California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (Morgan) (PERB 2089S)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SAVANNAH D. MORGAN,
Charging Party, 	Case No. SA-CO-439-S
V . 	PERB Decision No. 2089-S
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE LAW 	December 31, 2009
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Appearance: Kasey Christopher Clark, Chief Counsel, for California Statewide Law
Enforcement Association.
Before Mckeag, Neuwald and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
NEUWALD, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the California Statewide Law Enforcement
Association (CSLEA) to a proposed decision (attached) of an administrative law judge (ALJ).
The complaint alleged that CSLEA refused to honor the request of Savannah D. Morgan
(Morgan) to withdraw from membership with CSLEA after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement containing a "maintenance of membership" clause. The complaint
alleges that this conduct interfered with employee rights guaranteed by the Ralph C. Dills Act
(Dills Act) in violation of sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).' The ALJ found that CSLEA
violated the Dills Act by refusing to honor Morgan's request to withdraw from membership.
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SAVANNAH D. MORGAN,
Charging Party,
V.
CALIFORNIA ST ATE WIDE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. SA-CO-439-S
PERB Decision No. 2089-S
December 31, 2009
Appearance: Kasey Christopher Clark, Chief Counsel, for California Statewide Law
Enforcement Association.
Before McKeag, Neuwald and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
NEUWALD, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the California Statewide Law Enforcement
Association (CSLEA) to a proposed decision (attached) of an administrative law judge (ALJ).
The complaint alleged that CSLEA refused to honor the request of Savannah D. Morgan
(Morgan) to withdraw from membership with CS LEA after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement containing a "maintenance of membership" clause. The complaint
alleges that this conduct interfered with employee rights guaranteed by the Ralph C. Dills Act
(Dills Act) in violation of sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b). 1 The ALJ found that CSLEA
violated the Dills Act by refusing to honor Morgan's request to withdraw from membership.
1 The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code.

We have reviewed the entire record in this case, and find the ALJ's proposed decision
well-reasoned, adequately supported by the record and in accord with applicable law.
Accordingly, the Board hereby adopts the ALJ's proposed decision as the decision of the
Board itself, as supplemented by the discussion below.
CSLEA'S EXCEPTIONS
CSLEA makes four main arguments on appeal:
(1) The ALJ incorrectly failed to take administrative notice of a portion of the
legislative history, attached to CSLEA's closing brief, related to the enactment of Dills Act
section 3517.8.
(2)
which, pursuant to Section 3517.8, required the
parties to honor the window period for withdrawal of membership as though the agreement had
not yet expired. CSLEA contends that the ALJ erred in relying on California State Employees'
Association (Fry) (1986) PERB Decision No. 604-S (Fry) and California Union of Safety
Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision No. 1029-S (Trevisanut) to permit
withdrawals from membership upon expiration of the existing memorandum of understanding
(MOU).
(3) 	The proposed decision incorrectly holds that there is no requirement to establish
unlawful intent in order to state a claim of unlawful interference with employee rights under
the Dills Act.
(4) 	The proposed decision incorrectly determined that the controversy between the
parties was ripe for adjudication.
2
We have reviewed the entire record in this case, and find the ALJ' s proposed decision
well-reasoned, adequately supported by the record and in accord with applicable law.
Accordingly, the Board hereby adopts the ALJ's proposed decision as the decision of the
Board itself, as supplemented by the discussion below.
CSLEA'S EXCEPTIONS
CSLEA makes four main arguments on appeal:
(1) 	The ALJ incorrectly failed to take administrative notice of a portion of the
legislative history, attached to CS LEA' s closing brief, related to the enactment of Dills Act
section 3517.8.
(2) 	At the time of the attempted withdrawals from membership, there was a
collective bargaining agreement in place,
At the time of the attempted withdrawals from membership, there was a
which, pursuant to Section 3517.8, required the	collective bargaining agreement in place,
parties to honor the window period for withdrawal of membership as though the agreement had
not yet expired. CSLEA contends that the ALJ erred in relying on California State Employees'
Association (Fry) (1986) PERB Decision No. 604-S (Fry) and California Union of Safety
Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision No. 1029-S (Trevisanut) to permit
withdrawais from membership upon expiration of the existing memorandum of understanding
(MOU).
(3) 	The proposed decision incorrectly holds that there is no requirement to establish
unlawful intent in order to state a claim of unlawful interference with employee rights under
the Dills Act.
(4) 	The proposed decision incorrectly determined that the controversy between the
parties was ripe for adjudication.
2

