State v. Manseau

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

BRADLEY JAMES MANSEAU, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0026
FILED 04-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. S8015CR202400095
The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Rebecca Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Carr Law Office, PLLC, Kingman
By Sandra Carr
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MANSEAU
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Bradley James Manseau appeals his conviction and sentences
for three counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of attempted
sexual conduct with a minor. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Manseau's daughter Emmy (a pseudonym) accused him of
sexually abusing her between the ages of four and eleven. Manseau did not
always live with Emmy and served time in jail between April 2018 and
October 2020. In 2024, the State indicted Manseau on three counts of sexual
conduct with a minor and one count of attempted sexual conduct with a
minor. The State alleged the crimes occurred between 2015 and 2021.

¶3 Trial was delayed twice. First, the State requested a
continuance because a key witness, the investigating detective, was not
available on the original trial dates. The State moved to continue but was
also willing to accelerate trial. Manseau objected to a continuance, but
Manseau's counsel was unavailable for an earlier date and expressed a
preference for a later date. The court granted the continuance and delayed
trial by two weeks.

¶4 The second delay occurred when the State interviewed Emmy
the day before trial. Immediately following the interview, the State
disclosed that she had made new abuse allegations against Manseau. The
State also disclosed that another alleged Manseau victim, herself a potential
Arizona Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 404(c) witness in this case, had recently
made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse against a third party not
involved in this case (her stepfather). Manseau moved to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice, alleging the State violated its Brady obligation
by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence, putting him in the
untenable position of choosing between a speedy trial or effective assistance
of counsel. The superior court denied the motion, instead granting the
State's request to preclude evidence of the new allegations. The court also

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offered to preclude the Rule 404(c) witness altogether, but Manseau
disagreed because he wanted to explore using that witness's testimony to
impeach Emmy. Ultimately, Manseau requested a continuance.

¶5 At trial, Emmy, then thirteen, testified to the specifics of the
abuse, but had trouble remembering specific dates and prior statements.
For example, she testified Manseau had attempted to abuse her in a car in
2022, even though she previously claimed it occurred in 2020. Investigating
detectives also testified on a variety of topics, including discovery of recent
Google searches on Manseau's phone at the time of his arrest. Manseau
attempted to impeach Emmy with an alleged prior statement in which she
said the abuse was a dream. Emmy disagreed that she had called the abuse
a dream, and another testifying detective said he did not recall Emmy
making that statement.

¶6 The State also introduced a portion of Manseau's Google
search history as aberrant-sexual propensity evidence. The court had found
the evidence admissible under Rule 404(c) at a pre-trial hearing. During
trial, the State attempted to impeach Manseau's brother about drug use.
The brother denied drug use, stating he only had a slight addiction to
energy drinks. Finally, during closing arguments, the prosecutor referred
to Emmy's alleged "dream" statement as "false information" and used Ted
Bundy as an example of an outwardly likable individual that no one
expected to commit heinous crimes.

¶7 The jury returned a guilty verdict on all four counts, and
found an aggravator because Emmy suffered emotional harm. The court
sentenced Manseau to life in prison on count 1, consecutive 20-year prison
sentences on counts 2 and 3, and a consecutive 10-year prison sentence on
count 4. Manseau timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Manseau raises many issues on appeal. We address them
below, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict and resolving all reasonable inferences against Manseau. State v.
Castaneda, 254 Ariz. 9, 11, ¶ 2 (App. 2022).

I. Emmy's Competency.

¶9 Manseau argues the court should have sua sponte ordered a
competency hearing because Emmy's trial testimony was inconsistent and
she made factually impossible claims.

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¶10 Because Manseau failed to object on competency grounds or
request a competency hearing, we only review for fundamental error. State
v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018). Manseau must prove an error
occurred, and that the error was fundamental, i.e., it (1) went to the
foundation of the case, (2) took away a right essential to the defense, or (3)
was so egregious it made it impossible to have a fair trial. Id. at 142, ¶ 21.
If Manseau proves the first or second option of prong two, he must also
prove he suffered a non-speculative prejudice. See State v. Munninger, 213
Ariz. 393, 397, ¶ 14 (App. 2006).

