Samuel L. Conley v. Althea T. Conley

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 424
Digitally signed by Elizabeth
Perry
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Date: 2022.07.28 14:52:04 DIVISION IV
-05'00' No. CV-18-748
Adobe Acrobat version:
2022.001.20169
Opinion Delivered: October 2, 2019
SAMUEL L. CONLEY

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE UNION
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 70DR-15-503]

ALTHEA T. CONLEY
HONORABLE MICHAEL R.
APPELLEE LANDERS, JUDGE
MOTION TO DISMISS INITIAL
APPEAL GRANTED; MOTION TO
LIMIT CURRENT APPEAL
GRANTED; CURRENT APPEAL
AFFIRMED

RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge

The sole issue on appeal in this case is whether the circuit court’s award of attorney’s

fees in a postdivorce-decree order constitutes an abuse of discretion. We recognize that

appellant has presented four additional points 1 on appeal concerning the court’s divorce

decree, but we have no jurisdiction to address them. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s

motion to dismiss a previous appeal from the divorce decree (CV-18-603), we grant

appellee’s motion to limit the appeal in this case to the issue of attorney’s fees, and we affirm

the award.

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(1) The court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for divorce for
failure to prove grounds; (2) the court erred in making an unequal division of the marital
assets without explanation; (3) the court erred in the amount of alimony awarded; and (4)
the court erred in awarding custody to Althea and ordering Samuel to pay child support.
Althea and Samuel Conley were married in 1988 and divorced by decree entered on

December 30, 2016. During their marriage, both parties pursued advanced degrees with

Althea obtaining a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and an M.D. She completed her education

in 2004 and has been a practicing psychiatrist in South Arkansas since that time. Samuel has

a B.S. in engineering, a master’s degree in statistics, and several years of coursework for a

Ph.D. in biostatistics. He did not work outside the home during their marriage but stayed

home to care for their four daughters 2 and oversee the parties’ rental properties. Althea filed

a complaint for divorce on September 30, 2015. Both parties asked the court for primary

custody; Samuel also asked for alimony.

The circuit court entered a temporary order in January 2016 awarding primary

custody to Althea and directing that she and the children remain in the family home on

Ridgewood Drive in El Dorado. The court awarded exclusive possession of the parties’

West Little Rock home on Quercus Circle to Samuel.

The circuit court held a final hearing in December 2016 and entered a divorce decree

on December 30, 2016. The court granted a divorce to Althea and awarded her custody of

the three minor children with visitation to Samuel “as agreed between the parties” or

pursuant to the court’s standard visitation guidelines if they could not agree. The court

ordered Samuel to pay weekly child support of $119. The court considered that Samuel was

unemployed but noted the testimony of a qualified rehabilitation counselor confirming he

had the education and physical ability to earn a substantial wage but lacked the desire to

work. The court imputed minimum wage so that Samuel could prepare to get a job but

2
K.C. (born July 18, 1998); L.C. (born January 15, 2000); V.C. (born June 19, 2007);
and M.C. (born April 22, 2009).

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ordered him to “immediately present proof of income” upon obtaining employment and

stated that child support would be modified at that time. The court also ordered Althea to

pay alimony in the amount of $2000 a month for twenty-four months. Finally, the court

specifically divided the parties’ personal property and made the following division of their

real property:

a. [Althea] shall receive the residence and contents therein located at … Ridgewood
Drive, El Dorado, Arkansas. [Samuel] shall receive as his own property the four
duplexes in North Little Rock, Arkansas, and their contents.

b. There are two houses that are owned by the family LLC in Little Rock, Arkansas.
Each party shall receive one of the houses and contents. If the parties cannot agree as
to the ownership of these two houses, they shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale
divided evenly between them.

c. The home at … Quercus Circle, Little Rock, Arkansas, and contents shall be sold
and the proceeds divided evenly after payment of the debt presently owed for said
property and costs of sale. A sale may be avoided by agreement between the parties
made within thirty (30) days of the decree.[3]

Samuel filed a notice of appeal from the decree on January 27, 2017. An order to

extend the time to lodge the record on appeal was entered on April 25, extending the time

to lodge the record with our supreme court to August 28. Samuel did not lodge the record

by August 28.

