T. A. A., Jr. v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court: CC-21-323)

Rel: May 2, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
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CR-2024-0056
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T.A.A., Jr.

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court
(CC-21-323)

On Return to Remand

WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

T.A.A., Jr. appeals his guilty-plea convictions for 5 counts of

production of obscene matter containing a visual depiction of a person

under 17 years of age involved in obscene acts, see § 13A-12-197, Ala.

Code 1975, 6 counts of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years of age,
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see § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975, 1 count of first-degree sodomy, see §

13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, and 2 counts of a parent or guardian

permitting children to engage in the production of obscene matter, see §

13A-12-196, Ala. Code 1975. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Coffee

Circuit Court sentenced T.A.A. to concurrent terms of 35 years in prison

for his convictions for production of obscene matter, first-degree sodomy,

and a parent or guardian permitting children to engage in the production

of obscene matter and 20 years in prison for his convictions for sexual

abuse of a child less than 12 years of age.

On original submission, although neither party raised the issue,

this Court found that several of T.A.A.'s sentences were illegal. "Matters

concerning unauthorized sentences are jurisdictional," Hunt v. State, 659

So. 2d 998, 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); therefore, this Court may take

notice of an illegal sentence at any time. See, e.g., McCall v. State, 794

So. 2d 1243 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).

Section 13A-5-6(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in relevant part:

"In addition to any penalties heretofore or hereafter
provided by law, in all cases ... where an offender is convicted
of a Class A felony sex offense involving a child as defined in
Section 15-20A-4, [Ala. Code 1975,] and is sentenced to a
county jail or the Alabama Department of Corrections, the
sentencing judge shall impose an additional penalty of not

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less than 10 years of post-release supervision to be served
upon the defendant's release from incarceration."

The offenses of first-degree sodomy under § 13A-6-63(a)(3),

production of obscene matter containing a visual depiction of a person

under 17 years of age involved in obscene acts, and a parent or guardian

permitting children to engage in the production of obscene matter are

Class A felonies and "sex offense[s] involving a child" under §§ 15-20A-

4(2) and 15-20A-4(27). Because T.A.A. was convicted of Class A felony

sex offenses involving a child, he had to be sentenced according to § 13A-

5-6(c). As this Court stated in Bishop v. State, 344 So. 3d 906, 913 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2021):

"The authorized sentencing range for a Class A felony
sex offense involving a child is not less than 20 years, § 13A-
5-6(a)(4), nor more than 99 years or life in prison, § 13A-5-
6(a)(1), and not less than 10 years of post-release supervision,
§ 13A-5-6(c). The failure to impose a term of post-release
supervision as required by § 13A-5-6(c) is similar to the failure
to impose a term of probation as part of a split sentence under
15A-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, which renders a sentence illegal.

"....

"It is clear, based on the legislature's specific reference
in § 15-20A-20(d)[, Ala. Code 1975,] to § 13A-5-6(c), that the
post-release supervision referred to in 13A-5-6(c) is electronic
monitoring as found in § 15-20A-20(d). However, the plain
language of both § 13A-5-6(c) and § 15-20A-20(d) make it clear
that the period of post-release supervision is part of the

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offender's sentence and must be imposed by the trial court. In
addition, the length of the post-release supervision period
required by § 13A-5-6(c) is discretionary, i.e., not less than 10
years. See, e.g., Lane v. State, 66 So. 3d 824, 829-30 (Ala.
2010) (holding that where § 13A-5-9(b)(3), Ala. Code 1975,
required a sentence of life or "any term not less than 99 years,"
a term in excess of 99 years was authorized). Thus, in
sentencing a sex offender like Bishop, a trial court has
discretion to determine the appropriate length of the post-
release supervision period, as long as that period is not less
than 10 years, just as it has discretion to determine the
appropriate length of the prison term, as long as that term is
within the authorized statutory range."

On August 2, 2024, this Court issued an order remanding the case

for the circuit court to conduct a resentencing hearing to correct the

illegality in T.A.A.'s sentences by imposing a term of not less than 10

years of post-release supervision as required by § 13A-5-6(c) for each

Class A felony sex offense involving a child. This Court also stated that,

if T.A.A. determined that his resentencing affects the voluntariness of his

guilty plea and moves to withdraw his plea, the circuit court shall conduct

a hearing to determine whether withdrawal of the plea is necessary to

correct a manifest injustice. See Rule 14.4(e), Ala. R. Crim. P.

On remand, the circuit court, in accordance with this Court's

instructions, added terms of 10 years of post-release supervision to

T.A.A.'s sentences for his Class A felony convictions. T.A.A., in turn,

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moved to withdraw his guilty plea. T.A.A. testified that his guilty plea

had been involuntarily and unknowingly entered because he had been

unaware of the additional penalty of post-release supervision. The circuit

court found that the testimony was unpersuasive in light of T.A.A.'s

background as a law-enforcement officer and his extensive training and

instruction on Alabama law. The circuit court found "no merit in the

defendant's claim that he would have rejected a plea offer had he known

about the requirement to serve at least 10 years of post-release

supervision." (C. on remand 26.)

In his brief on return to remand, T.A.A. reasserts his argument that

his guilty plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered because he

was unaware of the additional penalty of post-release supervision and

argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. The State concedes the issue, at least with respect to T.A.A.'s

Class A felony convictions.

