rivera/carrillo v. Webb

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

VALARIE RIVERA and JESSE CARRILLO, Petitioners/Appellees,

v.

DIAMOND ENRIQUEZ WEBB, Respondent/Appellant.1

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0556 FC
FILED 05-11-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-051024
The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Defenders of Children, Phoenix
By Donna Berlinski
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Pangerl Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Phoenix
By Regina M. Pangerl
Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees

1 The caption has been amended to reflect the correct parties and shall be

used for future filings in this appeal.
RIVERA/CARRILLO v. WEBB
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Diamond Enriquez Webb (“Mother”) appeals the superior
court’s order granting Valarie Rivera (“Rivera”) and Jesse Carrillo
(“Carrillo”) (collectively, “the Petitioners”) third-party visitation with two
of Mother’s minor children. Because the record sufficiently supports the
visitation award, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Randy Carrillo (“Father”) never married but have
two children together—a daughter (“Daughter”), born in 2012, and a son
(“Son”), born in 2014 (collectively, “the Children”). For substantial periods
between October 2014 and November 2021, the Petitioners—Father’s aunt
and uncle—served as the Children’s primary caregivers, largely due to
Mother’s incarceration and medical issues and Father’s minimal contact. In
2018 and 2019, Mother signed temporary guardianship agreements
granting the Petitioners legal decision-making authority for the Children.
But in November 2021, Mother severed all contact between the Petitioners
and the Children.

¶3 In April 2022, the Petitioners petitioned to establish third-
party rights for legal decision-making, visitation, and child support. In
response, Mother acknowledged the Petitioners’ prior service as the
Children’s caregivers, but explained she “no longer wish[ed] to continue
contact” with them because of certain, enumerated “concerns” with their
behavior: failing to maintain up-to-date contact information, failing to
timely return phone calls, failing to ensure proper hygiene/dress for the
Children, preventing the Children from praying, encouraging the Children
to refer to them as “Mom” and “Dad,” offering Mother money to see the
Children, and reaching out to family members for “dirt” on Mother. In June
2022, Mother contacted police to report that Carrillo had showered with
Son and washed his genitals. She later submitted a pretrial statement
notifying the superior court that police were actively investigating
Carrillo’s conduct with the Children.

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¶4 Pending trial, the Petitioners repeatedly moved for temporary
orders. The superior court denied their first three requests but assigned a
court appointed advisor (“the CAA”) to investigate the matter and make a
recommendation to the court.

¶5 After interviewing Rivera, Carrillo, Mother, Father,
Daughter, and Son, the CAA submitted a report summarizing her
investigative findings. During a combined interview, the Petitioners denied
Mother’s allegations of misconduct and suggested she may have cut off
contact with them in retaliation for their report to the Department of Child
Safety in November 2021 alleging that a maternal relative had abused the
Children’s half-sibling. When Mother spoke with the CAA, she explained
that she severed the Children’s relationship with the Petitioners because the
Children “are afraid of them.” She also stated that she allows Father
supervised visitation with the Children. In his interview, Father
acknowledged that Mother had permitted him some supervised visits but
“expressed frustration” that she had largely “kept the children from him.”
When asked about Mother’s allegations that Carrillo had engaged in sexual
misconduct, Father denied that the Petitioners posed any risk of harm to
the Children, stating Mother had told Daughter “what to say” and
maintaining that Son had “never disclosed sexual misconduct” to him.
While stating he did not want visitation “forced” upon the Children, Father
recommended that the Petitioners have supervised visits. Finally, during
their separate interviews, the Children independently: (1) stated they
enjoyed visiting with Father and did not believe Mother needed to be
present for their visits, (2) expressed an interest in visiting with the
Petitioners, (3) recounted that Mother told them the Petitioners were trying
to take them away from her, (4) acknowledged that Mother had provided
them with negative information they should relay to the CAA about the
Petitioners, and (5) denied that Carrillo ever “got in the shower” with them
as reported by Mother.

