Calandra Lock-Fraser and Jahnell Fraser v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 402
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-24-391

CALANDRA LOCK-FRASER AND Opinion Delivered September 3, 2025

JAHNELL FRASER
APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
APPELLANTS
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 30JV-20-69]
V.
HONORABLE STEPHEN SHIRRON,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILD AFFIRMED
APPELLEES

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Calandra Lock-Fraser and Jahnell Fraser appeal the denial of their motion for

continuance and the grant of the decree of adoption to Victoria and Brandon McCorkle,

Minor Child’s (MC’s) foster parents. Specifically, the Frasers argue that the decree of

adoption is void, and therefore, that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for

continuance as moot. We affirm.

I. Background

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for dependency-

neglect concerning MC on October 23, 2020. In the petition, the affiant attested that there

were findings of inadequate supervision, minimal compliance with the case plan, and failures
to protect.1 MC was removed from the care of her biological parents because the

circumstances in the home presented an immediate danger to her health. After multiple,

unsuccessful attempts at reunification, parental rights were terminated on May 12, 2023.2

DHS initially attempted to place MC with Calandra Lock-Fraser, MC’s maternal

grandmother; and Jahnell Fraser, Calandra’s spouse, but it determined that the Frasers were

not suitable caretakers for MC. Specifically, DHS noted that Jahnell had recently been

arrested for aggravated assault with Calandra listed as the victim, and Jahnell had previously

been arrested in 2018 for pulling a knife on Calandra.3 Further, DHS noted that MC’s

biological mother would likely have unrestricted access to MC if she was placed with the

Frasers. Consequently, MC was placed in foster care outside the family.

On November 29, 2023, the Frasers sought to intervene in the case, and the circuit

court entered an order allowing them to intervene for the sole purpose of pursuing their

petition to adopt MC. On February 5, 2024, the Frasers filed their petition for adoption but

did not seek DHS’s consent for their petition, nor is there evidence that they later tried to

obtain DHS’s consent. Without DHS’s consent, the circuit court was unable to grant the

1
The failure-to-protect claim resulted from the biological mother and father engaging
in heavy drug use in front of MC, the mother driving “high” with MC in the vehicle, posting
on Facebook Live that MC was getting a “contact high,” and the belief that the biological
father was dealing controlled substances while caring for MC.
2
The biological parents appealed, and the termination order was affirmed on appeal.
Moore v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 4, 682 S.W.3d 706.
3
The charges were later dropped or never formally charged.

2
Frasers’ petition. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-206(a)(3) (Repl. 2020). On February 21, 2024,

the McCorkles filed identical adoption petitions both in the instant case and in a new

secondary case.

The circuit court held a post-termination hearing on March 13, 2024.4 The circuit

court set the hearing on the McCorkles’ adoption petition on the same day as the hearing

on the Frasers’ adoption petition, April 10, 2024. On April 5, the Frasers sought a

continuance, claiming that they needed additional time to perfect service on DHS. The

Frasers renewed their motion for continuance on April 9, alleging only that they needed

additional time to perfect service on DHS.

No orders granting or denying the Frasers’ two motions for continuance were issued,

and all parties were present at the April 10 hearing.5 At that point, the Frasers’ again

requested a continuance in order to serve the director of DHS. The Frasers’ further requested

a continuance on the McCorkles’ petition to adopt MC. The Frasers’ counsel attested that

he had “placed the necessary documents, certified mail, to – to attempt that service” but

failed to articulate when he mailed these documents and why he had waited until just before

the hearing to do so. Additionally, the Frasers’ counsel mistakenly thought that the hearing

4
The Frasers were not present for the post-termination hearing; however, their limited
intervention allowed them only to petition to adopt MC, and that did not extend to the
post-termination hearing.
5
The Frasers’ attorney, Charlie Cunningham, was unable to attend the April 10
hearing but sent another attorney—Logan Mustain—in his stead. Mr. Mustain informed the
court that he was “well and sufficiently advised as to what’s going on this case.”

3
was solely for the purpose of addressing the motions to continue rather than a hearing on

the merits: “It’s my understanding that, you know, for the purposes of today, really we are

addressing the motion to continue.”

The circuit court ruled that the Frasers lacked standing to request a continuance in

the McCorkles’ adoption case. The Frasers then conceded that if the circuit court granted

the McCorkles’ petition to adopt, their motions for continuance would be moot. The circuit

court held in abeyance the Frasers’ motion to continue and held the scheduled hearing on

the McCorkles’ petition. After finding that it was in MC’s best interest to be placed with the

McCorkles, the circuit court denied the Frasers’ motions to continue as moot.

