John Cullum v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 62
Elizabeth Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
I attest to the accuracy and DIVISION I
integrity of this document
No. CV-21-384
2023.08.22 11:09:05 -05'00'
2023.003.20269
JOHN CULLUM OPINION DELIVERED FEBRUARY 9, 2022
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE VAN BUREN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 71JV-19-22]

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE SUSAN WEAVER,
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

On May 24, 2021, the Van Buren County Circuit Court terminated appellant John

Cullum’s parental rights to S.C. On appeal, Cullum argues that the circuit court abused its

discretion by denying his request for a different attorney and that DHS failed to prove

termination was in S.C.’s best interest. We affirm.

I. Procedural History

On July 8, 2019, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition

for dependency-neglect alleging that S.C., born March 3, 2008, was at substantial risk of

serious harm as a result of abandonment, abuse, neglect, and/or parental unfitness. The

attached affidavit states that Cullum is S.C.’s father and custodial legal parent and that Devin
Cullum Black, S.C.’s mother, has visitation rights. 1 On July 5, Cullum was arrested for

assaulting S.C., and it was alleged that Cullum had picked up S.C. by his neck and held him

against the wall. S.C. suffered a cut under his tongue. As a result of Cullum’s arrest and

the unknown location of S.C.’s mother, DHS placed a seventy-two-hour hold on S.C. An

amended ex parte order awarding DHS emergency custody was filed July 9.

Cullum stipulated that probable cause existed based on the allegations in the petition,

and an order was filed on July 23. Cullum was granted supervised visitation for two hours

a week, and S.C. was placed in provisional relative foster care with Cullum’s sister.

On August 7, an adjudication hearing was held. The circuit court found by a

preponderance of the evidence that S.C. is dependent-neglected on the basis of “the court’s

acceptance of the father’s stipulation to a finding of dependency-neglect; cuts, bruises, welts;

the father has been charged with domestic battery and aggravated assault due to the injuries

to the juvenile and is presently incarcerated.” S.C. remained in DHS custody, and Cullum

was ordered to cooperate with DHS; keep DHS informed of his residence and employment

status; participate in individual and family counseling as recommended; take medications as

prescribed; refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol; submit to random drug screens;

demonstrate improved, appropriate parenting skills; obtain and maintain stable housing and

employment or income; maintain a clean, safe home; demonstrate the ability to protect

S.C.; comply with all court orders and terms of the the case plan; attend and complete

anger-management classes; submit to psychological and drug-and-alcohol assessments; and

1
Devin Cullum Black’s parental rights were also terminated by the order on appeal,
but she did not appeal the order, and this opinion does not address the circuit court’s findings
in relation to her when possible.

2
pay $25 a week in child support beginning August 15, 2019. Cullum was not allowed

visitation due to the no-contact order in the criminal case, but supervised visitation would

be allowed if the no-contact order was lifted or amended.

A review hearing was held on October 17, and the goal of the case was reunification.

The court found that Cullum had housing and transportation but had failed to produce

useable drug screens or attend his psychological examination. The order states,

John Cullum has not made substantial measurable progress.

The Court does not find the testimony of John Cullum credible, in that he is worried
about finances of going inpatient but claims to own a mountain and houses.
Furthermore, Mr. Cullum explained his tardiness for court in that he had unloaded
firewood. The court does not find that credible.

In addition to prior orders, Cullum was ordered to resolve any outstanding legal or criminal

issues, to complete a hair-follicle test within forty-eight hours, and to complete his

psychological evaluation within fourteen days.

At the review hearing on December 4, the court added the concurrent goal of

adoption. Cullum had not complied with the case plan and court orders in that he

continued to use illegal drugs and had tested positive for methamphetamine before the court

hearing. He had not completed his psychological evaluation and had not followed up with

any treatment after he completed his drug-and-alcohol assessment. He had not made himself

available for random drug screens or home visits and had missed two counseling

appointments. The no-contact order that prohibited contact with S.C. remained in place.