¶6 After holding an evidentiary hearing on their fourth request
for temporary orders, the superior court granted the Petitioners
unsupervised visitation with the Children for three hours on the first
Saturday of every month, “to take place at a public setting.” Three months
later, the Petitioners moved to enforce the temporary visitation order.
Mother responded by asking for “clarification of what constitutes
compliance,” stating the “children refuse to engage in visitation with the
Petitioners.” The court summarily denied Mother’s motion for clarification.

¶7 In a pretrial statement, the Petitioners abandoned their claims
for legal decision-making authority and child support, instead limiting

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their request to visitation. Mother, in turn, reasserted her concerns with the
Petitioners’ conduct.

¶8 At trial, the CAA, Carrillo, Mother, and Father testified.
Consistent with her investigative report, the CAA briefly recounted her
interviews with the Children. When asked to opine on whether visitation
would be in the Children’s best interests, the CAA expressed uncertainty,
explaining the situation was “very complicated” and any visitation “would
be very difficult” without “therapeutic intervention that would require
Mother’s participation.”

¶9 Next, Carrillo testified that he and Rivera served as the
Children’s primary caregivers for approximately eight years. He denied
asking the Children to refer to him and Rivera as “mom and dad” and
testified he never forbade the Children from praying in his home. He also
stated that since the court entered temporary orders, he and Rivera had not
had any visitation with Daughter and only one visit with Son, opining that
Mother controlled and manipulated the Children.

¶10 For his part, Father testified that he approved of the
Petitioners having visitation with the Children. He rejected Mother’s
allegation that the Petitioners posed a danger to the Children, and after
confirming his understanding that the Children’s best interests were
paramount, opined that visitation with the Petitioners would serve those
interests. When asked whether he believed Mother manipulated the
Children, Father stated that he believed Mother “talked to [the Children] in
a certain way”—causing them to fear they would not see her again if they
visited with the Petitioners. Father characterized these fears as “just not
normal.”

¶11 Finally, Mother testified that visiting with the Petitioners
would be detrimental to the Children’s mental and emotional health and
contrary to their best interests. Although she acknowledged the Petitioners
had served as the Children’s caregivers for substantial periods, she
disputed Carrillo’s characterization of the relationship, explaining that
other than her period of incarceration, she primarily cared for the
Children—except for unspecified periods when she “needed, like, more
help.” Mother testified that she filed a police report alleging Carrillo had
“forcibly washed” Son’s genitals and obliquely acknowledged that neither
child had confirmed the allegation when interviewed by police. To
substantiate her claim that the Petitioners pose a danger to the Children,
Mother pointed to therapeutic notes from the Children’s telehealth
counseling records, which reflect Son reported that Carrillo had washed

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him in the shower and Daughter disclosed Carrillo had made her feel
“uncomfortable” and showed her pornography.

¶12 After Mother testified, Father addressed the superior court
directly, stating that Mother had largely prevented him from seeing the
Children throughout their lives. He explained that he had “to speak to
[Mother] a certain way” or risk being cut off from the Children entirely. He
then urged the court to grant the Petitioners supervised visitation with the
Children. At that point, the Petitioners’ attorney told the court that the
police had closed the investigation into Carrillo without filing any charges.

¶13 After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court
entered a final order granting the Petitioners supervised visitation “on the
first Saturday of each month,” beginning with one-hour visits and
gradually increasing to three-hour visits over a six-month period. Mother
moved to stay the visitation order, which the court denied. Mother timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶14 We review a superior court’s visitation ruling for an abuse of
discretion. McGovern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, 175, ¶ 6 (App. 2001). A
court abuses its discretion by committing an error of law while reaching a
discretionary conclusion, In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 8
(App. 2008), or “when the record is devoid of competent evidence to
support the court’s decision,” Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 5 (App.
2019) (citation modified). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to upholding the visitation ruling, In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 244
Ariz. 111, 120, ¶ 36 (2018), we defer to the court’s factual findings if
supported by the record, but review de novo questions of statutory
interpretation, Borja v. Borja, 254 Ariz. 309, 313, ¶ 10 (App. 2022).