On October 10, 2017, Althea filed a motion for increase in child support and petition

to sell real estate. She contended that Samuel had failed to gain appropriate employment

and asked the court to impute income based on his earning ability and standard of living.

She also alleged that she had paid the mortgage on Quercus Circle while Samuel continued

to live there. She claimed that they had not been able to agree about the sale of the property

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The parties estimated the home’s value at $500,000; there was a mortgage of
approximately $50,000 on the home.

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and asked the court to order the property sold and to provide that she be reimbursed for

her payments. She also asked the court to order the two Little Rock homes owned by the

family LLC to be sold and the proceeds divided because the parties had been unable to agree

on a division of ownership. Samuel responded to the motion, denying all of Althea’s

allegations; he also denied that the parties were divorced on December 30, 2016, claiming

that some matters were incomplete; thus, the order was not a final order.

At a hearing on the motion on April 11, 2018, Althea testified that her understanding

of the divorce decree was that the Quercus Circle residence was to be sold if the parties did

not reach another agreement about the property within thirty days of the divorce decree.

She said that she had tried to arrange a sale but could get no agreement or cooperation from

Samuel. She said she was torn about making the monthly mortgage payments and

approached Samuel about giving him the Quercus Circle residence, but he would not

discuss it. She also testified that she had been unable to get him to cooperate on dividing or

selling the other two Little Rock homes. She testified that she offered to give him the two

Little Rock homes and the Quercus Circle residence just to have closure and to be able to

“have my life” and “move on,” but he refused to discuss it. She testified that her financial

obligations made it difficult to pay both the alimony and the extra mortgage payment, so

she decided to pay the mortgage instead of the alimony. She also testified that in October

2017 her lawyer sent to Samuel’s counsel a deed to the El Dorado home for Samuel to

execute along with deeds signed by her for the four duplexes awarded to Samuel in the

divorce. Samuel had not returned the Ridgewood Drive deed at the time of the hearing in

April 2018.

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Samuel testified that although the children had been in Althea’s custody for over two

years at the time of the motion hearing, his profession had been and remained an “at-home

father.” He said he had been looking for a job but thought it in his best interest to pursue a

doctorate. When provided copies of the letter from Althea’s counsel with attached deeds to

the four duplexes, he said he did not recall his lawyer giving him those deeds, and he

explained that he did not want to “waive any of his rights” by signing the deed to the

Ridgewood Drive residence. But he did recall that the divorce decree awarded that property

to Althea.

The court entered an order on May 15, 2018, denying Althea’s request for additional

child support but granting her relief on the property issues. Regarding the home on Quercus

Circle, the court ordered it to be sold by a commissioner approved by the court and directed

the proceeds to be divided evenly between the parties after fees and costs had been paid.

The court found that “despite the efforts of” Althea, Samuel had failed to cooperate and

intentionally delayed efforts to conclude a sale of the home in spite of the divorce decree’s

direction that it was to be sold and the proceeds divided. The court directed that Althea be

given credit for one-half of the mortgage debt she had paid since the divorce decree. The

court also ordered Samuel to execute a deed to the Ridgewood Drive residence, which was

granted to Althea in the divorce, and Althea to execute deeds to the four duplexes awarded

to Samuel in the divorce. Samuel filed a timely notice of appeal from the order on June 14,

2018.

On July 18, 2018, almost a year after it was due, Samuel tendered the record in his

earlier appeal from the decree of divorce, CV-18-603. He also filed a request for a stay of

the commissioner’s sale of the Quercus Circle property (scheduled for the next day) and

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petitioned for a writ of certiorari to complete the record. The supreme court denied the

request and petition on July 19.

On September 10, 2018, Samuel lodged the record in this appeal from the order

dated May 15, 2018. On October 29, 2018, he asked this court to join the record from his

earlier appeal for purposes of this appeal. We granted the motion on November 11, 2018,

and the record was transferred from our supreme court.

On February 14, 2019, Althea filed two motions: the first was filed with the supreme

court in CV-18-603 to dismiss Samuel’s appeal from the divorce decree for failure to timely

lodge the record. The second was filed in this case to limit the points on appeal to those

issues decided in the court’s order of May 15, 2018. Four of the five points in Samuel’s brief

in this appeal were from issues decided in the divorce decree entered on December 30,

2016. On April 4, 2019, the supreme court transferred the motion to dismiss to this court.

This court passed both motions to the panel to be heard on submission.