The court added that Cullum should attend NA/AA meetings and resolve any outstanding

legal issues. DHS was ordered to arrange for Cullum to attend an inpatient drug-treatment

program.

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The court’s order from the April 30, 2020 review hearing states that Cullum testified

from the Van Buren County Jail and that he had attended a thirty-day drug-treatment

program. The court found that Cullum “realizes” the program was not enough to treat his

drug addiction and that Cullum would finish the program and “then will know how the

criminal case will proceed.” The court found that Cullum had made minimal compliance

and that he needed to complete his psychological evaluation. The concurrent goals of

reunification and adoption remained.

A permanency-planning hearing was held on July 2, and the court ordered that the

goal of the case should be reunification “because John Cullum has made progress in that he

is in a drug-treatment program.” The court set a concurrent plan of adoption and ordered

that S.C. remain in DHS custody because the parents were unfit. Cullum had complied

with the case plan and court orders in that he had recently been in rehab and had completed

a psychological evaluation. “He still needs to resolve his criminal charges and have the no-

contact order lifted. Furthermore, he needs to remain drug free.”

At a fifteen-month-review hearing held on September 14, the court found that S.C.

needed DHS services and that he should remain in DHS custody because the “parents are

unfit,” and S.C.’s health and safety could not be protected if returned to them. Cullum’s

no-contact order remained in effect. The goal of the case was changed to adoption with

reunification services to continue. The court found that Cullum had not complied with

the case plan and court orders in that he had only recently obtained housing and

employment, and he had not resolved the criminal charges.

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II. DHS Petition and Hearing

DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights (TPR) on November 20.

DHS alleged six statutory grounds that applied to Cullum. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(A) and (B) (Supp. 2021). DHS alleged “the facts related to adoptability includ[e]

[that] he is a nice young man. [He] does have some health issues related to his

circumstances.”

On February 3, 2021, a hearing on the TPR petition was held. Before any

testimony, the following colloquy occurred:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And also[, my client] has asked me to request—he has
made a request to have other counsel appointed to him.
And that is the first that I’m hearing of that particular
request.

....

THE COURT: All right. So we’re going to go back on 71JV-19-22. I
know that [defense counsel] earlier had said something
about Mr. Cullum’s—and may not—a request for a new
counsel. Can you—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Can you tell us more about that, [defense counsel]?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I would have to leave that to Mr. Cullum to explain.
He just informed me—

MR. CULLUM: I’m requesting for me to get a new lawyer. I just—I
don’t see [my counsel] being able to handle the rest of
my case properly.

THE COURT: Okay, why?

MR. CULLUM: I just—I don’t feel like he’s doing everything in his
power that he could be. I—I mean, you know, it—I
had to ask him twice just to get my counselor to be

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subpoenaed into court, you know. But I just feel like if
I had different counsel, I believe that the case will turn
out different, you know. I mean, we—we got a new
lawyer for Devin. She’s coming in with all kinds of new
rules and policies, you know. I—and I just—I really feel
like that a different counsel will do me a lot of good.

THE COURT: [Defense counsel]?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I’m happy to withdraw as Mr. Cullum’s
counsel if he does not feel that I am capable of
representing his interests in this case. It won’t be any
skin off my back to do that. But however the Court
wants to proceed—I mean, if Mr. Cullum is saying he’s
firing me as his attorney, I’ve got things I could do this
afternoon. But I think he has to be—

THE COURT: I don’t think he has the choice of firing you—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: --entitled to be—

THE COURT: --because you—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: --appointed another attorney immediately. And that
would probably cause a delay in these cases being heard.

THE COURT: Right. And I don’t think he can fire you. You are a
court-appointed attorney. If he had hired you, that
would be a different situation. [Defense counsel], do
you feel that you’re doing the best of your ability with
what you have?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think I have worked with everything that Mr. Cullum
has given me to work with, and that his counselor is
here. Mr. McCuin is here to testify on his behalf,
whether it took two or three or ten times to get him
here—or for Mr. Cullum to as that, we—he is here.