DISCUSSION
Consideration of Legislative History Materials
This matter was submitted to the ALJ based upon a statement of stipulated facts and
exhibits agreed to by the parties at the hearing. No further testimony was taken. Following the
hearing, both parties submitted closing briefs. In its closing brief, CSLEA discussed and
attached an analysis of SB 683 by the Assembly, relating to the 2000 legislation that enacted
Dills Act section 3517.8. In his proposed decision, the ALJ did not consider this document
because it was not submitted as a joint amendment to the stipulated facts. CSLEA asserts that
the document should have been considered because it was not an exhibit, but rather a portion
of the legislative history subject to administrative notice.
PERB has a longstanding practice of considering legislative history to aid it in
interpreting the statutes it administers. (See, e.g., State of California (Department of Personnel
Administration) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2017-S; City & County of San Francisco (2009)
PERB Decision No. 2041-M.) A legislative committee analysis is not factual, evidentiary
material, but rather is relevant, publicly available information that was considered by the
Legislature in enacting a statute. PERB has the authority to consider such materials
sua sponte. Accordingly, we grant CSLEA's exception and conclude that we may consider the
legislative history of SB 683.
Impact of Government Code Section 3517.8
CSLEA asserts that Dills Act section 3517.8 overturned the Board's decision in
Travisanut by requiring the parties to treat the expired contract as though it were in full force
The Dills Act section 3517.8(a) provides:
If a memorandum of understanding has expired, and the Governor
and the recognized employee organization have not agreed to a
3
DISCUSSION
Consideration
of
Legislative History Materials
This matter was submitted
to
the ALJ based upon a statement
of
stipulated facts and
exhibits agreed to by the parties at the hearing. No further testimony was taken. 	Following the
hearing, both parties submitted closing briefs. In its closing brief, CSLEA discussed and
attached an analysis
of
SB
683 by the Assembly, relating to the 2000 legislation that enacted
Dills Act section 3517.8. In his proposed decision, the ALJ did not consider this document
because it was not submitted
as
a joint amendment to the stipulated facts.
	CS
LEA asserts that
the document should have been considered because it was not an exhibit, but rather a portion
of
the legislative history subject to administrative notice.
PERB has a longstanding practice
of
considering legislative history to aid it in
interpreting the statutes it administers. (See, e.g., State
of
California (Department
of
Personnel
Administration) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2017-S; City & County
of
San Francisco (2009)
PERB Decision No. 2041-M.) A legislative committee analysis is not factual, evidentiary
material, but rather is relevant, publicly available information that was considered by the
Legislature in enacting a statute. PERB has the authority to consider such materials
sua sponte. Accordingly, we grant CSLEA's exception and conclude that we may consider the
legislative history
of
SB 683.
Impact of Government Code Section 3517
.8
CSLEA asserts that Dills Act section 3517.82 overturned the Board's decision in
Travisanut by requiring the parties to treat the expired contract as though it were in full force
2 The Dills Act section 3517.8(a) provides:
If a memorandum of understanding has expired, and the Governor
and the recognized employee organization have not agreed to a
3

and effect. Thus, CSLEA argues, Morgan is bound by the window period specified in the
contract, which permitted withdrawals from membership only during the 30 days prior to
June 30, 2008. In Travisanut, the Board held that a union member could validly withdraw
from membership following the expiration of a MOU containing a maintenance of membership
clause because no contract was in force. Previously, in Fry, the Board had held that, where the
parties agree to extend the terms of an expired contract on a day-to-day basis, the right to
resign from union membership was also extended, such that the members were free to resign
any time after expiration of the contract and prior to agreement on a successor contract.
Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the relevant law, we disagree with
CSLEA's interpretation of the effect of the Dills Act section 3517.8. Section 3517.8 requires
the parties to continue to abide by the terms of the expired contract until a successor agreement
or an impasse in negotiations is reached. Section 3517.8 must be read in conjunction with
Section 3513(i), which prohibits enforcement of a maintenance of membership provision
during the 30 days prior to the expiration of an MOU. Both Sections 3517.8 and 3513(i),
however, are silent on the question of how the maintenance of membership provision is to be
new memorandum of understanding and have not reached an
impasse in negotiations, subject to subdivision (b), the parties to
the agreement shall continue to give effect to the provisions of the
expired memorandum of understanding, including, but not limited
to, all provisions that supersede existing law, any arbitration
provisions, any no strike provisions, any agreements regarding
matters covered in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.), and any provisions covering fair share fee
deduction consistent with Section 3515.7.
and effect. 	Thus, CSLEA argues, Morgan is bound by the window period specified in the
contract, which permitted withdrawals from membership only during the 30 days prior to
June 30, 2008. In Travisanut, the Board held that a union member could validly withdraw
from membership following the expiration of a MOU containing a maintenance of membership
clause because no contract was in force. Previousiy, in Fry, the Board had held that, where the
parties agree to extend the terms of an expired contract on a day-to-day basis, the right to
resign from union membership was also extended, such that the members were free to resign
any time after expiration of the contract and prior to agreement on a successor contract.
Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the relevant law, we disagree with
CSLEA's interpretation of the effect of the Dills Act section 3517.8. Section 3517.8 requires
the parties to continue to abide by the terms of the expired contract until a successor agreement
or an impasse in negotiation's is reached. 	Section 3517.8 must be read in conjunction with
Section 3513 (i), which prohibits enforcement of a maintenance of membership provision
during the 30 days prior to the expiration of an MOU. Both Sections 3517.8 and 3513(i),
however, are silent on the question of how the maintenance of membership provision is to be
nevv memorandum of understanding and have not reached an
impasse in negotiations, subject to subdivision (b), the parties to
the agreement shall continue to give effect to the provisions of the
expired memorandum of understanding, including, but not limited
to, all provisions that supersede existing law, any arbitration
provisions, any no strike provisions, any agreements regarding
matters covered in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.), and any provisions covering fair share fee
deduction consistent with Section 3 515. 7.
4

