Noah Thompson v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 558
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-25-15

NOAH THOMPSON Opinion Delivered November 19, 2025

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V. WESTERN DISTRICT
[NO. 16JCR-23-1191]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE RANDY PHILHOURS,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Appellant Noah Thompson appeals his conviction—following a conditional plea of

no contest—of theft by receiving a firearm and possession of a controlled substance and

resulting sentence of thirty-six months’ probation. Thompson argues on appeal that the

circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress physical evidence seized during law

enforcement’s warrantless seizure and search of his person and residence and, furthermore,

that the circuit court erred by refusing to suppress his custodial statements. We affirm.

I. Background Facts

On July 25, 2011, the City of Jonesboro filed a complaint for injunction and an order

of abatement in a civil matter alleging that various properties in the Cedar Heights

neighborhood, including the property at 1835 Cedar Heights Drive, were a public nuisance.
The circuit court entered an agreed order of abatement declaring the properties a public

nuisance and “detrimental to the public morals.” Furthermore, the order placed the

properties in the custody of the Craighead County Circuit Court pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-105-413 (Repl. 2016) and specifically provided that “the Defendant or

any other person present at the residence shall allow the Jonesboro Police Department to

search the premises to ensure that no activities in furtherance of this nuisance are occurring

on the property.” The order further directed the City of Jonesboro to place signs on the

affected properties—including 1835 Cedar Heights Drive—specifically warning that “the

property and all persons on the property are subject to search by the Jonesboro Police

Department.”

On October 4, 2023, Investigator Tanner Huff with Jonesboro Police Department’s

Street Crimes Unit was in the Cedar Heights neighborhood and saw several males

congregating outside of Thompson’s residence. Pursuant to the abatement order, Huff and

other members of the crime unit chose to perform a search of both the individuals at the

residence and the property itself. As Huff approached the property, he alleged that he could

smell the distinctive odor of marijuana and that Thompson was in the process of exiting the

front door of the residence. According to Huff’s bodycam video, Thompson was immediately

searched, and two oxycodone pills were seized. Huff also saw two promethazine cough syrup

bottles with torn labels—one with a usable amount—and a rolled marijuana “blunt” near the

front door of the residence. Following a brief telephone call with the Jonesboro city attorney,

Huff then entered the residence, pursuant to the ostensible authority given by the abatement

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order, and conducted a second search. The search yielded a .40-caliber Glock pistol that had

been reported stolen, a scale with marijuana residue, eleven empty bottles of promethazine

with the labels torn off, and a rolling tray. These items were found in and around the living

room area of the residence; the firearm was found in a couch cushion in the living room.

Huff’s bodycam video evidenced that the living room area was being occupied by one

or more individuals. According to Thompson’s mother, who rented the residence,

Thompson “lived” in the living room area when he stayed there. Following the search, Huff

walked outside and announced that it was his intent to arrest everyone in and around the

residence on the basis of the seizure of the stolen firearm. At this point, several of the

individuals began protesting their arrests. Thompson claimed ownership of the seized

firearm at that time. Due to the noise of the protests, Huff stated that he did not hear

Thompson’s statement. The following day, during his postarrest Mirandized statement,

Thompson again claimed ownership of the seized gun. Thompson was charged with one

count of theft by receiving, a Class D felony, and one count of possession of a controlled

substance, a Class D felony.

Thereafter, Thompson moved to suppress the seized firearm and drugs found during

the searches, arguing that the warrantless search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. Additionally, Thompson maintained that his statement regarding ownership of the

stolen firearm before he was Mirandized should be suppressed because it was not voluntary—

but rather occurred while he was in custody. Regarding Thompson’s statement of ownership

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of the firearm, after he was arrested and Mirandized, he argued that it was inadmissible

because it followed his unlawful arrest.

In ruling on Thompson’s motion, the circuit court entered a comprehensive order

detailing its conclusion of law. The court found that the warrantless searches and seizures

violated Thompson’s Fourth Amendment; thus, the drugs seized from Thompson and the

stolen firearm seized from the residence were subject to suppression. However, the court

found that suppression of the evidence seized—on this specific set of facts—was contrary to

the underlying rationale for the exclusionary remedy and inappropriate. In doing so, the

circuit court cited United States Supreme Court precedent explaining that the sole purpose

of the exclusionary rule is deterrence; thus, when there will be no appreciable deterrent effect

of law enforcement misconduct gained through exclusion, it is unwarranted. See, e.g., Arizona

v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). Furthermore, the court applied the good-faith exception

outlined in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Specifically, the circuit court held:

While there was no warrant here, the rationale of Leon remains applicable. In
a myriad of post-Leon cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that law enforcement’s
objectively reasonable reliance on facts, laws and circumstances despite their
subsequent invalidity neither implicates the exclusionary rule nor mandates exclusion
of the illegally seized evidence in a criminal trial. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1
(1995) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to clerical errors); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31 (1979) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to statutes later declared
unconstitutional); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable to binding appellate precedent later declared unconstitutional).

