State v. Welfenberg

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

TERRY LEE WELFENBERG, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0141
FILED 06-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CR202300618
The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Christine A. Davis
Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern, Chandler
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WELFENBERG
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Terry Lee Welfenberg appeals the superior court’s
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal for two manslaughter counts.
Welfenberg claims the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the
corpus delicti, or body of the crime, and that insufficient evidence supports
the jury’s verdicts for each manslaughter count. As the State concedes,
Welfenberg’s two convictions for manslaughter should be merged.
Therefore, this Court affirms Welfenberg’s convictions and sentences for
manslaughter as modified after merging the manslaughter convictions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Law enforcement officers conducted a welfare check in early
April 2023 for a missing person, Bruce2, who had been missing for over a
year. When the officers visited Bruce’s residence, the back door appeared
to have been forced open. The police found dog bowls containing dog food
in the backyard, but they did not find any dogs on the property. Officers
intended to speak with Welfenberg, who lived in a trailer on Bruce’s
property.

¶3 The officers spoke with Welfenberg, who claimed he had not
seen Bruce and did not know where he was. Welfenberg provided the same
response when officers returned two separate times. During one of these
visits, Welfenberg told the officers he had taken several guns from Bruce’s
home and had opened a gate on the property allowing Bruce’s dogs to run
free. On the third visit to the property, officers arrested Welfenberg for
burglary because he admitted entering Bruce’s house and stealing guns.

1 This Court “view[s] the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the

verdict.” State v. Cropper, 205 Ariz. 181, 182, ¶ 2 (2003).
2 This Court uses pseudonyms to protect the identity of victims. See, e.g.,

State v. Agueda, 253 Ariz. 388, 389, ¶ 2 n.1 (2022).

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¶4 Following Welfenberg’s arrest, a search and rescue team
systematically searched the property pursuant to a warrant, discovering a
burn pit and what they believed were human bones. This discovery
prompted a two-day excavation at the property. The officers dug up the
burn pit and sifted through it discovering bone fragments, later identified
as both animal and human bones, including remnants of a skull, foot and a
tooth. They also discovered a burned medical alert bracelet, with Bruce’s
name inscribed on it and a charred wallet with a vehicle registration form
containing Bruce’s name.

¶5 Days later, the detectives interviewed Welfenberg at a
detention center where he was being held on the burglary charges. During
this interview Welfenberg confessed to killing Bruce. He explained that
during an argument, he had “crushed” Bruce’s throat when Bruce reached
for a gun. Welfenberg then admitted he burned Bruce’s body in the burn
pit. He explained he regularly disposed of his trash in the burn pit and did
the same with Bruce’s body. Welfenberg told the detectives he removed the
ashes from the pit and placed them to the side of the pit.

¶6 The State charged Welfenberg with two counts of second-
degree murder, a class 1 felony (one for causing death or serious physical
injury and one for circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
human life); two counts of intentionally killing a domestic animal, a class 5
felony; one count of abandonment or concealment of a dead body, a class 5
felony; one count of tampering with physical evidence, a class 6 felony; one
count of burglary in the first degree, a class 2 felony; and one count of theft,
a class 6 felony.

¶7 The case proceeded with a four-day jury trial. After the State
rested, Welfenberg moved for a Rule 20 directed verdict. The court denied
the Rule 20 motion as to the manslaughter counts but granted the motion
on the two counts of killing a domestic animal, one count of burglary and
one count of theft. After the defense presented its case, the jury convicted
Welfenberg of two counts of manslaughter (a lesser-included offense of
second-degree murder), abandonment or concealment of a dead body and
tampering with physical evidence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1103(A) (manslaughter),
-1104(A)(2)–(3) (second-degree murder).

¶8 After the jury’s verdict, Welfenberg moved for judgment of
acquittal on the tampering with physical evidence count based on an
appellate court decision with similar facts, State v. Larriba-Tucker, 259 Ariz.
320 (App. 2025). The court granted the motion.

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¶9 The State and Welfenberg appealed separately. The State
appealed the judgment of acquittal on the tampering with evidence count,
which this Court affirmed. See State v. Welfenberg, 2025 WL 3764104, 1 CA-
CR 25-0177, at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Dec. 30, 2025) (mem. decision). In this
appeal, Welfenberg challenges his convictions and this Court has
jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Welfenberg argues (1) the court erred in denying his motion
for acquittal on the two second-degree murder counts under Arizona Rule
of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 20, and (2) the State failed to produce
substantial evidence supporting the second-degree murder convictions.