applied following expiration of the MOU but before the parties reach a successor agreement or
an impasse in negotiations."
In essence, CSLEA argues that, if a member did not exercise the right to withdraw from
membership during the term of the contract, the member is precluded from doing so
indefinitely until a successor agreement or impasse is reached." We do not read Dills Act
section 3517.8 to so completely extinguish the right of union members to withdraw from
membership following the expiration of a contract. Instead, we view this case as analogous to
the situation in Fry, in which the parties agreed to extend the contract on a day-to-day basis
until a new agreement was reached. By requiring the parties to continue to abide by the terms
of the expired agreement until a new agreement or impasse is reached, Section 3517.8
effectively imposes the existing contractual terms on the parties on a day-to-day basis. As in
Fry, we conclude that a request to withdraw received before the parties enter into a successor
agreement, but while the existing terms are in effect on a day-to-day basis falls within the
literal meaning of Dills Act section 3513(i) and is therefore valid. Accordingly, by refusing to
honor Morgan's requests to withdraw after expiration of the MOU, CSLEA violated her rights
under Dills Act sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
Unlawful Interference
PERB has long held that the test for interference with the rights of employees under the
Dills Act does not require that unlawful intent or motive be established, only that at least slight
kewise, the legislative history of Section 3517.8 does not indicate that the
legislation was directed at maintenance of membership provisions following contract
expiration.
*In its brief before the ALJ, CSLEA conceded that it could not prevent an employee
from discontinuing membership for an "unreasonable" length of time, and suggested that if a
collective bargaining agreement remained expired for a three-year period without impasse or a
successor agreement, a member may then be permitted to withdraw from membership.
applied following expiration
of
the MOU but before the parties reach a successor agreement or
an impasse in negotiations.3
In essence, CS LEA argues that,
if
a member did not exercise the right to withdraw from
membership during the term
of
the contract, the member is precluded from doing so
indefinitely until a successor agreement or impasse is reached.4 We do not read Dills Act
section 3517.8 to so completely extinguish the right
of
union members to withdraw from
membership following the expiration
of
a contract. Instead, we view this case as analogous to
the situation in Fry, in which the parties agreed to extend the contract on a day-to-day basis
until a new agreement was reached. By requiring the parties to continue to abide by the terms
of
the expired agreement until a new agreement or impasse is reached, Section 3517.8
effectively imposes the existing contractual terms on the parties on a day-to-day basis. As in
Fry, we conclude that a request to withdraw received before the parties enter into a successor
agreement, but while the existing terms are in effect on a day-to-day basis falls within the
literal meaning
of
Dills Act section 3513(i) and is therefore valid. Accordingly, by refusing to
honor Morgan's requests to withdraw after expiration
of
the MOU, CSLEA violated her rights
under Dilis Act sections 35i3(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
Unlawful Interference
PERB has long held that the test for interference with the rights
of
employees under the
Dills Act does not require that unlawful intent or motive be established, only that at least slight
Li Likewise, the legislative history of Section 3517.8 does not indicate that the
legislation was directed at maintenance
of
membership provisions following contract
expiration.
4 In its brief before the ALJ, CS LEA conceded that it could not prevent an employee
from discontinuing membership for an "unreasonable" length of time, and suggested that if a
collective bargaining agreement remained expired for a three-year period without impasse or a
successor agreement, a member may then be permitted to withdraw from membership.
5

harm to employee rights results from the conduct. (See, e.g., Los Angeles Unified School
District (Weightman) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2073 (Weightman).) In State of California
(Department of Developmental Services) (1983) PERB Decision No. 344-S, citing Carlsbad
Unified School District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89 and Service Employees International
Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106, the Board described the standard
as follows:
[In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful interference,
the charging party must establish that the respondent's conduct
tends to or does result in some harm to employee rights granted
under EERA.
Notwithstanding this authority, CSLEA asserts that the test for interference with
employee rights under the Dills Act requires a showing of unlawful intent, citing California
State Employees' Association (Miller) (1990) PERB Decision No. 819-S (Miller). In Miller,
an employee sought to withdraw her union membership prior to the window period specified in
the collective bargaining agreement containing a maintenance of membership clause. The
employee filed a charge with PERB, alleging that the union's refusal to permit her to withdraw
her membership violated the duty of fair representation. The Board dismissed the charge,
finding that no facts had been alleged to indicate that the union's actions had a substantial
impact on her relationship with her employer, the maintenance of membership provision had
been applied in a discriminatory manner, or any indication that the union had otherwise
interfered with the exercise of rights under the Dills Act. Although the Board phrased the test
as requiring a showing of unlawful intent to either interfere with or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the statute, citing Novato
Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210 (Novato), the Board in Novato and
subsequent cases has made it clear that, while motive is an element of discrimination or
harm to employee rights results from the conduct. (See, e.g., Los Angeles Unified School
District (Weightman) (2009) PERB Decision No. 2073 (Weightman).) In State of California
(Department of Developmental Services) (1983) PERB Decision No. 344-S, citing Carlsbad
Unified School District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89 and Service Employees International
Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106, the Board described the standard
as follows:
[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful interference,
the charging party must establish that the respondent's conduct
tends to or does result in some harm to employee rights granted
under EERA.
Notwithstanding this authority, CSLEA asserts that the test for interference with
employee rights under the Dills Act requires a showing of unlawful intent, citing California
State Employees' Association (Miller) (1990) PERB Decision No. 819-S (Miller). 	In Miller,
an employee sought to withdraw her union membership prior to the window period specified in
the collective bargaining agreement containing a maintenance of membership clause. 	The
employee filed a charge with PERB, alleging that the union's refusal to permit her to withdraw
her membership violated the duty of fair representation. The Board dismissed the charge,
finding that no facts had been alleged to indicate that the union's actions had a substantial
impact on her relationship with her employer, the maintenance of membership provision had
been applied in a discriminatory manner, or any indication that the union had otherwise
interfered with the exercise of rights under the Dills Act. Although the Board phrased the test
as requiring a showing of unlawful intent to either interfere with or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because of the exercise of rights guaranteed by the statute, citing Novato
Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210 (Novato), the Board in Novato and
subsequent cases has made it clear that, while motive is an element of discrimination or
6