And I’m not sure—[Devin’s counsel] had arguments to
make that don’t apply to my client because those are
arguments of nature of service and due process. And Mr.
Cullum has been here for the entire case. He’s been
served properly. And I think it would be very hard to
argue that he didn’t have notice and that there was any

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sort of due process argument to be made for his side of
the case.

So, that said, you know, clearly, he and I don’t see this
case the same way, the outcome of this case, I think his
expectations are, at this point, unreasonable about what
he thinks will happen. So, I can—

MR. CULLUM: I haven’t had contact visits with my youngest son, A.K.,
in over a year.[2] And I’m appointed by the Court to
have contact visits with him. The reason DHS says I
can’t is because he’s got RSV, and COVID-19. Well,
we’ve got DHS workers going up there and seeing him.
And I’ve got a picture of May Ann Conley not wearing
a mask around my youngest son. RSV is a virus—or a
bacteria disease, whatever you want to call it that lasts
two weeks. So, after two weeks, he’s cured, and he’s
good to go. Well, why can’t, after that two weeks, I
have contact visits with my youngest son? That makes
no sense, whatsoever.

THE COURT: Okay—

MR. CULLUM: I should be able to have contact visits with my youngest
son even—even in the COVID-19. And I’m sure
there’s other parents that are getting contact visits
through COVID-19. I have not been able to touch my
son, hug him, or kiss him in over a year. And I don’t—
I don’t feel that that’s fair. And I’ve said something to
[my counsel] several times in the last—since I’ve been
out of jail for the last seven months, about me getting
contact visits, and nothing, nothing at all. And it’s been
brought up in court. Nothing gets done. And I just—I
feel like a more aggressive lawyer would get more things
done.

THE COURT: Sadly, Mr. Cullum, there are certain lawyers that people
will pay an unreasonable amount of money to because
they are aggressive. And, unfortunately for the parties,
being aggressive doesn’t always mean they’re being
effective; and, actually, oftentimes has the reverse effect.
2
A.K. is the subject of a separate dependency-neglect case in the Searcy County
Circuit Court.

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[Defense counsel] is not an attorney that puts on a show.
He does his job, he does it well. And just because he’s
not doing it the way that you feel he should do it, when
he’s the trained professional in this field, does not mean
that he is not doing the best that he can do with what he
has to work with. Just because he doesn’t do everything
the way you want him to do it, doesn’t mean that he’s
not trying his best with what he can do. Because he’s
not being rude or obnoxious or pushy or being a bully
does not mean that he’s not aggressive. [Defense
counsel]—I would use [defense counsel]. Like, that’s
how much confidence I have in him. And, believe me,
I see a lot of attorneys. And there’s a lot of attorneys I
wouldn’t say that about.

I’m going to deny your request. We’re here, it’s time to
go. If you wanted to hire an attorney, you’ve had ample
time to do so.

Thereafter, Cullum testified that he is S.C.’s father and that he has more than one

pending criminal charge—aggravated assault due to the incident with S.C. and battery due

to a jail fight. He was not aware of a bench warrant for his failure to appear. He said that

the incident with S.C. happened when he was trying to discipline S.C. S.C. had run from

him, and he was trying to grab him. He denied pinning S.C. against the wall by his throat.

He said that the no-contact order had been in place since the incident, which occurred in

2019, and he has not had any visitation with S.C. since then. He had completed parenting

classes and a drug-treatment program at Wilbur D. Mills; thereafter, he tested positive for

marijuana. He said that he had completed everything except “adequate housing” and that

he had money to accomplish that and was looking for a place. He left one psychological

evaluation before it was completed because he thought he could leave to get something to

eat during the meeting, and the rules had changed. He has completed a psychological

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evaluation since then. He has completed a drug-and-alcohol assessment and has been to

rehab. He went to Gyst House as a condition of his bond, but he did not complete the

program because “they” wanted him to lie to DHS about his ability to get a job. He said

that he had attended an anger-management class in the past. He works for a construction

company and has had the job for four months. On cross-examination, he denied choking

S.C. and said that he had accidently caused S.C. harm.

