Chris Michael Baker v. State of Arkansas

Reason: I attest to the
Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 515
accuracy and integrity of this
document
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Date: 2021-06-18 10:04:55
Foxit PhantomPDF Version:
9.7.5 DIVISION IV
No. CR-19-111

Opinion Delivered November 6, 2019
CHRIS MICHAEL BAKER
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE WHITE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 73CR-17-651]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT
APPELLEE EDWARDS, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

Appellant Chris Michael Baker was convicted by a jury of criminal conspiracy to

deliver methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with purpose to deliver.

Baker appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support each conviction. We

affirm.

The standard of review is well settled. Baker moved for directed verdict on each

charge, and those motions were denied. A motion for a directed verdict at a jury trial is a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1 (2019). In reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict is supported

by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Martin v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 19, 567

S.W.3d 558. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one

way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. We view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered.
Id. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be

consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion.

Frederic v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 449, 560 S.W.3d 494. Whether the evidence excludes

every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. The credibility of witnesses is an

issue for the jury and not the court. Id. The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any

witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent

evidence. Id.

The charges related to two separate drug buys in Beebe using a confidential

informant, Shannon Anderson. The police wired Anderson so that both drug transactions

could be recorded; those recordings were presented at trial to the jury.

The conspiracy charge arose from the first meeting on July 31, 2017. In a telephone

call, Anderson arranged to meet Josh Allen, Baker’s codefendant, at a Walmart in Beebe.

Police maintained surveillance at a distance, and Anderson was given $340 cash to use in

the transaction.

Baker drove a GMC Yukon to Walmart, and Allen was in the passenger seat. Allen

had told Anderson on the phone that he was bringing someone with him. Anderson and

Allen talked to each other outside the store while Baker went into the store. Subsequently,

all three got into the Yukon with Anderson entering the back seat. Baker talked about the

weight of the drugs and about the police driving by. Baker reached into an air-conditioning

vent above the dashboard’s radio, but he had trouble getting the drugs (which were hidden

in a sock) out of the vent. Allen helped Baker by using a hanger to pull the sock out of the

vent. Baker then took a plastic bag that contained methamphetamine out of the sock and

2
handed it to Allen. Allen completed the sale of the meth to Anderson, who subsequently

exited the vehicle and gave it to the police.

At the close of the State’s evidence, Baker moved for directed verdict, arguing that

there was insufficient evidence to show that he conspired with Allen to deliver

methamphetamine in the first meeting due to the lack of proof of an agreement between

them or Baker’s active assistance. The circuit court denied the motion, the jury found him

guilty, and this appeal followed. Baker argues on appeal that the State failed to prove a

“conspiracy” because the evidence showed this drug deal to be solely between Anderson

and Allen and that Baker was merely present. We disagree.

A person commits conspiracy if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the

commission of any offense, (1) he or she agrees with another person that (a) one or more of

them will engage in conduct that constitutes the offense or (b) the person will aid in the

planning or commission of the offense, and (2) the other person commits any overt act in

pursuit of the conspiracy. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-401 (Repl. 2013). The State may prove

conspiracy with circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the conspirators’

conduct. Henry v. State, 309 Ark. 1, 828 S.W.2d 346 (1992); Vonholt v. State, 2018 Ark.

App. 53, 540 S.W.3d 312.

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only the

evidence that supports the verdict. Baker drove Allen to Walmart for the drug transaction,

Baker talked to Anderson about the weight of the drugs and about the police driving by,

and Baker was the person who reached into the vehicle’s air vent to pull out the hidden

drugs, even though Baker ultimately handed the drugs to Allen to complete the sale. The

3
jury could reasonably conclude on this evidence that Baker and Allen were working

together to deliver methamphetamine and that Baker assisted in that effort. The

circumstances of this drug transaction were sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude

that Baker was not merely present and uninvolved. Therefore, the circuit court did not err

in denying Baker’s motion for directed verdict on the conspiracy charge.

The possession charge related to a second meeting, on August 7, 2017. Anderson

and Allen agreed to meet at a church parking lot in Beebe for another methamphetamine

purchase. Anderson knew that Baker would be with Allen. Anderson was again equipped

with a recording device, he was given $1,240, and police maintained surveillance. Anderson

waited on the sidewalk of the parking lot. Baker drove into the lot in a pickup truck, and

Allen was in the front passenger seat. Anderson entered the back seat. Baker then drove to

a nearby gas station; Anderson explained that Baker and Allen were “spooked because of

the law.” On the way, Baker told Allen where the drugs were, reaching up to hit the

pickup cabin’s headliner. Anderson paid Allen for the drugs. Allen reached up to the

headliner and pulled out a McDonald’s pie box that contained approximately fifty-five grams

of methamphetamine. The police arrested the men before the transaction was completed.

At the close of the State’s evidence, Baker moved for directed verdict, arguing that

there was insufficient evidence to show that he constructively possessed the

methamphetamine in the second meeting. The circuit court denied the motion, and the

jury found him guilty. On appeal, Baker challenges the State’s proof that he constructively

possessed the methamphetamine in the truck, noting that there was no evidence that Baker

ever actually possessed the methamphetamine that day. The State sought to connect Baker

4
to the methamphetamine with the linking factors required in joint-occupancy cases, and we

hold that there is sufficient evidence of Baker’s constructive possession.

It is not necessary for the State to prove literal physical possession of drugs in order

to prove possession. Mings v. State, 318 Ark. 201, 884 S.W.2d 596 (1994). Possession of

drugs can be proved by constructive possession. Baltimore v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 622, 535

S.W.3d 286. Constructive possession requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that (1) the defendant exercised care, control, and management over the contraband and (2)

the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Id. Constructive possession can be

inferred when the drugs are in the joint control of the accused and another. Id. However,

joint occupancy of a vehicle, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish possession or joint

possession. Id. There must be some other factor linking the accused to the drugs. Id.

Other factors to be considered in cases involving automobiles occupied by more than one

person are (1) whether the contraband is in plain view; (2) whether the contraband is found

with the accused’s personal effects; (3) whether it is found on the same side of the car seat

as the accused was sitting or in near proximity to it; (4) whether the accused is the owner

of the automobile or exercises dominion and control over it; and (5) whether the accused

acted suspiciously before or during the arrest. Id. There is no requirement that all or even

a majority of the linking factors be present to constitute constructive possession of the

contraband. Id.

Baker argues that although he was the driver of the truck that had drugs in it, the

drugs were not in plain view, it is vague at best to say Baker was in close proximity to the

drugs, the drugs were not in his personal effects, and he did not act suspiciously before or

5
during arrest. The State counters that the following factors demonstrate Baker was in

constructive possession of the methamphetamine: (1) Baker was in control of and drove the

truck that contained the drugs; (2) Baker drove from the church to the nearby gas station

because he and Allen were “spooked” by police being in the area, which is suspicious

activity; (3) Anderson confirmed that Baker knew where the drugs were because Baker hit

the portion of the truck to show Allen where the drugs were hidden; and (4) Baker was in

proximity to the drugs because he was able to hit the location of the drugs. This is sufficient

evidence from which the jury could find that Baker was in constructive possession of the

methamphetamine in the truck. See McCastle v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 162, 392 S.W.3d

369.

Affirmed.

HARRISON and SWITZER, JJ., agree.

Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

6