retaliation, motive or intent is not an issue in interference cases, and that the charging party
"need only make a prima facie showing that the respondent's conduct tends to or does result in
harm to employee rights." (Novato; Weightman.) Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ
correctly stated the applicable standard in this case.
Ripeness
On appeal, CSLEA argues that the ALJ failed to consider its affirmative defense
asserting that this matter was not ripe for review because Morgan did not request to withdraw
from membership until approximately four months after expiration of the contract. CSLEA
asserts: "In order for the issue to be justiciable, CSLEA must be out of a contract for an
extended period of time and then deny a request for withdrawal." As indicated previously,
CSLEA conceded that it could not prevent an employee from discontinuing membership for an
unreasonable length of time, and suggested that, after a lapse of three years without reaching
impasse or a successor agreement, a member might then be permitted to withdraw from
membership. Until such time, CSLEA asserts, the issue is not ripe for adjudication.
CSLEA has offered no authority for its assertion that withdrawal of membership should
be permitted only after a three-year lapse without a contract. As we have determined,
continued membership in CSLEA can only be required until 30 days prior to the expiration of
the contract, and CSLEA was not free to refuse to honor requests to withdraw made after the
expiration but prior to the effective date of a successor agreement. Therefore, we find this
matter was ripe for adjudication.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it is found that California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (CSLEA) violated the
Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code section 3512 et seq., by refusing to honor
retaliation, motive or intent is not an issue in interference cases, and that the charging party
"need only make a prima facie showing that the respondent's conduct tends to or does result in
harm to employee rights." (Novato; Weightman.) Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ
correctly stated the applicable standard in this case.
Ripeness
On appeal, CSLEA argues that the ALJ failed to consider its affirmative defense
asserting that this matter was not ripe for review because Morgan did not request to withdraw
from membership until approximately four months after expiration of the contract. CS LEA
asserts: 	"In order for the issue to be justiciable, CSLEA must be out of a contract for an
extended period of time and then deny a request for withdrawal." As indicated previously,
CSLEA conceded that it could not prevent an employee from discontinuing membership for an
unreasonable length of time, and suggested that, after a lapse of three years without reaching
impasse or a successor agreement, a member might then be permitted to withdraw from
membership. Until such time, CSLEA asserts, the issue is not ripe for adjudication.
CS LEA has offered no authority for its assertion that withdrawal of membership should
be permitted only after a three-year lapse without a contract. As we have determined,
continued membership in CSLEA can only be required until 30 days prior to the expiration of
the contract, and CSLEA was not free to refuse to honor requests to withdraw made after the
expiration but prior to the effective date of a successor agreement. Therefore, we find this
matter was ripe for adjudication.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it is found that California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (CSLEA) violated the
Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code section 3512 et seq., by refusing to honor
7

valid requests by State employees to withdraw from membership in violation of Dills Act
sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519(b).
Pursuant to Dills Act section 3514.5(c), it is hereby ORDERED that CSLEA and its
representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
Refusing to honor valid requests to withdraw from CSLEA membership;
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE DILLS ACT:
1 . 	Honor valid requests to withdraw from association membership.
2. 	Make Savannah D. Morgan (Morgan) whole for the failure to honor her
request to withdraw from CSLEA membership in January 2009.
3 . 	Within 10 workdays of the service of a final decision in this matter, post
at all work locations where notices to CSLEA employees customarily are posted, copies of the
Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of
CSLEA, indicating that it will comply with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be
maintained for a period of 30 consecutive workdays. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure
that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material.
4. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the Office of the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel's designee. CSLEA shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by the
General Counsel or designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order shall be served
on Morgan.
Members Mckeag and Wesley joined in this Decision.
8
valid requests by State employees to withdraw from membership in violation of Dills Act
sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519(b).
Pursuant to Dills Act section 3514.5(c), it is hereby ORDERED that CSLEA and its
representatives shall:
A. 	ChA:Sh ANU DESIST FROM:
Refusing to honor valid requests to withdraw from CSLEA membership;
8
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE DILLS ACT:
1. 	Honor valid requests to withdraw from association membership.
2. 	Make Savannah D. Morgan (Morgan) whole for the failure to honor her
request to withdraw from CSLEA membership in January 2009.
3. 	Within 10 workdays of the service of a final decision in this matter, post
at all work locations where notices to CSLEA employees customarily are posted, copies of the
Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. 	The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of
CSLEA, indicating that it will comply with the terms of this Order. 	Such posting shall be
maintained for a period of 30 consecutive workdays. 	Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure
that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material.
4. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the Office of the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel's designee. 	CSLEA shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by the
General Counsel or designee. 	All reports regarding compliance with this Order shall be served
on Morgan.
Members McKeag and Wesley joined in this Decision.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SA-CO-439-S, Savannah D. Morgan v.
California Statewide Law Enforcement Association, in which all parties had the right to
participate, it has been found that the California Statewide Law Enforcement Association
(CSLEA) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code section 3512 et seq.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
Refusing to honor valid requests to withdraw from CSLEA membership.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE DILLS ACT:
1 . 	Honor valid requests to withdraw from CSLEA membership.
2. 	Make Savannah D. Morgan whole for the failure to honor her request to
withdraw from CSLEA membership in January 2009.
Dated: 	CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION
:
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State
of
California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SA-CO-439-S, Savannah
D.
Morgan
v.
California Statewide Law Enforcement Association, in which all parties had the right to
participate, it has been found that the Caiifornia Statewide Law Enforcement Association
(CSLEA) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code section 3512
et
seq.
As a result
of
this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
Refusing to honor valid requests to withdraw from CSLEA membership.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE DILLS ACT:
1.	
Honor valid requests to withdraw from CSLEA membership.
2. 	Make Savannah D. Morgan whole for the failure to honor her request to
withdraw from CSLEA membership in January 2009.
Dated:
---------
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION
By:
--------------	By
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SAVANNAH D. MORGAN,
UNFAIR PRACTICE
Charging Party, 	CASE NO. SA-CO-439-S
PROPOSED DECISION
(June 25, 2009)
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Appearances: Peace Officers of California by Chris Lewis, on behalf of Savannah D. Morgan;
Kasey Christopher Clark, Chief Counsel, and Lawrence J. Friedman, Senior Legal Counsel, for
California Statewide Law Enforcement Association.
Before Bernard McMonigle, Chief Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this case, an employee alleges that her union improperly refused to permit her to
withdraw from membership.
On February 23, 2009, Savannah D. Morgan (Morgan) filed an unfair practice charge
against the California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (CSLEA or Association). On
March 11, 2009, the Office of the General Counsel for the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) issued a complaint alleging that CSLEA had violated the Ralph C. Dills Act
(Dills Act or Act)' when it refused to honor Morgan's January 7, 2009, request to withdraw
from membership and become a fair share payer. On April 1, 2009, CSLEA answered the
complaint, denying any violation of the Dills Act and asserting affirmative defenses.
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3 512 et seq.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SAVANNAH D. MORGAN,
Charging Party,
V .
CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
UNFAIR PRACTICE
CASE NO. SA-CO-439-S
PROPOSED DECISION
(June 25, 2009)
Appearances: Peace Officers
of
California by Chris Lewis, on behalf
of
Savannah D. Morgan;
Kasey Christopher Clark, Chief Counsel, and Lawrence J. Friedman, Senior Legal Counsel, for
California Statewide Law Enforcement Association.
Before Bernard McMonigle, Chief Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this case, an employee alleges that her union improperly refused to permit her to
withdraw from membership.
On February 23, 2009, Savannah D. Morgan (Morgan) filed an unfair practice charge
against the California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (CSLEA or Association). 	On
March 11, 2009, the Office
of
the General Counsel for the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) issued a complaint alleging that CSLEA had violated the Ralph C. Dills Act
(Dills Act or Act) 1 when it refused to honor Morgan's January 7, 2009, request to withdraw
from membership and become a fair share payer. On April 1, 2009, CSLEA answered the
complaint, denying any violation
of
the Dills Act and asserting affirmative defenses.
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq.

