County of Orange (PERB 2350M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
ORANGE COUNTY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE,
Res ondent.
Case No. LA-CE-667-M
PERB Decision No. 2350-M
December 23, 2013
Appearances: Llesena Ontiveras, Senior Labor Relations Representative, for Orange County
Employees Association; Office of the County Counsel by Gabriel J. Bowne, Deputy County
Counsel, for County of Orange.
Before Martinez, Chair; Huguenin and Winslow, Members.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, Chair: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the Orange County Employees Association
(Association) to a proposed decision (attached) of a PERB administrative law judge (ALJ).
The complaint, and underlying charge, alleges that the County of Orange (County) terminated
the employment of John Claxton (Claxton) via a layoff in retaliation for filing and pursuing
grievances and participating in other activities protected by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
1
(MMBA). 	The complaint alleged that, by this conduct, the County violated MMBA
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. All further section
references are to the Government Code.

sections 35062 and 35033 and thereby committed unfair practices under MMBA section 3509,
subdivision (b), and PERB Regulation 32603, subdivisions (a) and (b). 4
An informal settlement conference was held on May 4, 2012, but the parties were
unable to resolve their differences. A formal hearing was held on August 6 through August 8,
2012. The parties filed closing briefs on or before October 19, 2012, at which time the record
was closed and the matter submitted for decision. On February 15, 2013, the ALJ issued a
proposed decision concluding that the Association had failed to establish that the County
retaliated against Claxton for engaging in protected activities. The ALJ ordered that the
complaint and underlying unfair practice charge be dismissed. The Association timely filed
exceptions on March 12, 2013, and the County timely filed a response on April 9, 2013.
The Board itself has reviewed the entire record in this matter including the complaint ·
and answer, the hearing record, the proposed decision, the Association's exceptions and the
County's response thereto. We conclude that the ALJ's findings of fact are generally
supported by the hearing record and his conclusions of law well-reasoned and consistent with
applicable law. Accordingly, we hereby adopt the ALJ' s proposed decision as the decision of
the Board itself except where specifically noted below, and respond to the exceptions.
2 MMBA section 3506 provides: "Public agencies and employee organizations shall
not interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce or discriminate against public employees because
of their exercise of their rights under Section 3502." Section 3502 provides, in pertinent part:
"[P]ublic employees shall have the right to form, join, and participate in the activities of
employee organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters
of employer-employee relations."
3 Section 3503 provides, in pertinent part: "Recognized employee organizations shall
have the right to represent their members in their employment relations with public agencies."
4 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 3100 I et seq.
2

FACTUALBACKGROUND5
Claxton began his employment with the County in the Probation Department on or
around December 18, 1998. On December 21, 2007, Claxton transferred to the County's
Public Administrator - Public Guardian agency (PA-PG) where he worked in a trainee position
as a Deputy I. 	Claxton was supervised by Chief Deputy Tim Beason (Beason).
On or about April 18, 2008, Claxton was placed on administrative leave.6 An
allegation had surfaced concerning Claxton's retention of his Probation Department badge,
which required investigation. On June 19, 2008, a Notice of Intent to Discharge was issued.
Claxton was discharged on July 7, 2008.
Claxton grieved his termination. That grievance went to binding arbitration and the
matter was heard on January 21 and 23, 2009. On April 24, 2009, the arbitration award issued
finding that the six grounds cited by the County in the Notice of Intent to Discharge, including
"[u]ntruthfulness and breach of trust," were based in fact, but concluding that a six-month
suspension without pay was a more appropriate level of discipline. Pursuant to the arbitration
award, Claxton was reinstated effective July 8, 2008, and given a six-month suspension
5 This section of the decision is not intended to summarize all the relevant facts. 	For
that, we direct the reader to the Findings of Fact in the ALJ' s proposed decision. Instead, this
section is intended to provide a brief description of Claxton's employment history with the
County so that the discussion section of the decision may be understood within a proper
chronological context.
6 PA-PG initially believed that Claxton's move from the Probation Department was a
promotion subject to a probation period. The Probation Department, however, considered
Claxton's move to PA-PG a transfer, not a promotion. According to the Probation
Department, employees who. transfer have no right of return and cannot be terminated without
cause. The arbitration award, discussed later in this decision, specifically inserts an end note
into the decision to explain this aspect ofClaxton's employment history. It states that "[u]nder
the applicable rules, Claxton's move to the PAPG did not constitute a promotion because the
salary differential was too small."
3

