State Bar of California (PERB 1904M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
EVAGELIA LISA VORGIAS,
Charging Party,
v.
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-389-M
PERB Decision No. 	1904-M
May 	8, 	2007
Appearance: 	Evagelia Lisa Vorgias, on her own behalf.
Before Duncan, Chairman; Shek and McKeag, Members.
DECISION
SHEK, Member: This case comes before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on appeal by Evagelia Lisa Vorgias (Vorgias) of the dismissal of her unfair
practice charge. The charge alleged that the State Bar of California (State Bar) violated the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)1 by delaying the grievance process and wrongfully
terminating her employment. 	The charge alleged that this conduct constituted a violation of
MMBA section 3502 and PERB Regulation 32603.2
The Board has reviewed the entire record in this case, including but not limited to, the
original and amended unfair practice charges, the State Bar's position statement, the warning
and dismissal letters, and Vorgias's appeal. Based upon this review, the Board affirms the
dismissal, as discussed herein.
T MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500, et seq. Unless otherwise indicated,
all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.
2PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001, et seq.

BACKGROUND
Vorgias filed the original unfair practice charge on August 29, 2006. The unfair
practice charge alleged that Vorgias was employed by the State Bar as a Deputy Trial Counsel.
Effective October 2003, the State Bar terminated Vorgias's employment on the basis that
Vorgias failed to timely file a document in a pending attorney disciplinary proceeding, and
allegedly misrepresented to the State Bar Court the reasons for filing the document late.
The unfair practice charge alleged that following her termination from employment,
Vorgias proceeded with Step III of the contractual grievance process. It alleged that the State
Bar delayed in proceeding with the grievance, and delayed in providing relevant documents to
Vorgias and her union, SEIU Local 535. The charge alleged that the State Bar denied
Vorgias's grievance and sustained the termination decision in a letter dated July 6, 2004. The
charge further alleged that the union notified Vorgias on June 17, 2005 that it would not pursue
arbitration.
The unfair practice charge also alleged that on December 6, 2005, Vorgias filed a
complaint in the United States District Court, Northern District of California, alleging unfair
practices and seeking relief under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C,
section 185 (Vorgias v. The State Bar of California, et al.. Case No.C05-05039). Vorgias
alleged that the federal district court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend on July
25, 2006, on the grounds of governmental immunity. The State Bar alleges that Vorgias served
the State Bar with notice of the federal action on June 1, 2006.
The Board agent issued a warning letter on October 2, 2006, and a dismissal letter on
November 2, 2006. Vorgias appealed the dismissal on November 28, 2006.
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DISCUSSION
This charge is barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to the MMBA.
(Coachella Valley Mosquito and Vector Control District v. Public Employment Relations
Board (2005) 35 Cal.4 th 1072 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 234].) The statute of limitations for an unfair
practice charge based upon termination of employment begins to run on the date of actual
termination. 	(Regents of the University of California (2004) PERB Decision No. 1585-H;
Los Angeles Unified School District (2005) PERB Decision No. 1754.) In this case, the
statute of limitations elapsed on April 3, 2004, which was six months after the October 3, 2003
effective date of Vorgias's termination. 	The original unfair practice charge was filed on
August 29, 2006. Therefore, the unfair practice charge was filed late, and the charge should be
dismissed.
Vorgias cites various theories why the statute of limitations was tolled, but none of
these theories apply.
First, Vorgias argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until arbitration
of the termination was denied on June 17, 2005, and that she had an additional five days
because the decision was communicated by mail. Based upon the cases cited above, however,
the statute of limitations in this case began to run on the effective date of termination, not on
the date arbitration was denied.
Second, citing Long Beach Community College District (2003) PERB Decision
No. 1564, Vorgias alleges that the statute of limitations was tolled under Government Code
section 3514.5(a)(2) (the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act)3) when her action was pending in the
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512, et seq. Section
3514.5(a)(2) states, in pertinent part:
[T]he board shall not... (1) issue a complaint in respect of any
charge based upon an alleged unfair practice occurring more than
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federal district court. 	However, a federal lawsuit does not fall within section 3514.5(a)(2).
Additionally, the federal district court action was not filed until December 6, 2005, long after
the statute of limitations had elapsed.
Third, Vorgias argues that the limitations period was further tolled for a period of 30
days after the federal claim was dismissed under 28 U.S.C.A. section 1367(d). Even if that
rule applied to PERB cases, it would be insufficient to make the charge timely because the
federal district court action was filed long after the statute of limitations had elapsed.
Fourth, Vorgias alleges that the State Bar came to the PERB proceeding with "unclean
hands" regarding the delay in processing her grievance. However that argument does not
impact the dismissal based upon the statute of limitations.
Based upon these considerations, the Board affirms the dismissal of the unfair practice
charge.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-389-M is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Chairman Duncan and Member McKeag joined in this Decision.
six months prior to the filing of the charge; (2) issue a complaint
against conduct also prohibited by the provisions of the
agreement between the parties until the grievance machinery of
the agreement, if it exists and covers the matter at issue, has been
exhausted, either by settlement or binding arbitration.
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