CourtListener 10837962•Eckert v. Eckert
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NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Matter of:
KIERA N. ECKERT, Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
CHARLES W. ECKERT, Respondent/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0366 FC
FILED 04-06-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-092556
The Honorable Steven McCarthy, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Adam C. Rieth P.L.L.C, Mesa
By Adam C. Rieth
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
Barreda Law PLLC, Gilbert
By Joshua A. Barreda, Erin Walters
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
ECKERT v. ECKERT
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
B E C K E, Judge:
¶1 Kiera N. Eckert (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
denying her post-decree petition to modify legal decision-making authority
and parenting time and her request for attorneys’ fees. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mother and Charles W. Eckert (“Father”) were married in
2010 and have one child together, born in 2013. Mother petitioned for
dissolution in 2022, and the parties resolved all issues in a July 2023 consent
decree. The parties share joint legal decision-making authority and a 5-2-2-
5 parenting time schedule. Mother remarried in March 2024, and her
husband lives in Idaho. Mother splits her time between Arizona and Idaho,
exercising parenting time in Arizona.
¶3 In late February 2024, Mother’s attorney emailed a letter to
Father’s attorney stating that Mother wanted to relocate to Idaho with the
child on June 1, 2024. This letter set forth a proposed long distance
parenting plan. Father’s attorney emailed a response the same day
opposing any relocation, stating that Father was unaware of Mother’s plan
to move on June 1, 2024, and noting that Mother had not provided the notice
required by A.R.S. § 25-408.
¶4 On July 31, 2024, the parties attended a mediation on an
unrelated dispute. During the mediation, Mother again said she wanted to
relocate to Idaho.
¶5 Two weeks before the mediation, on July 13, 2024, Mother
mailed a certified letter notifying Father of her intent to relocate as required
by A.R.S. § 25-408. Father did not receive the certified letter or a notice to
pick up the letter. The post office returned the unclaimed letter to Mother.
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¶6 In September 2024, Mother petitioned to modify legal
decision-making authority, parenting time, and child support. Mother
stated that, because Father failed to accept the certified letter or petition to
prevent relocation, she intended to relocate and proposed a long-distance
parenting plan. Mother also requested final authority on education issues
“[t]o facilitate the relocation[.]”
¶7 Less than two weeks later, Father petitioned to prevent
relocation. He alleged Mother failed to provide the notice required by
A.R.S. § 25-408. He argued that relocation to Idaho was not in the child’s
best interests. Father also responded to Mother’s modification petition and
filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan based on the child
residing in Arizona with Father and giving him final authority.
¶8 After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied
Mother’s relocation request, ordered the parties to continue the equal
parenting time schedule, and declined to give either party final say
authority. The court further ordered that, if Mother moved to Idaho, Father
would be the primary residential parent and set forth a long-distance
parenting plan. The court denied both parties’ requests for attorneys’ fees.
¶9 Mother timely appealed. She later moved for additional
findings and to alter or amend the order. This court stayed the appeal and
revested jurisdiction in the superior court so it could rule on Mother’s
motion. The superior court denied the motion without comment. Mother
then amended her notice of appeal to include the denial. We have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).
DISCUSSION
¶10 We review legal decision-making authority, parenting time,
and relocation orders for an abuse of discretion. Murray v. Murray, 239 Ariz.
174, 176, ¶ 5 (App. 2016). We construe statutes de novo. Id.
I. Father’s Petition to Prevent Relocation was Timely.
¶11 Under A.R.S. § 25-408(A), a parent sharing joint legal
decision-making authority or parenting time must give the other parent 45
days’ written notice if they want to move out of state or more than 100 miles
within Arizona. That notice must be sent “by certified mail, return receipt
requested, or pursuant to the Arizona rules of family law procedure.”
A.R.S. § 25-408(B). The other parent may file a petition to prevent relocation
within 30 days after the notice “is made.” A.R.S. § 25-408(C). “After
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expiration of this time[,] any petition . . . to prevent relocation of the child
may be granted only on a showing of good cause.” Id.
¶12 The evidence showed that Mother sent a notice to Father by
certified mail, return receipt requested. But the superior court found Father
did not receive the notice. As a result, the court concluded that the 30-day
response time was not triggered, and Father’s petition to prevent relocation
was not untimely. The court further found that, even if Father had notice,
there was “good cause to prevent relocation[.]” Specifically, the court found
the good cause was Mother’s failure to comply with the terms of the decree,
which required her to request mediation before petitioning to modify legal
decision-making and parenting time.
¶13 Mother challenges the finding that Father was credible when
he denied receiving the notice or the certified letter. She offers several
examples that she claims show Father’s lack of credibility. However, “the
[superior] court is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses
and resolve conflicting evidence, and appellate courts generally defer to the
findings of the [superior] court.” Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 18
(App. 2015). We do so here.
¶14 Mother argues that once she sent the notice, the 30-day
response time began. But the court did not find that Father rejected or
ignored the notice, as Mother suggests. Rather, the court concluded that
Father never received the notice, so he was unaware the 30-day period to
file had begun. Moreover, after Father learned that Mother filed a petition
to modify asserting her right to relocate, he quickly responded with his own
counter-petition to modify and petition to prevent relocation. Although this
is not the basis for the superior court’s good cause finding, we will affirm
the superior court’s ruling if it was legally correct for any reason. In re
Marriage of Friedman, 244 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶ 23 (2018).