¶11 Emmy was thirteen when she testified. Everyone is
presumed competent to testify unless the rules of evidence or applicable
statutes direct otherwise. Ariz. R. Evid. 601; see also, A.R.S. § 13-4061 ("In a
criminal trial every person is competent to be a witness."). "Neither age,
mental capacity nor feeble-mindedness renders a witness incompetent or
disqualified." Castaneda, 254 Ariz. at 12, ¶ 16 (cleaned up). A trial court has
no independent duty to examine the competency of a child over ten years
old. State v. Perez, 109 Ariz 572, 574 (1973). The trial court has broad
discretion to determine the need for a competency hearing to inquire into
the witness's capacity to perceive, recollect, or communicate about the
events in question. State v. Strong, 258 Ariz. 184, 203, ¶ 69 (2024). Notably,
competency and credibility are distinct inquiries, the latter being a question
of fact implicating the reliability of the testimony. Zimmer v. Peters, 176
Ariz. 426, 429 (App. 1993).

¶12 There is no debate Emmy's testimony was imprecise. She
approximated the years the abuse took place and could not recall specific
dates. She claimed Manseau attempted to abuse her in the car in 2022, even
though she previously claimed it happened in the spring of 2020. Emmy's
spotty memory, inability to discuss specific dates and times, and any other
inconsistencies in testimony were for the jury to consider when
determining her credibility and the weight of her testimony. See State v.
Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, 357, ¶ 27 (2007); State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 397, 400
(App. 1986). And while the jury was entitled to decide what weight to give
Emmy’s difficulty with dates, if any, the State had no obligation to prove
the specific date of abuse because that was not an element of the crime.
A.R.S. § 13-1405.

¶13 We are unpersuaded by Manseau's arguments. Emmy
demonstrated the ability to perceive, recollect, and communicate about the
events at issue. Manseau himself admits that the core issue here was her
credibility—a question for the jury. We see no error, much less
fundamental and prejudicial error.

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¶14 Manseau makes two other related claims. First, because the
State considered impeaching Emmy for making inaccurate statements on
the stand about her pre-trial interactions with the prosecution, Manseau
suggests a trial court must always evaluate the victim's testimony when that
happens. But Manseau cites no legal authority for this proposition. Second,
he mentions an alternative theory—that the State improperly coached
Emmy—but never develops the argument. Passing reference to arguments
in an opening brief that are not developed and supported with citations to
legal authority may be treated as abandoned and waived. Ritchie v. Krasner,
221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009); ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) (requiring briefs to
support arguments with citation to legal authorities). Therefore, we do not
address them.

II. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Under Count IV.

¶15 Manseau asserts error in the superior court's failure to acquit
him on Count IV, attempted sexual conduct with a minor. See Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 20. He insists the State presented insufficient evidence to support the
conviction because he was in jail between April 2018 and October 2020 and
could not have abused Emmy in April 2020, as she alleged. He claims this
is evidence of judicial bias that infected the entire trial and violated due
process.

¶16 Manseau did not object on bias or due process grounds. "By
failing to . . . object on constitutional grounds . . . [Manseau] forfeited the
right to obtain appellate relief unless he proves that fundamental error
occurred." State v. Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 8 (App. 2008) (cleaned up).

¶17 Manseau instead argued the evidence was insufficient to
convict. A directed verdict of acquittal under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20 is only
appropriate where there is no substantial evidence that a reasonable juror
would find sufficient to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 493, ¶ 24 (1999). We review the
denial of the Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20 motion de novo, "viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution" and asking whether "any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶¶ 15–16
(2011) (cleaned up). When reasonable minds can draw differing inferences
from the facts, the judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal,
re-weigh the facts, or disregard possible reasonable inferences—the case
must be submitted to the jury. See id. at 563, ¶ 18.

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¶18 Here, the court assessed that the underlying problem with
Emmy's testimony was her credibility. She had issues with providing
specific dates and included inconsistencies with her prior statements made
during the investigation. But those inconsistencies were presented to the
jury, and the precise date of the offense is not an element of the crime. See
State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, 111, ¶ 13 (App. 2022). Emmy's allegations
fit within the broad time frame alleged in the indictment (2015 to 2021).
And as we discussed, supra Part I, the jury is the proper arbiter of Emmy's
credibility. See State v. Buccheri-Bianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 334, ¶ 38 (App. 2013)
(stating that "no rule is better established than that the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are
questions exclusively for the jury" (cleaned up)). The court correctly denied
the motion. See id. at ¶ 39 (rejecting argument that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20
motion should have been granted because of "inconsistencies in the
children's testimony and the physical evidence"). Because Manseau has not
shown error, he has not established a due process violation.