Fairfield Bay Police Officer Lye Fultz testified that on July 5, 2019, he was sent to a

domestic disturbance, and when he arrived, Cullum was not there. Cullum’s girlfriend,

Lillian Loosey, appeared distraught, and he saw red marks on S.C.’s neck and a little bit of

blood in his mouth. Cullum returned to the scene and appeared calm. When Cullum was

placed under arrest, he became argumentative and denied that the altercation had happened.

Ms. Loosey testified that she witnessed Cullum pick up S.C. by his throat because

S.C. had not cleaned his room or done the dishes. S.C.’s mouth was bleeding. Cullum had

S.C. by his throat on the floor. Cullum threw an Xbox at S.C., but it did not hit him.

Cullum also threw a side table at S.C. and missed.

Mary Ann Conley testified that she is the DHS family service worker assigned to

S.C.’s case. She prepared the case plan and court report. Cullum was offered services

including case management, counseling, a drug-and-alcohol assessment, a psychological

evaluation, parenting classes, inpatient treatment, random home visits, and random drug

screening. He completed everything except the program at Gyst House. She said that

Cullum had not benefited from services and had minimal compliance with his case plan.

She said that S.C. will be thirteen years old next month and is adoptable. “There are some

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things that he needs to work through that we are helping him with, but we are on the road

to helping him.” She believes S.C. needs permanency. She said that Cullum had paid

$1200 in total child support and that he does not have an appropriate home for S.C. She is

fearful that S.C. would be subject to physical abuse if returned to Cullum. She said that S.C.

has been in a facility receiving therapy services since August 2020. In the beginning of the

case, S.C. had been placed with his aunt, but she has health problems and could not

continue. He had two other foster placements before going into the facility where he is

now. She had not run any data matches on S.C., and there were no background checks on

relatives for placement.

Dena Dunlap, the CASA volunteer, testified that she was assigned the case in

November 2019. She had met Cullum a few times and talked with him. She said that

during her testimony in July 2020, Cullum texted her that she was lying and that he wanted

to be put back on the stand. He later left her a voice message that she took as a threat. The

voicemail was played for the court, and it states, “Hey, this is John. My ex-wife, Devin, is

going to talk to me, we need to let you know. And just—we’ll get together when we get

time.” Dunlap said that S.C. is a delightful twelve-year-old and that he is smart and kind.

She said that S.C. wants a permanent place and someone to love him and make him feel

safe and secure. He has a hard time trusting anyone, has a lot of anger problems, and is

behind in his schoolwork but is working hard to catch up. He is working on his anger

issues in group and individual therapy and has come a long way, especially in the last couple

of months. She said that S.C. is absolutely adoptable and that she thinks that being returned

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to Cullum would put S.C. at risk because of Cullum’s anger issues. She testified that

adoption and some permanency would be in S.C.’s best interest.

Dan McCuin testified that he is Cullum’s counselor and that he began working with

Cullum in 2019, but he was discharged after a couple of sessions when Cullum went into a

drug-treatment facility and became incarcerated. Cullum came back for treatment in

October 2020 and has been seeing McCuin steadily since then. He works with Cullum on

conflict resolution, anger management, and substance abuse. Cullum’s anger and stress levels

are less apparent when he is not using drugs. He said that Cullum has made excellent

progress and that when he came back into treatment, he had a completely different attitude

of humility. He said that Cullum’s drug tests indicate he is not using, and Cullum is more

engaged in treatment, more pleasant and responsive.

When he was re-called, Cullum testified about his counseling, employment, and

pending criminal cases. He asked that his rights not be terminated so that he could get the

no-contact order lifted, and he asked that S.C. not be placed in a mental facility but with a

family member. He admitted that the termination hearing was the first time he had

mentioned any relatives for placement because “that’s a question that’s never been asked

before, so I never got a chance to say it in court.”

