Donnie Lee Abernathy v. State of Alabama.

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CR-21-0275
_________________________

Donnie Lee Abernathy

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Cherokee Circuit Court
(CC-16-254, CC-16-255, CC-16-256, and CC-16-257)

MINOR, Judge.

A jury convicted Donnie Lee Abernathy of two counts of capital

murder and one count each of attempted murder, first-degree criminal

mischief, and attempting to elude. Abernathy waived his right to jury

participation in sentencing on his capital-murder convictions. The
CR-21-0275

Cherokee Circuit Court sentenced Abernathy to death for both capital-

murder convictions, to life imprisonment for the attempted-murder

conviction, to 10 years' imprisonment for the criminal-mischief

conviction, and to 1 year in prison for the attempting-to-elude conviction.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of November 15, 2015, Abernathy broke into a house

in Cedar Bluff, kidnapped Jerrica Hamilton, and shot and killed

Hamilton's 71-year-old grandmother Sylvia Sue Duffe, Duffe's 68-year-

old sister Clara Edwards, and Edwards's 49-year-old daughter Pamela

Oshel. Abernathy also shot John McClung and crashed his vehicle into a

car driven by a law-enforcement officer who was chasing Abernathy.

Law-enforcement officers apprehended Abernathy within minutes of the

crimes.

In its order sentencing Abernathy to death, the trial court

summarized the evidence from Abernathy's trial:

"On or about November 15, 2015, Donnie Abernathy and
Jerrica Hamilton were in the middle of a custody dispute
regarding their biological child. Jerrica Hamilton was living
with her grandmother, Sue Duffe, in Cedar Bluff, Cherokee

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County, Alabama.[1] Also living in the same house was John
McClung. On that same day—November 15, 2015—Clara
Edwards (Sue Duffe's sister) and Pam Oshel (Clara Edwards's
daughter) traveled from Iowa to Cedar Bluff, Alabama, to help
care for the minor child and provide support to Ms.
Hamilton.[2] That night, around midnight, Abernathy entered
the residence of Jerrica Hamilton. Hamilton was awakened
from her sleep by Abernathy poking her in the ribs and telling
her to 'get up' and 'be quiet.' Sharing a room that night with
Hamilton was Pam Oshel. During the interaction between
Abernathy and Hamilton, Oshel was also awakened.
Hamilton testified that when Oshel was awakened and saw
Abernathy in the room, Oshel instantly grabbed her phone. It
was at this time Abernathy shot and killed Oshel.

"While Abernathy was shooting Oshel, Hamilton ran out
of her room and entered her grandmother's room. While in her
grandmother Sue Duffe's room, Hamilton called 911. That call
was made at approximately 12:05 a.m. on November 16, 2015.
At the same time, while in Duffe's room, Hamilton heard two
more gunshots outside of the bedroom, immediately followed
by a scream from Clara Edwards. Edwards was later found
dead with two gunshot wounds. After killing Clara Edwards,
Abernathy continued through the house.

"John McClung had been awakened by the gunshots and

1Because Hamilton was essentially blind and required dialysis, her

testimony was taken by deposition in September 2021 in Iowa, with a
prosecutor and Abernathy's counsel present. The trial judge was present
via Zoom videoconferencing. The parties stipulated to admitting into
evidence a video recording and transcript of Hamilton's deposition.

2Duffe's ex-husband Larry Cooke owned the house. When Cooke's

health began to decline, he asked McClung to move in and take care of
the residence. When Cooke died, McClung contacted Duffe, who traveled
to Alabama from Iowa to make burial arrangements for Cooke. Edwards
traveled with Duffe. Oshel arrived at the house on November 15, 2015.
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screams. McClung testified that he initially believed the
gunshots and screams to be a television that had been left on
with the volume turned up too loud. As the shots and screams
continued, he recognized the screams and realized it was not
a television. McClung testified that he exited his room and
met Abernathy coming around a corner in the hallway. He
recognized and identified Abernathy. Abernathy then shot
McClung. McClung would survive his injuries.

"After killing Clara Edwards and attempting to kill
John McClung, Abernathy then entered Duffe's room where
he proceed to shoot and kill Sue Duffe. Jerrica Hamilton
testified that after killing Duffe, Abernathy grabbed her and
drug her out of the bedroom to the back door. After exiting the
back door, Abernathy forced Hamilton to a golf cart. Evidence
introduced at trial indicated that Abernathy intended to use
the golf cart to transport him and Hamilton to a vehicle
Abernathy had parked in a clearing in the woods
approximately six-tenths of a mile away. After the golf cart
failed to operate correctly, Abernathy pointed the loaded
pistol to the head of Hamilton and ordered her to start
walking. Abernathy and Hamilton walked to the vehicle that
had been parked in the woods by Abernathy. Once they
entered the vehicle, Abernathy demanded that Hamilton call
911 again and tell the operator that the previous 911 call was
made by mistake. By this time, numerous police cars were
responding to the crime scene. From his position in the woods,
Abernathy could see the flashing emergency lights of each
police car. Believing the coast was clear, Abernathy pulled out
of the woods and onto the road. Upon entering the road, he
encountered Deputy Brent Snead who was arriving to the
scene. Deputy Snead activated his emergency lights, and
Abernathy accelerated and struck Deputy Snead's vehicle on
the driver's side.

"A car chase ensued in which Abernathy eventually lost
control of the vehicle, crashing into a tree. Abernathy was
removed from the vehicle by law enforcement. A .22-caliber
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pistol, later identified by forensic experts as the murder
weapon, was located inside the vehicle."

(C. 3192-94.)

A grand jury indicted Abernathy in September 2016 for attempted

murder, see § 13A-4-2 and § 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975 (case no. CC-16-

254); first-degree criminal mischief, see § 13A-7-21(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975

(case no. CC-16-255); and two counts of capital murder, one count for the

murder of two or more persons pursuant to one scheme or course of

conduct, see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975, and one count for murder

during a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975

(case no. CC-16-256). Abernathy was charged by complaint with

attempting to elude, see § 13A-10-52, Ala. Code 1975 (case no. CC-16-

257), and that case was transferred to the circuit court. See § 12-11-30,

Ala. Code 1975, and Rule 2.2, Ala. R. Crim. P. At his arraignment,

Abernathy pleaded not guilty or not guilty by reason of mental disease or

defect.3

At trial, the jury found Abernathy guilty of all five charges. With

the consent of the State, his trial counsel, and the trial court, Abernathy

3At trial, Abernathy did not pursue a defense of not guilty by reason

of mental disease or defect.
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waived his right to jury participation in sentencing for his capital-murder

convictions. See § 13A-5-44(c) and § 13A-5-46(a), Ala. Code 1975. The

trial court sentenced Abernathy to death for both capital-murder

convictions, to life imprisonment for the attempted-murder conviction, to

10 years' imprisonment for the criminal-mischief conviction, and to 1

year in prison for the attempting-to-elude conviction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Most of the issues Abernathy raises seek plain-error review.

"Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., was amended on January 12,
2023, to state:

" 'In all cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals may, but
shall not be obligated to, notice any plain error or
defect in the proceedings under review, whether or
not brought to the attention of the trial court, and
take appropriate appellate action by reason
thereof, whenever such error has or probably has
adversely affected the substantial right of the
appellant.'

"Before Rule 45A was amended, this Court was required to
conduct plain-error review in all cases in which the death
penalty had been imposed. Although Rule 45A now provides
that plain-error review is discretionary in such cases, this
Court has explained that it will continue to conduct plain-
error review in all cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed. Iervolino v. State, 402 So. 3d 845, 861-62 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2023). However, that does not mean that this Court will
provide a detailed analysis, or even any analysis, of those
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claims that were not properly preserved for appellate review,
as it historically did when plain-error review was mandatory.
Id.

"The standard this Court employs in conducting plain-
error review is well settled:

" ' " 'The standard of review in reviewing a claim
under the plain-error doctrine is stricter than the
standard used in reviewing an issue that was
properly raised in the trial court or on appeal.'
Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121 (Ala. Crim. App.
1999), aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 2001). Plain error
is 'error that is so obvious that the failure to notice
it would seriously affect the fairness or integrity of
the judicial proceedings.' Ex parte Trawick, 698
So. 2d 162, 167 (Ala. 1997), modified on other
grounds, Ex parte Wood, 715 So. 2d 819 (Ala.
1998). 'To rise to the level of plain error, the
claimed error must not only seriously affect a
defendant's "substantial rights," but it must also
have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's
deliberations.' Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 209
(Ala. Crim. App. 1998), aff'd, 778 So. 2d 237 (Ala.
2000). 'The plain error standard applies only
where a particularly egregious error occurred at
trial and that error has or probably has
substantially prejudiced the defendant.' Ex parte
Trawick, 698 So. 2d at 167. '[P]lain error must be
obvious on the face of the record. A silent record,
that is a record that on its face contains no
evidence to support the alleged error, does not
establish an obvious error.' Ex parte Walker, 972
So. 2d 737, 753 (Ala. 2007). Thus, '[u]nder the
plain-error standard, the appellant must establish
that an obvious, indisputable error occurred, and
he must establish that the error adversely affected
the outcome of the trial.' Wilson v. State, 142 So.
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3d 732, 751 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). '[T]he plain
error exception to the contemporaneous-objection
rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice
would otherwise result." ' United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1
(1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 163 n.14, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816
(1982))." '

"Iervolino, 402 So. 3d at 861-62 (quoting DeBlase v. State, 294
So. 3d 154, 182-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018))."

Henderson v. State, [Ms. CR-21-0044, May 3, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. Crim. App. 2024).

GUILT-PHASE ISSUES 4

I. NO TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING AT WHICH ABERNATHY
WAS ARRAIGNED

Abernathy argues that "reversal is required because [the] appellate

record does not contain the pretrial motions hearing at which Mr.

Abernathy was arraigned." (Abernathy's brief, p. 88.) Abernathy states

that his "appellate counsel requested" a transcript of a November 2016

"hearing at which it appears that the trial court addressed the State's

motion to amend indictment and that Mr. Abernathy pleaded not guilty

4We address Abernathy's issues in a different order than he raises

them in his brief.
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and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect as to all charges." (Id.

(citation omitted).) Appellate counsel requested the transcript, but the

court reporter indicated that her notes and recordings of that hearing

had been destroyed. (Id.) Abernathy asserts that "[t]he absence of this

transcript violates state and federal law requiring a complete record on

appeal." (Id.) He asserts that, "[w]ithout the transcript, there is no way

to know what else was discussed [at the hearing] and whether any errors

occurred that should be raised on appeal." (Abernathy's brief, p. 89.) He

states, "[f]or example, it is unclear if the need for a competency evaluation

was discussed as a result of Mr. Abernathy's plea." (Id.)

In Revis v. State, 101 So. 3d 247, 331-32 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011),

this Court rejected Revis's contention "that the record [was] inadequate

because it [did] not contain a transcription of the arraignment" and some

portions of the trial:

"Although the arraignment was not transcribed, there is
no requirement that the arraignment be transcribed. See
generally, Fox v. State, 50 So. 3d 494, 496 (Ala. Crim. App.
2007) (on appeal in a capital-murder trial this court noted
that, 'nor is there a transcript of arraignment in the record').
Revis makes no allegation of any impropriety during his
arraignment, nor does he allege that the arraignment was not
held. Furthermore, the record discloses that, in sentencing
Revis, the trial court stated that Revis had entered pleas of
not guilty to the charges against him."
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The record before us shows that Abernathy was arraigned and that he

had entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease

or defect. The record also shows that a competency evaluation was done

in September 2018 and that the results of that evaluation indicated with

"high confidence" that Abernathy was competent to assist in his defense

and to stand trial. (C. 120.) Finally, the record shows that the State's

motion to amend the indictment was granted only to correct a code

citation.

This Court will not "automatically reverse a conviction because the

transcript or record is less than complete." Ingram v. State, 779 So. 2d

1225, 1280 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). Abernathy has shown no prejudice or

reversible error on this issue, and he is due no relief.

II. TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SUA SPONTE REMOVE JUROR
S.Re. FOR CAUSE

Before trial, Abernathy moved the trial court to require prospective

jurors to complete a questionnaire. The State noted its agreement with

the motion, and the trial court granted the motion. On the first day of

trial, the trial court divided prospective jurors into two panels—a

morning panel and an afternoon panel. After the morning panel of

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prospective jurors was sworn, general qualification began, and those

prospective jurors not dismissed were given questionnaires to complete.