¶19 Manseau's opening brief also alleged that the denial of a
directed verdict demonstrated that the trial court "abandoned its role of
being fair and impartial" because the trial court knew Manseau was in jail
in 2020. Because the trial court correctly denied the motion, we see nothing
in the record that would support such a claim, particularly given the
presumption of impartiality extended to trial judges. Cf. State v. Ellison, 213
Ariz. 116, 128, ¶ 37 (2006) (stating that, in the context of a Ariz. R. Crim. P.
10.1 motion for change of judge based on bias, "[j]udges are presumed to be
impartial." (quoting State v. Smith, 203 Ariz. 75, 79, ¶ 13 (2002))).

III. The Admission of the Google Search History.

¶20 Manseau claims the superior court deprived him of a fair trial
by improperly admitting his internet search history under Rule 404(c) and
failing to provide the limiting instruction required by the rule.

¶21 Manseau objected to the evidence for lack of foundation but
did not object on the grounds that the evidence denied him a fair trial. Nor
did Manseau request a limiting instruction or object to the lack thereof.
Therefore, we review these claims for fundamental error. Escalante, 245
Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12. We review the admission of the evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. James, 242 Ariz. 126, 130, ¶ 11 (App. 2017). We find such
abuse only if "no reasonable [trial] judge would have reached the same
result under the circumstances." State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 354, ¶ 40
(2004). And we affirm the trial court's ruling if the result is "legally correct

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for any reason." State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 387, ¶ 7 (2015) (quoting State
v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984)).

¶22 Rule 404(c)(1) requires the court to make specific findings: (A)
that the evidence is sufficient for the trier of fact to find the defendant
committed the other act, (B) committing the act is a reasonable basis to infer
defendant has an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the crime charged,
and (C) that the value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice or other Rule 403 balancing factors. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1).
The finding under (A) must be made by clear and convincing evidence.
James, 242 Ariz. at 131, ¶ 17.

¶23 At the pre-trial hearing, the superior court made the required
Rule 404(c) findings. Then, it excluded some of the searches but found that
a few, taken together, supported the inference of aberrant sexual
propensity. And finally, balancing the Rule 403 and 404(c)(1)(C) factors, the
court found that those searches were not too remote, too dissimilar, too
infrequent, or otherwise inadmissible.

¶24 Manseau argues that the searches only evidence an adult
"kink" that is irrelevant to the sexual abuse of minors. His argument fails
because the search terms included explicit terms for sexual acts between a
father and a daughter. Having made the requisite findings, the court did
not abuse its discretion. Manseau has not shown any error in the admission
of the searches and does not establish that the admission of that evidence
denied him a fair trial. See State v. Tacho, 113 Ariz. 380, 384 (1976) (finding
that where the record shows no conduct so improper or outrageous as to
shock the conscience of the court and amount to a denial of appellant's
rights, absence of fairness did not fatally infect the trial).

¶25 As for the jury instructions, Rule 404(c)(2) states that "[i]n all
cases in which evidence of another act is admitted . . . the court shall instruct
the jury as to the proper use of such evidence." The relevant comment to
the 1997 amendment to the rule clarifies that, at minimum, the court should
instruct the jury that the admission of the other acts does not lessen the
State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury
cannot convict defendant simply because it finds he committed the other
act or had a predisposition to commit the charged crime. Id. The jury
instructions did not contain the specific instructions contemplated by Rule
404(c)(2). Although neither party objected to the final instruction, the trial
court erred by failing to include those specific instructions.

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¶26 Under fundamental-error review, Manseau also bears the
burden of establishing "the error caused him prejudice," State v. Riley, 248
Ariz. 154, 170, ¶ 24 (2020), but he fails to articulate a non-speculative
argument the instruction prejudiced him. He suggests that the admission
of the searches necessarily caused the jury to reach a decision on an
improper basis like "emotion, sympathy, or horror." See State v. Mott, 187
Ariz. 536, 545 (1997) (stating courts should exclude relevant evidence if it
"has an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as
emotion, sympathy, or horror").

¶27 We reject that argument for several reasons. For one, the trial
court properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof, not to be
influenced by prejudice, and the elements of the offenses charged,
repeatedly stating that "all jurors must agree that he committed the same
act which meets the elements of" the charged offense. Moreover, during
closing argument, the State limited its argument to the evidence of
Manseau's statements and reactions regarding the search history. On this
record, including the direct testimony of Emmy as to the charged offenses,
Manseau has not demonstrated prejudice from the absence of additional
Rule 404(c)-specific instructions.

