Kuerschner v. Kuerschner

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STEFANIE KUERSCHNER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JAMES T. KUERSCHNER, as Trustee of the
Joan F. Kuerschner Irrevocable Trust, Defendant/Appellee.1

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0871
FILED 05-07-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-019544
The Honorable Adam D. Driggs, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Stefanie Kuerschner, Carefree
Plaintiff/Appellant

Evans Dukarich LLP, Tempe
By Steven L. Evans, Gary Dukarich, Nicholas J. Kuntz, Michael Malin,
Jeff Boshes
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

1 The caption has been amended to reflect the correct parties on appeal and

shall be used for all future filings in this case.
KUERSCHNER v. KUERSCHNER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Stefanie Kuerschner appeals the superior court’s dismissal of
her claim under A.R.S. § 33-420 and award of attorneys’ fees against her.
For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 James Kuerschner is the trustee of the Joan F. Kuerschner
Irrevocable Trust (“the Trust”). Thomas Kuerschner, James’s father, was
also a trustee of the Trust before his death in 2021. Stefanie is Thomas’s
widow.2

¶3 As fully explained in Stefanie’s prior appeals, Thomas’s will
excluded Stefanie from receiving any assets, but she maintained her
community interest in the Scottsdale home they shared. In re Est. of
Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-0108, 2025 WL 2780806, at *1, ¶¶ 6–8 (Ariz. App.
Sept. 30, 2025) (mem. decision). Stefanie filed several claims against
Thomas’s estate (“the Probate case”), and the superior court rejected them
following a trial. Id. at *3–4, ¶¶ 20–26. We affirmed that decision on appeal
and ordered Stefanie to pay James’s (the personal representative of
Thomas’s estate) appellate attorneys’ fees for pursuing meritless claims. Id.
at *8, ¶¶ 50–51. We also warned Stefanie about providing incorrect citations
in her written briefs and omitting record references. Id. at *5, ¶¶ 29–30.

¶4 After that appeal, Stefanie continued to litigate in the superior
court several issues in the Probate case, resulting in sanctions against her.
In re Est. of Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-0491, 2026 WL 619894, at *1, ¶¶ 5–7
(Ariz. App. Mar. 5, 2026) (mem. decision). We dismissed her appeal of those
sanction orders, and imposed additional sanctions against her for again
providing incorrect citations and omitting record references. Id. at *2,
¶¶ 13–15.

2 Because parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first

names to avoid confusion.

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KUERSCHNER v. KUERSCHNER
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¶5 In this case, Stefanie brought a claim under A.R.S. § 33-420
against James in his capacity as trustee of the Trust in April 2024, alleging
that James had recorded an invalid promissory note in November 2020
creating “a cloud on title” to the Scottsdale home. 3 In May 2024, the superior
court dismissed Stefanie’s claim with prejudice by stipulation of the parties.

¶6 In July 2024, Stefanie filed another claim under A.R.S.
§ 33-420 against James in his capacity as trustee based on the same
recording of the same promissory note. On James’s motion, the superior
court dismissed the complaint—captioned as a “special action”—under
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) on claim preclusion
grounds. The court also granted James’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs
under A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01, -349, and 14-1105.

¶7 Stefanie timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Stefanie argues the superior court erred by dismissing her
complaint on claim preclusion grounds under Rule 12(b)(6). She also
challenges the court’s award of attorneys’ fees against her.

I. Claim Preclusion

¶9 Under Rule 12(b)(6), the superior court may dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de
novo. Shepherd v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 250 Ariz. 511, 513, ¶ 11 (2021).
Dismissal is appropriate if the claimant is not “entitled to relief under any
interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230
Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 8 (2012). We assume the truth of all well-pled factual
allegations in the complaint, but “mere conclusory statements are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Cullen v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7 (2008).

¶10 Claim preclusion “bars litigation in a subsequent action of
any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action
resulting in a final judgment.” Quinn v. Cardenas, 256 Ariz. 77, 83, ¶ 21 (App.

3 The materials from Stefanie’s April 2024 action are not in the record for

this case, but we take judicial notice of them. See In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz.
424, 425, ¶ 4 (App. 2000) (explaining that an appellate court may take
judicial notice of other actions heard in the same court).

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KUERSCHNER v. KUERSCHNER
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2023) (citation modified). Claim preclusion has three elements: “(1) an
identity of claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered and the
current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the previous
litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” In re
Gen. Adjudication of All Rts. to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz.
64, 69–70, ¶ 14 (2006).

¶11 Identity of claims exists when two claims are “based on the
[same] transaction or series of transactions . . . considering whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation.” Crosby-Garbotz v. Fell, 246
Ariz. 54, 59, ¶ 19 (2019) (citation modified). A final judgment may “be on
the merits and thus have claim preclusive effect when it results from the
stipulation of the parties.” 4501 Northpoint LP v. Maricopa Cnty., 212 Ariz.
98, 101, ¶ 17 (2006) (citation modified). We review the preclusive effect of a
prior judgment de novo. Howell v. Hodap, 221 Ariz. 543, 546, ¶ 17 (App.
2009).