¶15 Under A.R.S. § 25-409(C), the superior court may grant
visitation rights to a person other than a legal parent “on a finding that the
visitation is in the child’s best interests” if, as relevant here, “[t]he child was
born out of wedlock and the child’s legal parents are not married to each
other at the time the petition is filed.”

In deciding whether to grant visitation to a third party, the
court shall give special weight to the legal parents’ opinion of
what serves their child’s best interests and consider all relevant
factors including:

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1. The historical relationship, if any, between the child and
the person seeking visitation.

2. The motivation of the requesting party seeking visitation.

3. The motivation of the person objecting to visitation.

4. The quantity of visitation time requested and the potential
adverse impact that visitation will have on the child’s
customary activities.

5. If one or both of the child’s parents are deceased, the
benefit in maintaining an extended family relationship.

A.R.S. § 25-409(E) (emphasis added).

I. The Weight Accorded Each Parent’s Best-Interests Opinion

¶16 Mother challenges the superior court’s determination
concerning the weight to attribute to her and Father’s best-interests
opinions.

¶17 First, Mother contends the superior court erred by finding
Father’s best-interests opinion conflicted with her best-interests opinion.
Because Father never submitted a “written position in the case,” Mother
contends the record does not support a finding that his opinion on visitation
opposed her own.

¶18 We see no merit to Mother’s contention. While Father never
filed a written opinion statement with the superior court, he sat for an
interview with the CAA, in which he denied that the Petitioners pose any
danger to the Children, suggested that Mother manufactured the
misconduct allegations against the Petitioners, and recommended that the
court grant the Petitioners supervised visitation. More importantly, Father
testified to his opinions at trial, specifically confirming that he understood
the best interests of the Children were paramount to the visitation
determination and stating his belief that granting the Petitioners supervised
visitation would serve those interests. Thus, contrary to Mother’s
contention, the record reasonably supports the court’s finding that Father’s
best-interests opinion conflicted with her best-interests opinion.

¶19 Next, Mother argues the superior court improperly afforded
Father’s best-interests opinion equal weight to her own, leading to the
erroneous conclusion that the parents’ best-interests opinions “canceled

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each other out.” According to Mother, a “legal parent’s opinion under
A.R.S. § 25-409 should be weighted based on the level of legal decision
making [he or she has] established.”

¶20 To protect parents’ fundamental right “to the ‘care, custody,
and control of their children,’” Borja, 254 Ariz. at 313, ¶ 8 (quoting Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)), courts must: (1) apply a rebuttable
“presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child’s best interest” in
making decisions concerning visitation, and (2) afford “special weight to a
fit parent’s determination of whether visitation is in the child’s best
interest,” McGovern, 201 Ariz. at 177–78, ¶¶ 17–18 (citation modified).
“Special weight describes ‘the deference courts must afford a parent’s
visitation opinion, which prevents state interference with parents’
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of their
children.’” Douros v. Morse, 258 Ariz. 546, 550, ¶ 15 (App. 2024) (quoting
Friedman, 244 Ariz. at 115, ¶ 15).

¶21 “Even if Father’s opinion” opposed her own, Mother
contends “it is an unconstitutional imposition on her fundamental right as
the sole custodial parent to grant his opinion equal weight with hers.”
Additionally, Mother asserts that Father “is an unfit parent” and therefore
his best-interests opinion is not entitled to “special weight” deference. In
making these arguments, Mother directly challenges Friedman, arguing the
Arizona Supreme Court, in that case, improperly placed “a mere gamete
donor” on “equal footing” with “an actual parent.”