A formal hearing was conducted in this matter on April 21, 2009. At the hearing
representatives of the parties agreed to a stipulation of facts. With the receipt of briefs on
May 21, 2009, the matter was submitted for a proposed decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties to this proceeding stipulated that the following facts are true and correct:
1 . 	At least since August 2002, Charging Party Morgan was and continues to be a
voluntary member of California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (CSLEA).
2 . 	Pursuant to Article 3.1Al of the Agreement Between the State of California and
CSLEA covering Bargaining Unit 7, Protective Services and Public Safety, effective July 1,
2005 through June 30, 2007, a thirty (30) day window period from June 1, 2007 to June 30,
2007, existed which permitted CSLEA members to withdraw from membership.
3 . 	Morgan did not choose to withdraw from CSLEA membership during the June
2007 window period.
4. 	Pursuant to Article 3.1Al of the Agreement Between the State of California and
CSLEA covering Bargaining Unit 7, Protective Services and Public Safety, effective July 1,
2005 through June 30, 2008, a thirty (30) day window period from June 1, 2008 to June 30,
2008, existed which permitted CSLEA members to withdraw from membership.
5 . 	Morgan did not choose to withdraw from CSLEA membership during the June
2008 window period.
6. 	The most recent Agreement Between the State of California and CSLEA
covering Bargaining Unit 7, Protective Services and Public Safety expired by its terms on June
30, 2008.
With their briefs in this matter, both parties submitted exhibits to supplement the
factual stipulation. Because they were not joint amendments to the stipulated facts, they were
not considered for this proposed decision.
2
A formal hearing was conducted in this matter on April 21, 2009. At the hearing
representatives
of
the parties agreed to a stipulation
of
facts. 	With the receipt
of
briefs
on
May 21, 2009, the matter was submitted for a proposed decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties to this proceeding stipulated that the following facts are true and correct:2
1.	
At least since August 2002, Charging Party Morgan was and continues to
be
a
voluntary member
of
California Statewide Law Enforcement Association (CSLEA).
2.	
Pursuant to Article
3.lAl of
the Agreement Between the State
of
California and
CSLEA covering Bargaining Unit 7, Protective Services and Public Safety, effective
July
1,
2005 through June 30, 2007, a thirty (30) day window period from June
1,
2007 to June 30,
2007, existed which permitted CSLEA members to withdraw from membership.
3. 	Morgan did not choose to withdraw from CSLEA membership during the June
2007 window period.
4. 	Pursuant to Article 3
.1
A 1
of
the Agreement Between the State
of
California and
CSLEA covering Bargaining Unit 7, Protective Services and Public Safety, effective July
1,
2005 through June 30, 2008, a thirty (30) day window period from June 1, 2008 to June 30,
2008, existed which permitted CSLEA members to withdraw from membership.
5. 	Morgan did not choose to withdraw from CSLEA membership during the June
2008 window period.
6. 	The most recent Agreement Between the State
of
California and CS LEA
covering Bargaining Unit 7, Protective Services and Public Safety expired by its terms on June
30, 2008.
2 With their briefs in this matter, both parties submitted exhibits to supplement the
factual stipulation. Because they were not joint amendments to the stipulated facts, they were
not considered for this proposed decision.
2