¶28 The trial court is best positioned to "balance the probative
value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice."
State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, 33, ¶ 21 (App. 1998). Manseau only speculates
that the jury may have reached a different result with the correct
instructions, but speculation is not sufficient to establish the prejudice
required for fundamental-error review. See Munninger, 213 Ariz. at 397,
¶ 14.

IV. Disclosure Issues and Trial Delay.

¶29 Manseau argues the superior court should have granted his
motion to dismiss with prejudice once the State violated its obligations
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by disclosing "critical" material
new evidence on the eve of trial. Manseau moved to dismiss because the
State disclosed that (1) Emmy had alleged new instances of abuse for the
first time at her pre-trial interview that day, and (2) a few months prior,
another alleged minor Manseau victim, and potential Rule 404(c) witness
in his trial, had levied an unsubstantiated sexual abuse accusation against
a third party not involved in Manseau's case (her stepfather). Manseau
insists that the court's denial of his motion to dismiss forced him to choose
between accepting a continuance, which violated his right to a speedy trial
under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8, or proceed without investigating this new

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evidence, which violated his right to a fair trial with effective assistance of
counsel. He also claims that because the prosecutor and law enforcement
intentionally withheld the information until the eve of the scheduled trial
date, the court should have dismissed with prejudice instead of sanctioning
the State with a continuance.

¶30 We review the denial of the motion to dismiss for an abuse of
discretion, affirming the court's ruling if legally correct for any reason. State
v. Espinoza, 229 Ariz. 421, 424, ¶ 15 (App. 2012). Similarly, in discovery
matters, "the trial judge has broad discretion that we review only for abuse."
Naranjo v. Sukenic, 254 Ariz. 467, 472, ¶ 17 (2023) (quoting State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. v. Lee, 199 Ariz. 52, 57, ¶ 12 (2000)). We review the trial court's
ruling on sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. at 353–
54, ¶ 40.

¶31 The State has an ongoing obligation to disclose any
exculpatory evidence no later than seven days before trial. Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 15.1, 15.6(c); see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Failure to comply with the rule
allows the court to impose sanctions. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.7(b). To prove a
Brady violation, Manseau must show the evidence was favorable to him
because it was exculpatory or impeaching, it was unavailable at trial, and
prejudice ensued. Bands v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004). The key question
is "whether the undisclosed [exculpatory and material evidence] would
have created a reasonable doubt had it been presented to the jury." State v.
Montano, 204 Ariz. 413, 424, ¶ 52 (2003) (cleaned up).

¶32 The prosecutor disclosed the information before trial.
Therefore, Manseau cannot establish a completed Brady violation.
Moreover, the prosecutor disclosed the information almost immediately
upon discovery. The prosecutor's duty to obtain (and disclose) material
extends to law enforcement agencies that investigated the case. Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 15.1(f) ("The State's disclosure obligation extends to material and
information in the possession or control of any of the following: . . . (2) any
law enforcement agency that has participated in the investigation of the case
and is under the prosecutor's direction or control") (emphasis added); see also
State v. Reinhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 585 (1997). But the Rule 404(c) witness's
allegation came from a separate case, not this case. Cf. State v. Martinez-
Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 449 (1985) (finding that reports prepared exclusively
by a police department and disclosed for the first time through trial
testimony without giving prosecutor advance notice were not in
prosecutor's control). Under the circumstances, Manseau has not shown
that the prosecutor attempted to evade Brady requirements "by keeping

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[herself] ignorant or compartmentalizing information about different
aspects of [the] case." Milke v. Mroz, 236 Ariz. 276, 283, ¶ 18 (App. 2014).

¶33 Additionally, the State offered to preclude the new
inculpatory information, which the court did. And Manseau did not
attempt to call the Rule 404(c) witness to the stand at trial. So, Manseau
cannot meet the first Brady prong, much less prove a Brady violation.

¶34 On these facts, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court
to find the State's actions did not warrant a dismissal with prejudice.