I. The court properly denied Welfenberg’s motion for judgment of
acquittal on the second-degree murder counts.

¶11 This Court reviews “the denial of a motion for a judgment of
acquittal for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. 500,
510, ¶ 32 (App. 2007). A ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence of corpus
delicti is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 333,
¶ 33 (2007). Reversal is only appropriate if “a complete absence of probative
facts [ ] support a conviction.” Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. at 510, ¶ 32. A court
errs in granting a judgment of acquittal when “reasonable minds c[ould]
differ on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted).

¶12 Welfenberg argues the court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal because the State had insufficient evidence to
establish corpus delicti. Welfenberg challenges whether Bruce’s death
“actually occurred” and whether it “was the result of criminal conduct”
committed by him. (Citing State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442 (2003).)

¶13 Corpus delicti is a Latin phrase that means “body of the crime.”
See State v. Jones ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 198 Ariz. 18, 22, ¶ 12 (App. 2000)
(citing State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 506 (1983)). The doctrine “ensures that
a defendant’s conviction is not based upon an uncorroborated confession
or incriminating statement.” State v. Barragan-Sierra, 219 Ariz. 276, 280–81,
¶ 12 (App. 2008). It requires that a crime must have actually occurred before
a person can be convicted of it. See Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453, ¶ 43. And it
requires that the State provide evidence that a victim died because of
criminal conduct, rather than accident or suicide, before it may introduce a
defendant’s incriminating statement. Id.

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STATE v. WELFENBERG
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¶14 But “[o]nly a reasonable inference of the [crime] need exist
before a confession may be considered.” Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453, ¶ 43. Such
inference may be circumstantial. Id. Moreover, the State may submit the
incriminating statement before it submits any supporting “inference of
corpus delicti,” as long as the State “ultimately submits adequate proof of
the corpus delicti before it rests.” Morris, 215 Ariz. at 333, ¶ 34 (quotations
omitted); see Jones ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 198 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 14 (“As long as
the State submits adequate proof of the corpus delicti before it rests, the
defendant’s statements may be admitted, without prejudice. It is only if the
State altogether fails to make this showing that the court should direct
acquittal.”).

¶15 Here, evidence independent of Welfenberg’s incriminating
statements supports a reasonable inference that Bruce’s death was the result
of a crime. Bruce’s disappearance came to the attention of law enforcement
because the local United States Postmaster, who knew Bruce since 2009,
noticed Bruce’s mail was “building up.” The Postmaster requested law
enforcement conduct a welfare check when the mail had been accumulating
for about eight months. Though Bruce visited infrequently, the Postmaster
observed that “he would come . . . maybe once a month . . . . But he was
routinely coming in to pick up other items that he was looking forward to.”
Bruce’s mail “building up” was unusual behavior, the Postmaster testified,
because Bruce “used to be in good contact with us, my staff and myself, and
let us know when he would be gone for longer durations” than normal.

¶16 When officers conducted the welfare check at Bruce’s
residence on April 11, 2023, officers noted that the calendar in his home
remained open to “March 2022.” A look into Bruce’s bedroom revealed his
medication remained there. A detective confirmed the “March 2022”
calendar and found another calendar in the kitchen that was opened to
“February 2022.” That detective further testified that the most recent receipt
he recovered was dated “[e]arly February of 2022.”

¶17 At trial, a forensic anthropologist, who had experience in
commercial cremation, testified that the bones found in the burn pit were
human remains belonging to a male individual over 24 years of age. She
further explained that she identified human bone fragments from the same
area of the body that were various colors, indicating fracturing before they
ended up in separate locations. The forensic anthropologist also testified
that the bone fragments in this case revealed “[s]ome form of an external
interaction with the remains.” She testified that these observations differ
from commercial cremation which pulverizes bones.

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STATE v. WELFENBERG
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¶18 The State also presented evidence of the personal effects
found at the burn pit. A forensic document examiner tasked with retrieving
and restoring information from Bruce’s charred wallet applied different
wavelengths of light to detect information from papers found in the wallet.
Pulling apart layers of paper from the wallet, the examiner discovered a
vehicle registration document revealing Bruce as the owner of a vehicle
matching the make and model of a vehicle found on Bruce’s property. The
registration also matched the license plate on the vehicle.

¶19 Additionally, two individuals from the search and rescue
team confirmed the burned medical alert bracelet displayed Bruce’s name.
Later testimony established that the burned medical alert bracelet matched
Bruce’s second undamaged medical alert bracelet found in his home.

¶20 Despite the State’s lack of a physical body to present to the
jury, the court did not err in determining that the State met the corpus delicti
requirement. The record includes reasonable evidence, presented at trial,
supporting the court’s inference that Bruce’s death resulted from criminal
conduct and not suicide or natural causes. See Hall, 204 Ariz. at 434, ¶ 48
(corpus delicti does not require that a victim’s body “must be found and
identified”).

II. Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdicts.