When most veniremembers were finished filling out their questionnaires,

the trial court told the members of the morning panel that the attorneys

would review the completed questionnaires and that, once they had

completed their questionnaires, they were free to go for the day and to

return at 8:45 the next morning. The trial court used the same procedure

with the afternoon panel.

The next day, the parties agreed to proceed with voir dire of the

morning panel first and then to question individuals. The State

questioned the panel, and then defense counsel questioned several

veniremembers about their questionnaire responses. After a break, the

trial court gave the parties the chance to bring back prospective jurors

for individual questioning. Defense counsel requested eight from the

morning panel.

The trial court and parties followed a similar procedure with the

afternoon panel. The parties agreed to strike several members for cause,

and the trial court heard Abernathy's motions to strike other members

for cause. S.Re. was not mentioned.

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In response to question no. 62 on the juror questionnaire—"Is there

anything about the nature of the charges or the facts of the case (as they

have been explained to you thus far) that causes you to doubt your ability

to be fair and impartial?"—S.Re. (no. 388), a retired elementary teacher

who served on Abernathy's jury, checked "Yes" and wrote, "I am friends

with the niece of one of the victims." In response to question no. 63—"Do

you know of any reason whatsoever why you could not, or should not,

serve as a juror in this case?"—S.Re. did not check "Yes" or "No." But in

response to "If yes, please explain," S.Re. wrote, "The above." Abernathy

asserts that these responses "indisputably establish[] that Juror S.Re.

[was] biased and that she could not be a fair and impartial juror in this

case." (Abernathy's brief, p. 15.)

Abernathy also asserts that S.Re. "expressed additional areas of

bias." (Abernathy's brief, p. 17.) He notes that she checked "Disagree"

after the statement:

"The Defendant in this case, Donnie Abernathy, is presumed
innocent and cannot be found guilty of any offense unless the
jury, unanimously and based solely on the evidence presented
in court, decides that the State has proven each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests entirely with the State.
Donnie Abernathy is not required to prove his innocence."

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S.Re. did not respond to the prompt, "Please explain."

Abernathy asserts that "S.Re. also responded that she disagreed

with law establishing that a defendant's silence could not be used against

him" and agreed " 'that if someone does not testify then he or she must be

hiding something.' " (Abernathy's brief, p. 18.) Finally, he cites S.Re.'s

indication that she would give more weight to testimony from a member

of law enforcement "as opposed to any other witness." (Id.) S.Re.

explained on her questionnaire that "[t]hey would be more experienced."

She offered no written explanation for her other responses cited by

Abernathy. 5

Although Abernathy raised no issue over any of these responses in

5S.Re. also answered in her questionnaire that her friends would

describe her as "very loyal, fair, honest"; that her views on the death
penalty "would depend on the case. Only rare instances"; that her views
on the death penalty were due to her "religious beliefs"; that her religious
views teach that "[a] person has a chance to be forgiven under certain
circumstances"; that in her opinion the death penalty is not the only
appropriate sentence for someone who is guilty of capital murder; that in
her opinion "even the worst criminal [could] turn his life around"; that
she had heard no news or discussions of the case; that she had not formed
an opinion in the case; that she had no personal reason for wanting to
serve as a juror; and that there was nothing she wanted to discuss
privately with the judge. S.Re. also indicated on her questionnaire that
she knew potential witnesses Josh Summerford, Shawn Rogers, Brent
Snead, Jeff Shaver, and Jeremy Deaton, as well as the prosecutors,
Michael O'Dell and Robert Johnston, and the trial judge.
13
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the trial court, he argues that the trial court's failure to sua sponte

remove S.Re. was plain error. Cf. Lindsay v. State, 326 So. 3d 1, 22 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2019) ("Lindsay did not move to remove prospective juror

M.O. for cause; therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See Rule

45A, Ala. R. App. P."). In support of his claim, Abernathy relies

principally on Ex parte Killingsworth, 82 So. 3d 761 (Ala. 2010).

In Killingsworth, F.J. during voir dire stated that she knew

members of the families of the victims. When asked directly if she "[c]ould

… put all of that out of your mind and just sit on this jury and listen to

the evidence," F.J. replied, "No, sir." She also nodded affirmatively when

asked if she thought she "would be biased by that." The Alabama

Supreme Court noted that, although "[t]he other 13 potential jurors who

were dismissed all indicated an inability to be fair and impartial," the

trial court did not dismiss F.J., and F.J. served on the jury. The Supreme

Court found that the failure to dismiss F.J. was plain error:

"F.J. testified that she knew members of the victims' family.
The fact that a prospective juror knows the victim or members
of the victim's family does not automatically disqualify the
prospective juror for cause. Harris v. State, 632 So. 2d 503,
521 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aff'd, 632 So. 2d 543 (Ala. 1993),
aff'd, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1995).
Unless the prospective juror indicates on voir dire that his or
her relationship with the victim or the victim's family would
14
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prevent him or her from being fair and impartial, a challenge
for cause should be denied. Dunning v. State, 659 So. 2d 995,
997 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Here, F.J. stated unequivocally
that she could not be impartial. Nothing in the record
indicates that F.J. was asked any additional questions
regarding her partiality toward the victims' family members,
which is in contrast to other jurors, whose answers regarding
their partiality were equivocal. Instead, it appears that both
the trial court and the parties may have been confused when
the court dismissed C.J., with whom F.J. shared a last name
and who never indicated that she could not be impartial, only
that she did not want to serve. Nevertheless, F.J., a juror who
unequivocally stated that she could not be impartial, sat on
the jury that ultimately convicted Killingsworth.

"….

"…. Killingsworth's right to an impartial jury was
violated, and he is entitled to a new trial."

82 So. 3d at 764-65. Killingsworth is distinguishable.

First, S.Re. never stated unequivocally that she could not be fair

and impartial. See Killingsworth, 82 So. 3d at 764 ("The fact that a

prospective juror knows the victim or members of the victim's family does

not automatically disqualify the prospective juror for cause."); see also

Petersen v. State, 326 So. 3d 535, 557 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) ("[T]he

failure of a court to sua sponte remove a juror from the venire does not

rise to the level of plain error where there is no indication in the record

that the juror could not be fair and impartial."). The responses of S.Re. to

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questions no. 62 and no. 63 were not unequivocal and unambiguous like

the responses of F.J. in Killingsworth. The fact that a prospective juror

indicates doubt in a juror questionnaire about whether he or she can

remain impartial based on a familiarity with a relative of a victim is not

tantamount to absolute bias.

Second, unlike the trial court in Killingsworth, which heard the

responses during voir dire, nothing in the record shows that the trial

court knew about S.Re.'s responses. Abernathy cites no decision in which

this Court or the Alabama Supreme Court has found plain error based on

a trial court's failure to sua sponte remove a prospective juror based

solely on responses to a questionnaire—and even more so questionnaire

responses that the record does not show that the trial court knew about.

Trial courts are not omniscient, and we know of no authority requiring

trial courts to parse juror questionnaires to follow up on any indication,

however slight, of possible bias.

The trial court's failure to sua sponte remove S.Re. was not plain

error, and Abernathy is due no relief on this issue.

III. DENIAL OF ABERNATHY'S MOTIONS TO REMOVE FOUR
JURORS

Abernathy argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions
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to remove prospective jurors E.M. (no. 365), M.B. (no. 236), C.Cr. (no.

266), and J.R. (no. 390). E.M. served on Abernathy's jury, and M.B. was

an alternate. Abernathy used peremptory strikes to remove C.Cr. and

J.R.6

" 'To justify a challenge for cause, there must
be a proper statutory ground or " 'some matter
which imports absolute bias or favor, and leaves
nothing to the discretion of the trial court.' " Clark
v. State, 621 So. 2d 309, 321 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992)
(quoting Nettles v. State, 435 So. 2d 146, 149 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1983)). This Court has held that "once a
juror indicates initially that he or she is biased or
prejudiced or has deep-seated impressions" about
a case, the juror should be removed for cause. Knop
v. McCain, 561 So. 2d 229, 234 (Ala. 1989). The
test to be applied in determining whether a juror

6Although we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Abernathy's motions to remove E.M., M.B., C.Cr., and J.R.,
we also note that, because M.B. was an alternate and was removed before
jury deliberations and because Abernathy used peremptory strikes to
remove C.Cr. and J.R.,

"any error in failing to remove these jurors for cause was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. '[T]he Alabama
Supreme Court has held that the failure to remove a juror for
cause is harmless when that juror is removed by the use of a
peremptory strike. Bethea v. Springhill Mem'l Hosp., 833 So.
2d 1 (Ala. 2002).' Pace v. State, 904 So. 2d 331, 341 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2003). Cf. Ex parte Colby, 41 So. 3d 1 (Ala. 2009) (may
not be harmless when multiple challenges for cause are
involved)."

Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84, 115 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
17
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should be removed for cause is whether the juror
can eliminate the influence of his previous feelings
and render a verdict according to the evidence and
the law. Ex parte Taylor, 666 So. 2d 73, 82 (Ala.
1995). A juror "need not be excused merely because
[the juror] knows something of the case to be tried
or because [the juror] has formed some opinions
regarding it." Kinder v. State, 515 So. 2d 55, 61
(Ala. Cr. App. 1986). Even in cases where a
potential juror has expressed some preconceived
opinion as to the guilt of the accused, the juror is
sufficiently impartial if he or she can set aside that
opinion and render a verdict based upon the
evidence in the case. Kinder, [515 So. 2d] at 60-61.
In order to justify disqualification, a juror " 'must
have more than a bias, or fixed opinion, as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused' "; " '[s]uch opinion
must be so fixed ... that it would bias the verdict a
juror would be required to render.' " Oryang v.
State, 642 So. 2d 979, 987 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993)
(quoting Siebert v. State, 562 So. 2d 586, 595 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1989)).'

"Ex parte Davis, 718 So. 2d 1166, 1171-72 (Ala. 1998).
Further,

" ' "[t]he qualification of prospective jurors rests
within the sound discretion of the trial judge."
Morrison v. State, 601 So. 2d 165, 168 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1992); Ex parte Cochran, 500 So. 2d 1179,
1183 (Ala. 1985). This Court will not disturb the
trial court's decision "unless there is a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion." Ex parte
Rutledge, 523 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Ala. 1988). "This
court must look to the questions propounded to,
and the answers given by, the prospective juror to
see if this discretion was properly exercised." Knop
[v. McCain], 561 So. 2d [229] at 232 [(Ala. 1989)].
18
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We must consider the entire voir dire examination
of the juror "in full context and as a whole." Ex
parte Beam, 512 So. 2d 723, 724 (Ala. 1987); Ex
parte Rutledge, 523 So. 2d at 1120.'

"Ex parte Burgess, 827 So. 2d 193, 198 (Ala. 2000)."

Mulkey v. State, [Ms. CR-2023-0304, May 2, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. Crim. App. 2025).

JUROR E.M.

On her questionnaire, E.M. responded that she would give "more

weight" to testimony from law-enforcement officers, explaining that "law

enforcement is held in a higher regard." She was then summoned for

individual questioning by the parties and the trial court. In the first

questioning, this exchange with defense counsel occurred:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So is that to say that if you
have investigators or officers testifying, that that would
carry—you would consider that more truthful than maybe
another witness testifying, like an eyewitness or—

"[E.M.]: Not necessarily.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Can you explain what
you mean by that?

"[E.M.]: I don't feel like it would [sic] one versus the
other in that sense. I think anybody is capable of getting up
there and telling the truth or not telling the truth. I think a
law enforcement officer would be more likely to always tell the
truth. That's the hope. But it was more so that I think an
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average person is capable of either.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure. But—but you're saying
that you would—you would consider law enforcement to be
more truthful testimony?

"[E.M.]: Ideally.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Okay. That's all I have.
I don't have anything else."

(2d Supp. R. 689-90.) Abernathy moved to strike E.M. for cause, stating,

"I just think that the questionnaire is the unbridled answer." (2d Supp.

R. 709.) The State objected to the motion, arguing that "I don't think that

what she commented on rose to the level of being disqualified. She said

she was hopeful law enforcement would be truthful. Didn't say she would

automatically believe one over another." (2d Supp. R. 709.)

The trial court summoned E.M. for more questioning:

"THE COURT: … [I]n your answer, I believe number 41,
that you would give more weight to the testimony of a law
enforcement officer as opposed to any other witness, we want
to follow up with you ….

"[PROSECUTOR]: Ms. [M.], I didn't ask you questions
earlier because I understood you in the end to say that that
was aspirational, that your hope would be—

"[E.M.]: Right.