¶35 Manseau's related argument—that the disclosure and
continuance forced him to forgo his right to a speedy trial—is similarly
unconvincing. The right to a speedy trial in Arizona is procedural, not
constitutional or fundamental, and distinct from the speedy trial guarantees
of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Leota, 256 Ariz.
351, 356, ¶ 22 (App. 2023). If the court finds time limits have been violated,
it must dismiss the case but may do so with or without prejudice. Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 8.6. To warrant dismissal with prejudice, Manseau must show the
State delayed to gain an advantage or harass him, and that he suffered
actual prejudice. Leota, 256 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 23.

¶36 The State requested the first continuance because the main
detective was not available. It was within the court's discretion to grant it
and exclude the time for Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8 purposes. When State diligence
could have avoided the error, a delay may violate Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8. See
State v. Heise, 117 Ariz. 524, 526 (App. 1977). But here, the State offered to
accelerate trial while Manseau expressed a preference for delaying by two
weeks. On this record, Manseau has not established that the court abused
its discretion by continuing trial.

¶37 As to the continuance related to the late disclosure, Manseau
had the right to make, and made, the tactical choice of refusing preclusion
of the Rule 404(c) witness, with the hope of eliciting impeachment evidence.
Instead, he requested the continuance once the court refused to dismiss the
case.

¶38 Again, on this record, Manseau's conclusory allegations that
the prosecutor and law enforcement colluded to get him convicted are not
sufficient to show the State intended to gain an advantage over Manseau or
harass him. Manseau asked for extra time to investigate the new
information and then opted not to use it at all at trial. With the benefit of
time, diligence, and hindsight, he cannot now take the position that the
information was still "critical," and its delayed disclosure prejudiced him.

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V. Alleged Misconduct.

¶39 Manseau argues prosecutorial and law enforcement
misconduct so infected trial that the only remedy was dismissal with
prejudice. He offers a few individual examples and also alleges cumulative
error: (1) the State knowingly relied on Emmy's faulty testimony to obtain
a conviction on Count IV; (2) a conflicted law enforcement officer
intentionally withheld evidence, thus depriving Manseau of a speedy trial;
(3) the State improperly compared Manseau to Ted Bundy during closing
argument; (4) the State improperly attempted to impeach Manseau's
brother on the stand; and (5) the State impugned Manseau's trial counsel
and intentionally misrepresented Manseau's claim that Emmy was not sure
if the abuse was a dream as "false information," even though the State knew
of the specific reference.

¶40 Prosecutorial misconduct encompasses any conduct that
infringes on a defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Murray, 250 Ariz.
543, 548, ¶ 12 (2021). The burden is on Manseau to prove the misconduct
infected the trial with unfairness to the point the conviction resulted in a
denial of due process. Id. at 548, ¶ 13. But because Manseau did not object
on misconduct grounds at trial, we only review for fundamental error.
Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12. Under fundamental-error review, Manseau
must show that absent the error, a reasonable jury could have reached a
different verdict. Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 14.

A. Faulty Testimony and Withheld Evidence Allegations.

¶41 The first two allegations—Emmy's faulty testimony and the
allegedly withheld evidence—we have mostly resolved already.

¶42 That the State intentionally obtained a Count IV conviction
based on insufficient and faulty testimony, merely rehashes the credibility
argument we resolved, supra Part I. Recasting the issue as misconduct
requires proof of error, which we did not find.

¶43 The law enforcement officer misconduct assertion rehashes
the Brady/speedy trial argument we resolved, supra Part IV. We only add
that Manseau's reliance on Milke, and State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431 (2000)
is inapposite. Both cases involved proven serial misconduct by officers
directly involved with the investigation of the case at bar, not a single,
speculative allegation that evidence in a separate case was withheld from the
prosecutor in this case. And that evidence was disclosed in this case, albeit
on the eve of an early trial setting. Manseau's conclusory county-wide
conspiracy allegations are not enough to overcome this critical distinction.

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B. The Ted Bundy Reference.

¶44 At closing the State mentioned:

An example that's very far removed from our case, which is
why I'm gonna use it. It's not analogous in any type of way.
But Ted Bundy, super charismatic, super nice, always
smiling, always looking sharp, together. No one had any idea
he was out there doing all those heinous crimes. His own wife
whom he had a child with had no idea. She never would have
suspected Ted was out there doing all that. Similar to here,
we know that people we know do heinous things.

¶45 Notably, Manseau's counsel explicitly waived this issue by
stating on the record he chose not to object. Therefore, we review for
fundamental error only. Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12.