without pay, which ended effective January 8, 2009. Claxton physically returned to work at
PA-PG as a Deputy I on May 1, 2009, and was awarded back pay for the intervening time
period.
Upon Claxton' s return to work, he was given very basic assignments, described by the
ALJ as "menial," such as reading materials and policies, purging files, making copies of
benefit cards, going through mail, etc. Claxton's supervisor, for all intents and purposes, was
Supervising Deputy Sheila Roberge (Roberge). It was the PA-PG's view that the types of
misconduct in which Claxton was found to have engaged required Claxton to earn back their
trust, especially given that the client population served by PA-PG was vulnerable to being
victimized. It was Claxton's view that his work assignments were punitive and retaliatory.
During the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the County was experiencing severe budget
shortfalls, which required several departments or agencies to implement layoffs, as early as
January 2009. For a period of time, PA-PG was able to avoid layoffs by taking other cost-
cutting measures such as drawing down $750,000 in reserves, deleting positions, discontinuing
vacation payouts and reducing travel, supplies and service costs. Sometime in September or
October 2009, however, revenues generated by PA-PG were not as expected,7 and layoffs
became necessary. Two PA-PG classifications were affected, senior social workers and
Deputy Is. Claxton was the only incumbent in the Deputy I classification. He was laid off
effective January 20, 2010.
PA-PG generates revenue by billing the state for certain face-to-face encounters or
needs assessments called targeted case management and by selling property. For fiscal year
2009-2010, there was a negative 6.34 percent change in actual revenues over fiscal year 2008-
2009.
4

DISCUSSION
The theory of the Association's case is that upon Claxton's return to work following
reinstatement as a Deputy I in PA-PG, he was given insubstantial assignments that deprived
him of the opportunity to promote to a Deputy II. According to the Association's theory, had
Claxton been promoted to a Deputy II, he would not have been laid off. The Association
asserts that the County engaged in this concerted strategy to not make Claxton eligible for
promotion and eventually lay him off in retaliation for having engaged in the protected
activities of participating in the grievance process and seeking the assistance of the
Association.
We agree with the ALJ that the Association established all but the nexus element of a
retaliation claim, Regarding the nexus element, looking at the evidence in the record as a
whole, we cannot conclude that the County gave Claxton insubstantial assignments so as to
make him ineligible for promotion to a Deputy II in order to retaliate against him for having
grieved his termination or having sought the assistance of the Association. As a threshold
matter, Claxton's supervisor who was responsible for making the assignments to Claxton was
not involved in the decision to lay him off. The assignments were a means to address problems
identified in the disciplinary proceedings relating to improper computer usage, dishonesty and
breach of trust. 	Although Claxton assumes that but for his assignments, he would have been
eligible for promotion, the evidence in the hearing record is not in his favor. 	Not only is there
no automatic trigger date for promotion, there is also no automatic entitlement to a promotion.
The Deputy I position is a trainee position, allowing PA-PG to assess a person's qualifications
for promotion to a Deputy IL Claxton viewed his promotion as a given, bi.it that was far from
the case given PA-PG's concerns about his basic integrity.
5