"[PROSECUTOR]: —that every law enforcement officer
would be truthful when they took the stand because that's
20
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part of their job?

"[E.M.]: Right.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Is that what you meant?

"[E.M.]: Yes.

"[PROSECUTOR]: All right. In other words, every single
law enforcement officer wouldn't automatically be believed
over any other witness?

"[E.M.]: No. And there's somewhere in there that I did
put, you know, not—and I can't remember the question, but
that I do understand that not every law enforcement officer is
of a good intent. There are bad ones, but I do think that the
good ones outweigh the bad ones. But that there are what you
would consider bad ones and—if that's an answer.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Right. Right. …

"Can you weigh each person's testimony, their various
motives, their demeanor, what they're saying, and give it the
weight that it is due without respect to whether or not they're
law enforcement or a civilian?

"[E.M.]: Yes. And I think what you said is true. It's
more—you would like to think that law enforcement is held in
a higher regard and would always be truthful. Do I think they
are? Maybe not. I don't know. It would depend on what you
gather from—from while they're up there giving their
testimony.

"[PROSECUTOR]: And so each time that you answered
that question, I understood you to say hopefully, not
unequivocally yes?

"[E.M.]: Right.
21
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"….

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I'll just rephrase, maybe
the question. I guess more specifically the question is: Do you
believe that, by nature, the fact they're wearing a uniform will
make them more truthful?

"[E.M.]: Than any other witness? Not necessarily. I
mean, you might have a preacher up there, and you would say,
well, a preacher would never lie. No, that's not true either.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay."

(2d Supp. R. 714-17.) The trial court then denied Abernathy's motion to

strike E.M. for cause.

Abernathy has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying his motion to strike E.M. As the above exchanges show, her

"answers did not indicate an absolute bias or favor toward law-

enforcement officers." Francis v. State, 368 So. 3d 919, 930 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2020).

ALTERNATE JUROR M.B.

On her questionnaire, in response to the statement that "[a]

criminal defendant should be required to produce evidence to prove that

he or she is not guilty," M.B. indicated her agreement with that

statement with a "9"—with "10" indicating the strongest agreement.

22
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Defense counsel questioned her about it:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: … Can you tell me why you
put that answer?

"[M.B.]: I really think that, you know, there are two
sides to every story, but the—apparently the burden of proof
is on the State to prove that someone is guilty.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Does—does that go
along with your answer on the question about a person not
testifying?

"[M.B.]: Now, I do wish that everyone was, you know,
forced to testify because you don't really get a feel for, you
know, who they are as a person without hearing things in
their own words.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. And the law says—

"[M.B.]: Doesn't make them.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It doesn't make them. And
that you can't make an assumption that the reason they didn't
testify is they're guilty.

"[M.B.]: Right.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. Now, that's what
the law says.

"[M.B.]: True to yourself.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Human nature says the more
information, the more I know. And so you're going to be
looking, are you not, for—for something to come from this side
of the room as opposed to all—all the evidence coming from
the State, is that fair to say?
23
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"[M.B.]: Yes."

(2d Supp. R. 614-15.)

The trial court summoned M.B. for follow-up questioning:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ma'am, we talked out there
for a little while and got the impression that you believe
that—that a defendant … ought to testify in his or her own
trial and that you would be looking for them to come forward
with testimony themselves?

"[M.B.]: I would like to hear it. But, I mean, if it's—I do
understand the whole perjuring yourself or, you know, not
being able to articulate your side, so I do understand that.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And when you would
say that they were committing perjury, it'd be that they
weren't telling the truth, right, if they said, I'm innocent, I
was somewhere else, et cetera?

"[M.B.]: Correct.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. So that would—is it
fair to say that maybe the flip side of that statement is that if
they're not testifying, there's something to hide?

"[M.B.] I don't necessarily believe that. I mean maybe
you are just too nervous and cannot speak or you're afraid that
you would stumble over something and—if someone asks you
a question that you don't know how to answer correctly.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

"[M.B.]: I kind of like to hear both sides of every story.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure.
24
CR-21-0275

"[M.B.]: I'm just one of those on-the-fence people. And,
you know, until I hear everyone's side, I hate to pick one until
I've heard everything. So I like to give people a chance to
speak for themselves, but—

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So as a follow-up to that …
you had mentioned that you understood what the law is, but
that you wish we were in a position where we could force the
defendant to testify. You said, I wish we could just force people
to testify.

"[M.B.]: Well, if you could just hear everything in
someone's own words it's going to be different than if you
heard it secondhand.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure. So my question to you
is: … [I]f a defendant chooses not to testify, whether that's by
the attorney or themselves, and you're not provided the
reason for it, would that be something that you would consider
when you're deliberating to determine guilt is, you know,
what, he's—it still bothers me that he didn't testify?

"[M.B.]: No. I think—you know, I think I could probably
still say they don't necessarily have anything to hide, maybe
they just had other reasons for not doing it.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. If there is no evidence
presented by the defense, if it's only evidence by—by the
State, would you still be able to hold them to their burden or
would you weigh that more heavily in their favor, just the fact
that you did not hear any evidence from the defense?

"[M.B.]: I mean, I think—wow. With—with only one side
of the story? Yes, I would probably tend to—to lean toward
where all the evidence lay. I mean—

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
25
CR-21-0275

"[M.B.]: —you know, if there were not background
reasons—for committing an act or anything like that.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Thank you.

"[PROSECUTOR]: That question seems to presuppose
that they would sit there quietly while we presented a case for
three days. You know, … they will be cross-examining and—
and trying to hold our evidence up to scrutiny. I think a better
question might be: Would you hold his not testifying against
him? And could you—

"[M.B.]: I could be impartial.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Yeah. In other words, if we presented
evidence, even if they didn't present evidence, would you still
hold us to the standard that you would not convict until—
unless and until we had presented evidence to convince you
beyond a reasonable doubt?

"[M.B.]: I mean, again, I'm kind of one of those on-the-
fence people. I can't decide what I want to eat for dinner, you
know, one of those. But, no, I would definitely want to hear,
you know both sides. But if there was overwhelming evidence,
you know—

"[PROSECUTOR]: And their side might—

"[M.B.]: —on one rather than the other and no
background story or anything like that, then, you know, I
would probably tend to—

"[PROSECUTOR]: What I hear [defense counsel] saying
is that their side may—I don't know. They don't have to tell
us, and that's fine. Their side may be to cross-examine our
witnesses and not present any witnesses on—for their
defense. And I think the question we just really need
26
CR-21-0275

answered is: Would you hold it against him that he didn't
testify, if—if he chooses not to?

"[M.B.]: No.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Okay. I think that's all I have.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Nothing further.

"THE COURT: If … my instructions were that Mr.
Abernathy is presumed innocent, which he is right now, and
that that presumption of innocence is only overcome if the
State proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, when you
went back to the jury room to decide whether to vote guilty or
not guilty, would you let the fact that—if Mr. Abernathy's
lawyers decided not to let him testify, would that influence
your decision on whether he was guilty or not guilty?

"[M.B.]: No, not really.

"THE COURT: When you say 'not really,' what do you
mean?

"[M.B.]: That—that's one of my on-the-fence answers.
No. No, I would not hold that against him.

"THE COURT: Would you be able to follow my
instructions that he's presumed innocent?

"[M.B.]: Absolutely.

"THE COURT: Would you be able to follow my
instructions that that presumption is only overcome by the
State if they prove the elements of his crime beyond a
reasonable doubt?

"[M.B.]: Yes.

27
CR-21-0275

"THE COURT: Would you be able to follow my
instructions that you are not allowed to consider the fact that
he did not testify?

"[M.B.]: Yes. Yes.

"THE COURT: And I give those instructions, and even
when you come back here, you would be able to set your
personal opinion—or would you—I don't want to ask you a
leading question. Would you be able to set your personal
feelings aside that go, hey, look, if this was me, I would
testify? Would you be able to set that aside and not consider
that but follow my instructions?

"[M.B.]: Yes.

"THE COURT: Unequivocally, you would be able to do
that?

"[M.B.]: Yes."

(2d Supp. R. 670-77.)

In moving to remove M.B., Abernathy argued that "she kept going

back and forth, and she kept describing herself as being on the—on the

fence and would—and her responses to you were no, not really." (2d Supp.

R. 710.) The trial court denied the motion, finding that its colloquy had

sufficiently rehabilitated M.B.

We agree with the trial court. M.B. "was sufficiently rehabilitated

through further questioning and responses." Francis, 368 So. 3d at 931.

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Abernathy's
28
CR-21-0275

motion to remove her for cause. See Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d 131, 160

(Ala. Crim. App. 2011) ("Prospective juror J.J. clearly stated that she

could follow the law as instructed by the court and would not hold

Albarran's failure to testify against him. Therefore, the circuit court did

not abuse its discretion by denying Albarran's challenge to prospective

juror J.J. on the ground that she would like for Albarran to testify."). 7

PROSPECTIVE JUROR C.Cr.

C.Cr. answered on his questionnaire that the death penalty is the

only appropriate punishment for capital murder and said, "If one

commits an act of murder … they shouldn't be able to be allowed to have

separate treatment." C.Cr. also responded affirmatively during voir dire

when defense counsel asked the panel:

"If you found someone guilty of capital murder—which is
intentional murder, murder that occurred with specific intent,
intent to kill someone. All right. That's what capital murder
is, coupled generally with some other circumstance, like a
robbery or a burglary or something like that.

7Abernathy also cites M.B.'s response on her questionnaire
indicating that she would give "more weight" to testimony from law-
enforcement officers, explaining in writing, "Given the nature of their job,
I would hope that an officer would be more likely to tell the truth." But
Abernathy asked no questions about this response, and he did not cite it
when he moved to remove her. Thus, we would review any claim based
on this response only for plain error. For the reasons stated in Part II of
this opinion addressing a similar claim, we find no plain error.
29
CR-21-0275

"If you found somebody guilty—this makes sense—you
disbelieved any kind of defense, like self-defense, like the
death was an accident, or there were mental problems that
led to the killing. So you're at the point where you found
somebody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of capital murder.
They did it. No defense. Who among y'all would say that the
only appropriate sentence at that point is the death penalty—
death penalty? Nobody would automatically think that crime
requires the death penalty every time?"

(2d Supp. R. 611-12.) The trial court summoned C.Cr. for individual

questioning:

"THE COURT: Mr. [Cr.], … if I gave you instructions on
the law that … if a jury had found the defendant guilty, that
you were to consider certain circumstances that might make
you decide in favor of [the] death penalty or certain
circumstances that may make you decide in favor of life
without parole, would you be able to take those instructions
and consider both of those?

"[C.Cr.]: Yes, sir, I would.

"THE COURT: Would you be able to set aside your
personal convictions or personal feelings and just follow the
law and the instruction as I give it to you?

"[C.Cr.]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: And that law and instruction being that
there are two possible sentences, one being the death penalty
and one being life without parole, and be able to make a
decision based on what I tell you?

"[C.Cr.]: Yes, sir. And the evidence too.

30
CR-21-0275

"THE COURT: Okay. And you don't think that your
personal feelings, the fact that people can't—you can't bring
people back from the dead, those sorts of things, you would be
able to exclude those and not let those creep in on your
decision; you would just follow the law based on what I tell
you, based on the evidence that you hear?

"[C.Cr.]: Yes, sir."

(2d Supp. R. 638-40.) The trial court denied Abernathy's motion to

remove C.Cr.

C.Cr. "was sufficiently rehabilitated through further questioning

and responses." Francis, 368 So. 3d at 931. Thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Abernathy's motion to remove him for

cause. See Albarran, 96 So. 3d at 160.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR J.R.

In her questionnaire, J.R. indicated that she thought death was the

only appropriate sentence for capital murder, emphasizing that "[t]he

Bible states 'Thou shalt not kill.' I believe, if you are found guilty … then

your life should be taken" and that "why should a person get to 'carry on'

with their life, when an 'innocent victim' is dead." During voir dire, J.R.

explained that her father was a minister. Defense counsel asked her if

she thought that, for capital murder, "the death penalty is the only

appropriate sentence according to your personal moral code." (2d Supp.
31
CR-21-0275

R. 495-96.) J.R. replied, "Yes and no," explaining that "[t]he yes would be

because I don't want to dishonor my father because of how much he

meant to me" and "the no because it's not the law." (2d Supp. R. 496.) J.R.

agreed that life without the possibility of parole was a viable choice and

that "[i]f the situation warrants it," she "would be okay with saying, in

this case I recommend life without parole." (2d Supp. R. 497.)