¶12 Here, both of Stefanie’s claims were brought as special actions
under A.R.S. § 33-420. Both claims arose out of the same transaction—the
November 2020 recordation of the challenged promissory note. Stefanie
argues that her claims are not the same because she alleges new or ongoing
harms arising out of the recordation of the note, but the fact remains that
she does not allege any new harmful conduct or transaction outside of the
November 2020 recordation. The first element of claim preclusion is
therefore met because both claims arise out of the recordation of the
promissory note.

¶13 Because the parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice in
the first action, that dismissal is a final judgment on the merits with
preclusive effect. See 4501 Northpoint LP, 212 Ariz. at 101, ¶ 17. And though
Stefanie maintains she sued James in the first suit “as Personal
Representative of his mother Joan’s estate, or possibly in an individual
capacity regarding marital/community property issues,” both complaints
clearly identify Stefanie as the plaintiff and James as trustee of the Trust as
the defendant. The second and third elements of claim preclusion are
therefore satisfied. Accordingly, the superior court correctly dismissed the
underlying action based on claim preclusion grounds.

II. Attorneys’ Fees

¶14 Stefanie next challenges the award of attorneys’ fees assessed
against her. We note that the superior court’s order granting James’s
request for attorneys’ fees did not specifically identify the statutory bases

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for the award. However, James’s request, as granted by the court, cited
A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01, -349, and 14-1105. Stefanie’s primary argument
surrounding attorneys’ fees is that the court did not make the requisite
findings that she “acted in bad faith or that her claim was frivolous.” Thus,
we construe her argument as a challenge to the court’s award of attorneys’
fees under A.R.S. § 12-349, which governs awards of attorneys’ fees for
groundless claims not made in good faith.

¶15 “Review of an attorney fees award under § 12-349 presents a
mixed question of fact and law. We defer to a trial court’s findings of fact
unless clearly erroneous, but we review the court’s interpretation and
application of the fees statute de novo.” Ariz. Republican Party v. Richer, 257
Ariz. 237, 242, ¶ 10 (2024).

¶16 A court “must issue an award of attorney fees whenever an
attorney or party is proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have
engaged in the enumerated conduct” listed in A.R.S. § 12-349. Id. at 242,
¶ 9. Fees must be awarded if a party, as relevant here, “[b]rings or defends
a claim without substantial justification.” A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1). “’[W]ithout
substantial justification’ means that the claim or defense is groundless and
is not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-349(F).

¶17 A claim is groundless for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-349 “if the
proponent can present no rational argument based upon the evidence or
law in support of that claim.” Rogone v. Correia, 236 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 22 (App.
2014) (citation modified). Whether a claim is groundless is viewed through
an objective lens, without regard to the claimant’s subjective beliefs. Richer,
257 Ariz. at 243, ¶ 15. “A claim is not made in good faith if (1) it is
groundless and (2) the party or attorney knows or should know that it is
groundless, or is indifferent to its groundlessness, but pursues it anyway.”
Id. at 248, ¶ 38 (citation modified).

¶18 A court awarding fees under A.R.S. § 12-349 must “set forth
the specific reasons for the award.” A.R.S. § 12-350. Stefanie appears to
argue the court did not fulfill this mandate, and that in any event, her claim
was not groundless and was made in good faith. We disagree.

¶19 “[T]he failure of a party to object to the lack of findings of fact
and conclusions of law in making awards of attorneys’ fees under . . .
§ 12-349 precludes that party from raising the absence of findings as error
on appeal.” Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 301 (1994). Stefanie did not
object to the lack of findings supporting the attorneys’ fee award in superior
court. As such, she has waived this argument on appeal.

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KUERSCHNER v. KUERSCHNER
Decision of the Court

¶20 Even if she had not waived the argument, her argument still
fails. In awarding attorneys’ fees, the superior court found that Stefanie’s
prior and current complaints “contain[ed] numerous identical allegations,”
”all concern[ed] the same transaction,” and that the majority of “the prayers
for relief are nearly identical.” These findings support that Stefanie’s claim
was groundless because there is “no rational argument” that such
duplicitous filings were not clearly barred by claim preclusion. See Rogone,
236 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 22. Stefanie knew or should have known her July 2024
filing was precluded because she stipulated to dismissing her April 2024
complaint with prejudice, which arose from the same recording of the same
promissory note. But she did not pursue her second claim in good faith. See
Richer, 257 Ariz. at 248, ¶ 38. The superior court appropriately awarded
attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-349.

¶21 James requests his attorneys’ fees on appeal under A.R.S.
§ 12-349. Because we conclude Stefanie’s claim was groundless and not
made in good faith, we grant James’s request for reasonable fees and costs
upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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