¶15 We reject Mother’s argument that Father’s knowledge that
she wanted to relocate triggered his 30-day response time. The 30-day
provision in A.R.S. § 25-408(C) applies to the specific written notice
described in § 25-408(A), made by certified mail, return receipt requested,
or by court rule, not uncertified letters between counsel, emails, or in-
person conversations between the parties. Although Father could have
petitioned to prevent relocation at any point after Mother told him she
wanted to relocate, he was not required to do so until Mother sent the
statutory notice. See A.R.S. § 25-408(C).
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¶16 We also reject Mother’s suggestion that she was entitled to
relocate by “default” because Father failed to file a petition within 30 days
after she sent the notice. See Day v. Wallaert, 1 CA-CV 20-0062 FC/1 CA-CV
21-0020 (consol.), 2021 WL 8016848, *2, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Dec. 16, 2021)
(mem. decision) (citing Jurgens v. Jurgens, 1 CA-CV 17-0492, 2018 WL
2676255, at *3, ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. June 5, 2018) (mem. decision)). The court
must consider the child’s best interests when addressing a petition to
modify parenting time. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A). Mother’s petition asked the
court to change the child’s primary residence. “Any change in residence
outside Arizona is necessarily a relocation.” Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529,
533, ¶ 11 (App. 2019). Thus, the court had to consider the factors set forth
in both A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A) and 25-408(I) when ruling on Mother’s petition
to modify.
¶17 We affirm the finding that there was good cause to consider
Father’s petition to prevent relocation.
II. The Record Supports the Finding that Relocation is Not in the
Child’s Best Interests.
¶18 Mother challenges several of the findings on the best interests
factors in A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A) and -408(I). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s findings and defer to the
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Vincent, 238 Ariz.
at 155, ¶ 17. On appeal, “[w]e will not substitute our judgment by
reweighing the evidence underlying the court’s best-interests’ analysis.”
Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 27 (App. 2020).
¶19 Under A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(2), the court considers the child’s
interaction and interrelationship with any person who may significantly
affect the child’s best interest. Mother argues the court ignored evidence of
the child’s relationship with her husband’s family in Idaho and gave greater
weight to the child’s relationship with Father’s relatives and stepfamily.
The superior court found the child has a good relationship with Mother’s
husband, as well as with Mother’s Arizona family. To be sure, Mother
testified that the child also has a good relationship with his Idaho
stepfamily but did not otherwise elaborate. The lack of findings about the
child’s relationship with his stepfamily in Idaho does not mean the court
failed to consider that evidence. Instead, we assume the court did not find
such evidence compelling and weighed it accordingly. Mother contends
that the court should have weighed the child’s relationship with her
husband’s family differently, but we do not reweigh the evidence. See
Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27.
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¶20 Mother argues that the court ignored the fact that the child is
well-adjusted at home, at school, and in the community, because of
Mother’s involvement, rather than because of Father’s more relaxed
approach. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(3). But Father testified that he would
increase his involvement if needed, and the court’s findings on the
“adjustment” factor are supported by the record. Again, we do not reweigh
conflicting evidence on appeal. See Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27.
¶21 In considering which parent is more likely to allow the child
frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent, the
superior court found this factor weighed in Father’s favor. See A.R.S. § 25-
403(A)(6). For example, Father has not opposed the child’s travel schedule
even when it limited his parenting time. The court also noted that Mother
recording the child’s phone calls with Father had a chilling effect on the
child’s communications and that she unnecessarily involved the police at
an exchange. See A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A)(6), -408(I)(4) (likelihood of residential
parent complying with parenting time orders).
¶22 The evidence supports the court’s findings about these
events. Mother argues these events are irrelevant in determining whether
she will allow frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with Father.
However, the court viewed Mother’s conduct as impacting the child’s
contact with Father, as Father testified. Again, we do not reweigh the
evidence or witness credibility. See Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27.
¶23 Similarly, Mother asks this court to reweigh evidence about
the prospective advantage of the relocation for improving the child’s life
and the fact that Mother’s proposed long distance parenting plan would
allow Father a realistic opportunity for parenting time. See A.R.S. § 25-
408(I)(3), (5). We decline to do so. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 27. The
record supports the court’s factual findings on these factors.
¶24 Because the record supports the court’s findings, we affirm
the legal decision-making and parenting time orders. Mother’s challenge to
the final authority order was conditioned on the child relocating, so we do
not address that argument.
III. The Record Supports the Denial of Mother’s Request for
Attorneys’ Fees in Superior Court.
¶25 Under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), the court may award attorneys’ fees
after considering the parties’ financial resources and “the reasonableness of
the positions each party has taken throughout the litigation.” The superior
court declined to award fees to either party, finding no financial disparity
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Decision of the Court
or unreasonable positions. Mother contends there was a significant
financial disparity. We review a ruling on attorneys’ fees under § 25-324 for
an abuse of discretion. Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 494, ¶ 6 (App. 2014).
¶26 The superior court attributed a monthly income of $3,750 to
Mother and $9,468.67 to Father. Although this is a significant disparity in
earnings, Mother testified that her husband has a good job and financially
supports her. Her financial affidavit confirms this. Despite being
unemployed, Mother often travels between Arizona and Idaho and lists no
debts on her financial affidavit. This suggests that Mother has other
financial resources. Thus, the record supports the finding that there is no
financial disparity. See Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, 489, ¶ 11 (App. 1998)
(“[W]e may infer additional findings of fact . . . sufficient to sustain the
[superior] court’s order as long as those findings are reasonably supported
by the evidence, and not in conflict with any express findings.”).
ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL
¶27 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline
to award fees. However, Father is entitled to his taxable costs upon
compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S. § 12-342.
CONCLUSION
¶28 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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