The trial court brought J.R. back for further questioning. Replying

to questions from defense counsel, J.R. assured counsel and the trial

court "that whatever the instructions of the court were, that's what [she]

would follow" about "considering life without parole and the death

penalty." (2d Supp. R. 545-46.)

In denying Abernathy's motion to remove J.R., the trial court found:

"I think … once we followed up with her—I think she even
said that, quote, she had to be—she had to honor God and
herself. … [S]he distanced herself from the emotion and said
that she could do … what I instructed, even above her emotion
for her father. So I'll leave [her] on there, and that will be over
the objection of the defendant."

(2d Supp. R. 571.)

We agree with the trial court's finding. J.R. "was sufficiently

rehabilitated through further questioning and responses." Francis, 368

So. 3d at 931. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
32
CR-21-0275

Abernathy's motion to remove her for cause. See Albarran, 96 So. 3d at

160.

In part VII.B of his brief, Abernathy argues that eight jurors on his

jury were biased and would have been the subject of peremptory

challenges. (Abernathy's brief, p. 65.) This part of Abernathy's argument

hinges on his claims, which we have rejected, that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his motions to remove prospective jurors E.M.,

M.B., C.Cr., and J.R. What's more, Abernathy's allegations of bias hinge

solely on the jurors' responses to questionnaires. But Abernathy asked

no questions about those responses. Thus, we would review this claim

only for plain error. For the reasons stated in Part II of this opinion

addressing a similar claim, we find no plain error.

IV. ADMISSION OF AUTOPSY AND CRIME-SCENE
PHOTOGRAPHS

Abernathy argues that "the trial court erred in admitting into

evidence 27 disturbing autopsy and crime scene photographs depicting

the bodies of Sylvia Duffe, Clara Edwards, and Pam Oshel … when there

was no dispute as to their cause of death." (Abernathy's brief, pp. 89-90.)

Abernathy argues that any probative value of the photographs "was far

outweighed by the photographs' prejudicial effect." (Abernathy's brief, p.
33
CR-21-0275

90.)

This claim is subject to plain-error review. Abernathy did not object

to the photographs in the trial court, and his cursory argument on appeal

is little more than bald assertion. Cf. Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.; Ex

parte Borden, 60 So. 3d 940, 944 (Ala. 2007).

This Court has long held that autopsy photographs and the like are

admissible even if they are gruesome. See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 335 So.

3d 1, 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (" ' "The fact that a photograph is

gruesome and ghastly is no reason to exclude it from the evidence, so long

as the photograph has some relevancy to the proceedings, even if the

photograph may tend to inflame the jury." ' Eggers v. State, 914 So. 2d

883, 914-15 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Bankhead v. State, 585 So.

2d 97, 109-10 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), remanded on other grounds, 585

So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1991), aff'd on return to remand, 625 So. 2d 1141 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1992), rev'd, 625 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. 1993))."). See also Burton

v. State, 521 So. 2d 91, 92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) ("Photographs which

show external wounds in the body of a deceased victim, even though they

are cumulative and based upon undisputed matters, are admissible. The

fact that they are gruesome is not grounds to exclude them so long as

34
CR-21-0275

they shed light on the issues being tried. Warrick v. State, 460 So. 2d 320

(Ala. Cr. App. 1984). Having such items admitted into evidence 'comes

with the territory' in cases dealing with violence against the person.

Further, the receipt into evidence of such exhibits lies within the sound

discretion of the trial court. Hopkins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1983)."). Abernathy has shown no error, plain or otherwise, in the

admission of the photographs.

V. ADMISSION OF IMAGES OF TEXT MESSAGES BETWEEN
ABERNATHY AND HAMILTON

Abernathy argues that the trial court admitted into evidence, over

his objection, "photographs of a phone displaying alleged text messages

between Mr. Abernathy and Jerrica Hamilton." (Abernathy's brief, p. 47.)

Abernathy argues that "[t]he contents of the photographs, however, were

not properly authenticated and contained inadmissible hearsay." (Id.)

In Hamilton's deposition, she testified that her cell phone was

inside the vehicle when Abernathy was trying to evade the police.

Hamilton testified that Abernathy handed her phone to her "in the car,"

telling her "to call 911 back" and say that the first call to 911 call was a

misunderstanding and "that … a roommate … had scared" Hamilton. (C.

4338, 4357.)
35
CR-21-0275

At trial, Leigha Blake, who in 2015 worked as an investigator for

the City of Centre, testified that she had recovered a cell phone from

Abernathy's vehicle after the crash. (R. 172-73, 190-91.) Inv. Blake

testified that she had read the text messages on that device and had

captured images of those text messages. (R. 173-74.) The State

introduced State's Exhibits 13-34 and presented them to Inv. Blake, who

stated that they accurately reflected what she had captured on the phone.

(R. 174.) She described the images, beginning with an image showing a

message thread on the phone with a contact named "Donnie." Each text

message from "Donnie" in the thread includes a message signature,

"Mackenzie's Daddy." 8 (R. 180-81.)

In her deposition, Hamilton testified that, based on text messages

she had received from Abernathy in the days leading up to and on the

day of the murders, she was under the impression that Abernathy was

angry and jealous. (C. 4327-28, 4344.) She stated that Abernathy was

asking in the messages who she was with and that he suspected she was

seeing someone. (C. 4328.) Defense counsel also questioned Hamilton

8Evidence showed that Abernathy and Hamilton had a child named

Mackenzie.
36
CR-21-0275

about the text messages. (C. 4344-45.) Hamilton said that she did not

recall "the exact words" in the messages but that Abernathy "was very

upset" and that "it felt like he was being very jealous of what was going

on at that time." (C. 4344.) Hamilton told defense counsel that she had

not seen Abernathy watch her, but that "it felt like somebody was

watching." (C. 4345.)

When the State sought to admit State's Exhibits 13-34 through Inv.

Blake's testimony, Abernathy objected. He argued first that Hamilton's

testimony was necessary to authenticate the phone. He asserted that "we

had an opportunity to present [Hamilton] with phone screen captures

and text messages, and that was not done." (R. 175.) Abernathy also

asserted that the statements in the messages were "hearsay."

The prosecutor responded that Hamilton was blind and thus could

not be shown images. He also argued that the communication shown in

the photos corroborated Hamilton's testimony "that she received a

barrage of text messages" from Abernathy, "so many that she quit

responding to them." (R. 175.) The prosecutor also argued that

statements from Abernathy were not hearsay and that the other

messages in the thread attributable to Hamilton were admissible at a

37
CR-21-0275

minimum to provide context. The trial court admitted the exhibits.

On appeal, Abernathy argues that the text messages between

Abernathy and Hamilton were not properly authenticated. He argues

that "[i]nstead of seeking to authenticate the text messages through the

extraction report, through a telephone service provider, or through Ms.

Hamilton herself, the State sought to authenticate text messages

contained in photographs through" Inv. Blake's testimony, "an

investigator who simply took the photographs, but was in no position to

authenticate the cell phone or the messages themselves." (Abernathy's

brief, pp. 48-49.) Abernathy argues that "the State did not meet even the

minimum requirements for authenticating these text messages by

confirming who the phone numbers at issue belonged to, or even

establishing what the two phone numbers were." (Id. at 49-50.)

" ' " 'The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court.' Taylor v. State,
808 So. 2d 1148, 1191 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 808 So. 2d
1215 (Ala. 2001). 'The question of admissibility of evidence is
generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial
court's determination on that question will not be reversed
except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Ex parte
Loggins, 771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 (Ala. 2000). In addition, '[t]rial
courts are vested with considerable discretion in determining
whether evidence is relevant, and such a determination will
not be reversed absent plain error or an abuse of discretion.'
Hayes v. State, 717 So. 2d 30, 36 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)." ' "
38
CR-21-0275

Capote v. State, 323 So. 3d 104, 121 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting

Woods v. State, 13 So. 3d 1, 23 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007), quoting in turn

Gavin v. State, 891 So. 2d 907, 963 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)).

Rule 901(a), Ala. R. Evid., provides: "The requirement of

authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility

is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims."

"Rule 901(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides a nonexhaustive list of
ways to properly authenticate evidence. For example,
pursuant to Rule 901(b)(1), evidence may be authenticated by
testimony from a witness with knowledge 'that a matter is
what it is claimed to be.' Additionally, however, pursuant to
Rule 901(b)(4), evidence may be authenticated by '[d]istinctive
[c]haracteristics and the [l]ike,' such as '[a]ppearance,
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.' "

Thomas v. State, 302 So. 3d 720, 727 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).

In Culp v. State, 178 So. 3d 378 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014), this Court

addressed the proper authentication of emails. Discussing cases from

other jurisdictions, this Court quoted with approval State v. Koch, 157

Idaho 89, 334 P.3d 280 (2014):

" 'Because Idaho Rule of Evidence 901 is based on Federal
Rule of Evidence 901, how other jurisdictions have
interpreted the federal rule's requirements with regard to the
39
CR-21-0275

admission of e-mails and text messages is instructive in this
case. Other jurisdictions have recognized that electronic
evidence may be authenticated in a number of different ways
consistent with Federal Rule 901 and corresponding state
statutes. Courts have not required proponents offering
printouts of e-mails, internet chat room dialogues, and
cellular phone text messages to authenticate them with direct
evidence, such as an admission by the author or the testimony
of a witness who saw the purported author typing the
message. See, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 999
(7th Cir. 2012). Rather, courts have held that circumstantial
evidence establishing that the evidence was what the
proponent claimed it to be was sufficient. See, e.g., State v.
Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617, 624 (N.D. 2010) (providing a
comprehensive review of other jurisdictions' authenticity
requirements for electronic communications). Circumstantial
proof might include the e-mail address, cell phone number, or
screen name connected with the message; the content of the
messages, facts included within the text, or style of writing;
and metadata such as the document's size, last modification
date, or the computer IP address. See Fluker, 698 F.3d at 999;
United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-1323 (11th Cir.
2000); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40-41
(D.D.C. 2006).' "

Culp, 178 So. 3d at 384 (quoting Koch, 157 Idaho at 96, 334 P.3d at 287).

This Court in Culp held that emails were properly authenticated under

Rule 901(b)(4) based on evidence showing "distinctive characteristics and

the like." See also Smith v. State, 196 So. 3d 1191, 1202 (Ala. Civ. App.

2015) ("This court has reviewed the packet of e-mails and text messages

(some of which are duplicates), and the tone, syntax, appearance, and

other characteristics over months' worth of conversations remain
40
CR-21-0275

consistent. Based on the totality of the e-mails and the text messages and

the circumstances under which they were sent, i.e., casual conversations

between friends, we are of the opinion that sufficient circumstantial

evidence exists to support the trial court's determination that the e-mails

and text messages were admissible.").

The hurdle for authenticating text messages is not high. As one

Court has observed:

"It is widely recognized that a prima facie showing of
authenticity is a low burden. See United States v. Barnes, 803
F.3d 209, 217 (5th Cir. 2015) (standard 'is not a burdensome
one' (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied sub
nom. Hall v. United States, 580 U.S. 1078, 137 S. Ct. 691, 196
L. Ed. 2d 570 (2017); United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d
31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) ('minimal standards for authentication');
Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., … 241 F.R.D. [534,] 545
[(D. Md. 2007)] (recognizing 'the proponent's light burden of
proof in authenticating an exhibit' (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Gagliardi v. Commissioner of Children & Families,
155 Conn. App. 610, 619, 110 A.3d 512 (bar for authentication
of evidence is not particularly high), cert. denied, 316 Conn.
917, 113 A.3d 70 (2015); State v. Mrza, 302 Neb. 931, 938, 926
N.W.2d 79 (2019) ('[the] rule does not impose a high hurdle
for authentication'). This is because '[a] proponent of evidence
is not required to conclusively prove the genuineness of the
evidence or to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with
authenticity.' (Emphasis added.) State v. Mrza, supra, at 938,
926 N.W.2d 79; accord Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 549
(Tex. App. 2012); see also State v. Valentine, 255 Conn. 61,
77, 762 A.2d 1278 (2000) ('[t]he proffering party must
demonstrate to the trial court that there is substantial
evidence from which the jury could infer that the telephone
41
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communication was authentic' (emphasis added)).

"The commentary to our rule of evidence makes clear
that electronic communications, such as text messages, are
subject to the same standard of authentication and the same
methods of authentication as other forms of evidence: 'As with
any other form of evidence, a party may use any appropriate
method, or combination of methods, described in this
commentary, or any other proof to demonstrate that the
proffer is what its proponent claims it to be, to authenticate
any particular item of electronically stored information.'
Conn. Code Evid. (2018) § 9-1, commentary; cf. State v.
Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. 78, 88-89, 151 A.3d 99 (App. Div.
2016) ('Despite the seeming novelty of social [network
generated] documents, courts have applied the existing
concepts of authentication .... We need not create a new test
for social media postings.' (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.))."

