Cody Stevens v. Harvey N. Hillenburg and Mark Hillenburg

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 295
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-22-585

CODY STEVENS Opinion Delivered May 8, 2024
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE STONE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 69CV-21-14]

HARVEY N. HILLENBURG AND MARK HONORABLE HOLLY L. MEYER,
HILLENBURG JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Cody Stevens appeals the Stone County Circuit Court order quieting title of ten acres

of real property to Mark Hillenburg. On appeal, Cody argues that the circuit court erred by

finding that Mark and his father, Harvey Hillenburg, adversely possessed the property. We

affirm.

Harvey and Mark live in two mobile homes on property in Stone County. Cody has

record title to the property on which Harvey and Mark reside.

On February 5, 2021, Cody filed an unlawful-detainer complaint against Harvey and

Mark alleging that they had detained possession of his property after he had attempted to

gain possession by civil notice. He further alleged that Harvey had fired guns at his agent and
obstructed the county road to the property. Cody requested a writ of possession, damages,

and attorney’s fees and costs.

On March 25, the Hillenburgs answered and counterclaimed for a declaratory

judgment and claimed adverse possession pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-

11-106 (Repl. 2015). They asserted that they had adversely possessed the property around

their homes, and they further alleged that they had color of title and had paid taxes on real

property adjoining the property around their homes.

The court held a bench trial on May 31, 2022. Cody testified that he acquired

property from Vickie Wyatt in 2019 that includes ten acres around the Hillenburgs’ houses.

He stated that he wrote Harvey a letter asking him to vacate, but Harvey refused. During

Cody’s testimony, he introduced an aerial photograph of the relevant properties.

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1

On cross-examination, Cody explained that before purchasing the property, he saw a

“private drive” sign, so he did not inspect the entire property, and he consequently did not

see the Hillenburgs’ houses. He noted that he checked a survey, and the survey showed that

he would own the private drive. Cody testified that since he purchased the property, the

Hillenburgs have posted additional no-trespassing signs and have threatened him with

firearms. Following Cody’s testimony, he rested his case.

The Hillenburgs then presented their case. Harvey testified that his former wife

purchased property in 1987.2 He explained that after she purchased the property, he

1
In his appellate brief, Cody included this redacted image of the aerial photograph.
This redacted image omits several properties that are in the original aerial photograph, but
the omitted properties are irrelevant to this case.
2
Harvey explained that his wife initially purchased the property with her sister, Lisa
Pearrow, and Lisa gave him and his wife her interest in 1997.

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mistakenly placed their mobile home north of the true property line—on the property that

Cody had purchased from Wyatt—and that he had lived on the wrong property since 1987.

During Harvey’s testimony, the parties labeled the property that Harvey lives on as the

contested property and the property that Harvey actually purchased as the adjoining

property.

Harvey explained that he moved a single-wide trailer onto the contested property in

1987 and that he installed a new mobile home there in 1999. He also stated that he had

installed several deer stands, a deer blind, four-wheeler trails, and a refuse pile. He noted

that a tree had grown around the straps of one stand. He testified that he hunted on the

property until 20143 and that his children and grandchildren continue to hunt on the

property. He stated that he had the timber cut in 1999 and that he cleared around the houses

and maintained the four-wheeler trails. He noted that he uses the four-wheeler trails daily.

During Harvey’s testimony, the Hillenburgs introduced photographs of the structures and

the trails.

Harvey also stated that he gave Petit Jean Electric permission to run power lines across

the contested property about thirty years ago, but he did not recall the specific individual to

whom he gave permission. Petit Jean Electric installed the lines across the central eastern

portion of the contested property. Harvey acknowledged that he did not fence the perimeter

of the contested property.

3Harvey explained that he had a massive heart attack in 2014 and that he is now

disabled.

4
The Hillenburgs also introduced the following hand-drawn map of the ten-acre

contested property.

Harvey testified that he paid taxes on the adjoining property, which is south of the

contested property, from 1987 through 2005 and that he deeded the adjoining property to

his son Mark in 2005. He explained that after he deeded the adjoining property to Mark,

Mark moved a mobile home onto the contested property. He noted that Mark currently lives

there with his fiancée and two children. Harvey testified that Dina Wright and her husband

reside on the adjoining property, and he noted that no one inhabits the property to which

the Wrights have record title that is south of the adjoining property.