The facts here are important, and Huff’s actions on October 4, 2023, are
equally important. Both highlight the undeniable truth that exclusion of the evidence
seized from [Thompson’s] person and the evidence seized from [Thompson’s]
Property is inappropriate in this particular case because exclusion would have no
deterrent effect.

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The Abatement Order was filed in the civil division of this Court on July 25,
201l. Shortly thereafter, the City of Jonesboro posted signs throughout the Cedar
Heights neighborhood warning all present in the neighborhood that their mere
presence within the abatement zone might subject them to warrantless searches and
warning tenants in the neighborhood that their leaseholds were also subject to
warrantless searches. The Abatement Order remained unchallenged and in effect in
this area until [Thompson] filed his Motion on April 11, 2024. For nearly thirteen
(13) years, the Abatement Order’s provisions allowing for warrantless searches has
remained unchallenged.

Additionally, the circuit court found that Thompson’s statements in which he took

ownership of the stolen firearm were admissible. The court held that the first statement

Thompson made at the scene—while in custody—was admissible as a spontaneous statement.

The circuit court noted that because it had the benefit of watching and hearing the entire

interaction recorded on Huff’s bodycam video, “[i]t would stain credulity to even suggest that

Huff’s statement to the assembled masses was an unconstitutional custodial interrogation.”

Rather, the court held that Thompson’s statement was “purely voluntary and completely

gratuitous.” Regarding the second statement, the circuit court highlighted that Thompson’s

only argument in support of its inadmissibility was premised on a finding that Thompson’s

first statement was involuntary. Accordingly, the court held that because the first statement

was voluntary and admissible, Thompson’s post-Miranda statement was as well.

Thompson entered a conditional plea of no contest, pursuant to Arkansas Rule of

Criminal Procedure 24.3 (2024), to one count of theft by receiving a firearm and one count

of possession of a controlled substance and received thirty-six months’ probation. The

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sentencing order was filed on June 17, 2024, and Thompson timely filed his notice of appeal.

This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this court conducts a de

novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of fact for clear

error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable

cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference to the

circuit court’s findings. Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark. 31, 257 S.W.3d 50 (2007). Arkansas

appellate courts defer to the superior position of the circuit court to evaluate the credibility

of witnesses at a suppression hearing. Ilo v. State, 350 Ark. 138, 85 S.W.3d 542 (2002). We

will reverse the denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is clearly against the

preponderance of the evidence. Id.

III. Points on Appeal

Thompson argues that (1) the circuit court erred by finding that the good-faith

exception saved law enforcement’s illegal seizure and subsequent illegal searches of both his

person and residence, and (2) the circuit court clearly erred by denying the motion to

suppress his custodial statements.

IV. Discussion

A. Good-Faith Exception

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Thompson first argues that the circuit court erred by applying the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule and holding that the evidence obtained pursuant to the

warrantless searches and seizures were admissible. We disagree.

A warrantless search can be reasonable and thus constitutional, but a warrantless

search is reasonable only if the search falls within a recognized exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); Dortch

v. State, 2018 Ark. 135, 544 S.W.3d 518. The good-faith exception, a judicially created

remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights, was

clarified by the United States Supreme Court in Leon, 468 U.S. 897. However, the Court

explained in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), that the exception does not apply if law

enforcement relies on a legal authority that is facially deficient or clearly lacking in specificity

or probable cause.