State v. Manuel T., 337 Conn. 429, 454-55, 254 A.3d 278, 294-95 (2020).

The State's evidence showed that Hamilton and Abernathy had

exchanged text messages the day of the murders, including the content

and context of those messages; that Inv. Blake recovered the phone from

Abernathy's car, read the messages, and made images of the messages;

and that the messages were from Abernathy, as shown by the contact

name "Donnie," the signature "Mackenzie's Daddy," and the context of

the messages. This Court has reviewed the messages, and the content,

tone, appearance, and other characteristics are consistent with

Hamilton's testimony about the messages Abernathy had sent her.
42
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The trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in finding

that the State had provided a sufficient foundation under Rule 901, Ala.

R. Evid., to show that the phone recovered from Abernathy's car was

Hamilton's and that the messages in the screenshots were from

Abernathy to Hamilton. Authorship of the messages was a question for

the jury to decide. See, e.g., Capote, 323 So. 3d at 123 ("The State

presented sufficient evidence tending to connect the letters to Capote.

Actual authorship of the letters was for the jury to decide."). Abernathy

is due no relief on his argument that the State did not properly

authenticate the phone or the messages.

As for Abernathy's assertions that the messages included

inadmissible hearsay statements from Hamilton to Abernathy, he argues

that the State used statements from Hamilton to show that Abernathy

was "spying" on Hamilton and that Abernathy had acted out of jealousy.

The crux of those statements, however, was cumulative to Hamilton's

testimony in her deposition that she thought Abernathy seemed jealous

and that she felt like she was being watched by somebody. Thus, we need

not decide whether the messages included inadmissible hearsay from

Hamilton, because, even if they did, any error in their admission was

43
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harmless. See Ward v. State, 589 So. 2d 777, 779 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

("Harmless error occurs when the hearsay evidence erroneously admitted

was cumulative of other admissible evidence on the same issue.").

VI. ADMISSION OF ABERNATHY'S STATEMENTS

Abernathy argues that the trial court erred in admitting

statements Abernathy made to law-enforcement officers. He asserts that

the trial court failed to hold a suppression hearing, that his Miranda9

waiver was invalid, and that his statements were involuntarily made.

(Abernathy's brief, pp. 54-55.)

Before trial, Abernathy moved to suppress statements he made

after the vehicle crash. The State responded that it did not plan to

introduce the statements. At a hearing in September 2021, defense

counsel asked for a chance "to get some information about the

circumstances of the statement" if the prosecution introduced the

statements at trial. (2d Supp. R. 189.) Defense counsel asked the trial

court "to have the DA instruct their law enforcement witnesses, if they're

about to say something like, Mr. Abernathy told me XYZ, we're going to

need notice of that for potential challenge to its submission." (2d. Supp.

9Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

44
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R. 190.) The State agreed, and the trial court granted Abernathy's motion

to suppress.

During cross-examination of Inv. Josh Summerford at trial, defense

counsel asked whether Inv. Summerford had "participate[d] in any

interviews of Ms. Hamilton, Mr. Abernathy, or any other people

connected … with this case." (R. 109.) Inv. Summerford replied that he

had, and defense counsel then asked if the interviews were recorded:

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: The … interview that I would
have been involved in—there are two interviews I was
involved in. One occurred at the emergency room at the
hospital. That would not have been recorded. And there was
a subsequent interview of the suspect at the sheriff's office in
the interview room that … should have been recorded.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Do you know if it, in
fact, was?

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: … I never viewed it. … I was
chief investigator at that time. There was an issue with the
recording system, and we replaced that recording system …
very soon after that because there was a problem with the
recording system.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: At—at the hospital, was
anybody wearing a body camera?

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: No.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. And with respect
to—you—this interview that occurred later at the sheriff's
department, you've never seen a video of that?
45
CR-21-0275

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: No, I have not.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And so it would stand to
reason that that either was not interview [sic] or the
equipment malfunctioned?

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: Yes.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not—not interviewed. Not
recorded. There we go.

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: That's right. There was an
equipment malfunction.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I see. … Did the audio portion
work?

"[INV. SUMMERFORD]: To my knowledge, no. … I was
never given … a disk to review … because of the malfunction.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. Very well. Thank
you."

(R. 109-11.) The State then requested a sidebar. The trial court dismissed

the jury, and the parties took up this matter:

"[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, there was a series of pretrial
motions that were dealt with pretrial. One of them asked to
suppress statements of the defendant. The statement of the
defendant really amounted to little more than I remember
driving to that scene and location, I remember parking the car
on the side, I don't remember anything after that. So he puts
himself on Road 664.

"So because it amounts to nothing more than, hey, I got
near the scene but I don't remember anything else, I didn't
46
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think it had a high degree of value. It just didn't seem worth
fooling with. And so I consented to the motion just because I
didn't want to confuse or mislead the jury when otherwise
there was plenty of evidence for the jury to appreciate and
comprehend the movements of all the people involved in the
case.

"And so now defense counsel asked [Inv.] Summerford if
he had any other role in the investigation, for example,
interviewing [Jerrica] Hamilton or Mr. Abernathy. And then
[Inv.] Summerford has to say, well, yeah, I interviewed a
witness at the ER that was not recorded and then I
interviewed the suspect at the sheriff's office, which should
have been recorded. Then I think [defense counsel] asked him,
well, was it recorded. And he said no.

"So now we're left sitting here with the jury aware that
there was an interview with the suspect that was not recorded
but at least in [Inv.] Summerford's memory. And it looks like
we're hiding something now if we don't ask him what he asked
Mr. Abernathy and what Mr. Abernathy had to say.

"So now we've been put in a position where I have to take
it back. If [Inv.] Summerford testifies … to the voluntariness
predicate and/or the Miranda predicate and Mr. Abernathy
gave some kind of statement, I now think it needs to come in."

(R. 113-114.) After discussing the matter, the trial court ruled that, "now

that it's been brought up, I think it's proper to get into." (R. 120.) The

State said it would inquire about only "three lines of quoted statements

from Abernathy" in a summary of the statement Abernathy made at the

sheriff's office and not any statement he made at the hospital. (R. 120.)

The trial court instructed Inv. Summerford that he could testify only
47
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about direct statements Abernathy made to him—not about any

summary of those statements. (R. 119.)

On further redirect, Inv. Summerford testified that he had

interviewed Abernathy at the sheriff's office, that before the interview he

had advised Abernathy of his Miranda rights, and that Abernathy had

waived those rights. (R. 123-26.) The State then questioned Inv.

Summerford about the statement:

"Q. If you would, tell these ladies and gentlemen … what
he told you about this incident.

"A. He told us—again, this is a quote, 'I do not—or I don't
know who I heard [sic].' He also stated, 'If I did, I'm sorry.'
And I know before we left he told us, 'I believe what y'all say
because you are police officers.'

"Q. Okay. Anything else that you recall him specifically
telling you?

"A. I do recall asking him if he remembered anything
about the pursuit, and he said he remembered being chased
by blue lights.

"Q. Anything about the parking in any of the area there?

"A. Yes. … [H]e did say that he remembered parking the
Ford Mustang he was driving in the tree line near the scene."

(R. 126-27.) Defense counsel briefly cross-examined Inv. Summerford

about the statement.

48
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On appeal, Abernathy asserts (1) that defense counsel did not "open

the door" to the admission of the statement; (2) that the Miranda waiver

and the statement were involuntarily made because, Abernathy says, he

was under the influence of narcotics; (3) that the trial court erred in not

holding a suppression hearing; and (4) that the quoted statements from

Abernathy were an incomplete picture of the entire statement.

Defense counsel did not renew an objection to the statements, ask

for a suppression hearing, or make any argument about the

voluntariness of Abernathy's statement at the sheriff's office. Nor did

defense counsel, despite cross-examining Inv. Summerford, explore the

circumstances of the statements. Thus, any error in those matters was

invited by defense counsel.10 See, e.g., Lane v. State, 169 So. 3d 1076,

10As for Abernathy's assertion that defense counsel's questioning

did not "open the door," that assertion lacks merit. See, e.g., Morgan v.
State, 589 So. 2d 1315, 1320-21 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("The appellant
cannot complain about exploration of an issue which the appellant
injected into trial. Morgan v. State, 440 So. 2d 1240 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983).
'Where a matter has been gone into by one party to a cause, the other
party has the right to explain away anything, if he can, that may have
been brought out to his detriment.' Wyrick v. State, 409 So. 2d 969, 975
(Ala. Cr. App. 1981), cert. denied, 409 So. 2d 969 (Ala. 1982). A defendant
is not permitted to present evidence to the jury on a specific issue and
object when the state attempts to introduce evidence on the same point.
Billingsley v. State, 402 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. Cr. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 402 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S.
49
CR-21-0275

1110 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) ("Additionally, it was defense counsel who

caused the initial hearing to be postponed. Thus, if any error did occur, it

was invited by defense counsel's actions. 'Invited error applies in death-

penalty cases and operates to waive the error unless the error rises to the

level of plain error.' Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171, 187 (Ala. Crim. App.

2013), citing Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276, 1316 (Ala. Crim. App.

1996)."), judgment vacated on other grounds, 577 U.S. 802 (2015).

We also hold that there was no plain error in the admission of

Abernathy's statements. Inv. Summerford's testimony about the

circumstances of the statements and Abernathy's waiver of his Miranda

rights showed that Abernathy's statements were voluntarily made and

thus admissible. See Davis v. State, 728 So. 2d 192, 195 (Ala. Crim. App.

1992). Abernathy's statements about being at the scene of the crash and

seeing blue lights were cumulative to other evidence at trial. And given

the overwhelming evidence of Abernathy's guilt, any error in the

admission of his statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Abernathy is due no relief on this issue.

Ct. 1276, 79 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1984).").
50
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VII. PURPORTED VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE DURING THE
GUILT PHASE

Abernathy argues that the trial court erred by allegedly permitting

victim-impact evidence during the guilt phase. (Abernathy's brief, p. 68.)

He asserts that "the State repeatedly introduced irrelevant evidence

concerning the victims' lives before the incident, the nature of their

relationships, their shared adversity, and their health conditions. The

State then made this evidence a central feature of its case."11 (Id.)

Abernathy preserved nothing for review, and we thus review this issue

for plain error. 12 We find none. See, e.g., Ex parte Rieber, 663 So. 2d 999,

11For example, Abernathy cites evidence about Hamilton's health

problems, including her need for dialysis, her vision problems, and her
use of a service dog; evidence suggesting that Duffe had diabetes and had
suffered a stroke; and evidence about McClung's caring for the home and
Duffe's ex-husband while he was on hospice care. Abernathy also cites
the State's introduction of "lifetime" photographs of the victims and the
State's analogizing the victims to the characters in the movie Steel
Magnolias.

12Abernathy objected to the introduction of one "lifetime" photo of

each victim. He argued that the photos were irrelevant and cumulative,
not that the photos were improper victim-impact evidence.

During the cross-examination of defense witness Stephanie
Benefield, the prosecutor asked Benefield if she knew Hamilton's
parents, who were in the courtroom. Benefield replied that she did. The
prosecutor asked if she knew that Hamilton could not travel because she
requires dialysis, and Benefield replied that she did. The prosecutor then
51
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1006 (Ala. 1995); Russell v. State, 272 So. 3d 1134, 1165 (Ala. Crim. App.

2017); Shanklin v. State, 187 So. 3d 734, 781-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014).

VIII. ADMISSION OF THE RECORDING OF McCLUNG'S 911 CALL

Abernathy asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the 17-

minute recording of McClung's 911 call into evidence. (Abernathy's brief,

p. 72.) He asserts that much of the recording was unduly prejudicial and

included impermissible comments on Abernathy's intent. Because

Abernathy did not object to the admission of the recording, we review this

issue for plain error.

Abernathy asserts that statements McClung made—such as "he's

gonna kill her now," "he may still come back in here and kill me," "he may

come back here and finish me off," and "he's coming back and kill me"—

were "speculative statements that concerned the ultimate issue in this

case" and "could confusingly appear to the jury to have heightened value

as to Mr. Abernathy's intent at the time of the shooting though they are

asked if Benefield knew that Hamilton is blind. Abernathy objected,
stating, "We're getting far afield from the nature of her testimony." The
trial court sustained Abernathy's objection. On appeal, Abernathy
asserts that the trial court also should have instructed the jury to
disregard the testimony and given the jury a limiting instruction.
52
CR-21-0275

actually expressions of Mr. McClung's fear." 13 (Abernathy's brief, p. 73.).