I. Motion to Dismiss

Whether the four points on appeal from the divorce decree are before us is a matter

of subject-matter jurisdiction. We turn first to the motion to dismiss Samuel’s first appeal in

CV-18-603. Samuel filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s divorce decree entered

December 30, 2016. He did not tender the record, however, until July 18, 2018, almost a

year after it was due on August 28, 2017. The supreme court denied his petition for

certiorari to complete the record.

The timely lodging of the record is a jurisdictional requirement to perfect an appeal.

Fire Sys. Tech., Inc. v. First Cmty. Bank of Crawford Cty., 2015 Ark. App. 334, at 5, 464

S.W.3d 125, 128. Althea contends in her motion to dismiss that we therefore have no

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jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. Samuel argues that our order granting his

motion to join the records for purposes of appeal “merged” the appeals and thus, dismissal

is not appropriate. Samuel misconstrues our order. We allowed the record to be transferred

to our court from our supreme court because it contained all the pleadings, orders, and other

documents in this case prior to December 30, 2016. We did not accept jurisdiction of the

appeal in the earlier case. Samuel failed to perfect his appeal from the divorce decree.

Accordingly, we grant Althea’s motion to dismiss the appeal in CV-18-603.

II. Motion to Limit Appeal

We turn now to Samuel’s current appeal and to Althea’s motion to limit appeal.

Appellant raises five issues in his brief, four of which were decided by the circuit court in

its December 2016 divorce decree and one of which relates to the May 2018 order appealed

in this case. Althea filed a motion to limit the issues on appeal to the only one that relates

to the actual order appealed. Samuel contends that the four points on appeal concerning

findings from the divorce decree are properly before this court because the divorce decree

was not a final order. He argues that the court’s order of May 15, 2018, is the final divorce

decree and that his appeal is timely from that order to bring up issues addressed in the

December 2016 order. We disagree. The divorce decree is a final order, Samuel’s appeal

from that order was not perfected and so we have dismissed it, and his current appeal is not

timely from that order. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction over those issues.

The divorce decree addressed all issues between the parties, including custody of the

children, visitation, child support, alimony, and division of all the parties’ personal and real

property. Samuel argues that the circuit court’s division of the real property was not

sufficiently specific to be final and that it left issues unresolved:

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a. [Althea] shall receive the residence and contents therein located at … Ridgewood
Drive, El Dorado, Arkansas. [Samuel] shall receive as his own property the four
duplexes in North Little Rock, Arkansas, and their contents.

b. There are two houses that are owned by the family LLC in Little Rock, Arkansas.
Each party shall receive one of the houses and contents. If the parties cannot agree as
to the ownership of these two houses, they shall be sold and the proceeds of the sale
divided evenly between them.

c. The home [on] Quercus Circle, Little Rock, Arkansas, and contents shall be sold
and the proceeds divided evenly after payment of the debt presently owed for said
property and costs of sale. A sale may be avoided by agreement between the parties
made within thirty (30) days of the decree.

Specifically, he claims that the court did not direct which party was to receive which house

in subsection b and that it did not include the actual name of the family LLC that owned

the houses.

With exceptions not applicable here, an appeal may be taken only from a final

judgment or decree entered by the circuit court. Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(1) (2018). Our

supreme court specifically addressed what constitutes a final order in a divorce case in Davis

v. Davis, 2016 Ark. 64, 487 S.W.3d 803. In that case, the court held that the following

language did not cause the decree to be contingent and held the decree was a final order:

4. All marital property unless otherwise set forth herein shall be sold at public auction
to the highest bidder upon the customary terms and conditions. The Circuit Clerk
shall be appointed to act as the commissioner for that purpose at a date and time to
be agreed upon by the parties or set by the Court no later than 90 days after the entry
of this Divorce Decree. The proceeds of the sale shall be first applied to any
indebtedness secured by the individual properties, then to the costs, clerk’s fee and
the marital debts of the parties with the remainder to be divided equally between the
parties unless another disbursement is specified below.

5. The division of property shall be as follows:

....

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g. Personal Property. The court shall honor any agreement as to their personal
property. Any and all personal property upon which the parties cannot agree shall be
inventoried for the Court Clerk and sold and the proceeds divided as set forth above.