In Deshazo v. State, this court held that the sheriff acted in good-faith reliance on a

facially valid court order in executing an order of immediate possession. 95 Ark. App. 398,

237 S.W.3d 493 (2006). Deshazo involved the search of property that was rented to the

appellant. The owner of the property issued a notice for Deshazo to vacate the premises, but

Deshazo did not vacate; thus, an order for immediate possession and a writ of possession

were filed and sent to Deshazo. Id. Thereafter, the sheriff’s office served the order on Deshazo

and informed him that he had a week to vacate the premises. When the officers returned

to claim possession of the property, the individual who opened the door claimed that

Deshazo was not home. The officers did a protective sweep outside and inside the residence

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in search of Deshazo and, in the process, found weapons and what appeared to be drug

paraphernalia. Accordingly, a warrant was issued—on the basis of the preliminary items

found during the search of the home—and that evidence was used to convict Deshazo.

Subsequently, it was determined that law enforcement failed to serve Deshazo with a writ of

possession as required by statute and instead served him with an order of possession.

On appeal, this court held that for all practical purposes, the order of immediate

possession and writ of possession accomplished the same thing and entitled the owner to

possession of the property. Id. In applying the good-faith exception as outlined in Leon, the

Deshazo court explained that while Leon involved a defective search warrant, the Supreme

Court has extended the good-faith exception to a warrantless search permitted by a state

statute that was later ruled unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); and to a

search incident to an arrest that was based on erroneous information, Arizona v. Evans, 514

U.S. 1 (1995). Deshazo, 95 Ark. App. at 403, 237 S.W.3d at 497.

Accordingly, this court found no error in the circuit court’s finding that the sheriff

acted in good-faith reliance on a facially valid court order in executing the order of

possession. Id. at 404, 237 S.W.3d at 497. Specifically, this court held that the sheriff “was

of the understanding that he had complied with the statutory requirements, and when he

returned . . . he believed he had the legal right to repossess the property for the plaintiff.”

Id. Considering the totality of the circumstances, this court held that suppressing the

evidence in Deshazo would not serve the remedial purposes of the exclusionary rule. Id.

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Here, law enforcement acted in reliance on an abatement order that was entered by

a Craighead County Circuit Court in 2011 pursuant to the Arkansas Drug Abatement Act

of 1989—an anti-drug law that allowed for the abatement of common nuisances, specifically

targeting properties used for illegal drug activity. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-105-401 et seq.

(Repl. 2016). The purpose of the abatement order was crime prevention in the Cedar

Heights neighborhood. Shortly thereafter, the City of Jonesboro posted signs throughout

the Cedar Heights neighborhood that a person’s presence within the abatement zone might

subject the person to warrantless searches. The signs specifically state, “This property and

all persons upon the property are subject to search by Jonesboro Police Department.” The

abatement order and signage remained unchallenged for nearly thirteen years until

Thompson filed his motion to suppress.

Nonetheless, the circuit court was clear in its finding that the search of Thompson

and the property were not authorized without a warrant merely because the abatement order

gave the Jonesboro Police Department the authority to do so. In fact, the circuit court

expressly rejected the State’s argument to that effect:

[T]he Fourth Amendment does not provide that the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, may be violated if violated pursuant to an otherwise valid court order
unless that court order also comports with the [w]arrant requirement.

Rather, the circuit court focused on whether Huff’s actions were reasonable in light of the

totality of the circumstances and the plain language of the abatement order.

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In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court reiterated that “when the police act with

an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their conduct is lawful, or when their

conduct involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence, the ‘deterrence rationale loses much of

its force,’ and exclusion cannot ‘pay its way.’” 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (quoting Leon, 468

U.S. at 919; Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009)). Therefore, the specific facts of this

case and Huff’s actions on October 4, 2023, are equally important.

Before the date in question, Huff testified that he believed he saw a drug transaction

take place at the residence via SkyCop. Huff also testified that the street-crime unit had

several investigations centered on residents in the Cedar Heights neighborhood and that he

had previously used his abatement authority to conduct searches of individuals within the

abatement premises. Furthermore, Huff stated that he is familiar with Thompson, had

previously arrested him in 2023, and had other various contacts with Thompson that did

not ultimately result in an arrest.

When Huff’s street-crime unit was patrolling the Cedar Heights neighborhood on

October 4, 2023, he saw several males congregating outside the property. According to Huff’s

bodycam video, Huff immediately searched Thompson, and two oxycodone pills were seized.

At the suppression hearing, Huff confirmed that it was standard practice of the Jonesboro

Police Department to conduct searches of individuals based on the abatement order and

that he had always been advised that conducting a search of a residence was also covered by

the order. However, because Huff had never personally used the abatement order to search

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a residence, he contacted the city attorney before conducting the search to confirm that he

had such authority.