II. Standard of Review

A motion for continuance shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.

Grimwood v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 417, at 3, 586 S.W.3d 667, 669. The

appellant bears the burden of showing that the circuit court’s denial of a continuance was

an abuse of discretion, and to show an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that he

or she was prejudiced by the denial. Id. at 3–4, 586 S.W.3d at 670. A circuit court abuses its

discretion when it acts improvidently and without due consideration. Id. Lack of diligence

by the moving party is sufficient reason to deny a motion for continuance. Britt v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 95, at 7–8, 640 S.W.3d 721, 726. Credibility determinations

are within the circuit court’s discretion, and appellate courts will not question those

determinations on appeal. Copp v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 491, at 13, 679

S.W.3d 380, 390.

4
III. Discussion

On appeal, the Frasers argue that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied

their motion for continuance. Specifically, the Frasers argue that the McCorkles’ adoption

decree is void because it did not follow the case-numbering mandates under the adoption

code; accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion to rely on that adoption decree to dismiss

their motion for continuance as moot. Second, the Frasers argue they were prejudiced by the

circuit court’s abuse of discretion since they were unable to introduce evidence about their

custody of MC’s half sister and have “their day in court.”

First, at the start of the April 10 hearing, the Frasers’ counsel conceded that their

motion for continuance would become moot if the McCorkles’ petition for adoption of MC

was granted. The circuit court reiterated this before holding the motion in abeyance: “And

as for your continuance in the petition for adoption . . . as you have pointed out, [counsel

for the Frasers], even if it were to be granted, it’s a moot point if the other case and the

adoption is granted therein.”

Second, even if the Frasers had standing to collaterally attack the validity of the

adoption decree in another case, the McCorkles’ case, they do not present a compelling

argument that the decree is void. The Frasers contend that failure to strictly adhere to the

adoption code renders the adoption decree void. In fact, our supreme court has rejected a

strict-compliance standard:

[Appellant’s] argument seems to suggest that any noncompliance with
the adoption code, however slight, would prohibit a probate court’s entry of
an adoption decree. Such suggestion by its very nature would extend

5
Arkansas’s settled rule so as to permit an adoption order to be set aside for a
reason other than fraud, duress, or intimidation. Certainly, no statute is cited
to support this idea and our case law, particularly this court’s decision in Pierce,
disabuses us of any such notion.

See Martin v. Martin, 316 Ark. 765, 769–70, 875 S.W.2d 819, 821 (1994).6

Here, the McCorkles’ petition for adoption was filed in the instant case and in a new

juvenile case. The McCorkles respond that this is proper procedure and cite the “Instructions

for the State of Arkansas Circuit Court: Juvenile Dependency-Neglect” as support. Indeed,

the state-propagated instructions inform courts that “although an adoption in juvenile court

arises from an existing case, it should be filed as a new case and receive a new case number.”

Accordingly, even if it was improper to create a new case, the error was not sufficient to

render the entire adoption decree void, contrary to the Frasers’ argument.

Finally, the Frasers have not provided any evidence that they were prejudiced by the

denial of their motion for continuance. As support for a finding of prejudice, the Frasers

argue that (1) they were not able to present evidence of a relationship between MC and MC’s

half sibling; and (2) they did not get “their day in court.” Neither argument was preserved

for appellate review. Dejarnette v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 410, 654 S.W.3d

83. The only reason the Frasers cited in their motion for continuance was the need to perfect

6
The Frasers cite London v. Sauerwin, 2023 Ark. App. 525, as support for their
contention that strict adherence to the adoption code is required. London does not—in any
way—deal with or discuss the adoption code. Nor is it applicable to the instant case.
Furthermore, London cannot override Martin.

6
service on DHS. Consequently, because these arguments were not preserved for appeal, we

do not address them here.

IV. Conclusion

The Frasers bore the burden of demonstrating that the circuit court abused its

discretion by failing to grant their motion for continuance. As explained above, they have

failed to meet this burden. The adoption decree is not void, and even if the Frasers had

standing to challenge the adoption decree in the McCorkles’ case, they have failed to preserve

any argument that they suffered any prejudice from the circuit court’s denial of their motions

for continuance.

Affirmed.

BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.

D. Franklin Arey III, for appellants.

Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

7