In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0176
FILED 04-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400SV202500003
The Honorable Levi Gunderson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Elizabeth M. Brown, Phoenix
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Zachary Law Group, PLC, Mesa
By Jessica Zachary
Counsel for Appellee Father
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Mother appeals the superior court’s denial of her petition to
terminate Father’s parental rights to their minor child (“C.M.”). For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father were never married but lived together
from the time C.M. was born in October 2018 until Mother and C.M. moved
out in July 2023. C.M. has lived with Mother ever since.

¶3 In October 2023, Mother obtained an order of protection
against Father that listed C.M.’s name but did not include any restrictions
on Father having contact with C.M. Around the same time, Mother filed a
petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. In May 2024, the petition and
order of protection were dismissed when the parties participated in
mediation conducted through the Dependency Alternative Program and
agreed to establish legal decision-making and a parenting plan.1 As part of
that mediation, a social study was conducted.

¶4 At mediation, the parties agreed to designate Mother the
primary residential parent and award her sole legal decision-making
authority. Father was awarded supervised parenting time along with
telephone and videoconference contact with C.M. in the afternoons.

1 The superior court took judicial notice of the case establishing legal
decision-making and parenting time, S1400DO2024-00422. The superior
court was permitted to do so, and we similarly take judicial notice of the
-00422 case. See Ariz. R. Evid. 201; In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4
(App. 2000).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.
Decision of the Court

¶5 In January 2025, Mother again petitioned to terminate
Father’s parental rights as to C.M., alleging abandonment and substance
abuse. Mother alleged Father had made no attempts to contact or see C.M.
in almost a year. She also alleged Father had an extensive history of abusing
alcohol and had “since run into legal trouble” concerning this abuse.

¶6 At a two-day trial held in August and September 2025, the
superior court heard testimony from Mother, Father, the mother of one of
Father’s other children, Mother’s mother and step-father, Father’s
probation officer, and the court-appointed investigator who conducted the
social study in the 2024 case.

¶7 Although the superior court found Mother had proven by
clear and convincing evidence both that Father had abandoned the child
and that Father had a history of chronic alcohol abuse under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and (3), it denied Mother’s petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights because it did not find termination to be in C.M.’s best
interests. The court found Mother’s concern that C.M. would be returned to
Father’s care if she were to die too speculative. Furthermore, the court
found that Mother did not have immediate plans to have C.M. adopted by
someone else if Father’s rights were terminated. Finally, the court found
Father’s limited parenting time negated Mother’s concerns that C.M. was
being harmed by Father’s inconsistent parenting efforts. Thus, the court
denied Mother’s petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶8 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 When terminating parental rights, the superior court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists and by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245
Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). We accept the court’s factual findings if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them and affirm the court’s
legal conclusions unless clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
255 Ariz. 471, 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.
Decision of the Court

¶10 Father does not contest the superior court’s findings that
grounds existed for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and (3). We
therefore address only Mother’s arguments regarding C.M.’s best interests.

I. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Assessing the
Best Interests of the Child.

¶11 Mother argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
finding that termination was not in the child’s best interests. She contends
that the court should have focused on the child’s present need for stability,
permanency, and emotional security, but instead it focused on the lack of
an adoption plan.

¶12 Once the superior court finds a statutory ground for
termination exists by clear and convincing evidence, “the focus shifts to the
interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent.” Alma S., 245 Ariz
at 150, ¶ 12. Termination is in the child’s best interests if the child will
benefit from severance or if the child will be harmed if severance is denied.
Id. at ¶ 13. The court may consider an adoption plan in making its best
interests finding. See Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 17 (2016)
(“[A]doption can provide sufficient benefits to support a best-interests
finding in private and state severance actions alike.”).

¶13 Here, the superior court found that while Mother was the
only parent providing for C.M.’s needs, this fact alone did not mean
Father’s rights should be terminated. The court found that Mother failed to
present “a more concrete plan for [the child] in connection with an
anticipated adoption by a stepparent.” Additionally, contrary to Mother’s
assertion that the court only relied on the lack of an adoption plan to deny
her petition, the court also found Mother’s two arguments regarding C.M.’s
best interests unpersuasive.

¶14 First, the superior court found Mother’s concern that C.M.
would be placed in Father’s care if she were to die too “remote and
speculative” absent evidence of Mother’s poor health. Second, the court
understood Mother’s concern that Father’s efforts to contact C.M. were
inconsistent, but it found the parenting plan in place remedied this concern
given Father’s limited parenting time and Mother being the primary
residential parent.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.
Decision of the Court

¶15 The record supports the superior court’s findings. No
evidence was presented on an adoption plan or Mother’s health. And
although Mother testified that Father’s attempts at contacting the child
were inconsistent, the court weighed that evidence against the parenting
plan’s limitation on Father’s parenting time and found that this concern did
not support termination. Mother testified that she would allow Father to
see the child even if his rights were terminated. Mother fails to show the
court abused its discretion in determining that termination of Father’s
rights was not in the child’s best interests.

¶16 Mother also argues the superior court failed to properly
weigh her testimony. However, this court does not reweigh evidence. Alma
S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18.

¶17 Mother finally argues that the superior court erred by relying
on a prior parenting plan instead of conducting a new best-interests
analysis. However, the court did conduct a best-interests analysis. The court
merely used the parenting plan as a factor in deciding whether termination
was appropriate. Mother fails to show error.

II. The Superior Court’s Denial of a Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law is Not Inconsistent With Its Final Ruling on Termination.

¶18 The superior court denied Father’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law (“JMOL”) after Mother presented her case. Mother argues this
denial means the court must also have determined Mother had established
termination was in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the
evidence.

¶19 The denial of that motion, however, simply allowed the case
to go to the finder of fact (the court); it did not establish that Mother was
entitled to prevail on her petition. “Judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate ‘only if the facts presented in support of a claim have so little
probative value that reasonable people could not find for the claimant.’”
Flanders v. Maricopa County, 203 Ariz. 368, 376, ¶ 49 n.6 (App. 2002) (citing
Shoen v. Shoen, 191 Ariz. 64, 65 (App. 1997)). By contrast, when the court
rules on a petition to terminate parental rights after presentation of all the
evidence and ultimately determines termination is in the child’s best
interests, it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S., 245
Ariz. at 149–50, ¶ 8. “Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances
existing at the time of the severance determination.” Id. at 150–51, ¶ 13.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.M.
Decision of the Court

¶20 The standards for these decisions are not the same. Surviving
a JMOL motion requires Mother to present “sufficient” evidence from
which a factfinder could find that termination is in the child’s best interests.
To terminate parental rights, however, Mother must prove by a
“preponderance of the evidence” that termination is in the child’s best
interests. Compare Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 319(d)(2) with Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149–
50, ¶ 8. Additionally, at the JMOL motion stage, the court views all evidence
in favor of Mother, but when ruling on the petition at the conclusion of the
trial, the court considers all relevant evidence and gives it appropriate
weight. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 319(a)(3); Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–51, ¶ 13.
Again, we do not reweigh evidence. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18. Mother
fails to show the court’s rulings were inconsistent and thus, fails to show
error.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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