The Association excepts to the ALJ' s nexus analysis on three separate grounds. 	We
discuss those grounds next.
Knowledge Regarding Layoffs
First, the Association asserts that the ALJ was wrong in concluding that no one
involved in assigning Claxton work after his return to work on May 1, 2009, was aware of the
need for layoffs in PA-PG until September 2009, after Claxton's assignments were already
underway. The ALJ's conclusion is well supported by the hearing record. 	During fiscal year
2009-2010, the County's poor fiscal health required severe budget cutting measures. As of
February 18, 2009, there were four departments that had experienced layoffs or other types of
budget reductions. As of July 3, 2009, there had been layoffs in a few more departments. 	At
least up and through this point in time, the need for layoffs in PA-PG had not been definitively
established. Instead, PA-PG found other, less drastic, ways to cut costs.
By September or October 2009, however, revenues generated by PA-PG were not as
expected. 	John Williams, the Public Administrator and the Public Guardian and agency head
(PA-PG Williams), informed Thomas Mauk, the County Executive Officer (CEO Mauk), by
memorandum dated November 3, 2009, that all other options had been explored and there was
no other option but to implement a reduction in force to address the shortfall. PA-PG began
working with the human resources department and County Counsel on a plan. 	PA-PG
considered on a classification-by-classification basis the programmatic impacts that would be
caused by a layoff. 	PA-PG determined that senior social workers were performing work that in
part duplicated the work of social workers in outside facilities for aging seniors. 	PA-PG also
considered the Deputy I/II classification series. While Deputy IIs carry an independent
caseload, the Deputy I classification is a trainee position. Therefore, PA-PG concluded that
laying off senior social workers and Deputy Is would have the least impact on the work and
6

staff. 	PA-PG's William's reduction in force proposal dated November 23, 2009, was approved
by CEO Mauk. As a result, the four senior social workers and the one Deputy I, Claxton, on
PA-PG's payroll received layoff notices effective January 20, 2010.8
The bases for the Association's assertion that those involved in assigning Claxton work
were aware prior to September 2009 that PA-PG would ultimately have a layoff at which time
PA-PG could terminate Claxton's employment are unfounded. Noted initially is that Claxton's
direct supervisor responsible for giving him assignments, Sheila Roberge (Roberge), was not
involved in the decision to lay him off. Moreover, that the County had already laid off
employees in other County departments or agencies prior to September 2009 was not outcome
determinative for PA-PG.9 Neither was a comment by Beason to Claxton that the County
Noted is the fact that the Association did not present evidence or argument disputing
that the County has an economic need for layoffs when it decided to lay off Claxton. Nor did
the Association present evidence or argument that elimination of the senior social worker and
the Deputy I positions would have the least impact on the work.
9 In aid of this argument, the Association relies on PA-PG Williams' memorandum to
CEO Mauk, referred to above, which states that PA-PG first proposed layoffs in response to a
Grand Jury Supplemental Report. PA-PG Williams' memorandum, however, does not state
when the Grand Jury Supplemental Report was made public. The Association attached the
Grand Jury Supplemental Report and an internet print-out showing a June 30, 2009,
publication date to its statement of exceptions. These documents were neither introduced nor
admitted into evidence at the formal hearing. PERB Regulation 32300, subdivision (b), states
that "[r]eference shall be made in the statement of exceptions only to matters contained in the
record of the case." Even were we to consider these documents, we note the following:
(1) The Grand Jury Supplemental Report was issued two months after Claxton returned to
work when his assignments were already underway; (2) PA-PG Williams' memorandum does
not state when he made a layoff proposal in response to the Grand Jury Supplemental Report;
and (3) as stated above, the evidence establishes that PA-PG initially pursued less drastic
budget cutting measures and only when it was determined in September or October 2009 that
revenues were not meeting expectations, did the actual need for more drastic measures like a
layoff first arise.
7