Lois Black testified that she is S.C.’s maternal grandmother and that she lives in

Missouri. She had contact with DHS early in the case, and DHS had asked if she wanted

placement of S.C. She received paperwork about Cullum’s criminal charges six months

ago, but she did not receive the ICPC paperwork. She called DHS many times to get an

update but never received any. She was told that S.C. was in foster care and later told that

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he was in a facility. She said that she is interested in having S.C. placed with her and that

she would adopt if necessary for him to have a happy family and home life. She last had

contact with S.C. in 2018. She said that she would love to have visits with him. She has a

two-bedroom home that needs new flooring, and she could take S.C. within thirty days.

On cross-examination, she said that she had asked someone at DHS for a visit with S.C. so

she could understand his demeanor and whether he wanted to be with her. She said that

she would be willing to keep her daughter away from S.C. if the judge ordered it, but she

thought all parents should have a chance to redeem themselves. She said that she would

allow her daughter to live with her and S.C.

Mary Ann Conley was re-called and testified that she got employer information and

a check stub from Cullum. After she called to verify his employment, Cullum texted her

and asked why she called his boss and whether she was trying to make him look bad. This

concerned her, and she said that it was not her intention to make him look bad.

On May 24, 2021, the court’s TPR order was filed. The court found that DHS had

proved the grounds as alleged by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the court found

that it was in S.C.’s best interest to terminate parental rights:

In making this finding, the court specifically considered (A) the likelihood that the
juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted, specifically the
testimony of Mary Conley and Dena Dunlap, stated that [S.C.] is currently in a
mental health facility but that with time to address the trauma he has been through,
there are no known barriers to a successful adoption, and [S.C.] is a loving child who
is a joy to be around.

Cullum filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

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III. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

TPR cases are reviewed de novo. Jones v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App.

446, 636 S.W.3d 811. An order terminating parental rights must be based on a finding by

clear and convincing evidence that the sought-after termination is in the children’s best

interest. Id. The circuit court must consider the likelihood that the children will be adopted

if the parent’s rights are terminated and the potential harm that could be caused if the

children are returned to a parent. Rocha v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 454,

637 S.W.3d 299. The circuit court must also find that one of the grounds stated in the

termination statute is satisfied. Id.

Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-

finder a firm conviction that the allegation has been established. Fisher v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 39, 569 S.W.3d 886. When the burden of proving a disputed fact is

by clear and convincing evidence, we ask whether the circuit court’s finding on the disputed

fact is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence

to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Id.

Adoptability is not an essential element of proof in a termination case.
McDaniel v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 263. In other words, the
identification of would-be adoptive parents is not a prerequisite to terminating a
biological parent’s rights. Baker v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 507. All
the law requires is that the circuit court consider the likelihood that the child will be
adopted when making its best-interest determination. Sharks v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 569.

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Jones, 2021 Ark. App. 446, at 5, 636 S.W.3d at 815. A caseworker’s testimony that a child

is adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability finding. Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2016 Ark. App. 239, at 8, 492 S.W.3d 113, 118.

IV. Request to Change Counsel

Cullum argues that the circuit court committed reversible error when it denied his

request for new counsel without performing any balancing test and stated that he did not

have the right to fire his appointed counsel. He contends that this issue raises a legal question

and that the circuit court’s denial should be reviewed de novo and given no deference on

appeal. See, e.g., Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Fluker, 371 Ark. 574, 268 S.W.3d 879

(2007). He asserts that his request was, in practical effect, a request for a continuance. He

argues that when the circuit court denied his request to continue the matter for a new

attorney to be appointed without performing a balancing test, the circuit court abused its

discretion.