7. 	In May, 2008, the Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) and CSLEA
initiated negotiations for a successor agreement. To date, DPA and CSLEA continue to engage
in negotiations and neither party has declared impasse.
8 . 	On January 7, 2009, Morgan wrote CSLEA and requested to discontinue
membership. On January 9, 2009, CSLEA Director of Member Services wrote Morgan and
denied her request as untimely as it was not within the thirty (30) day window period prior to
the expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement.
ISSUE
Did CSLEA violate the Dills Act when it refused to honor Morgan's request to
withdraw from membership?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Dills Act permits a union that has been recognized as exclusive representative for a
bargaining unit to negotiate with the State of California (State) for union security provisions in
the form of fair share fees or maintenance of membership. The most recent memorandum of
agreement (MOU) between CSLEA and the state employer, which expired June 30, 2008,
contained both. The maintenance of membership provision is at issue here.
Section 3513(i) of the Dills Act states:
"Maintenance of membership" means that all employees who
voluntarily are, or who voluntarily become, members of a
recognized employee organization shall remain members of that
employee organization in good standing for a period as agreed to
by the parties pursuant to a memorandum of understanding,
commencing with the effective date of the memorandum of
understanding. A maintenance of membership provision shall not
apply to any employee who within 30 days prior to the expiration
of the memorandum of understanding withdraws from the
employee organization by sending a signed withdrawal letter to
the employee organization and a copy to the Controller's office.
7.	
In May, 2008, the Department
of
Personnel Administration (DPA) and
CSLEA
initiated negotiations for a successor agreement. To date, DPA and CSLEA continue
to
engage
in negotiations and neither party has declared impasse.
8.	
On January 7, 2009, Morgan wrote CSLEA and requested to discontinue
membership. On January 9, 2009, CS LEA Director
of
Member Services wrote Morgan and
denied her request as untimely as it was not within the thirty (30) day window period
prior
to
the expiration
of
the last collective bargaining agreement.
ISSUE
Did CSLEA violate the Dills Act when it refused to honor Morgan's request to
withdraw from membership?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Dills Act permits a union that has been recognized as exclusive representative for a
bargaining unit to negotiate with the State
of
California (State) for union security provisions in
the form
of
fair share fees or maintenance
of
membership. The most recent memorandum
of
agreement (MOU) between CSLEA and the state employer, which expired June 30, 2008,
contained both. The maintenance
of
membership provision is at issue here.
Section 3513(i)
of
the Dills Act states:
"Maintenance
of
membership" means that all employees who
voluntarily are, or who voluntarily become, members
of
a
recognized employee organization shall remain members
of
that
employee organization in good standing for a period as agreed to
by the parties pursuant to a memorandum
of
understanding,
commencing with the effective date
of
the memorandum
of
understanding. A maintenance
of
membership provision shall not
apply to any employee who within 30 days prior to the expiration
of
the memorandum of understanding withdraws from the
employee organization by sending a signed withdrawal letter to
the employee organization and a copy to the Controller's office.
3

Thus, for 30 days prior to the expiration date for an MOU between a union and the
State, employees have a 30 day window period to withdraw from union membership.'
PERB has addressed the right of an employee to withdraw from membership when the
MOU containing a maintenance of membership agreement has expired but no successor
agreement is in place.
In California State Employees' Association (Fry) (1986) PERB Decision No. 604-S
(Fry), the Board reviewed a situation wherein an employee sought to resign from membership
while a union and the State extended the expired agreement on a day-to-day basis during
negotiations. The Board found that a request for withdrawal made after the 30 day window
period, but before negotiations for the successor MOU conclude, "falls literally within the last
30 days prior to the expiration date of the agreement." The Board also determined that the
Dills Act prohibits parties from extending an MOU without extending the time for withdrawal
from membership.
In California Union of Safety Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision
No. 1029-S (Trevisanut), both the MOU and an agreed extension of the MOU expired prior to
agreement on a successor MOU. The Board found that all withdrawals from membership after
the MOU expired were valid. (Ibid.) Considering the post-extension withdrawals, the Board
found that maintenance of membership provisions are creatures of a valid contract, stating "no
contract was in force and thus no maintenance of membership agreement was in force." (Ibid.)
Here, Morgan submitted her withdrawal from membership during a time when "no
contract was in force." Accordingly, the application of Trevisanut results in a determination
der the subject MOU, an employee that withdraws from membership becomes a
fair share payer required to financially support the employee organization.
Thus, for 30 days prior to the expiration date for an MOU between a union and the
State, employees have a 30 day window period to withdraw from union membership.3
PERB has addressed the right of an employee to withdraw from membership when the
MOU containing a maintenance of membership agreement has expired but no successor
agreement is in place.
In California State Employees' Association (Fry) (1986) PERB Decision No. 604-S
(Fry), the Board reviewed a situation wherein an employee sought to resign from membership
while a union and the State extended the expired agreement on a day-to-day basis during
negotiations. The Board found that a request for withdrawal made after the 30 day window
period, but before negotiations for the successor MOU conclude, "falls literally within the last
30 days prior to the expiration date of the agreement." The Board also determined that the
Dills Act prohibits parties from extending an MOU without extending the time for withdrawal
from membership.
In California Union of Safety Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision
No. 1029-S (Trevisanut), both the MOU and an agreed extension of the MOU expired prior to
agreement on a successor MOU. The Board found that all withdrawals from membership after
the MOU expired were valid. 	(Ibid.) Considering the post-extension withdrawals, the Board
found that maintenance of membership provisions are creatures of a valid contract, stating "no
contract was in force and thus no maintenance of membership agreement was in force." 	(Ibid.)
Here, Morgan submitted her withdrawal from membership during a time when "no
contract was in force." Accordingly, the application of Trevisanut results in a determination
Under the subject MOU, an employee that withdraws from membership becomes a	U
fair share payer required to financially support the employee organization.
n
4