"might have to be doing layoffs," as testified to by Claxton. 10 Notwithstanding the hearsay
problem with this testimony, as the above chronology shows, decreasing revenues triggered the
need for layoffs after less severe cost-cutting measures were tried. The need for layoffs was
not identified until September or October 2009, after Claxton's work assignments had been
underway for at least four months. 11 In sum, contrary to the Association's exception, the ALJ
was correct in concluding that no one involved in assigning Claxton work was aware of the
need for layoffs in PA-PG until September or October 2009.
Differential Treatment
Second, the Association excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the Association "did not
present evidence that other employees who had been disciplined were treated differently from
Mr. Claxton." In support of this exception, the Association relies on the testimony of
Claxton's attorney at the arbitration, Mary Shumate (Shumate). Shumate testified that based
on her experience litigating discipline cases at the County, Claxton had been treated differently
In the same vein, the Association relies on the testimony of Karen Batesol (Batesol),
a former PA-PG senior social worker also laid off by the County. She testified that she was
told by Beason not to talk to Claxton because he was not going to be there long. She could not
remember if she was told by e-mail or in a staff meeting. No e-mail was introduced or
admitted into evidence. She testified that she thought it was Beason who made the statement.
She could not remember the exact words. She admitted to having "ill feelings" towards PA-
PO as a result of her layoff. In addition to the hearsay problem, Batesol' s testimony is vague
and uncertain and therefore unreliable as evidence supporting the Association's assertion that
PA-PG was aware of the need for layoffs prior to September 2009. 	(PERE Reg. 32176
["Hearsay evidence is admissible but shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless
it would be admissible over objection in civil actions."].)
11 The Association also points to the County's failure to pay Claxton's professional
association membership dues on August 28, 2009, to support the Association's position that
the County knew before September 2009 that there would be a need for layoffs in PA-PG.
These dues are paid by the County on behalf of the employees in the Deputy PA-PG
classifications. Ann Barlow, PG-PA's manager of administrative services during the relevant
period of time, testified that the professional association was transitioning from one set of
secretaries to another, and that it did not have on record everyone that should have been
included. Given this evidence and the fact that Claxton returned to work mid-way through the
year, it cannot be concluded that the County's failure to pay Claxton's dues supports the
Association's position that PA-PG was aware of the need for layoffs prior to September 2009.
8

upon his return to work than other employees. Upon cross-examination, however, Shumate
was asked directly:
So you don't know if they treated him the same or different than
other people that are returning from misconduct?
Shumate responded, "Correct."
The Association also relies on the arbitration award in support of its disparate treatment
argument. 	The Association argues that the make-whole remedy did not allow the County to
treat Claxton differently than other employees upon his return to work in termsof the
assignments he was given and the conditions under which he was placed. The Association also
argues that the arbitration award did not impose conditions on Claxton's reinstatement other
than allowing the County to place Claxton on a reasonable performance improvement plan.
We are not persuaded by these arguments.
The make-whole order is not an employee management or work plan, but rather a
remedial mechanism intended to make an employee who has been wronged financially whole.
In imposing a six-month suspension without pay on Claxton and recognizing the necessityof a
performance improvement plan, however, the arbitration award cannot be seen as a vindication
for Claxton, as the Association's argument suggests. The arbitrator found that all six reasons
provided for in the County's Notice oflntent to Discharge were founded in fact. 	The arbitrator
found that Claxton committed the following specific acts of misconduct: (1) improper
computer use; and (2) retention of his Probation Department badge, then offering to use it in
his work at PA-PG and being dishonest when he claimed that he had lost it. 	With respect to
the badge issue, the arbitrator concluded that Claxton was not a credible witness at the
arbitration. The arbitrator stated that he could not "criticize the Department for deciding not to
continue the employment of a deputy who cannot be trusted" given the mission of PA-PG to
"protect[] those who cannot protect themselves from the dishonesty of others." The arbitrator
9

ultimately decided to impose a six-month suspension without pay rather than sustain a
discharge because he found certain aspects of Beason' s testimony to be lacking in candor .12
In reviewing the hearing record in its entirety, we conclude that the ALJ was justified in
concluding that the Association failed to demonstrate that other similarly situated employees
were treated differently. 	In fact, no evidence was presented as to how other employees
returning from a six-month, or any other, suspension without pay had been treatedby PA-PG
or even by other departments or agencies within the County, let alone how an employee whose
misconduct involved dishonesty had been treated. That the County circumscribed Claxton's
responsibilities upon his return to work, giving him assignments that were basic and did not
involve a caseload, was within its prerogative. 	Such conduct does not demonstrate disparate
treatment for purposes of establishing nexus.
Performance Incentive Program (PIP)
Last, the Association excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that the PIP is used by the
County only as a guideline and therefore deviations therefrom do not demonstrate the nexus
required to support a retaliation claim. In support of this exception, the Association asserts that
the ALJ erred in identifying Claxton's transfer from the Probation Department to PA-PG as a
promotion requiring a mid-cycle review after three months. 	According to the Association,
Claxton was a lateral transfer and maintained the same annual review date he had in his prior
The arbitrator wrote:
My reaction to the testimony that was presented to me in this case
is best summed up by Shakespeare, when he wrote: "A plague
o[n] both your houses." (Romeo and Juliet, Act. III, Sc. I.) I
have no sympathy for Claxton and initially started to write a
decision in which I sustained the discharge. 	However, I could not
in good conscience do so in light ofBeason's equally suspect
testimony which he gave under penalty of perjury.
10