¶21 Welfenberg next argues insufficient evidence supported the
jury’s verdicts. This Court reviews de novo whether sufficient evidence
supports a conviction. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). This
Court limits its review to the evidence presented at trial. Id. Evidence is
substantial when “reasonable persons could accept [it] as sufficient to
support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Substantial
evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, State v. Aguirre, 255 Ariz.
89, 92, ¶ 8 (App. 2023), and is evaluated “against the statutorily required
elements of the offense,” State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 8 (App. 2005).
When there is an absence of probative facts to support a conviction, reversal
may be appropriate. State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 341, ¶ 109 (2022).

¶22 As relevant here, second-degree murder without
premeditation occurs when a person knows his “conduct will cause the
death or serious physical injury of another person” or “recklessly engages
in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes death of
another person” with “extreme indifference to human life.” A.R.S. § 13-
1104(A)(2)–(3). However, a jury may find the defendant guilty of
manslaughter, the lesser-included offense, when “a sudden quarrel or heat

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STATE v. WELFENBERG
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of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim,” ends in
murder. A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2).

¶23 Because the State provided sufficient evidence to establish the
corpus delicti of Bruce’s death, the jury had both the circumstantial evidence
presented to establish the corpus delicti—the burned remains and personal
effects—and Welfenberg’s confession to consider.

¶24 Welfenberg agreed to an interview with detectives after
receiving his Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In that interview, Welfenberg confirmed he had a court-appointed attorney
representing him on the burglary charge. The officers then said they wanted
to discuss “something different” and began asking Welfenberg about the
burn pit and the remains found in it.

¶25 Welfenberg explained that he and Bruce had “a bit of an
argument” in a truck when Bruce pulled a gun from his ankle holster.
Welfenberg told the detectives when Bruce revealed the gun, Welfenberg
“crushed his throat,” knowing it would be a lethal strike based on his
experience as a combat soldier. Welfenberg also told the detectives he
“watched [Bruce] kick it out in the truck.” Following Bruce’s death,
Welfenberg admitted he “drove [Bruce] home” and “got rid of him.” When
detectives asked Welfenberg why he lied to the officers who conducted the
welfare check, he replied “I had just killed my landlord or partner.”

¶26 During trial, the court held a voluntariness hearing
concerning some statements Welfenberg made to detectives. But the court
found that admitting these statements did not violate Miranda.

¶27 Based on the evidence in the record and his confession, a
reasonable jury could infer that Welfenberg knew crushing Bruce’s throat
“would cause death or serious physical injury” or that he “recklessly
engage[d] in conduct that . . . cause[d] death of another person” with
“extreme indifference to human life.” A.R.S. § 13-1104(A)(2)–(3); see Douglas
v. State, 26 Ariz. 327, 337 (1924) (“[A] conviction cannot be sustained upon
the mere confession of the accused . . . but the confession, when freely and
voluntarily made, the corpus delicti being established, even though by
purely circumstantial evidence, is sufficient to sustain the conviction.”).
Moreover, Welfenberg’s concealment of Bruce’s whereabouts and body
showed a “consciousness of guilt.” See Allen, 253 Ariz. at 342, ¶ 115.
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination of guilt.

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III. Welfenberg’s manslaughter counts should be merged.

¶28 In its answering brief, the State concedes Welfenberg’s
manslaughter counts “should merge into a single conviction and sentence”
as the homicide counts arose from the same victim. Welfenberg did not
raise this issue in his opening brief and did not file a reply brief. Though
this Court does not search the record for errors, it will not ignore
fundamental error. State v. Fernandez, 216 Ariz. 545, 554, ¶ 32 (App. 2007);
see State v. Hollenback, 212 Ariz. 12, 16, ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (“The imposition of
an illegal sentence is fundamental error.”).

¶29 The record confirms the jury convicted Welfenberg for two
convictions based on one act and is serving identical 14-year concurrent
sentences for two counts of manslaughter, despite an offense to one victim.
Because a defendant who murders a single victim may only receive a single
conviction and sentence for the homicide, State v. Williams, 232 Ariz. 158,
161, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (“[T]he crime of murder of a single victim necessarily
results in one conviction and one sentence”), Welfenberg’s dual convictions
and sentences for manslaughter of the same victim are inconsistent with
Arizona law.

¶30 Therefore, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4036, this Court modifies
Welfenberg’s manslaughter convictions, merging them into a single
conviction and vacating one of the 14-year concurrent sentences. A.R.S. §
13-4036; see State v. Hunter, 102 Ariz. 472, 477–78 (1967); see also Ariz. Podiatry
Ass’n v. Dir. of Ins., 101 Ariz. 544, 547–48 (1966) (statutes enacted before the
establishment of the Court of Appeals which confer authority on the
Supreme Court also confer the same authority to the Court of Appeals).

CONCLUSION

¶31 This Court affirms as modified.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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