirements of those acts,

we decline to address them.

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PETITION GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, AND

DISMISSED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore and Edwards, JJ., concur in the result, without opinions.

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