In the recording, McClung, immediately after he had been shot and

had seen Abernathy take Hamilton away at gunpoint, reports to law-

enforcement personnel what he perceives is happening or about to

happen. McClung's statements were admissible as present-sense

impressions and as excited utterances under Rule 803, Ala. R. Evid. They

also were admissible as part of the res gestae of the offenses, see, e.g.,

State v. Martin, 562 So. 2d 468, 472-73 (La. Ct. App. 1990), and they

explained the actions of law-enforcement officers in responding to the

crimes. What's more, many of McClung's statements in the recording

were cumulative to McClung's testimony and Hamilton's testimony. See,

e.g., Brown v. State, 74 So. 3d 984, 1000 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)

(" '[Evidence] that may be inadmissible may be rendered harmless by

13Rule 704, Ala. R. Evid., which prohibits "[t]estimony in the form

of an opinion or inference … if it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact," does not apply to the recording of the 911 call, which
did not involve sworn testimony. Cf. Jackson v. State, 169 So. 3d 1, 107
(Ala. Crim. App. 2010) ("As to Jackson's claim that the recording of the
911 call violated his confrontation rights, this claim lacks merit, because
the call was not testimonial. … The 911 call in this case was made to
provide information to enable police to respond to a perceived ongoing
emergency. Therefore, the call was not testimonial and its admission did
not run afoul of Jackson's rights to confrontation.").
53
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prior or subsequent lawful testimony to the same effect or from which the

same facts can be inferred.' White v. State, 650 So. 2d 538, 541 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Rivers, 669 So. 2d 239

(Ala. Crim. App. 1995). Because the portions of the transcript were

cumulative to the testimony of Blankenship and Washington, error, if

any, in the reading of the transcript was harmless. See Rule 45, Ala. R.

App. P.").

Finally, the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially

outweigh the probative value of the recording of the 911 call. See Rule

403, Ala. R. Evid. We find no plain error.

IX. ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER CHARACTER EVIDENCE DURING
McCLUNG'S TESTIMONY

Abernathy asserts that "the State elicited testimony alleging Mr.

Abernathy had engaged in prior acts of violence against Jerrica Hamilton

as well as evidence of his bad character that was irrelevant to any issue

at trial." (Abernathy's brief, p. 80.) He argues that "[t]he trial court's

failure to exclude this evidence and issue proper curative instructions

constitutes reversible error." (Id.).

During McClung's testimony, when the prosecutor stated, "we've

heard some testimony that there was difficulties about who was going to
54
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have the child when," McClung interjected that Hamilton "had a

restraining order on him." (R. 161.) The prosecutor then asked, "My

question is: Was the baby there that night?," to which McClung replied,

"No. No." (R. 161.)

A few moments later, the prosecutor asked McClung, "There's been

some testimony about a firearm in the house …. Do you recall that? Was

there a gun in the house?" McClung replied, "Yeah. … Jerrica set it on

the entertainment center. It was for Donnie—when Donnie came. She

had a restraining order on him. And she said, when he comes .…" (R. 162-

63.) At that point, defense counsel raised a hearsay objection, which the

trial court sustained. After McClung finished testifying but before the

next witness began testifying, defense counsel stated:

"Your Honor, before you get underway, during Mr.
McClung's testimony there was something elicited—well, no,
it wasn't elicited, it was volunteered, about a restraining
order. We ask that the Court ask the jury to disregard that
and … to strike that part of his testimony. That would
obviously be prejudicial and subject to a [Rule] 404(b) notice
if it was meant to be introduced. I don't think the State meant
to introduce it. It just came out of his testimony.

"[PROSECUTOR]: No objection to that being stricken
from the record, Judge.

"THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, in Mr.
McClung's testimony he mentioned something of a
55
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restraining order. There's no evidence in this case that would
be introduced to the restraining order, and so you are not to
consider that as part of the evidence."

(R. 168.)

On appeal, Abernathy argues that the trial court's limiting

instruction was "inadequate," and he argues that the evidence about the

gun and the restraining order requires reversal. We review this issue for

plain error. There is none.

First, the trial court granted Abernathy's request for a limiting

instruction, and we presume that the jury followed the trial court's clear

instruction not to consider the testimony about the restraining order.

See, e.g., Eaton v. State, 759 So. 2d 562, 564 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999);

Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84, 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).

Second, assuming the testimony could be classified as Rule 404(b)

evidence, it did not rise to the level of plain error. The State did not elicit

information about a supposed restraining order, and the State agreed to

the trial court's giving a limiting instruction about it. And the State did

not elicit testimony about the purpose of the gun, and Abernathy did not

object to that testimony. Considering the evidence as a whole, McClung's

brief reference to the gun's being for protection from Abernathy could not

56
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have influenced the jury's verdict, and it did not seriously affect the

fairness and integrity of the proceedings. See Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.

That is particularly so given the overwhelming evidence of Abernathy's

guilt. See Yeiter v. State, [Ms. SC-2022-0417, Sept. 2, 2022] ___ So. 3d

___, ___ (Ala. 2022) ("The evidence of Yeiter's guilt was virtually ironclad

and so overwhelming that the prior-bad-acts evidence could not

reasonably have affected the outcome of Yeiter's trial.").

X. ALLEGED AMENDMENT OF THE CAPITAL-MURDER-
DURING-A-FIRST-DEGREE-KIDNAPPING CHARGE

Count 2 of the indictment in case no. CC-16-256 reads:

"The Grand Jury of [Cherokee] County further charges that
before the finding of this Indictment, DONNIE LEE
ABERNATHY … did, with the intent to cause the death of
another person, cause the death of that person or another
person, to-wit: Sylvia Sue Duffe, Clara Lee Edwards and
Pamela Collette Oshel, by shooting them with a gun, and the
said Donnie Lee Abernathy caused said death during his
abduction or attempt to abduct another person, to-wit: Jerrica
Hamilton, with the intent to inflect physical injury upon her
or to violate her or to abuse her sexually, in violation of
Section § 13A-5-40(a)(1) of the Code of Alabama."

(C. 2158.) Section 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides: "Murder by

the defendant during a kidnapping in the first degree or an attempt

thereof committed by the defendant" is a capital offense. Section 13A-6-

43(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
57
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"(a) A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the
first degree if he abducts another person with intent to

"(1) Hold him for ransom or reward; or

"(2) Use him as a shield or hostage; or

"(3) Accomplish or aid the commission of any
felony or flight therefrom; or

"(4) Inflict physical injury upon him, or to violate
or abuse him sexually; or

"(5) Terrorize him or a third person; or

"(6) Interfere with the performance of any
governmental or political function."

Although it did not cite the code section, the indictment used language

from § 13A-6-43(a)(4)—"Inflict physical injury upon [her], or to violate

[her] sexually."

The trial court began its instructions to the jury by reading the

indictments. (R. 449.) The trial court then instructed the jury about the

offenses. As to the charge of capital murder during a first-degree

kidnapping, the trial court stated:

"Count two, the defendant is charged with capital
murder. The law states that an intentional murder committed
during a kidnapping in the first degree or an attempt thereof
is capital murder. A person commits an intentional murder if
he causes the death of another person, and in performing the
act or acts that caused the death of that person, he intends to
58
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kill that person or another person.

"A person commits kidnapping in the first degree if he
abducts another person with the intent to, one, hold that
person for ransom or reward or, two, use that person as a
shield or hostage or, three, accomplish or aid the commission
of any felony or flight therefrom or, four, inflict physical injury
upon that person or to violate or abuse that person sexually
or, five, to terrorize that person or a third person or, six,
interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function.

"To convict, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the following elements of an intentional murder
during kidnapping in the first degree: That Sylvia Sue Duffe,
Clara Lee Edwards, and Pamela Collette Oshel are dead; that
the defendant caused the death of Sylvia Sue Duffe, Clara Lee
Edwards, and Pamela Collette Oshel by shooting each of
them; that in committing the acts that caused the death of
Sylvia Sue Duffe, Clara Lee Edwards, and Pamela Collette
Oshel, the defendant intended to kill the deceased or another
person; that the defendant committed or attempted to commit
kidnapping in the first degree; and that the murder took place
during the kidnapping."

(R. 457-59.) During its deliberations, the jury sent a question to the trial

court: "On this sheet, do we choose just one? Capital murder during a

kidnapping in the first degree, not guilty, guilty; lesser included offense

of murder, not guilty, guilty." (R. 473.) After discussions with the

attorneys, the trial court reread the above instruction, which was based

on the statutory language, to the jury, along with rereading its

instructions about the lesser-included offense. (R. 480.)
59
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Abernathy argues that, because the trial court used language based

on all of § 13A-6-43(a) in its instructions—rather than just § 13A-6-

43(a)(4), the trial court "improperly amended the indictment for capital

murder during a first-degree kidnapping." (Abernathy's brief, p. 28.)

Abernathy asserts that, "[a]s a result, the trial court diminished the

State's burden of proof with respect to the charge of capital murder

during a kidnapping, rendered it impossible to know the statutory

element upon which the jury based its verdict, and deprived Mr.

Abernathy of fair notice of the charges against him." (Id.) In support of

his position, Abernathy relies on cases such as Stirone v. United States,

361 U.S. 212 (1960), McKinnis v. State, 99 So. 3d 1265 (Ala. Crim. App.

2012), Williams v. State, 701 So. 2d 832 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), Styles v.

State, 474 So. 2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), and House v. State, 380 So.

2d 940 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979). He contends that the trial court's

instructions violated Rule 13.5(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., which prohibits

amending "[a] charge … except to change the offense or to charge new

offenses not contemplated by the original indictment."

Abernathy did not object to the instructions or raise this issue in

the trial court. We thus review it for plain error.

60
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"When reviewing a trial court's jury instructions, we
keep in mind the following:

" ' " 'A trial court has broad discretion in
formulating its jury instructions,
providing those instructions accurately
reflect the law and the facts of the case.
Raper v. State, 584 So. 2d 544 (Ala. Cr.
App. 1991). We do not review a jury
instruction in isolation, but must
consider the instruction as a whole,
Stewart v. State, 601 So. 2d 491 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1992), aff'd in relevant part,
659 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1993), and we must
evaluate instructions like a reasonable
juror may have interpreted them.
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105
S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985);
Stewart v. State.' "

" 'Griffin v. State, 790 So. 2d 267, 332 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1999), quoting Ingram v. State, 779 So. 2d
1225, 1258 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). "This court has
consistently held that a trial court's oral charge to
the jury must be viewed in its entirety and not in
'bits and pieces.' Parks v. State, 565 So. 2d 1265
(Ala. Cr. App. 1990); Williams v. State, 538 So. 2d
1250 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988); Lambeth v. State, 380
So. 2d 923 (Ala.), on remand, 380 So. 2d 925 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 926 (Ala.
1980)." Smith v. State, 585 So. 2d 223, 225 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991).'

"Smith v. State, 908 So. 2d 273, 295 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000),
cert. quashed, 908 So. 2d 302 (Ala. 2005), cert. denied, Smith
v. Alabama, 546 U.S. 928, 126 S. Ct. 148, 163 L. Ed. 2d 277
(2005).

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" ' "A trial court has broad discretion in formulating
its jury instructions, providing those instructions
accurately reflect the law and the facts of the case."
Ingram v. State, 779 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Crim. App.
1999) (citing Raper v. State, 584 So. 2d 544 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991)). Moreover, this Court does not
review jury instructions in isolation, instead we
consider the instruction as a whole. Stewart v.
State, 601 So. 2d 491 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).'

"Living v. State, 796 So. 2d 1121, 1130-31 (Ala. Crim. App.
2000)."