position with the Probation Department. The Association asserts that Claxton did not receive a
mid-cycle review, nor did he receive an interim progress review.
According to the PIP manual, the PIP process is a "new performance management
program" requiring a mid-cycle performance review and a final performance review. Prior to
the final performance review, an employee at risk of receiving a below standard rating is to be
provided with an improvement plan as well as an interim progress review after three months if
the employee has not improved. New employees and newly promoted employees are on a six-
month performance planning cycle. Other employees are on an annual performance planning
cycle. Employees whose status has changed come under other performance planning timing
requirements depending on whether the status is new employee probation, promotional
probation, transfer, leave of absence without pay, part time, or retirement/separation. With a
transfer, an employee maintains the same annual review date, i.e., presumably their initial hire
date, upon transfer to a new position in a new agency or department. Notably absent from this
list of status categories are return from administrative leave and return from suspension.
Although we do not agree with the ALJ's characterization of PIP as only a guideline,
despite Barlow's testimony to that effect, 13 we do see potential for confusion in identifying
Claxton's correct status both upon transfer to PA-PG from the Probation Department and upon
his return to work on May 1, 2009, for performance planning purposes. And while certain
performance planning processes were not complied with to the letter of the PIP manual, there
was substantial compliance with the PIP process in terms of providing Claxton feedback on his
performance consistent with the arbitrator's decision allowing PA-PG to place Claxton on a
13 Article XXVI of the 2009-2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the County
and the Association, which sets forth an exception to the requirement that PIP time be taken off
within one year, states that "[a]ll other performance management components of PIP remain in
effect." None of the documents in evidence concerning PIP suggest that its performance
management provisions and timeframes are guidelines to be used, or not, at the County's
discretion.
11

reasonable performance improvement plan upon his return to work. In the eight and ahalf
months between Claxton' s return to work and his layoff, Claxton received four improvement
plans, three in May 2009 and one in November 2009,14 and participated with Roberge in the
PIP conciliation process15 in December 2009 to resolve their outstanding performance planning
issues.
Nonetheless, the Association points to the following passage in the PIP manual in
support of its argument that PA-PG's deviations from the PIP manual constitute circumstantial
evidence of retaliatory motive:
It is the responsibility of the manager and supervisor to have
knowledge of the scheduled employee performance review date
for each employee, and to ensure that performance planning is
conducted and _completed in a timely manner.
The first improvement plan, dated May 1, 2009, was used to inform Claxton about
his new work schedule, including meal and rest breaks. The sel:ond improvement plan, which
incorporated the gist of the first improvement plan and also is dated May 1, 2009, identifies
performance issues relating to Claxton' s violations of the County's Information Technology
Usage Policy and Code of Ethics including his misuse of County time and resources,
falsification of work hours, and untruthfulness. The improvement plan requires Claxton to
read and memorize the County's Information Technology Usage Policy and Code of Ethics, an
article entitled "Ethics Liabilities and Legal Issues for the PA/PG Practitioner," and sections of
the Probate Code covering guardians, powers of attorney, wills and intestate succession and
administration of estates. The third improvement plan, dated May 29, 2009, reviews Claxton's
work history and the County's expectations before laying out an improvement plan that
includes a description of his assignments, permissible computer usage and time keeping
requirements. The fourth improvement plan, dated November 18, 2009, identifies numerous
performance areas where improvement is needed. The improvement plan provides a chronicle
of problems, e.g., mistakes made in purging files, instances showing a lack of initiative, failure
to ask questions, be proactive or seek direction, etc. This improvement plan notes that in the
approximately six and a half months since Claxton returned to work, Claxton had taken
150.5 hours off from work, commenting "[t]his is a large amount of time spent absent from a
training position."
15 This is a confidential process designed to provide employees and supervisors a
method to resolve issues related to the performance management process and the PIP. The
subject employee and supervisor first will attempt to reach agreement with the assistance of
members of a mediation team. If no agreement is reached, the matter shall be heard before a
neutral third party for a final and binding determination.
12