Harvey stated that he has never met Cody, but he had met Cody’s father, Glen

Stevens. He explained that starting in February 2019, Glen had entered the contested

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property and that he had asked Glen to leave. Harvey stated that he installed a gate to

obstruct Glen’s access.

Mark, Harvey’s son, testified that in 2005, his father deeded him the adjoining

property. He noted that he has paid taxes on the adjoining property since 2005. Mark further

explained that in 2005, he moved a mobile home onto the contested property and installed

a deer stand on the contested property. He testified that he still lives on the contested

property, that he mows and maintains the contested property, and that he uses the trails. He

noted that he hunts intermittently on the contested property in the fall, winter, and spring.

Dina Wright testified that she has lived on the adjoining property since 1993, and

she acknowledged that the Hillenburgs have record title to the adjoining property. She

further stated her belief that she owned the adjoining property. Her deed is actually to the

tract south of the adjoining property.

On June 15, 2022, the court entered an order finding that the Hillenburgs had

adversely possessed the contested property under the common-law requirements and also

under the statutory requirements found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-11-106.

The court found that they had maintained; cut the timber on; and hunted on, gated, and

held the contested property for their exclusive use and dwelling. The court further found

that the contested property is contiguous to the adjoining property. The court thus denied

Cody’s unlawful-detainer complaint, and it quieted title to the contested property in Mark.

Cody appealed the order to this court.

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This court reviews adverse-possession and quiet-title actions de novo on the record

and will not reverse a finding of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous.

Parkerson v. Brown, 2013 Ark. App. 718, 430 S.W.3d 864. In reviewing a circuit court’s

findings of fact, this court gives due deference to that court’s superior position to determine

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. Strother v.

Mitchell, 2011 Ark. App. 224, 382 S.W.3d 741.

On appeal, Cody raises two issues concerning the Hillenburgs’ proof establishing the

common-law elements of adverse possession. To prove the common-law elements of adverse

possession, a claimant must show that he has possessed the contested property continuously

for seven years and that the possession has been actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile,

and exclusive, and it must be accompanied with an intent to hold against the true owner.

Collier v. Gilmore, 2018 Ark. App. 549, 562 S.W.3d 895; Thompson v. Fischer, 364 Ark. 380,

384, 220 S.W.3d 622, 625 (2005).

We first address Cody’s argument on the common-law hostility requirement. Cody

argues that the Hillenburgs presented insufficient evidence of hostile intent that they

intended to hold the contested property against the true owner. He relies on Harvey’s

testimony that he mistakenly placed his and Mark’s mobile homes on the contested property.

However, this court recently held that the hostility element should be determined by

behaviors and not primarily by inquiring into a claimant’s subjective intent. Collier, 2018

Ark. App. 549, 562 S.W.3d 895. In Collier, the claimant believed he owned the contested

tract of land for forty years, and during that time, he possessed and farmed the contested

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property; however, the claimant was mistaken on where the relevant deed placed the true

boundary line. We favored the claimant’s conduct over his intent when determining hostile

use and held that “the possession was ‘hostile’ because it was to an extent greater than the

deed anticipated; and his conduct was not subordinate to [the true owner’s property]

interests or done with [the true owner’s] permission.” Id. at 9, 562 S.W.3d at 900.

In this case, even though Harvey testified about the initial mistake, his actions of

dwelling on and maintaining the property established his intent to hold the property as his

own, and there is no dispute that the Hillenburgs possessed the contested property without

permission. Given these circumstances, we find no error by the circuit court.

Cody also argues that the Hillenburgs presented insufficient evidence that they

possessed the entire ten acres of the contested property. He concedes that the Hillenburgs

actually possessed their mobile homes and curtilage, but he argues that as to the remaining

acreage, the Hillenburgs merely hunted and rode four-wheelers which does not constitute

possession.4

The proof required as to the extent of possession and dominion may vary according

to the location and character of the land. Morrison v. Carruth, 2015 Ark. App. 224, 459

S.W.3d 317; Moses v. Dautartas, 53 Ark. App. 242, 922 S.W.2d 345 (1996). It is ordinarily

4
On this point, Cody additionally argues that he constructively possessed the property
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-11-102 (Repl. 2015) by having color of
title and paying taxes. The statute concerns unimproved and unenclosed land. However,
Cody did not raise the statute argument to the circuit court. Accordingly, we decline to
address it on appeal.