¶22 In Friedman, our supreme court squarely addressed how
courts presiding over third-party visitation requests should weigh the
conflicting best-interests opinions of legal parents. In that case, the mother
and father of two minor children divorced. 244 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 2. The
dissolution decree granted the mother sole custody of and legal decision-
making for the children and awarded the father only supervised parenting
time due to his “psychiatric issues” and “abusive behavior toward the
children.” Id. Before the divorce, the paternal grandparents took an active
role in the children’s lives. Id. at ¶ 3. After the divorce, the mother
“obstructed” the paternal grandparents’ attempts to maintain a relationship
with the children. Id. With “nearly four years” of “almost no contact” with
the children, the paternal grandparents sought an award of third-party
visitation. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4. At trial, the mother “testified that she believed
visitation would be harmful to her children’s mental health.” Id. at 113–14,
¶ 6. The father, on the other hand, “expressed his belief that visitation
would benefit the children.” Id. at 114, ¶ 7. The superior court granted the
paternal grandparents’ visitation petition. Id. at ¶ 8. On appeal, the mother

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argued that the superior court “lacked authority to award visitation to [the
paternal grandparents] absent a showing that her visitation opinion would
cause substantial harm to the children’s bests interests.” Id. at 116, ¶ 18.

¶23 To evaluate the mother’s legal challenge, the supreme court
turned to the controlling statutory language. First, the supreme court noted
that A.R.S. § 25-409(E) “does not contain any varying gradations of ‘special
weight’” or any qualifying language limiting who receives the benefit of
“special weight” deference “other than “’legal parent’ status.” Id. at 117,
¶ 21. Finding “the legislature’s use . . . of ‘legal parents’ in the plural
possessive form” significant, the supreme court determined that A.R.S.
§ 25-409(E) “contemplates scenarios in which two legal parents’ visitation
opinions are entitled to ‘special weight,’” yet “the legislature did not qualify
that directive” by requiring parental agreement. Id.

¶24 “Because no court had found him to be ‘an unfit parent,’” the
supreme court determined that the father, like the mother, was “entitled”
to a presumption that he acted in the children’s best interests. Id. at ¶ 22.
But the supreme court further concluded that “the parental presumption”
did not apply because the “two legal parents ha[d] competing visitation
views.” Id. Under such circumstances, “the respective presumptions
effectively and necessarily cancel each other out,” and the superior court
may grant visitation if, after considering all relevant factors, it finds
visitation is in the child’s best interests. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23. Stated differently,
the supreme court held that “when two legal parents disagree about
whether visitation is in their child’s best interests, . . . neither parent is
entitled to a presumption in his or her favor and the parents’ conflicting
opinions must give way to the court’s finding on whether visitation is in the
child’s best interests.” Id. at 113, ¶ 1.

¶25 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court stressed that
under A.R.S. § 25-409(E)’s plain language, the parental presumption “does
not hinge on whether one has custody” or “legal decision-making
authority,” but on “‘legal parent’ status.” Id. at 118–19, ¶¶ 26, 30. To the
extent the mother argued that the father was unfit and therefore did not
qualify for the parental presumption, the supreme court held that the
“significant restrictions” on his parenting time did “not strip him of, or even
limit, his fundamental right to direct the upbringing of his children.” Id. at
119, ¶ 31 (citation modified). In fact, the supreme court clarified that
whether a parent qualifies for the parental presumption “does not turn on
whether he is declared to be a ‘fit’ parent, but on whether his parental rights
have been terminated.” Id. at ¶ 32; see also A.R.S. § 25-401(4) (defining “legal

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parent” as a “biological or adoptive parent whose parental rights have not
been terminated”).

