Dardanelle Public Schools v. Andrea Ewton

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 575
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-25-148

DARDANELLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS Opinion Delivered December 3, 2025
AND ARKANSAS SCHOOL BOARDS
ASSOCIATION APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION

V. [NO. H305182]

ANDREA EWTON
AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Dardanelle Public Schools (DPS) and its insurance carrier, Arkansas School Boards

Association (ASBA), appeal the Commission’s decision that Andrea Ewton suffered a

compensable injury because she was within the scope of her employment when the injury

occurred. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

Andrea Ewton filed a workers’-compensation claim for injuries to her knee and ankle

she sustained while working for DPS. Ewton asserted that she was eligible for temporary

total-disability benefits from August 16, 2023, to a date yet to be determined, reasonable and

necessary medical treatment, and attorney’s fees. DPS controverted the claim, contending

that she was on a personal errand and not performing any employment services or advancing

her employer’s interest at the time of the injury.
A hearing was held on August 1, 2024. At the hearing, Ewton testified that on August

15, 2023, she was working as a substitute custodian at the Dardanelle intermediate school.

When she arrived on campus, she went into the main office and filled out her time sheet,

clocked in, and was given keys by the school secretary, Becca Manatt. She testified that

around 8:15 a.m., while she was on the clock, she walked to her car through the school

parking lot to get a bottle of water and keys she needed to clean the agricultural and

electronics buildings. Ewton explained that Manatt had given her the wrong keys that

morning, but she had a set in her car that would open those buildings. On the way, she

stepped off the curb and broke her ankle and injured her knee. She stated that she reported

the injury to both Manatt and the school nurse, April McGuire. Ewton was cross-examined

about an earlier statement in her deposition that when she arrived at the intermediate school

office, she went to get the keys for the gym and the technology lab. She explained that Manatt

was there, but she got the keys from McGuire. Ewton did not recall speaking with the claims

supervisor for the ASBA. Ewton testified that she had not worked since the date of the

accident.

Becca Manatt testified that she did not remember if she gave Ewton keys the morning

of the accident, but she remembered that when Ewton came into the office after she had

been injured, she referred Ewton to the school nurse. She said that generally she did not give

out keys, and the custodians kept the keys to the technology building and the gym in their

closet; however, there were times that she had given out keys.

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April McGuire testified that on the day of the accident, Ewton came into her office,

and she put ice on Ewton’s ankle. McGuire explained that Ewton told her that “she had

been walking out to her car to get a drink and slipped off the curb.” McGuire contacted the

claims supervisor for the ASBA, Misty Thompson, to let her know about the accident.

McGuire remembers telling Ewton that she was not sure that her injury would be covered

by workers’ compensation.

Thompson testified that on the morning of August 15, 2023, she received a call from

DPS, which was recorded. According to the transcript of the recorded phone call, Ewton

explained that at the time of the accident, she was walking to her car to get a bottle of water

she had left there. When Thompson asked her if there was any other purpose for going to

her car, she replied, “No, ma’am.”

On August 12, 2024, the administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) opinion was entered. In

it, the ALJ determined that Ewton failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

she suffered a compensable injury to her left knee and right ankle because she was not

performing employment services at the time of her injury. The ALJ did not find credible

Ewton’s testimony that she had returned to her car to get a set of keys and cited Ewton’s

shifting story about who had given her keys that morning. The ALJ noted that Ewton’s

explanation about why she was going to her car changed from getting a drink to getting keys

necessary to do her job. The ALJ also found that although Ewton claimed she had not

worked since the date of the accident, her unemployment application showed that she had

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worked full time for Dardanelle Nursing & Rehabilitation from October 5, 2023, to

February 22, 2024. Ewton appealed to the Full Commission (Commission).

On January 16, 2025, the Commission entered the decision reversing the ALJ,

determining that Ewton had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained

a compensable injury. The ALJ found that Ewton was entitled to temporary total-disability

benefits beginning August 16, 2023, through June 22, 2024, and her attorney was entitled

to fees, plus an additional $500 for prevailing on appeal. The Commission credited Ewton’s

testimony that she obtained keys from Manatt when she arrived on campus. The

Commission also found credible Ewton’s testimony that she was on the clock and on campus

at the time the accident, and she was on her way to her car to get keys to the building and a

bottle of water when she fell and injured herself. The Commission additionally found that

Ewton had proved that the injury was compensable because she testified that at the time of

the accident, she was on the clock, not on a break, and on campus.

DPS and ASBA timely filed a notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the

Commission. Ark. Dep’t of Parks & Tourism v. Price, 2016 Ark. App. 109, 483 S.W.3d 320.

