Gaston v. Carter

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SHAWNTEIA GASTON, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JUSTIN CARTER, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0865
FILED 06-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-002974
The Honorable John R. Hannah, Jr., Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Office of Jesse D. Cook, PLC, Tempe
By Jesse Cook, Ethan Aman
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Shawnteia Gaston, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant
GASTON v. CARTER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Shawnteia Gaston (“Landlord”) appeals the superior court’s
judgment in favor of Justin Carter (“Tenant”) in their landlord-tenant
dispute. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Landlord owned real property in Phoenix, Arizona and listed
the fully furnished property for rent online. Tenant entered into a lease
agreement with Landlord in December 2023 for a two-month term. Under
the lease agreement, Tenant was to pay Landlord two monthly installments
of $2,300 and a refundable $300 security deposit.

¶3 Upon arriving at the property, Tenant notified Landlord that
the property had not been properly cleaned or furnished. Tenant then
provided a ten-day notice of intent to vacate on January 22, 2024, listing
non-compliances and issues with the property. Tenant sent another notice
on January 29, 2024, which was for five days. Following these notices,
Landlord did not remedy the issues outlined in Tenant’s two notices.
Tenant then sent a follow-up notice to terminate the lease as of February 14,
2024. Landlord filed a suit alleging breach of contract, slander, and
negligence, among other things. On the day Tenant returned the property
keys, Landlord served Tenant with the lawsuit.

¶4 Arbitration was held in November 2024 and the arbitrator
issued a ruling in favor of Tenant in December 2024. Landlord appealed the
arbitration award to the superior court. The superior court held a trial on
the matter and entered judgment in favor of Tenant, adopting the
arbitrator’s findings. Landlord timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-120.21(A)(1) and
-2101(A)(1).

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GASTON v. CARTER
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DISCUSSION

I. Landlord’s Opening Brief Fails to Comply with Arizona Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13 and Thus, Her
Arguments are Waived.

¶5 Tenant asks that we dismiss Landlord’s appeal because her
opening brief is deficient under ARCAP 13. Pursuant to ARCAP 13, an
appellant’s opening brief must contain certain required elements, including
a statement of the background facts, the issues presented for appeal, and an
“argument” containing the appellant’s contentions. ARCAP 13(a)(5)–(7).
An appellant’s argument must also include citations to legal authorities in
support of their contentions, references to the record, and a statement of the
appropriate standard of review. ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A)–(B).

¶6 “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and reasonably
intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and arguments
not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (citation
modified). Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as
attorneys and are not afforded any special leniency. Id.

¶7 Although Landlord includes a “table of citations” purporting
to list legal authorities, the cases listed in this table are not referenced within
the brief. Moreover, her arguments lack citations to the record. Landlord’s
brief, thus, fails to comply with ARCAP 13.

¶8 Accordingly, Landlord has waived all issues not properly
presented. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491 ¶ 6 n.2 (App.
2007) (we may find arguments waived when a party fails to cite relevant
authority and develop their argument). But even if they were not waived,
Landlord’s arguments would still fail on their merits, as we next explain.

II. We Will Not Re-Weigh the Evidence on Appeal.

¶9 Landlord argues the court’s determination that Tenant
provided notice to terminate the lease conflicted with Tenant’s testimony.
This argument equates to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will
not do. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284 ¶ 20 (App. 2019). We defer
to the court’s determinations of credibility and the weight given to
conflicting evidence. Id. Further, a “finding of fact is not clearly erroneous
if substantial evidence supports it, even if substantial conflicting evidence
exists.” Kocher v. Dep’t of Revenue of State of Ariz., 206 Ariz. 480, 482 ¶ 9 (App.
2003).

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GASTON v. CARTER
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¶10 Here, after weighing the evidence, the court found sufficient
evidence to support its findings that Tenant provided notice to terminate
the lease. The court adopted the arbitrator’s factual findings, which stated
“on or around February 9, 2024, [Tenant] properly sent their Termination
Notice . . . notifying that [Tenant] was terminating the Lease Agreement
effective February 14, 2024.” “When a ruling is based on conflicting
testimony, we will not disturb the court’s ruling by reweighing the
evidence.” CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC, 233 Ariz. 355, 363 ¶ 25
(App. 2013). Thus, we will not disturb the court’s finding. Kocher, 206 Ariz.
at 482 ¶ 9.

III. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Awarding Attorneys’
Fees to Tenant.

¶11 Landlord challenges the court’s award of attorneys’ fees to
Tenant. We review an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for an abuse of
discretion and will affirm the award if supported by any reasonable basis.
Peterson v. City of Surprise, 244 Ariz. 247, 253 ¶ 25 (App. 2018). “In any
contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may
award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).

A. The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding fees.

¶12 To determine whether to award fees under A.R.S. Section 12-
341.01(A), courts consider the following factors: (1) the merits of the
unsuccessful party’s claims or defenses; (2) “whether the parties could have
avoided or settled the litigation and whether ‘the successful party’s efforts
were completely superfluous in achieving the result;’” (3) whether the fee
award will cause extreme hardship for the paying party; (4) “whether the
successful party prevailed on all relief sought;” (5) the novelty of the issue;
(6) whether the claims or defenses are issues of first impression in Arizona;
and (7) “whether an award of fees would discourage other parties with
tenable claims or defenses from litigating or defending legitimate contract
issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial amounts of attorney
fees.” Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc’y, 209 Ariz. 260, 265–66 ¶ 19 (App.
2004) (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570 (1985)).

¶13 The superior court considered these factors and determined a
fee award was appropriate. The court found that Landlord’s “contract claim
was colorable, but her tort claims . . . were not” and that it was “unlikely
[Tenant] could have avoided or settled the dispute, because [Landlord]
appears to have been unwilling to consider the possibility that she was not
completely in the right.” Further, the court found that Landlord “offers no

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proof to support her claim that a fee award would cause her a substantial
financial hardship.” On this record, the court provided a reasonable basis
for its award pursuant to A.R.S. Section 12-341.01.

B. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining the
amount of fees to be awarded.

¶14 Landlord also challenges the amount of attorneys’ fees
awarded. We also review the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded for an
abuse of discretion. Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v. Jigsaw Techs., Inc., 221 Ariz.
515, 521 ¶ 21 (App. 2009). The superior court has broad discretion in
determining the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded under A.R.S. Section
12-341.01(A). Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551, 562 ¶ 39 (App. 2014).
After the requesting party submits an affidavit detailing its fees, the
opposing party bears the burden to show the fees are improper or
unreasonable. In re Indenture of Tr. Dated January 13, 1964, 235 Ariz. 40, 52 ¶
47 (App. 2014).

¶15 In Landlord’s response to Tenant’s application for fees, she
challenged the inclusion of “pre-litigation attorney fees and costs incurred
prior to the filing of this case.” However, in determining the amount of fees,
the court considered the “number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” in consideration of “the
quality of the advocate, the character of the work to be done, the work that
the lawyer actually performed, and the result obtained.” Landlord did not
establish that any particular billing entry was unreasonable, and the court
did not abuse its discretion in including pre-litigation fees.

¶16 Landlord also argues the court’s award of legal fees
“surpass[ed] the actual value of the case” and the court had an ethical
obligation to deny or reduce the fee. The court examined this, however, and
determined that “[t]he low stakes should have been evident to the parties,
especially after the Court found that the case was worth no more than
$12,000 and ordered mandatory arbitration.” The court found that “counsel
could have spent less time on some tasks, and let some things go, without
compromising his client’s position,” and, as a result, discounted the total
amount of fees by over twenty percent.

¶17 On this record, Landlord failed to show the fees were
improper or unreasonable. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding fees and costs against Landlord as specified in the judgment.

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GASTON v. CARTER
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CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm the superior court’s judgment in favor of Tenant.
Tenant requests award of fees and costs incurred on appeal citing ARCAP
21(a), A.R.S. Sections 12-341.01, -341, and/or -349. Because Tenant is the
prevailing party in this appeal, we award him his costs. Further, in our
discretion, we award Tenant his reasonable attorneys’ fees under A.R.S.
Section 12-341.01.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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