¶26 On appeal, Mother urges this court to “overturn” Friedman.
But we “are bound by the decisions of [the Arizona Supreme Court] and do
not have the authority to modify or disregard” its rulings. State v. Smyers,
207 Ariz. 314, 318, ¶ 15 n.4 (2004). Accordingly, we apply Friedman to this
case and find it determinative. The superior court found both Mother and
Father “fit” and therefore entitled to the parental presumption. We do not
question these findings. Mother did not directly contest Father’s fitness in
the superior court and thus waived such challenge on appeal. See Odom v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216 Ariz. 530, 535, ¶ 18 (App. 2007) (“[A]rguments
raised for the first time on appeal are untimely and deemed waived.”).
Waiver aside, our supreme court has declared, unequivocally, that
“a parent is presumed to be ‘fit’ until he or she has been adjudicated unfit.”
Friedman, 244 Ariz. at 119, ¶ 33. Therefore, having found that Mother’s
best-interests opinion conflicted with Father’s best-interests opinion, the
superior court properly determined that neither parent’s opinion was
entitled to special weight.

II. Determination of the Children’s Best Interests

¶27 Mother contests the superior court’s finding that supervised
visitation with the Petitioners is in the Children’s best interests. She
contends the court failed to consider all the relevant factors and adequately
explain “how the factors it considered affected its determination.” She also
argues that the court erroneously placed the burden of proof on her to
demonstrate how visitation would harm the Children rather than upon the
Petitioners to show how visitation would serve the Children’s best interests.

¶28 Because the parents’ conflicting opinions canceled each other
out, the superior court conducted an independent best-interests analysis.
As detailed in its final order, the court “considered all relevant factors,
including those enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409(E).” Specific to A.R.S.
§ 25-409(E), the court found, in relevant part:

1. The historical relationship, if any, between the child and the person
seeking visitation.

Great Aunt and Uncle cared for the children exclusively while
Mother was in the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and
during her subsequent medical issues after released from
DOC. Father has not established legal decision making or
parenting time. Great Aunt and Uncle believe Mother began

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withholding the children from them because she did not want
the children to have a relationship with Father. Great Aunt
and Uncle cared for the children for eight (8) years, from the
time [Daughter] was two (2) years old, and [Son] was a few
weeks old. . . .

2. The motivation of the requesting party seeking visitation.

Great Aunt and Uncle are motivated by the strong historical
bond with the children.

3. The motivation of the person objecting to visitation.

Mother’s objection is based on the children’s disclosures that
Great Aunt and Uncle forced the children to bathe in the
apartment swimming pool, forced the children to call them
“mom” and “dad,” and allegations that Great Uncle hit
[Daughter] and forced [Son] to shower with him wherein
Great Uncle insisted on washing the child’s genitals after the
child requested to do it himself. Mother alleges that the
children disclosed that Great Aunt and Uncle talk negatively
about Mother. Mother does not believe Great Aunt and Uncle
gave sufficient weight to her concerns.

4. The quantity of visitation time requested and the potential adverse
impact that visitation will have on the child’s customary activities.

Great Aunt and Uncle are requesting the Court affirm the
temporary orders visitation of three (3) hours . . . on the first
Saturday of each month in a public setting. . . . The Court finds
this three (3) hour visitation is not likely to have an impact on
the children’s customary activities but could impact their
emotional health based on testimony from the [CAA].

5. If one or both of the child’s parents are deceased, the benefit in
maintaining an extended family relationship.

Both parents are alive.

Given these findings, and its consideration of other, unspecified “relevant
factors,” the court granted the Petitioners third-party visitation with the
Children “based on the strong historical bond and lack of demonstrated
safety concerns.”

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¶29 Despite the superior court’s declaration that it “considered all
relevant factors,” Mother contends the court improperly omitted
consideration of the factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-403. Specifically, Mother
asserts that two A.R.S. § 25-403 factors are relevant here:

A. The court shall determine legal decision-making and
parenting time, either originally or on petition for
modification, in accordance with the best interests of the
child. The court shall consider all factors that are relevant
to the child’s physical and emotional well-being,
including:

....

4. If the child is of suitable age and maturity, the wishes of
the child as to legal decision-making and parenting time.

....

9. The nature and extent of coercion or duress used by a
parent in obtaining an agreement regarding legal
decision-making or parenting time.