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sufficient that the acts of ownership are of such a nature as one would exercise over his own

property and would not exercise over that of another and that the acts amount to such

dominion over the land as to which it is reasonably adapted. Walker v. Hubbard, 31 Ark. App.

43, 787 S.W.2d 251 (1991).

Our supreme court has held that for adverse possession, “there need not be a fence

or building, yet there must be such visible and notorious acts of ownership exercised over

the premises continuously for the time limited by the statute, that the owner of the paper

title would have knowledge of the fact, or that his knowledge may be presumed as a fact.”

Utley v. Ruff, 255 Ark. 824, 827, 502 S.W.2d 629, 632 (1973) (quoting Culver v. Gillian, 160

Ark. 397, 400, 254 S.W. 681, 682 (1923)). The supreme court has stated that “if the claimant

‘raises his flag and keeps it up,’ continuously for the statutory period, knowledge of his hostile

claim of title may be inferred as a matter of fact.” Id. at 828, 502 S.W.2d at 632 (quoting

Culver, 160 Ark. at 400, 254 S.W. at 682).

In Moses, this court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that “work[ing] on the

property, cutting grass, raking leaves, cutting and hauling wood” as well as storing shingles

and a large pile of lumber was sufficient evidence of possession of unenclosed land. 53 Ark.

App. at 247, 922 S.W.2d at 348.

In this case, we hold that the circuit court’s finding that the Hillenburgs possessed

ten acres of the contested property is not clearly erroneous. In its oral ruling, the court

concluded “there was use of this 10-acre property—and the entirety of the 10-acre property.”

The court specifically found that the Hillenburgs maintained the property, cut the timber,

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hunted, and held the contested property for their exclusive use and dwelling since 1987. The

evidence supports this finding. Most significantly, the Hillenburgs’ hand-drawn map shows

the locations of the structures, trails, and driveway across the entire ten acres. Accordingly,

given the particular facts of this case, we find no error by the circuit court.

Cody additionally challenges a statutory element of adverse possession. In 1995, the

General Assembly added the requirement that the claimant prove color of title and payment

of taxes on the subject property or contiguous property for seven years to the existing

common-law element of adverse possession. Ark. Code Ann. § 18-11-106;5 see Collier, 2018

Ark. App. 549, at 5 n.2, 562 S.W.3d at 898 n.2. Specifically, subdivision (a)(2) requires an

adverse-possession claimant to have held color of title to real property contiguous to the

property being claimed by adverse possession for a period of at least seven years and during

that time paid ad valorem taxes on the contiguous real property to which the person has

color of title.

Here, Cody argues that the Hillenburgs failed to establish that their mobile homes

and curtilage are contiguous to any property satisfying the requirements under subdivision

(a)(2). In other words, Cody concedes that the evidence establishes that the contested

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If a claimant’s right to the disputed property vested before 1995, he need not comply
with the 1995 statutory change. Collier, 2018 Ark. App. 549, at 5 n.2, 562 S.W.3d at 898
n.2; Sutton v. Gardner, 2011 Ark. App. 737, 387 S.W.3d 185. Here, the circuit court found
that the Hillenburgs satisfied the statutory requirements. However, Harvey claimed
possession of the contested property starting in 1987. Because we need not address the merits
of Cody’s statutory argument, it is unnecessary to determine whether the statutory change
applies.

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property is contiguous to the adjoining property, which satisfies subdivision (a)(2). Cody,

however, claims that the specific location of the Hillenburgs’ mobile homes and curtilage is

not contiguous to the adjoining property. Thus, Cody raises this argument in the event we

reverse the circuit court’s finding that the Hillenburgs’ adversely possessed the entire ten

acres of the contested property. Because we do not reverse the circuit court’s finding

concerning possession of the ten acres of the contested property, we need not address this

point.

Cody’s final point on appeal also hinges on whether this court reverses the circuit

court’s finding concerning possession of the entire ten acres of the contested property. He

argues that if this court concludes that the Hillenburgs presented insufficient evidence that

they possessed the ten acres, we must also reverse as to their mobile homes and the curtilage

because the Hillenburgs presented no evidence concerning the curtilage boundaries. Again,

because we do not reverse the circuit court’s finding concerning the ten acres, we need not

address this point.

Affirmed.

THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Jeremy B. Lowrey; and Patterson Law Firm, P.A., by: Jerry D. Patterson, for appellant.

Morgan Law Firm, P.A., by: Nathan S. Morgan; and Blair & Stroud, by: Barrett S. Moore,

for appellees.

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