Davis, 2016 Ark. 64, at 2–3, 487 S.W.3d at 804. The Davis court also noted that Kelly v.

Kelly did not present a finality issue, where the decree provided that pursuant to the parties’

agreement, they were to list their residence for sale with a realtor and that if a contract for

sale was not entered within six months, “either party may petition the Court to have the

residence sold via commissioner’s sale.” Davis, 2016 Ark. 64, at 6, 487 S.W.3d at 806

(quoting Kelly v. Kelly, 2011 Ark. 259, at 5, 381 S.W.3d 817, 822).

Holding that there were no finality problems in either case, the court reasoned that

a divorce decree’s allowance for alternative methods of property distribution does not

automatically defeat the decree’s finality. Davis, 2016 Ark. 64, at 8, 487 S.W.3d at 807. The

court held that the decree merely gave the parties a period of time to work out their

differences with a definitive, judicially enforceable solution if no agreement was reached. Id.

at 9, 487 S.W.3d at 808.

The decree in the present case is not conditional. The court very clearly divided the

real property but allowed the parties to agree on the division of the Little Rock houses

owned by the family LLC and the Quercus Circle home. If the parties were unable to agree,

the court directed them to sell the property and divide the proceeds evenly. The divorce

decree is a final decree. Appellant failed to perfect his appeal from the decree, and the notice

of appeal in the current case, filed in 2018, is not a timely appeal from the decree. Therefore,

we grant Althea’s motion to limit the issues on appeal to the only one arising out of the

order entered May 15, 2018.

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III. Attorney’s Fees

We turn to the sole point on appeal: whether the circuit court’s award of attorney’s

fees to Althea was an abuse of discretion. Samuel contends that the circuit court did not

make any findings about the attorney’s fees; that Althea did not prevail on any issue; and

that testimony in the hearing demonstrated Althea had made only one alimony payment

during the sixteen months after entry of the divorce decree. Therefore, he argues, the circuit

court’s award of attorney’s fees to her was an abuse of discretion. He does not challenge the

reasonableness of the amount but only the award of any fees at all.

Although as a general rule, attorney’s fees are not allowed in the absence of a statute

permitting them, a circuit court has the inherent power to award attorney’s fees in domestic-

relations proceedings. Hudson v. Hudson, 2018 Ark. App. 379, at 6, 555 S.W.3d 902, 906.

When awarding attorney’s fees in a domestic-relations case, the court is not required to

conduct an analysis using the Chrisco 4 factors or make any particular findings. Tiner v. Tiner,

2012 Ark. App. 483, at 16–17, 422 S.W.3d 178, 187. Rather, in domestic-relations cases,

where the court is intimately acquainted with the record and the quality of services rendered,

we have held that the circuit court is in a better position than we to evaluate the services of

counsel and observe the parties, their level of cooperation, and their obedience to court

orders. Hudson, 2018 Ark. App. 379, at 7, 555 S.W.3d at 906. We will not disturb a circuit

court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees absent an abuse of discretion. Vice v. Vice, 2016

Ark. App. 504, at 10, 505 S.W.3d 719, 725.

4
Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990).

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Although there is no requirement that a party “prevail” for the court to award fees

in this case, we disagree with Samuel’s argument that Althea did not prevail. The court

found that Samuel had refused for sixteen months to cooperate with Althea to conclude the

sales or dispositions of the parties’ real estate and had “intentionally” delayed the process in

spite of the divorce decree’s specific order that he do so. No legal fees to pursue the petition

to sell real estate would have been required had Samuel followed the court’s directives in

the divorce decree. The court granted Althea’s petition to sell the real estate and ordered

the parties to execute the deeds necessary to provide closure. Althea did admit at the hearing

that she had not made monthly alimony payments of $2000, but she explained that she had

not paid alimony due to the financial strain of making the $2800 mortgage payment on the

residence solely occupied by Samuel, who refused to make the payment, discuss taking

ownership of the home, or cooperate in efforts to sell it.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Althea.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Motion to dismiss initial appeal granted; motion to limit current appeal granted;

current appeal affirmed.

HARRISON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

J.F. Valley Esq., P.A., by: James F. Valley, for appellant.

Ronald L. Griggs, for appellee.

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