¶30 Applying these A.R.S. § 25-403 factors to this case, Mother
argues the superior court should have considered evidence that: (1) the
Children experienced discomfort and anxiety when faced with the prospect
of third-party visitation, as documented in their telehealth counseling
records; (2) the Children refused to comply with the temporary visitation
orders; (3) the Petitioners offered Mother money in exchange for time with
the Children and solicited “dirt” on her from family members for litigation
purposes; and (4) the Petitioners attempted to coerce the Children to
comply with the temporary orders by threatening that their refusal to do so
would “get Mother in trouble” and “guilt-tripping them about their great-
grandmother’s impending death.”

¶31 While a court’s best-interests analysis may include factors
under A.R.S. § 25-403, that statute governs legal decision-making and
parenting time, not the visitation rights of third parties. See Douros, 258 Ariz.
at 550, ¶ 18 (explaining that in addition to the A.R.S. § 25-409(E) factors, a
court “may also consider the general best interests factors in Section
25-403,” but noting that those “factors are tailored to a custody dispute
between two lawful parents,” in “contrast with a third-party visitation
dispute”). We also note that A.R.S. § 25-409 does not require the court to
make specific findings on the record regarding a child’s best interests in

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third-party visitation cases, so a court does not run afoul of the statute by
failing to identify all relevant factors considered. Cf. A.R.S. § 25-403(B)
(requiring specific best-interests findings in contested cases regarding legal
decision-making or parenting time). To be sure, specific findings on all
relevant factors “would assist on appeal or in a future modification,” but
“they are not required under [A.R.S.] § 25-409 unless timely requested
under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 82.” Torrez v. Bombard,
1 CA-CV 16-0758 FC, 2018 WL 3722451, at *3, ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. July 31, 2018)
(mem. decision).

¶32 Contrary to Mother’s contention, the record does not reflect
that the superior court failed to consider all relevant factors in analyzing
the Children’s best interests. Without question, Mother presented evidence
that the Children did not wish to visit with the Petitioners and refused to
comply with the temporary orders, but during their separate interviews
with the CAA, each child independently expressed an interest in third-
party visitation. Likewise, Mother presented evidence that the Petitioners
attempted to coerce both her and the Children into visitation, but the
Petitioners and Father claimed, both in their interviews with the CAA and
at trial, that Mother controlled the Children by causing them to fear the
Petitioners and believe that they may be taken away from Mother
permanently. During their interviews with the CAA, the Children largely
substantiated these claims, disclosing that Mother had instructed them to
share negative information about the Petitioners and, when asked, denying
Mother’s allegations of sexual misconduct against Carrillo. We defer to the
superior court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to
give evidence. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998).
Given the conflicting evidence concerning the Children’s wishes and the
manipulative tactics allegedly used by the parties, on this record, Mother
has not shown the superior court failed to consider all relevant factors in
making its best-interests termination.

¶33 Next, Mother argues the superior court failed to sufficiently
explain how the factors it considered led to the conclusion that third-party
visitation is in the Children’s best interests. She asserts that “mere long-term
caregiving” cannot justify an award of third-party visitation, and she
disputes the court’s finding that the Petitioners and the Children have a
“strong bond,” characterizing that finding as “com[ing] out of nowhere.”

¶34 “When ordering third-party visitation, especially over the
objection of a fit parent, the court must demonstrate how the factors it
considered affected its determination of the child’s best interests.” Douros,
258 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 21 (emphasis added). The formation of a “good

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relationship” between a child and a third party, alone, does not provide a
legal basis for court-ordered visitation. Id. “The court must explain why
visitation is in the best interest of the child—not the third party.” Id. “Most
critically, [A.R.S. § 25-409’s] direction to give special weight to the fit, legal
parent’s opinion requires some analysis why the court’s evaluation of the
child’s best interests trumps that of the fit parent.” Id.