As the ALJ noted, however, the PIP manual also states the following:
It is the responsibility of the employee to know his or her
scheduled review date and to ensure, by the Plan Options
described in this manual, that each component of PIP is
completed in a collaborative manner with his or her supervisor,
and within the specified timeframes.
Regardless, based on our reading of the PIP manual, considering Claxton's move to
PA-PG to be a transfer rather than as a promotion, Claxton should have maintained
December 18, the date he started employment with the County, as his armual review date. 	The
Probation Department would have been responsible for Claxton's final performance review for
the December 18, 2006 through December 17, 2007, cycle. 	Claxton's mid-cycle performance
review should have occurred on June 18, 2008, after his transfer to PA-PG, but he was on
administrative leave at that time. 	Upon Claxton's return to work on May 1, 2009, if his
original review cycle was still in place, he should have received his mid-cycle review on
July 18, 2009. Although that did not occur, he did receive three improvement plans prior to
that date. Finally, although he did not receive his final performance reviewon December 18,
2009, Claxton and Roberge were resolving performance planning issues in the PIP conciliation
process at that very same time and had come to agreement.
In sum, we do not infer from any of the deviations from the performance review
process cited by the Association a nexus, or a retaliatory motive. 	Our overall impression of the
evidence is that the assignments Claxton was given and the conditions under which he worked
upon his return to work on May 1, 2009, were designed to address the problems uncovered by
PA-PG before Claxton engaged in protected activities and upon which he was discharged, i.e.,
16
improper computer usage on work time 	and dishonesty regarding his Probation Department
Amongst other things, Claxton used his computer on occasion at work for his outside
real estate business.
13

badge. 	Although the arbitrator did conclude that discharge was unwarranted, harsh discipline,
a six-month suspension without pay, was imposed.
The Deputy position involves managing the affairs and protecting the assets of the
vulnerable elderly and mentally ill populations in the County. For the County, integrity is a
baseline qualification for the position and Claxton's proven dishonesty about his badge was a
cause for great and ongoing concern. As Barlow explained:
[T]he deputy position is a very important position. They are
responsible for the most vulnerable people in our society that are
adults. 	They are people who are not able to care for themselves,
so they have to have somebody who is extremely trustworthy and
above reproach. And ifI couldn't believe that he was going to be
truthful with us, how was he ever going to testify in court? How
could he ever go out into the field on his own? How do we know
that he would not take property? I mean there was all sorts of
things that just did not, would not set well with somebody who
was supposed to be entrusted with so much control over
vulnerable people.
PA-PG did not trust Claxton and believed it was important for Claxton to earn back
their trust In the meantime, PA-PG had to determine the best way to utilize Claxton in an area
of work that requires the utmost in integrity, a characteristic the County found lacking in
Claxton. 	The County did not deliberately hinder Claxton's ability to promote to a Deputy II in
retaliation for utilizing the grievance machinery, as the Association asserts. Rather, the County
was keeping Claxton on the proverbial short leash in light of the severity of his misconduct and
its obligation to protect PA-PG's programmatic mission. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Association's exceptions regarding the ALJ's nexus analysis have no merit.
We also conclude that notwithstanding the evidentiary holes in the Association's
theory, as discussed above, the theory itself is premised on a fundamentally faulty notion, i.e.,
that Claxton was correct to view a promotion as something he was automatically entitled to
rather than something he needed to work hard to earn. Altogether, Claxton was employed with
14