We must affirm the decision of the Commission if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion of the Commission. Id. We reverse the Commission’s decision only if

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we are convinced that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusion with

the same facts before them. Bronco Indus. Servs., LLC v. Brooks, 2021 Ark. App. 279, 625

S.W.3d 753.

III. Discussion

For its sole point on appeal, DPS contends that the Commission erred in finding that

Ewton offered substantial evidence that she sustained a compensable injury. Specifically,

DPS argues that she did not prove the accident occurred when she was within the scope of

her employment because she gave inconsistent testimony regarding her purpose for going to

her car. We disagree.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2023) defines a

compensable injury as “[a]n accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to

the body . . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical

services or results in disability or death. For an accidental injury to be compensable, it must

arise out of and in the course of employment. Id. A compensable injury does not include an

injury incurred when employment services were not being performed. Id. § 11-9-

102(4)(B)(iii). An employee is performing employment services when he or she is doing

something that is generally required by his or her employer. Cont’l Constr. Co. v. Nabors, 2015

Ark. App. 60, 454 S.W.3d 762. We use the same test to determine whether an employee is

performing employment services as we do when determining whether an employee is acting

within the course and scope of employment. Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69

S.W.3d 1 (2002). The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space

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boundaries of the employment when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose

or advancing the employer’s interest, either directly or indirectly. Id. Moreover, whether an

employee was performing employment services within the course of employment depends

on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Ctrs. for Youth & Families v. Wood,

2015 Ark. App. 380, 466 S.W.3d 422.

DPS compares the instant case to Fulbright v. St. Bernard’s Medical Center, 2016 Ark.

App. 417, 502 S.W.3d 540, in which this court affirmed the Commission’s determination

that the appellant, a laundry aide for St. Bernard’s, was not within the scope of her

employment when she tripped and fell returning from a smoke break. The claimant testified

that “she was indirectly benefiting her employer by getting something to eat so that she could

have energy to do the physical labor associated with her work.” 2016 Ark. App. 417, at 2,

502 S.W.3d at 542. The Commission found that she was on a personal errand; thus, the

injury was not compensable. The difference between Fulbright and the instant case is that

here, aside from the bottle of water, Ewton was also retrieving keys to open the buildings so

she could perform her job duties; thus, Fulbright is inapplicable here.

DPS cites several cases along these lines for support. In Hill v. LDA Leasing, Inc., 2010

Ark. App. 271, 374 S.W.3d 268, this court affirmed the denial of benefits when the

employee, who was returning from the restroom and stopped at a vending machine to buy a

snack, slipped and fell. In Black v. First Step, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 341,this court affirmed the

Commission’s decision that a personal-care aide who stopped to buy food for her client was

acting outside the scope of her employment because buying food was not one of her job

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duties. In Campbell v. Randal Tyler Ford Mercury, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 35, 13 S.W.3d 916 (2000),

this court affirmed the Commission’s decision that a man who had taken work home with

him on the weekend and was on his way to work when he died in a car accident was not

acting within the scope of his employment because he was not working when he died. In

McKinney v. Trane Co., 84 Ark. App. 424, 143 S.W.3d 581 (2004), this court affirmed the

Commission’s decision that appellant’s accident, which occurred when he was getting a soda

to go outside for his smoke break, was not compensable even though he was under an

obligation to “report anything askew in the workplace had he observed it during that time.”

The pattern in each of these cases only reinforces that this court affirms the

Commission when the credibility of the witness is the issue on appeal. It is well settled that

questions of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony are within the

exclusive province of the Commission. Sheridan Sch. Dist. v. Wise, 2021 Ark. App. 459, 637

S.W.3d 280. Here, Ewton testified at the hearing that she was getting keys from her car to

clean the buildings pursuant to her job duty. DPS claims that the “ALJ accurately noted that

he did not find Ms. Ewton’s testimony that she was going to her car to get keys to be

credible.” We give no weight to the ALJ’s findings whatsoever. Bean v. Reynolds Consumer

Prods., 2022 Ark. App. 276, 646 S.W.3d 655; Multi-Craft Contractors, Inc. v. Yousey, 2018 Ark.

107, 542 S.W.3d 155; Johnson v. Hux, 28 Ark. App. 187, 772 S.W.2d 362 (1989); Clark v.

Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). Ewton’s inconsistent earlier

statements are for the Commission to weigh, and once the Commission has made its

decision on issues of credibility, this court is bound by that decision. Id.

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Affirmed.

GLADWIN and HARRISON, JJ., agree.

Worley, Wood & Parrish, P.A., by: Melissa Wood, for appellants.

Caldwell Law Firm, P.A., by: Andy L. Caldwell, for appellee.

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