that CSLEA unlawfully interfered with employee rights to withdraw from union membership.
"Trevisanut, supra, PERB Decision No. 1029-S.)
CSLEA contends that Fry and Trevisanut were nullified by the Legislature's later
addition of section 3517.8(a) to the Dills Act." (Fry, supra, PERB Decision No. 604-S;
If a memorandum of understanding has expired, and the
Governor and the recognized employee organization have not
agreed to a new memorandum of understanding and have not
reached an impasse in negotiations, subject to subdivision (b), the
parties to the agreement shall continue to give effect to the
provisions of the expired memorandum of understanding,
including, but not limited to, all provisions that supersede
existing law, any arbitration provisions, any no strike provisions,
any agreements regarding matters covered in the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.), and any
provisions covering fair share fee deduction consistent with
Section 3515.7.
According to the Association, "DPA and CSLEA are now required to give effect to the
provisions of the expired Agreement until impasse or a successor agreement is reached" and
the request to withdraw from membership at issue here was untimely.
However, CSLEA misinterprets section 3517.8(a). It does not create a successor MOU.
It requires that the status quo regarding terms and conditions of employment be maintained
until the parties reach agreement or impasse. (State of California (Board of Prison Terms)
(2005) PERB Decision No. 1758-S.) In both Fry and Trevisanut , the Board determined that
the status quo for a maintenance of membership provision, at MOU expiration, permits
withdrawals from union membership. (Fry, supra, PERB Decision No. 604-S; Trevisanut,
supra, PERB Decision No. 1029-S.)
Section 3517.8(a) was enacted in 2000.
5
that CSLEA unlawfully interfered with employee rights to withdraw from union membership.
(Trevisanut, supra, PERB Decision No. 1029-S.)
CSLEA contends that Fry and Trevisanut were nullified by the Legislature's
later
addition
of
section 3517.S(a) to the Dills Act.4 (Fry, supra, PERB Decision No. 604-S;
Trevisanut, supra, PERB Decision No. 1029-S.) It states:
If a memorandum
of
understanding has expired, and the
Governor and the recognized employee organization have not
agreed to a new memorandum
of
understanding and have not
reached an impasse in negotiations, subject to subdivision (b), the
parties to the agreement shall continue to give effect to the
provisions
of
the expired memorandum
of
understanding,
including, but not limited to, all provisions that supersede
existing law, any arbitration provisions, any no strike provisions,
any agreements regarding matters covered in the Fair Labor
Standards Act
of
1938 (29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.), and any
provisions covering fair share fee deduction consistent with
Section 3515.7.
According to the Association, "DP A and CS LEA are now required to give effect to the
provisions
of
the expired Agreement until impasse or a successor agreement is reached" and
the request to withdraw from membership at issue here was untimely.
However, CSLEA misinterprets section 3517.S(a). It does not create a successor MOU.
It requires that the status quo regarding terms and conditions
of
employment be maintained
until the parties reach agreement or impasse. (State
of
California (Board
of
Prison Terms)
(2005) PERB Decision No. 1758-S.) In both Fry and Trevisanut, the Board determined that
the status quo for a maintenance
of
membership provision, at MOU expiration, permits
withdrawals from union membership. (Fry, supra, PERB Decision No. 604-S; Trevisanut,
supra, PERB Decision No. 1029-S.)
4Section 3517.S(a) was enacted in 2000.
5

The Board's conclusions in Fry and Trevisanut continue to be supported by plain
language of the Act. (Fry, supra, PERB Decision No. 604-S; Trevisanut, supra, PERB
Decision No. 1029-S.) The limitations on a maintenance of membership agreement were left
unchanged when the Legislature amended the Act in 2000. Section 3513(i) remained intact;
employees who voluntarily become members of a recognized union shall remain members for
the duration of the MOU. Continued membership can only be required from the "effective
date" to "30 days prior" to the expiration of the MOU. ($ 3513(i).)
Thus, a maintenance of membership provision continues only for the term of a valid
contract. During the last 30 days, and continuing until a successor agreement becomes
effective, membership can be withdrawn.
CSLEA also argues that Morgan cannot prevail here because she has not established an
unlawful intent to interfere with their rights under the Dills Act. However,
the test for whether a respondent has interfered with the rights of employees under the Dills
Act does not require that unlawful motive be established, only that at least slight harm to
employee rights results from the conduct. In State of California (Department of
Developmental Services) (1983) PERB Decision No. 344-S, citing Carlsbad Unified School
District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89 and Service Employees International Union, Local 99
(Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106, the Board described the standard as follows:
[In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful interference,
the charging party must establish that the respondent's conduct
tends to or does result in some harm to employee rights granted
Under the above-described test, a violation may only be found if the Dills Act provides
the claimed rights. Section 3515 of the Act guarantees the right of an employee to refuse to
join or participate in the activities of an employee organization. Section 3513(i) guarantees
The Board's conclusions in Fry and Trevisanut continue to be supported by plain
language of the Act. (Fry, supra, PERB Decision No. 604-S; Trevisanut, supra, PERB
Decision No. 1029-S.) The limitations on a maintenance of membership agreement were left
unchanged when the Legislature amended the Act in 2000. Section 3513(i) remained intact;
employees who voluntarily become members of a recognized union shall remain members for
the duration of the MOU. 	Continued membership can only be required from the "effective
date" to "30 days prior" to the expiration of the MOU. (§ 3513(i).)
Thus, a maintenance of membership provision continues only for the term of a valid
contract. During the last 30 days, and continuing until a successor agreement becomes
effective, membership can be withdrawn.
CSLEA also argues that Morgan cannot prevail here because she has not established an
unlawful intent to interfere with their rights under the Dills Act. However,
the test for whether a respondent has interfered with the rights of employees under the Dills
Act does not require that unlawful motive be established, only that at least slight harmto
employee rights results from the conduct. In State of California (Department of
Developmental Services) (1983) PERB Decision No. 344-S, citing Carlsbad Unified School
District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89 and Service Employees International Union, Local 99
(Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106, the Board described the standard as follows:
[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful interference,
the charging party must establish that the respondent's conduct
tends to or does res11lt in some h:=irm to employee rights granted
under EERA.	under EERA.
Under the above-described test, a violation may only be found if the Dills Act provides
the claimed rights. 	Section 3 515 of the Act guarantees the right of an employee to refuse to
join or participate in the activities of an employee organization. 	Section 3513(i) guarantees
6