PA-PG for a total of approximately 15.5 months, including the time period during which he
was on administrative leave prior to his discharge. Admitted into evidence at the formal
hearing was a chart showing hire and promotion dates for Deputy 1s. The shortest time
between hire as a Deputy I and promotion to a Deputy II is six months; the longest time,
32 months; and the average time, 13.54 months.17 More importantly, promoting to Deputy II is
not simply a timing issue. It is a matter within the discretion and prerogative of the County
entailing a determination of readiness for the responsibilities of the position. It is important to
remember that the County initially wanted to return Claxton to the Probation Department
believing his move to PA-PG to be a promotion and subject to a probationary period. Thus,
even prior to Claxon's discharge and engagement in protected activities, PA-PG had already
determined that he was not a good fit. Moreover, it is unrealistic to assume entitlement to a
promotion fresh off a six-month suspension without pay, particularly given the nature of
Claxton's proven misconduct and the inherent difficulty of addressing a lack of trust
engendered by his previous dishonesty in a performance improvement plan. And although the
chart does not state whether any of the employees promoted from a Deputy I to a Deputy II had
been suspended for six months without pay, we assume that if there were such an example, the
Association would have brought that evidence forward.
Finally, noted is the fact that the Association does not except to the ALJ's conclusions
of law regarding the County's burden of proving its affirmative defense. The ALJ concluded
that even if the Association had established a prima facie case of retaliation, the County would
have met its burden of proving that retaliation was not the true cause ofClaxton's termination.
7 There is nothing in the hearing record that explains the discrepancy between the
evidence concerning hire and promotion dates as represented in the chart and the following
class specification for the Deputy I classification: "There is no permanent status in this class.
Incumbents must successfully complete probation and qualify for promotion to the Deputy II
level within the one-year probation period or be subject to termination of their trainee status
and/or [sic]."
15

As the ALJ explained, "it cannot be said that 'but for' Claxton' s protected activities, he would
have been promoted and therefore protected from layoff." In discussing an employer's
affirmative defense in a retaliation case, the ALJ did not have the benefit of the Board's
decision in Palo Verde Unified School District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2337 (Palo Verde),
which articulated the following standard:
Once a charging party establishes a prima facie case of
retaliation, the burden shifts to the respondent to establish
both: (1) that it had an alternative non-discriminatory reason for
the challenged action; and (2) that it acted because of this
alternative non-discriminatory reason and not because of the
employee's protected activity.
The ALJ relied on Baker Valley Unified School District (2008) PERB Decision
No. 1993 (Baker Valley) in his articulation of the standard for the proposition that "the focus of
this analysis 'is not whether the employer had a lawful reason for the action but whether it took
the action for an unlawful reason."' In Baker Valley, the school district argued that PERB had
no authority to second-guess its reasons for not renewing a teacher because the administrative
hearing procedure in the Education Code provides the exclusive means for making that
assessment. In other words, the school district argued that the Educational Employment
Relations Act (EERA)18 may not supersede these Education Code sections under a preemption-
type analysis. The Board in Baker Valley rejected the school district's argument holding:
The District's argument misconstrues PERB's inquiry in a
retaliation case. PERB does not determine whether the employer
had cause to discipline or terminate the employee.
(San Bernardino City Unified School District (2004) PERB
Decision No. 1602.) Rather, PERB weighs the employer's
justifications for the adverse action against the evidence of the
employer's retaliatory motive. Thus, PERB's inquiry is not
whether the employer had a lawful reason for the action but
whether it took the action for an unlawful reason. (See
McFarland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations
Bd. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 166, 169 [276 Cal.Rptr. 26] [stating
18 EERA is codified at section 3540 et seq.
16

"the District has cited no authority, nor can it, for the proposition
that its power to deny tenure for any lawful reason insulates it
from the scrutiny of the PERB when an unfair labor practice
complaint alleges that tenure was denied in retaliation for the
exercise of a protected right"].)
Context is critical. In stating that PERB 's inquiry is not "whether the employer had a
lawful reason," the Board was responding to and rejecting the school district's argument that
the Education Code provides the exclusive measure of what is lawful in a non-renewal setting
and that PERB has no authority to evaluate the school district's proffered reasons. Inclusion in
the proposed decision of this statement from Baker Valley without providing the context in
which it was made is problematic because it could be construed to mean that the employer
need not demonstrate that it had an alternative non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
action under the first prong of Palo Verde. 	Under the standard as set forth in Palo Verde,
however, the outcome in this case does not change. The evidence amply demonstrates that the
County had a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action and that it acted because of that
alternative non-discriminatory reason, rather than because of the employee's protected activity.
ORDER
Based upon the ALJ' s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the foregoing discussion
and the entire record in this matter, the complaint and underlying unfair practice charge in
Case No. LA-CE-667-M are hereby DISMISSED.
Members Huguenin and Winslow joined in this Decision.
17