¶46 Two factors determine if an argument constitutes
misconduct: (1) whether the statement called the jury's attention to matters
it should not consider in making its decision, and (2) the probability jurors
were in fact influenced by the argument. Riley, 248 Ariz. at 187, ¶ 125. The
law gives attorneys wide, but not unlimited latitude in closing arguments.
State v. Dansdill, 246 Ariz. 593, 602, ¶ 29 (App. 2019). We have found
fundamental error where the prosecutor misstates the State's burden of
proof, Murray, 250 Ariz. at 554, ¶ 40, or improperly references the potential
consequences of a conviction, Dansdill, 246 Ariz. at 604, ¶ 40.

¶47 Considered in context, the State's argument was not
misconduct. In mentioning Ted Bundy, the State explicitly noted that
Manseau's case was "very far removed" and "not analogous" and only
argued that otherwise likeable people may do heinous things. We allow
closing argument analogies that remind jurors of facts in common
knowledge, including referencing Ted Bundy. See State v. Jones, 197 Ariz.
290, 306, ¶ 41 (2000) ("The prosecutor . . . drew an analogy between Jones's
attitude at trial and that of well-known murderers [including Ted Bundy].
The error, if any, could not have affected the outcome of the trial."). Even
assuming the comment drew the jury attention to something it should not
consider, namely fear or disgust with Manseau, it is unlikely that one
fleeting statement would influence the jury. Riley, 248 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 152.
After all, the jury instructions specifically directed it not to be influenced by
emotions like prejudice, and we presume the jury follows instructions.
Strong, 258 Ariz. at 212, ¶ 124. While not a best practice, this isolated
comment did not rise to the level of fundamental error.

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C. The Brother's Attempted Impeachment.

¶48 Manseau also claims the State improperly attempted to
impeach his brother on the stand by alleging drug use without any evidence
in the record. Manseau objected only to a follow-up question on asked-
and-answered grounds. The State is allowed to attack a witness's character
for truthfulness on the stand using specific instances of the witness's
conduct. Ariz. R. Evid. 608(b). We need not decide whether drug use was
relevant to this witness's character for truthfulness. If it was error to ask, it
was not fundamental. Manseau's brother firmly denied the allegation, and
the State did not attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach him.
Ariz. R. Evid. 608(b). Manseau has not shown this interaction constituted
fundamental error.

D. Calling the Dream Comment "False Information."

¶49 Manseau asserts that the State failed to correct the testifying
detective when he stated he did not remember Emmy saying Manseau's
abuse could have been a dream, even though the reference was discussed
at length before trial. He claims the State then called it "false information"
during closing arguments, implying defense counsel lied about it.

¶50 Manseau correctly points out that it is not proper for law
enforcement to misstate the evidence. State v. Cannon, 148 Ariz. 72, 77
(1985). But that is not what happened here. The detective simply stated he
did not remember the reference and had not reviewed the DCS report
where it allegedly appeared. Manseau never offered that report into
evidence, only asking Emmy about it on the stand, to which she responded
that a detective had asked her if she had dreamed the abuse but she denied
doing so, testifying she was "pretty sure it perfectly happened."
Accordingly, Manseau does not demonstrate that the record confirmed
Emmy agreed that the abuse could have been a dream.

¶51 Manseau argues the prosecutor has an ethical duty to correct
false testimony. But we see no error here because Manseau does not
demonstrate that the witness lied about his recollection of the claimed
statement.

¶52 Neither did calling the evidence "false information" impugn
the character of defense counsel. Manseau's reliance on State v. Hulsey, 243
Ariz. 367, 390, ¶ 99 (2018), is unavailing. There, the prosecutor commented
on defense counsel, referring to him as "Don Quixote." Here, the prosecutor
commented on the defense's theory of the case. Referring to Manseau's
dream theory defense as "false information" was argument about the

13
STATE v. MANSEAU
Decision of the Court

strength of inferences to be drawn from that evidence. See State v. Acuna
Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 220, ¶ 93 (2018) ("referring to defense evidence as
myth or fanciful and attacking defense theories is permissible, so long as it
is directed at defense theories rather than defense counsel." (cleaned up)).
Nothing in the record suggests the State made any other comments that,
taken together with this one, would show an attack on Manseau's attorney.

¶53 Finding no error in the individual issues in this section, we
cannot find that taken together they demonstrate cumulative error either.

CONCLUSION

¶54 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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