In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0191
FILED 05-14-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD45137, JS22562
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee A.C.
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Arqusha C. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
terminating her rights to her child A.C. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A.C. was born in August 2024.1 In June 2025, an unknown
woman dropped him off at the hospital with visible injuries, claiming that
she found the child on a trail. A.C. was diagnosed with severe injuries
including a traumatic brain injury, skull fracture, injuries to his frenulum,
brain bleeding that led to seizures, bruising on both eyelids, and abrasions
on his ears and nose. The injuries were described as “non-accidental” and
required follow-up treatment.

¶3 Mother arrived at the hospital several hours later. She
claimed that A.C. had fallen off a bed earlier that day and that she was with
a friend when she noticed swelling on A.C.’s head. Mother said that she
did not want to be the person to take A.C. to the hospital because she was
embarrassed and did not want the child to be taken away from her.

¶4 Mother likewise told police that A.C. fell off the bed, but she
later asserted that he had fallen and hit his head on the carpeted floor while
she was attempting to place him in his baby carrier. She denied harming
A.C. and noted that he had several accidental falls in the prior months.
Mother claimed that she noticed A.C.’s head swelling while they were
riding the bus to the mall, and she arranged for an unidentified adult to
drop A.C. off at the hospital.

¶5 Mother had four other children. Her oldest child is deceased,
and the other children have lived with out-of-state relatives. One of

1 Mother has not identified A.C.’s father, and he is not a party to this
appeal.

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IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

Mother’s other children was removed from her care due to a brain bleed
and a burn, which Mother asserted was caused by a bug bite.

¶6 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took temporary
custody of A.C. while he was in the hospital, then placed him with a
licensed foster family. In July 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate the
relationship between Mother and A.C. on the grounds that Mother
neglected or abused A.C.2 See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).

¶7 The court held a contested dependency and severance
adjudication in October 2025. Finding that Mother had abused and
neglected A.C., the court terminated the parent–child relationship. See
A.R.S. §§ 8-201(2)(a), (25)(a), -533(B)(2).

¶8 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶9 The superior court may terminate a parent–child relationship
if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground
for termination and a preponderance of the evidence shows termination to
be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210
Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). We defer to the superior court’s factual findings
if supported by reasonable evidence and accept the court’s legal
conclusions unless clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023).

¶10 DCS sought termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), alleging
that Mother neglected or willfully abused the child. Abuse is defined as
“the infliction or allowing of physical injury, impairment of bodily function
or disfigurement or the infliction of or allowing another person to cause
serious emotional damage.” A.R.S. § 8-201(2)(a).

¶11 Mother does not dispute that there is sufficient evidence to
support the court’s finding of abuse or neglect. Mother argues only that the
record does not support the court’s finding that termination was in A.C.’s
best interests. Termination is in a child’s best interests if the child will
benefit from the termination or will be harmed if the relationship continues.
Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018).

2 DCS petitioned for dependency and termination concurrently, and
the court also found A.C. dependent.

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IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.C.
Decision of the Court

¶12 Mother argues that the court did not consider the totality of
circumstances, claiming that she had stable housing and employment
throughout this case. But the court considered that evidence, specifically
finding that Mother had stable employment and housing and had been
compliant with the services offered to her. Nevertheless, other evidence
supported the finding that termination was in A.C.’s best interests. The
child suffered extensive traumatic injuries, and Mother failed to plausibly
explain those injuries. An unidentified adult took A.C. to the hospital and
left without signing medical consent forms or providing the hospital with
information about the child’s injuries, and Mother initially lied about this
individual’s identity.

¶13 Medical testimony at trial revealed that A.C.’s injuries were
not consistent with Mother’s explanations and instead appeared to have
resulted from abuse. The evidence showed that A.C. was a vulnerable child
due to his age. Witnesses opined that A.C. would be in imminent danger if
he were returned to Mother’s care because of his vulnerability, the severity
of his injuries, and Mother’s limited caregiver protective capacities. The
evidence showed that A.C. was adoptable, his placement was willing to
adopt him, and his placement could meet his physical, social, educational,
medical, psychological, and emotional needs.

¶14 The evidence supports the superior court’s finding that
termination is in A.C.’s best interests. Accordingly, the court did not err by
terminating Mother’s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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