¶35 As outlined in its A.R.S. § 25-409(E) analysis, the superior
court found that the Petitioners served as the Children’s primary caregivers
for eight years, from the time Daughter was two years old and Son was a
few weeks old until Mother severed contact. The court further found that
Petitioners sought visitation because of their “strong historical bond with
the [C]hildren” and that Mother objected to visitation because she believes
the Petitioners have engaged in misconduct with the Children. The court
concluded that no evidence substantiated Mother’s “safety concerns” and
therefore visitation “should be encouraged” based on the “strong historical
bond” between the Petitioners and the Children.

¶36 While the superior court’s explication of its A.R.S. § 25-409(E)
analysis is brief, and a more fulsome recitation of all the relevant factors
considered and the factual basis for ordering third-party visitation could
have better informed the parties and assisted this court on review, Mother’s
contention that the court failed to conduct a full A.R.S. § 25-409(E) analysis
is without merit. Here, the court was not tasked with explaining how its
evaluation of the Children’s best interests “trumped” that of a fit parent
because Mother and Father offered conflicting best-interests opinions that
canceled each other out. Rather than deferring to Mother’s best-interests
opinion, the court was charged with independently assessing whether
visitation with Petitioners served the Children’s best interests. As this court
has previously noted, when “a parent has shared child-rearing decisions
and responsibilities with a third party for an extended period, thereby
allowing a parent-like relationship to develop, terminating that relationship
may not be in the child’s best interests.” Douros, 258 Ariz. at 554, ¶ 40
(Catlett, J., concurring). Thus, rather than “com[ing] out of nowhere,” the
court’s determination that the Petitioners and Children share a “strong
historical bond” logically flows from its finding that the Petitioners
primarily cared for the Children for most of their lives—since Daughter was
a toddler and Son was an infant. In fact, at trial, Mother acknowledged that
the Petitioners “did create this type of bond” with the Children during their
caregiving. On this record, reasonable evidence supports the court’s best-
interests determination.

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¶37 Finally, Mother argues the superior court erroneously shifted
the burden of proof from the Petitioners to her, as reflected in its finding
that the evidence did not substantiate her claimed safety concerns. In
support of this contention, Mother cites Goodman v. Forsen, 239 Ariz. 110
(App. 2016), which holds that “a parent opposing visitation does not bear
the burden of proof under [A.R.S. § 25-409]”; instead, “’special weight’
means the party seeking visitation must prove that a fit parent’s decision to
deny visitation would substantially impair the child’s best interests.” Id. at
111, ¶ 1.

¶38 Despite her reliance on Goodman, Mother’s best-interests
opinion was not entitled to special weight, and the superior court’s A.R.S.
§ 25-409(E) analysis does not reflect improper burden shifting. Rather than
requiring Mother to prove that visitation with the Petitioners was contrary
to the Children’s best interests, the court simply found that Mother’s
unsubstantiated safety concerns did not support a finding that visitation was
contrary to the Children’s best interests. To the extent Mother contends that
the “supervision” restriction on the Petitioners’ visitation constitutes “a
tacit acknowledgment” that the Petitioners “would indeed put the children
at risk,” belying the court’s finding of a “lack of demonstrated safety
concerns,” we disagree. As part of its visitation order, the superior court
specifically and repeatedly addressed the Children’s fears, stating it would
impose certain “parameters” to ensure “the children understand the visit is
just that” and “they will be returned to Mother.” Read within that broader
context, the supervision restriction does not evince a belief that the
Petitioners pose a danger to the Children.

¶39 In sum, reasonable, competent evidence supports the
superior court’s factual findings and best-interests determination.
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Petitioners
third-party visitation.

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RIVERA/CARRILLO v. WEBB
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶40 We affirm the superior court’s visitation order. The
Petitioners request attorney’s fees and costs on appeal under A.R.S.
§ 25-324. In our discretion, we decline to award fees. However, because the
Petitioners are the prevailing party, we award them their reasonable costs
upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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