In light of these facts, we agree with the circuit court that Huff acted in good faith in

relying on the clear directives of the abatement order. As stated by the circuit court, “Huff

did exactly what courts expect of him in any court order, and the thirteen (13) years between

the filing of that order and October 4, 2023 must have given Huff great confidence in its

validity.” We also agree that Huff’s good faith was illustrated by his call to the city attorney

to obtain legal advice as to the abatement order’s scope before he executed a search of the

residence. Furthermore, considering Huff’s testimony regarding his personal knowledge of

the ongoing criminal activity in the Cedar Heights neighborhood; familiarity with

Thompson; observation of what he believed to be a prior drug transaction at the residence;

and the longstanding reliance of the Jonesboro Police Department on the abatement order,

we cannot say that Huff violated Thompson’s Fourth Amendment rights deliberately,

recklessly, or with gross negligence. Thus, applying Leon’s reasoning to the specific facts of

this case, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress.

B. Admission of Custodial Statements

Next, Thompson argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress

his statements claiming ownership of the stolen firearm. Thompson contends that the court

erred by finding that his first statement—made at his residence while he was in custody and

not yet given his Miranda warnings—was not a spontaneous statement but the result of a

custodial interrogation; thus, the statement should have been suppressed. Alternatively,

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Thompson maintains that his statement at the residence and his Mirandized statement the

following day should have been suppressed because they were inexorably tied to his illegal

arrest.

A statement made while in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is

on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was

given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294,

107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). In cases involving a ruling on the voluntariness of a confession, this

court makes an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances. Clark

v. State, 374 Ark. 292, 287 S.W.3d 567 (2008). We review the circuit court’s findings of fact

for clear error, and the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary is subject

to an independent, or de novo, determination by this court. Id. A circuit court’s ruling will

be reversed only if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Furthermore,

evaluating the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing about the

circumstances surrounding an appellant’s custodial statement is for the circuit court to

determine, and we defer to the circuit court in matters of credibility. Id.

Here, the circuit court held that Thompson’s first statement was admissible

because it constituted a spontaneous statement, not a custodial interrogation. Further,

the court found that the State met its burden of proof despite the fact that Thompson

was in custody when he made the statement. A suspect’s spontaneous statement while

in police custody is admissible, and it is irrelevant whether the statement was made before

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or after Miranda warnings because a spontaneous statement is not compelled or the result

of coercion under the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. Fricks v.

State, 2016 Ark. App. 415, 501 S.W.3d 853. A voluntary custodial statement does not

become the product of an interrogation simply because an officer asks a defendant to

explain or clarify something he or she already said voluntarily. Connor v. State, 2022 Ark.

App. 375, 653 S.W.3d 37.

The circuit court explained that it “had the benefit of watching and hearing the

entire interaction recorded on Huff’s bodycam video” and that “it would strain credulity

to even suggest that Huff’s statement to the assembled masses was an unconstitutional

custodial interrogation.” Additionally, the court considered the fact that Thompson gave

a post-Miranda statement the next day claiming ownership of the stolen firearm as further

proof that his original statement was knowingly and intelligently made.

We hold that the circuit court’s finding that Thompson’s first statement

constituted a spontaneous statement was not clearly against the preponderance of the

evidence. After the firearm was seized, Huff announced to a large group of people, “I got

a hot gun [and] everybody goes in cuffs . . . until I figure out whose gun it is.” Amid the

crowd and noise, Thompson said that the firearm belonged to him. However, Huff did

not hear Thompson’s statement. While Thompson was in custody at the time, he again

claimed ownership of the seized firearm the following day after he had been arrested and

Mirandized—and, as noted by the circuit court, expressed “some level of incredulity that

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there was any question about that issue.” Given the totality of the circumstances, we

affirm the circuit court’s finding that Thompson’s original statement was voluntary and

knowingly and intelligently made and, therefore, admissible.

Finally, Thompson argues that his statement claiming ownership of the firearm at

the police station made after he had been properly Mirandized was inadmissible because

it was tied to the illegal search and seizure or, alternatively, because his first statement was

involuntary. However, because we affirm the circuit court’s application of the good-faith

exception to the warrant requirement and its finding that Thompson’s original custodial

statement constituted a spontaneous statement, both of Thompson’s arguments

regarding the inadmissibility of his second custodial statement must fail.

V. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the order denying Thompson’s motion to

suppress because the circuit court’s order was not against the preponderance of the evidence.

Affirmed.

HIXSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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