Whatley v. State, 146 So. 3d 437, 468-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

Three of the Alabama decisions that Abernathy relies on—

McKinnis, Williams, and Styles—involved situations in which the

indictment named as the victim a specific person or persons but the trial

court's instructions to the jury permitted the jury to convict the defendant

as to a different person or persons not named in the indictment. See

McKinnis, 99 So. 3d at 1282 ("Because McKinnis could have been charged

and convicted separately for two counts of capital murder during a

robbery based on the two separate robberies of Conaway and Belser, but

he was indicted for only one of those robberies—the robbery of

Conaway—the trial court's instructions to the jury that it could find

McKinnis guilty of capital murder during a robbery if it found that

McKinnis robbed either Conaway or Belser, improperly amended the
62
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indictment to add an additional charge not contemplated by the original

indictment—the robbery of Belser—and clearly violated the prohibition

in Rule 13.5(a), Ala. R. Crim. P."); Williams, 701 So. 2d at 833 ("It is clear

that in order for the jury to convict Williams of the offense charged in the

indictment, the jury would have to have found him guilty of robbing both

alleged victims. … It is equally clear that if the jury followed the trial

court's instruction, it could have found Williams guilty based on the

robbery of either of the alleged victims."); Styles, 474 So. 2d at 188

(similar issue as in Williams).14

"First-degree kidnapping requires an abduction coupled with one of

six enumerated 'goals of criminal intent,' Smith v. State, 838 So. 2d 413,

468-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)," as set forth in § 13A-6-43(a)(1) through

(6). Davis v. State, 42 So. 3d 162, 168 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). The trial

court's instructions, which tracked the statutory language for first-degree

14Another Alabama decision cited by Abernathy—Wright v. State,

902 So. 2d 738 (Ala. 2004)—involved a related issue. In Wright, the
defendants were indicted for first-degree robbery but were each convicted
of second-degree robbery as a lesser-included offense. Applying Ex parte
Cole, 842 So. 2d 605 (Ala. 2002), the Alabama Supreme Court held that
the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over second-degree-
robbery charges because the original indictments did not allege that the
defendants might have been aided by another individual rather than
acting alone. Wright does not apply to Abernathy's case.
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kidnapping, did not change who the victim was—Jerrica Hamilton. And

the trial court's instructions did not amend the indictment to charge a

different offense—that offense was first-degree kidnapping of Jerrica

Hamilton. We are thus not persuaded that McKinnis, Williams, or Styles

apply here.

The trial court's instruction on first-degree kidnapping also did not

impermissibly broaden the indictment or create a substantial likelihood

that Abernathy would be convicted of an uncharged offense. See Ex parte

Phillips, 287 So. 3d 1179, 1221 (Ala. 2018) ("A constructive amendment

of an indictment occurs when the terms of the indictment are altered by

evidence or jury instructions that modify the essential elements of the

charged offense, thereby establishing a substantial likelihood that the

defendant was convicted of an offense other than the offense charged in

the indictment.").

"It is also crucial to examine the court's instructions in the light of

the trial itself." United States v. Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557, 1559 (11th Cir.

1988). The State's theory from the beginning was that Abernathy entered

the home with the intent to abduct Hamilton to harm or kill her. (R. 31.)

See Andrews, 850 F.2d at 1559 ("The Record clearly reveals that the

64
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government's evidence and arguments targeted the alleged conspiracy

between Ford and Andrews; never did the government attempt to show

that Andrews conspired with some other person allegedly present at the

scene of the crime."); State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 2007)

("Because bodily harm was never at issue in Weaver's case, and the State

never argued or presented evidence of bodily harm, the trial court's

inclusion of the bodily harm element in the jury instructions did not rise

to the level of fundamental error."); cf. McKinnis, 99 So. 3d at 1282

("[T]he record here reflects that the State's case at the guilt phase of the

trial was not presented in such a fashion as to specifically distinguish

Conaway as the victim of the robbery charged and Belser as the victim of

the murder charged. Rather, throughout the trial, the prosecutor referred

to Belser as the victim of the crime generally and to Conaway simply as

the owner of the club. Indeed, the focus of the State's case was on

McKinnis's intent to kill, not on the robbery element of the crime.").

In closing, the prosecutor listed the elements of all the charged

offenses, stating in part: "Number four, that the defendant, in connection

to or during these murders, abducted Jerrica Hamilton with the intent to

inflict physical injury upon her." (R. 395.) He then argued how the

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evidence had proven the capital-murder-during-a-kidnapping charge,

stating that Abernathy "[j]ust got through killing the three relatives …

and then puts a gun to her head said, you'll go. You'll die here or you'll

die later and marches her out of the house." (R. 397.)

Finally, the jury's verdict read, "We, the jury, find the defendant,

Donnie Lee Abernathy, guilty of the offense of capital murder during a

kidnapping in the first degree as charged in the indictment." (R. 487

(emphasis added).)

The State presented no evidence or argument about the other "goals

of criminal intent" listed in § 13A-6-43(a), and the evidence of

Abernathy's criminal intent to inflict physical injury upon Hamilton, see

§ 13A-6-43(a)(4), was overwhelming and virtually ironclad. No plain error

occurred, and Abernathy is due no relief on this issue.

XI. INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES

Abernathy argues that the trial court should have instructed the

jury on felony murder as a lesser-included offense to the capital-murder

charges.15 (Abernathy's brief, p. 19.)

15In a footnote, Abernathy argues that the trial court should have

instructed the jury on first-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of
attempted murder. (Abernathy's brief, p. 21 n.7.) But Abernathy did not
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At the charge conference, defense counsel requested a "charge on

noncapital murder," and the State objected, arguing that there was "no

reasonable theory of the evidence that would give rise to a lesser" offense.

(R. 375.) In response, defense counsel stated:

"Our argument would be that even if you have a
circumstance that appears to be inescapable, you know, the
fact that there were two or greater deaths, … it doesn't make
that capital murder necessarily. You still have to prove the
further element of specific intent to kill.

"So … you have a situation where any capital murder
allegation wherein there's a failure to prove that extra level
of specific intent would necessarily default back to … a
noncapital murder, even if … there were multiples, even if the
victim were under 12, even if any of those other circumstances
that appear as if, well, this is capital and only capital. If
there's a failure of specific intent to be proven, then you're
dealing with just an ordinary murder."

(R. 376.) The Court then stated:

"So … the pattern jury instructions for what we would call
ordinary murder, are you getting to the extreme indifference

ask for such an instruction, and, because plain-error review does not
apply to that conviction and sentence, the claim is not preserved for
appellate review. See, e.g., Ex parte Woodall, 730 So. 2d 652, 665 (Ala.
1998). Other than that claim, Abernathy raises no issues about his
convictions and sentences for attempted murder, first-degree criminal
mischief, and attempting to elude, although he did include those
convictions on his notice of appeal. Thus, we do not address those
convictions or sentences. See, e.g., Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91, 93
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ("We will not review issues not listed and argued
in brief.").
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to human life? Because … intent is still an element … under
[§] 13A-6-2(a)(1)[, Ala. Code 1975]. You go to (a)(2), you start
to get into the extreme indifference to human life …. Is that
what you're getting at?

(R. 376-77.) Defense counsel replied:

"Right. In other words, I'm not thinking extreme
indifference. I'm thinking, you know, we've got two murders—
and two murder varieties, I guess you would say. And we have
… what I guess we would call ordinary murder where it must
be intentional or it's some other variety of homicide.

"But there's a difference with respect to capital murder.
It's not just the—the intent that we have for—for the ordinary
murder statute. It's called specific intent. And, in fact, in the
jury instructions, the specific intent, I believe, is like it must
be real and it must be specific. That's something other than
the ordinary state of mind for noncapital murder."

(R. 377-78.)

After a brief recess, the trial court stated it would instruct on a

lesser-included offense for the capital-murder-during-a-kidnapping count

but not on the other capital-murder count. (R. 380.) Defense counsel

stated, "Just based on our argument before, just if the Court would show

that that's over our objection." (R. 381.) The trial court clarified that

defense counsel's objection was to the trial court's refusal to instruct the

jury on lesser-included offenses as to the capital-murder-of-two-or-more-

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persons charge. 16 (R. 381.) The trial court then gave copies of its

instructions to the parties, and defense counsel stated: "We're satisfied

that these are acceptable, Your Honor." (R. 381.)

As a lesser-included offense on the capital-murder-during-a-

kidnapping charge, the trial court instructed the jury on noncapital

murder, reading the elements for intentional and reckless murder under

§ 13A-6-2(a)(1) and (2), Ala. Code 1975. (R. 459-61.)

Abernathy asserts that defense counsel made an "explicit request

not to instruct on reckless murder." (Abernathy's brief, p. 21.) Yet the

record does not support that claim. Rather, the record shows that defense

counsel requested charges on "non-capital murder" and that counsel did

not specifically request that the trial court charge the jury on felony

murder.

In Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84, 155-56 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012),

this Court stated:

" 'A defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser-included
offense only if there is any reasonable theory from the

16Abernathy describes defense counsel as "explicitly indicat[ing]"

that counsel was not requesting a charge on reckless murder.
(Abernathy's brief, p. 27.) Yet the record does not show that defense
counsel "explicitly" opposed the giving of that charge. Indeed, counsel
stated that he was satisfied with the charges. (R. 381.)
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evidence to support the charge. Ex parte Smith, 756 So. 2d
957, 963 (Ala. 2000).' Pilley v. State, 930 So. 2d 550, 562 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2005).

" 'A trial court may refuse to charge on a lesser-
included offense only when: (1) it is clear to the
judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to
bring the offense within the definition of the lesser
offense; or (2) the charge would tend to mislead or
confuse the jury. Turner v. State, 708 So. 2d 232,
234 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Holladay v.
State, 549 So. 2d 122 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)).'

"McClain v. State, 26 So. 3d 491, 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).

"Where the evidence will support a charge on the offense
of capital murder, a charge on the lesser-included offense of
felony murder is warranted only if a reasonable theory of the
evidence indicates that the murder may not have been
intentional. See, e.g., Peoples v. State, 951 So. 2d 755, 758
(Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (' " '[F]elony murder does not require
intent to kill; the only intent necessary is the intent to commit
the underlying felony.' " ' (citations omitted)); Calhoun v.
State, 932 So. 2d 923, 969 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). In the
present case, there was no reasonable theory of the evidence
that indicated that the murders were not intentional. Nor was
there any evidence that the taking of the gun and the killings
were not committed pursuant to one course of conduct.

"There was no rational basis to support a conviction on
any lesser-included offense."

As this Court did in Thompson, we have no problem concluding that

the trial court should not have instructed the jury on felony murder. "The

crime of felony murder is reserved for those situations where an

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unintended death occurs as a result of a defendant's dangerous conduct."

Calhoun v. State, 932 So. 2d 923, 969 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).

There was no reasonable theory of the evidence that Abernathy did

not intend to shoot and kill Oshel, Edwards, and Duffe. The evidence

showed that he parked his car off the road in the woods about six-tenths

of a mile from Duffe's home. He entered the home armed with a revolver

and found where Hamilton was sleeping. He attempted to awaken

Hamilton and kidnap her, but when Oshel woke up and reached for her

cell phone, Abernathy shot her twice—once in the chest and once in the

back—killing her.

Hamilton ran to Duffe's room, and Abernathy exited Oshel's room

into the den, where Edwards had been sleeping, and shot Edwards

twice—once in the chest and once in the shoulder—killing her. Abernathy

then entered Duffe's bedroom and shot her three times—once in the

chest, once in the shoulder, and once in the back—killing her. He then

reloaded his revolver and drug Hamilton from Duffe's bedroom, where he

was met by McClung. Seeing that Abernathy had a gun, McClung turned

around to run, and Abernathy shot him once in the back. McClung heard

Abernathy tell Hamilton that "if she didn't go with him, he was going to

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kill her like the rest of [them]." (R. 158.) As in Calhoun, "the manner of

the killing[s] … showed that the murder[s] [were] intentional. The circuit

court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on felony murder." 932 So.

2d at 969-70. Abernathy is due no relief on this issue.

PENALTY-PHASE ISSUES

XII. WAIVER OF THE JURY'S PARTICIPATION

Abernathy argues that the trial court erred in accepting his "waiver

of the jury at the penalty phase of [his] trial." (Abernathy's brief, p. 85.)

Because Abernathy requested the waiver, there is no adverse ruling

before us. Thus, we review this issue only for plain error.

Section 13A-5-44(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the defendant
with the consent of the state and with the approval of the
court may waive the participation of a jury in the sentence
hearing provided in Section 13A-5-46[, Ala. Code 1975].
Provided, however, before any such waiver is valid, it must
affirmatively appear in the record that the defendant himself
has freely waived his right to the participation of a jury in the
sentence proceeding, after having been expressly informed of
such right."

" 'When determining the validity of any waiver we look at the particular

facts of the case and the totality of the circumstances.' " Osgood v. State,

341 So. 3d 170, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Turner v. State, 924

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So. 2d 737, 782 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)).