The circuit court's failure to impose a period of post-release

supervision as part of T.A.A.'s sentences for the Class A felony sex

offenses involving a child rendered those sentences illegal. See Bishop,

344 So. 3d at 913. A trial court "cannot accept a plea agreement that

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calls for an illegal sentence." Calloway v. State, 860 So. 2d 900, 906 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2002). T.A.A. pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea

agreement, and he was not informed of the additional penalty of post-

release supervision. T.A.A.'s resentencing constituted a rejection of his

negotiated plea agreement. Wells v. State, 381 So. 3d 508, 512 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2022). Consequently, the circuit court, notwithstanding its

findings regarding T.A.A.'s credibility, should have allowed T.A.A. to

withdraw his guilty plea. See Wells, supra; see also Williams v. State,

203 So. 3d 888, 894 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) ("When an illegal sentence is

imposed in accordance with a plea agreement the [defendant] is entitled

to withdraw his plea.").

Despite conceding that T.A.A. is entitled to relief with respect to his

Class A felony convictions, the State argues that T.A.A.'s guilty plea to

the Class B felonies – 6 counts of sexual abuse of a child less than 12

years of age – should remain in place. The State reasons that the

sentences for the Class B felonies were not affected by his resentencing;

thus, T.A.A. received the sentence for which he had negotiated, leaving

him no ground to warrant the withdrawal of his guilty plea to those

offenses.

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Whether a trial court has the discretion to sever a guilty plea,

allowing a defendant to withdraw only a portion of his plea, appears to

be, as the State asserts, an issue of first impression in Alabama. The

Supreme Court of Washington has considered this issue, and this Court

finds its reasoning well-taken. See State v. Turley, 149 Wash. 2d 395, 69

P.3d 338 (2003).

In Turley, the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement to charges of first-degree escape and conspiracy to

manufacture methamphetamine. During the guilty-plea hearing, the

State failed to inform the defendant that the drug charge required

mandatory community placement, which in Washington is considered to

be a direct consequence of a plea. The trial court sentenced the defendant

in accordance with the plea agreement. When the State learned three

years later that the drug charge carried a mandatory term of community

placement, it moved the trial court to amend the defendant's sentence.

The trial court amended the defendant's sentence over his objection.

The defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that

his guilty plea to the drug charge had not been knowing and voluntary

because he had been unaware of the mandatory community placement

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that had been added to his sentence. The defendant also argued that,

because he had pleaded guilty pursuant to a single plea agreement, he

should be allowed to withdraw both guilty pleas. The trial court granted

the defendant's motion in part, allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea

with respect to only the drug charge. The defendant appealed the

decision, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed in an

unpublished memorandum.

The Supreme Court of Washington granted the defendant's petition

for review. The court addressed the question "whether a trial court may

grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea agreement as to each count

separately when the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts entered

the same day in one agreement." Turley, 149 Wash. 2d at 398, 69 P.3d

at 340. The court "answer[ed] that question in the negative." Id. The

court recognized that "[a] plea agreement is essentially a contract made

between a defendant and the State," and, in accordance with principles

of contract law, considered the "the intent of the parties" to determine

whether a plea agreement should be considered severable. Turley, 149

Wash. 2d at 400, 69 P.3d at 341.

"When determining intent, we do not concern ourselves with
unexpressed subjective intent, only objective manifestations

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of intent. See, e.g., Wilson Court Ltd. P'ship v. Tony Maroni's,
Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 692, 699, 952 P.2d 590 (1998).

"… Here, the record contains sufficient objective
indications of intent from which we conclude the plea
agreement was meant to be indivisible, without inquiry into
the substance of the plea negotiations. Turley negotiated and
pleaded to two charges contemporaneously. One document
contained the plea to and conditions for both charges. The
trial court accepted his plea to both charges at one hearing.
In that hearing, the court advised Turley of the consequences
of his plea, but did not separate these consequences out based
on the individual charges. We hold that a trial court must
treat a plea agreement as indivisible when pleas to multiple
counts or charges were made at the same time, described in
one document, and accepted in a single proceeding. Absent
objective indications to the contrary in the agreement itself,
we will not look behind the agreement to attempt to determine
divisibility. Such a determination, after the fact, would not
serve the plea negotiation process. When the defendant can
show manifest injustice as to one count or charge in an
indivisible agreement, the defendant may move to withdraw
the plea agreement or have specific performance of the
agreement."

Turley, 149 Wash. 2d at 400, 69 P.3d at 341-42.

The courts of this State have shown a reluctance to apply rigid

principles of contract law to guilty pleas but have nonetheless recognized

that they may provide a "useful analytical framework." Ex parte Yarber,

437 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (Ala. 1983). This Court agrees with the holding of

Turley, finding its use of principles of contract law to determine the

intent of the parties to produce a fair and workable standard.

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Here, T.A.A. was charged with 14 offenses in a single indictment.

(C. 328-33.) T.A.A. negotiated with the State for a single plea agreement

that covered all 14 pending charges. (C. 454-55.) The circuit court

accepted T.A.A.'s guilty pleas to the 14 charges in a single proceeding.

Applying the reasoning of Turley to the facts of this case, we hold that it

was the intent of the parties to enter into a single plea agreement that

covered all of T.A.A.'s charges. Therefore, the circuit court cannot sever

T.A.A.'s guilty plea. See id.; see also People v. Blanton, 317 Mich. App.

107, 897 N.W.2d 613 (2016) (adopting the rationale of Turley and holding

that a defendant's guilty plea could not be severed), Whitaker v. State,

881 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial court

erred by granting only a partial withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea

because the record demonstrated that the parties had intended to

negotiate the defendant's guilty plea to several charges as part of a

package in exchange for the dismissal of other charges).

Therefore, this Court reverses the judgments of conviction against

T.A.A. and remands the case to the circuit court with directions to set

aside T.A.A.'s guilty plea and the resulting convictions and to restore

T.A.A.'s case to the docket for appropriate disposition.

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REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Kellum, Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.

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