Cullum contends that there is an exception in TPR cases to the general rule that the

constitutional protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment are not typically extended in

an ordinary civil case. See Jones v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 361 Ark. 164, 205 S.W.3d 778

(2005) (holding that the right to counsel in TPR cases includes the right to effective

counsel). He argues that the exception should also apply when a parent in a TPR case seeks

to obtain new counsel because the Sixth Amendment also grants the right to counsel of the

defendant’s choosing. Arroyo v. State, 2013 Ark. 244, 428 S.W.3d 464. He contends that

the Arkansas Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether the circuit court

committed reversible error is based on whether the defendant’s motion to substitute counsel

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was wrongly denied, not whether the defendant was prejudiced by the denial. Id.

(differentiating between counsel of choice and an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim).

He claims that the same standard should apply here and that the question is whether the

circuit court wrongly denied his motion for new counsel without regard for prejudice.

Cullum then argues that it is true that this right to choose counsel is not absolute and

that the circuit court maintains broad discretion to grant or deny a continuance for the

purposes of obtaining new counsel. Id. He argues that the circuit court must balance his

right to counsel of his choice against the needs of fairness and the demands of its calendar.

Id. He argues that the circuit court denied his request for a continuance to have a new

attorney appointed without performing a balancing test; thus, he claims, the circuit court

abused its discretion.

Cullum argued to the circuit court that he wanted new counsel because he wanted

an aggressive attorney. Cullum did not raise his constitutional or “balancing test” arguments

before the circuit court; thus, the arguments are not preserved for appeal. Langston v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. 152, 574 S.W.3d 138 (holding that even when constitutional

issues are presented in a TPR hearing, these objections will be waived unless made in a

timely fashion to the circuit court); Taylor v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 227

(holding appellant’s argument that her constitutional rights had been violated when her

request for new counsel at the TPR hearing was denied was not preserved because it was

not raised in the circuit court).

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V. Best Interest

Cullum contends that DHS failed to prove that TPR was in S.C.’s best interest. He

argues that the evidence demonstrates that S.C. had to be moved from two foster homes for

violent behavior toward his foster parents. He claims that the only evidence of adoptability

was testimony from a caseworker, which he maintains “glossed over” S.C.’s significant

behavioral issues and should not be found to support the adoptability prong “or that there

was an appropriate permanency plan for the child.” He emphasizes the caseworker’s

testimony that after six months of treatment at a facility, S.C.’s aggression was only “getting

a little better.” He asserts that there was no testimony offered from an adoption specialist

and that no matching lists were introduced. He points to the testimony that S.C. was not

adoptable on the day of the TPR hearing and that there were some hurdles to get to that

point. Cullum contends that, considering the lack of evidence that S.C.’s specific

characteristics were properly considered in the adoptability analysis and the fact that the

system is flooded with children twelve years old and up, it is unreasonable to conclude that

the evidence met the level of proof required as it relates to the likelihood that S.C. would

be adopted and that termination was ultimately in S.C.’s best interest.

DHS contends that the circuit court’s adoptability findings were not clearly

erroneous. We agree. The best-interest determination includes consideration of the

evidence supporting the specific grounds for termination. Camarillo-Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 360 Ark. 340, 201 S.W.3d 391 (2005). The best-interest standard also includes

consideration of the following two factors: (1) the child’s likelihood of adoption; and (2)

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the potential for harm from returning the children to the parents’ custody. Ark. Code Ann.

§ 9-27-341(b)(3). These are not exclusive factors.

The record is clear that the circuit court considered evidence regarding S.C.’s

adoptability before making its decision that TPR was in his best interest. Further, appellate

courts will not reweigh the credibility of the evidence on adoptability. Blasingame v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 71, 542 S.W.3d 873. The circuit court specifically

relied on Ms. Conley’s and Ms. Dunlap’s testimony about S.C.’s likelihood of adoption.

The circuit court noted that “with time to address the trauma” S.C. had suffered, there were

“no known barriers to a successful adoption.” The circuit court considered the evidence

on S.C.’s adoptability, and there is no requirement that DHS disprove all possible barriers

to adoption—such as behavioral issues—by clear and convincing evidence. Solee v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 640, 535 S.W.3d 687.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.

Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Andrew Firth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

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