"In Peraita v. State, 897 So. 2d 1161 (Ala. Crim. App.
2003), this Court addressed a similar situation and held that
a defendant had freely waived his right to the participation of
the jury in the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial
when the court 'thoroughly explained the rights that [the
defendant] would be waiving,' 'questioned [the defendant]
extensively about his decision and his understanding of the
consequences thereof,' and the defendant 'remained adamant
about his decision to waive jury participation.' 897 So. 2d at
1197."

Osgood, 341 So. 3d at 218.

Defense counsel told the trial court that Abernathy wanted to waive

the jury's participation in sentencing:

"Your Honor, we—having talked to Mr. Abernathy about the
possibility that the conviction would be for capital murder, we
looked ahead and have opted to request that the Court do the
sentencing, waive jury sentencing. The State, I believe, is
prepared to consent to that. And the last piece of the puzzle is
your approval that we go to sentencing before the Court,
rather than the advisory verdict, and—and then sentencing
by the Court."

(R. 491.) After confirming that the State consented to the waiver, the trial

court questioned Abernathy:

"THE COURT: … Mr. Abernathy, let me ask you: Your
lawyers have indicated that you have agreed to waive your
right, which you do have a right, … to present sentencing
mitigating evidence to the jury and have them make a
recommendation. It's an advisory recommendation on
sentencing to me.
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"Understand that my reading of the law is that we are
still under a prior law that would still allow me the final
authority on whether to give you, on the capital cases, a
sentence of death or a sentence of life in prison without parole.
The jury would advise me in that, and then I would make the
final decision.

"Your lawyers have indicated to me, that after
discussions with you, that they're asking to forgo the advisory
recommendation of the jury and just have a sentencing
hearing before me and allow me the final say. Is that, in fact,
what you're asking me to do?

"MR. ABERNATHY: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: And you understand that once we get to
that point, if I excuse the jury, I can't bring them back, that
… if you consent to this today, that I will excuse the jury and
that the sentencing hearing tomorrow morning would be only
in front of me and that it would be my decision as to whether
to give you life in prison without parole or the sentence of
death?

"MR. ABERNATHY: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Okay. Do you need any additional time
to talk to your lawyers about this before I excuse the jury?

"MR. ABERNATHY: No, sir.

"THE COURT: Do you feel like you understand what
you're doing?

"MR. ABERNATHY: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Do you feel like anybody is pressuring
you or forcing you to forgo the advisory recommendation of the
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jury?

"MR . ABERNATHY: No, sir.

"THE COURT: This is—this is what you want to do
based on your discussions with your lawyer and the facts of
this case?

"MR . ABERNATHY: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else, [defense
counsel]?

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, sir.

"THE COURT: Okay. … I'll grant that request."

(R. 495-97.)

"Based on the record as a whole and the totality of the
circumstances presented here, we conclude that the record
affirmatively establishes that [Abernathy] was fully informed
of his right to jury participation in the sentencing proceedings
and that he subsequently freely waived his right to
participation of the jury."

Osgood, 341 So. 3d at 226. Abernathy is due no relief on this issue.

XIII. TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO FIND THAT TWO STATUTORY
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED

Abernathy asserts that "the trial court erroneously refused to find

and consider" that two statutory mitigating circumstances existed—that

Abernathy committed the offenses "while … under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance," § 13A-5-51(2), Ala. Code 1975,
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and that "the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of

his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was

substantially impaired," § 13A-5-51(6), Ala. Code 1975. (Abernathy's

brief, p. 74.) Abernathy argues that he presented the "substantial,

unrebutted" testimony of Dr. Robert Shaffer, who opined that Abernathy

"exhibited impaired executive functioning and that he was 'childlike,'

'slow in many ways,' and 'very low functioning,' possessing an IQ of 82."

(Abernathy's brief, p. 75.) Dr. Shaffer opined that Abernathy "was unable

to appropriately assess consequences and change course as his actions

had negative outcomes." (Id.) Dr. Shaffer opined that Abernathy's

impairment "was the result of childhood trauma in which Mr. Abernathy

lost his eye at age 11," which he asserted "gave rise to post-traumatic

stress disorder." (Id.)

The trial court's sentencing order shows that the trial court

considered the evidence offered by Abernathy but that it did not find that

the evidence showed the existence of the statutory mitigating

circumstances in § 13A-5-51(2) and § 13A-5-51(6). The trial court noted,

among other things, that Dr. Shaffer had testified that he did not have

knowledge about Abernathy's mental state on the day of the murders. (C.

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3195.) The trial court also cited Abernathy's actions on the night of the

murders, which the trial court found showed "careful planning and

thought processing." (C. 3197.)

Abernathy has not shown that the trial court erred in these

conclusions. See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 143 So. 3d 230, 330-31 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2012). He is due no relief on this claim.

XIV. ALLEGED REFUSAL TO "MEANINGFULLY CONSIDER" THE
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Abernathy argues that the trial court improperly weighed the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances because, he asserts, "the trial

court refused to meaningfully consider the mitigating evidence by finding

no amount of mitigation could outweigh the aggravating circumstance of

causing the death of two or more persons." (Abernathy's brief, p. 44.)

Abernathy did not raise this issue in the trial court, and thus we review

it for plain error.

Abernathy's argument hinges on two sentences of the trial court's

sentencing order. First, in discussing the aggravating circumstance that

Abernathy had murdered two or more people, the trial court stated: "In

fact, this Court finds it very hard to imagine a combination of mitigating

circumstances that could fairly and reasonably outweigh the value of
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three innocent lives." (C. 3201.) Contrary to Abernathy's assertion, this

sentence does not show that the trial court refused to consider his

mitigation evidence. The trial court's order shows that it did consider that

evidence but that the trial court did not give the evidence the weight

Abernathy thinks it should have. That gives Abernathy no right to relief.

Cf. Miller v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0654, Aug. 18, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. Crim. App. 2023) ("The record shows that the circuit court

considered Miller's youth and background mitigating but did not assign

that evidence the weight Miller contends it should have. Miller has not

shown that he is due relief.").

Second, in its conclusion, the trial court stated that Abernathy's

"complete disregard for innocent life will not—in fact, it cannot—be met

with leniency in this case." (C. 3203.) This sentence is an expression

supporting the trial court's conclusion in the next sentence:

"Accordingly, after great thought and consideration under the
laws of this State, the testimony heard at trial and at the
sentencing hearing, the pre-sentence investigation report,
and in consideration of all other matters proffered before this
Court, and with complete appreciation for the gravity of such
a sentence, this Court has determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances."

(C. 3203.)
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The record shows that the trial court evaluated the circumstances

of the offense, Abernathy's evidence offered in mitigation, and the

aggravating circumstances the State submitted. See Maples v. State, 758

So. 2d 1, 32-33 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) ("The trial court allowed the

appellant to present all of the mitigating evidence he wanted to present,

and its sentencing order clearly indicates that it considered all of the

mitigating evidence the appellant presented."); Phillips v. State, 287 So.

3d 1063, 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) ("[T]he trial court is required only

to consider evidence presented as mitigation and has the discretion to

decide whether a particular mitigating circumstance exists and what

weight, if any, is to be given to that mitigating circumstance.").

Abernathy is due no relief on this issue.

XV. THIS COURT'S INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Under § 13A-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, this Court is required to address

the propriety of Abernathy's capital-murder convictions and death

sentence.

As discussed above, a jury convicted Abernathy of two counts of

capital murder, one count for the murder of two or more persons pursuant

to one scheme or course of conduct, see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975,
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and one count for murder during a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-

40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. Abernathy waived his right to jury participation

in sentencing on his capital-murder convictions, and, after a hearing, the

trial court sentenced Abernathy to death for both capital convictions.

The record does not show that Abernathy's death sentence was

imposed as the result of the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other

arbitrary factor. See § 13A-5-53(b)(1), Ala. Code 1975.

The trial court correctly found that the aggravating circumstances

outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The trial court, in its

sentencing order, found two aggravating circumstances to exist: (1) that

Abernathy caused the death of two or more persons by one act or

pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, see § 13A-5-49(9), Ala. Code

1975, and (2) that Abernathy committed the murders during the course

of a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-49(4), Ala. Code 1975. The trial

court found that both aggravating circumstances weighed in favor of a

death sentence and "place[d] the most weight on the fact that Abernathy

intentionally killed two or more persons." (C. 3201.)

The trial court then considered each of the statutory mitigating

circumstances and found one to exist—that Abernathy had no significant

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history of prior criminal activity, see § 13A-5-51(1), Ala. Code 1975. The

trial court gave that statutory mitigating circumstance "due weight." (C.

3195.) The trial court also considered the nonstatutory mitigating

evidence Abernathy presented, and it found these nonstatutory

mitigating circumstances to exist: that Abernathy had been a "model

prisoner since his incarceration"; that Abernathy has "a below average

level of intelligence and mental capabilities"; that Abernathy suffered

"trauma—physical, mental, and emotional—from [his] eye injury [at age

11]"; that Abernathy had a "bad childhood," including a father who "was

often absent and was abusive when present" and a mother who "suffered

from mental issues that required in-patient mental health treatment";

that Abernathy had provided love and care to his minor children; and

that "Abernathy's plea for mercy is well-taken." (C. 3197-3200.)

The trial court then weighed the statutory aggravating

circumstances and the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating

circumstances and concluded that it had "determined beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the

mitigating circumstances." (C. 3203.) Thus, the trial court's amended

sentencing order shows that it properly weighed the aggravating

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circumstances and the mitigating circumstances and that it correctly

sentenced Abernathy to death. The record supports these findings.

Section 13A-5-53(b)(2), Ala. Code 1975, requires this Court to

reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine

whether the death sentence is appropriate.

"Section 13A-5-48, Ala. Code 1975, provides:

" 'The process described in Sections 13A-5-
46(e)(2), 13A-5-46(e)(3) and Section 13A-5-47(e)[17]
of weighing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to determine the sentence shall not
be defined to mean a mere tallying of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances for the purpose of
numerical comparison. Instead, it shall be defined
to mean a process by which circumstances relevant
to sentence are marshalled and considered in an
organized fashion for the purpose of determining
whether the proper sentence in view of all the
relevant circumstances in an individual case is life
imprisonment without parole or death.'

" 'The determination of whether the aggravating

17Act No. 2017-131, Ala. Acts 2017, amended § 13A-5-46(e)(2) and §

13A-5-46(e)(3), Ala. Code 1975, to make the jury's verdict no longer
advisory, and the act removed § 13A-5-47(e), Ala. Code 1975, which
placed the final sentencing decision with the trial court. The decision in
Stanley v. State, 143 So. 3d 230 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012), applied the
versions of those subsections in effect before the 2017 amendment, and
those versions in effect before 2017 apply to Abernathy's case because he
was charged before the effective date of the 2017 act. See Yeiter v. State,
[Ms. CR-18-0599, June 28, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2024).
82
CR-21-0275

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances is not a
numerical one, but instead involves the gravity of the
aggravation as compared to the mitigation.' Ex parte Clisby,
456 So. 2d 105, 108-09 (Ala. 1984). '[W]hile the existence of an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a fact susceptible
to proof, the relative weight of each is not; the process of
weighing, unlike facts, is not susceptible to proof by either
party.' Lawhorn v. State, 581 So. 2d 1159, 1171 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1990) .... 'The weight to be attached to the aggravating
and the mitigating evidence is strictly within the discretion of
the sentencing authority.' Smith v. State, 908 So. 2d 273, 298
(Ala. Crim. App. 2000)."

Stanley, 143 So. 3d at 333. We agree with the trial court's findings, and,

after independently weighing the aggravating circumstances and the

mitigating circumstances, this Court holds that Abernathy's death

sentence is appropriate.

Under § 13A-5-53(b)(3), Ala. Code 1975, this Court holds that

sentencing Abernathy to death is not excessive or disproportionate when

compared to the penalty imposed in similar cases. See, e.g., Knight v.

State, 300 So. 3d 76, 132 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (imposing death sentence

for capital murder during a first-degree kidnapping); Phillips, 287 So. 3d

at 1178-79 (imposing death sentence for capital murder of two or more

persons pursuant to one act or one scheme or course of conduct).

Finally, although we are no longer required to do so by Rule 45A,

Ala. R. App. P., we have reviewed the record and have found no plain
83
CR-21-0275

error that may have adversely affected Abernathy's substantial rights. 18

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Anderson,* JJ., concur. Cole, J.,

concurs in the result.

18Although we have not specifically addressed Issues II, XI, XIII, or

XVII as listed in Abernathy's brief, we find no plain error as to those
issues.

*Although Judge Anderson was not a member of the Court when
the case was orally argued, he has reviewed the video recording of the
oral argument.
84