that a union member may withdraw from membership at the expiration of an MOU containing
a maintenance of membership agreement. Here, CSLEA interfered with those rights when it
refused to honor Morgan's request for withdrawal.
For the reasons stated, I find that by refusing to honor Morgan's January 7, 2009
request to withdraw from membership, CSLEA interfered with employee rights in violation of
Government Code sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
REMEDY
Pursuant to section 3514.5(c), PERB is given the authority to:
[Issue a decision and order directing an offending party to cease
and desist from the unfair practice and to take such affirmative
action, including but not limited to the reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this chapter.
It has been found that CSLEA unlawfully interfered with employee rights when it
refused to honor Morgan's valid request to withdraw from membership, in violation of Dills
Act sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b). It is appropriate that CSLEA be ordered to cease
and desist from refusing to honor valid requests for withdrawal from membership.
It is also appropriate that Morgan be reimbursed in the amount of the money wrongfully
withdrawn from her pay, with interest at 7 percent.
It is also appropriate that CSLEA be required to post a notice incorporating the terms of
the order at all work locations where notices to employees are customarily posted. Posting of
such notice, signed by an authorized agent of CSLEA, will provide employees with notice that
CSLEA has acted in an unlawful manner, is being required to cease and desist from this
activity, and will comply with the order. It effectuates the purposes of the Dills Act that
employees are informed of the resolution of this controversy and CSLEA's readiness to
comply with the ordered remedy. (State of California (Departments of Personnel
that a union member may withdraw from membership at the expiration
of
an MOU containing
a maintenance
of
membership agreement. Here, CS LEA interfered with those rights
when
it
refused to honor Morgan's request for withdrawal.
For the reasons stated, I find that by refusing to honor Morgan's January 7, 2009
request to withdraw from membership, CSLEA interfered with employee rights in violation
of
Government Code sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
REMEDY
Pursuant to section 3514.5(c), PERB is given the authority to:
[I]ssue a decision and order directing an offending party to cease
and desist from the unfair practice and to take such affirmative
action, including but not limited to the reinstatement
of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies
of
this chapter.
It
has been found that CSLEA unlawfully interfered with employee rights when it
refused to honor Morgan's valid request to withdraw from membership, in violation
of
Dills
Act sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
It
is appropriate that CSLEA be ordered to cease
and desist from refusing to honor valid requests for withdrawal from membership.
It is also appropriate that Morgan be reimbursed in the amount
of
the money wrongfully
withdrawn from her pay, with interest at 7 percent.
It is also appropriate that CSLEA be required to post a notice incorporating the terms
of
the order at all work locations where notices to employees are customarily posted. Posting
of
such notice, signed by an authorized agent
of
CS LEA, will provide employees with notice that
CSLEA has acted in an unlawful manner, is being required to cease and desist from this
activity, and will comply with the order. It effectuates the purposes
of
the Dills Act that
employees are informed of the resolution of this controversy and CS LEA' s readiness to
comply with the ordered remedy. (State
of
California (Departments
of
Personnel
7

Administration, Banking, Transportation, Water Resources and Board of Equalization) (1998)
PERB Decision No. 1279-S.)
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it is found that CSLEA violated the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code
section 3512, et seq. by refusing to honor a valid request by a State employee to withdraw from
membership in violation of Government Code sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
Pursuant to section 3514.5(c) of the Government Code, it is hereby ORDERED that
CSLEA and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1 . 	Refusing to honor valid requests to withdraw from Association
membership.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Honor valid requests to withdraw from Association membership.
2 . 	Make Savannah Morgan whole for the failure to honor her request to
withdraw from Association membership in January 2009.
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed
Decision and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement of exceptions with the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days of service of this
Decision. The Board's address is:
8
Administration, Banking, Transportation, Water Resources and Board
of
Equalization) (1998)
PERB Decision No. 1279-S.)
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings
of
fact and conclusions
of
law, and the entire record
in
this
case, it is found that CSLEA violated the Ralph
C.
Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code
section 3512, et seq. by refusing to honor a valid request by a State employee to withdraw from
membership in violation
of
Government Code sections 3513(i), 3515 and 3519.5(b).
Pursuant to section 3514.5(c)
of
the Government Code, it is hereby ORDERED that
CSLEA and its representatives shall:
A.	
CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1.	
Refusing to honor valid requests to withdraw from Association
membership.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1.	
Honor valid requests to withdraw from Association membership.
2. 	Make Savannah Morgan whole for the failure to honor her request to
withdraw from Association membership in January 2009.
Pursuant to California Code
of
Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed
Decision and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement of exceptions with the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days of service
of
this
Decision. The Board's address is:
8

Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement of exceptions should identify by
page citation or exhibit number the portions of the record, if any, relied upon for such
exceptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32300.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB
business day. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $$ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code,
$ 1 1020, subd. (a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile
transmission before the close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet
which meets the requirements of California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 32135,
subdivision (d), provided the filing party also places the original, together with the required
number of copies and proof of service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32135,
subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $$ 32090 and 32130.)
Any statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its
filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall accompany each copy served
on a party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, $ 32300, 32305, 32140,
and 32135, subd. (c).)
Bernard McMonigle
Chief Administrative Law Judge
9
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement
of
exceptions should identify by
page citation or exhibit number the portions
of
the record,
if
any, relied upon for such
exceptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
8,
§ 32300.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB
business day. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code,
§ 11020, subd. (a).) A document
is
also considered "filed" when received by facsimile
transmission before the close
of
business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet
which meets the requirements
of
California Code
of
Regulations, title 8, section 32135,
subdivision (d), provided the-filing party also places the original, together with the required
number
of
copies and proof
of
service, in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135,
subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32090 and 32130.)
Any statement
of
exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its
filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof
of
service shall accompany each copy served
on a party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32300, 32305, 32140,
and 32135, subd. (c).)
Bernard McMonigle
Chief Administrative Law Judge
9