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
ORANGE COUNTY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
V.
COUNTY OF ORANGE,
Respondent.
UNFAIR PRACTICE
CASE NO. LA-CE-667-M
PROPOSED DECISION
(02/15/2013)
Appearances: Llesena U. Ontiveros, Senior Labor Relations Representative, for Orange
County Employees Association; Gabriel J. Bowne and Mark R. Howe, Attorneys, for County
of Orange.
Before Eric J. Cu, Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this case, an exclusive representative claims that a public agency laid-off one of its
employees in retaliation for filing grievances and/or participating in other activities protected
by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).1 The employer denies any violation.
On February 11, 2011, the Orange County Employees Association (OCEA) filed an
unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board). OCEA
alleged that the County of Orange (County) violated the MMBA and PERB Regulations2 by
retaliating against represented member John Claxton.
On March 15, 2012, the PERB Office of the General Counsel issued a complaint
alleging that the County terminated Claxton's employment in retaliation for filing grievances
and for seeking OCEA's assistance in meeting with the County. On April 13, 2012, the
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq.
2 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.

County filed an answer to the PERB complaint admitting all the allegations in the PERB
complaint except that there was any causal connection between Claxton's termination and his
protected activity. The County also filed a motion to dismiss the PERB complaint.
An informal settlement conference was held on May 4, 2012, but the matter was not
resolved. 	On July 20, 2012, PERB denied the County's motion to dismiss the PERB
complaint. A formal hearing was held on August 6-8, 2012. On or before October 19, 2012,
the parties filed closing briefs. At that point, the record was closed and the matter was
submitted to PERB for decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Parties
The County is a public agency within the meaning ofMMBA section 350l(c) and
PERB Regulation 32016(a). OCEA is an exclusive representative within the meaning of
PERB Regulation 32016(b). Prior to his layoff, Claxton was an employee at the County within
the meaning of MMBA section 350 I (b ). Claxton began his employment with the County in
1998, in the Probation department. He later transferred to the Public Administrator-Public
Guardian (PA-PG), another County agency. Both of these positions are part of a bargaining
unit represented by OCEA.
The Parties' Memorandum of Understanding
OCEA and the County are parties to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that has
been in effect at all times relevant to this case. The parties' MOU includes a grievance
procedure that culminates in binding arbitration. The MOU also contains a provision
specifying that layoffs in the bargaining unit are done by classification. Within each
classification, the unit member with the least amount of County seniority is to be laid off first,
regardless of seniority at any particular County agency.
2

The County Performance Incentive Program
The County has adopted a Performance Incentive Program (PIP) to allow managers,
supervisors; and rank and file employees to collaborate in setting professional goals and
providing/receiving useful feedback. 	Embedded into this program is the performance
evaluation process where employees receive a "mid-cycle" and a "final" review of their work
performance. The review cycle for new hires or new promotions is six months. According to
the PIP manual,
It is the responsibility of the employee to know his or her
scheduled review date and to ensure, by the Plan Options
described in this manual, that each component of PIP is
completed in a collaborative manner with his or her supervisor,
and within the specified timeframes.
Under the PIP process, an employee not meeting expectations may be placed under an
"Improvement Plan" outlining the Comity's performance expectations, objectives for the
employee, and timeframes for meeting those objectives. Similar to the traditional PIP
evaluation process, employees under a Performance Plan receive an "interim progress review"
after three months.
The Public Administrator-Public Guardian
As its name implies, the PA-PG agency has two main purposes. The Public
Administrator (PA) oversees the estates of deceased County residents that have no capable
descendants. 	The Public Guardian (PG) manages the affairs of living County residents who
are unable to do so on their own due to mental illness or other infirmity. This case primarily
concerns the operations in the PG. The two main units in the PG are Probate and Lanterman-
Petris-Short (LPS). 	Each unit is overseen by a Supervising Deputy. The Probate unit typically
handles cases for County residents afflicted with diseases associated with aging such as
3

Alzheimer's disease or dementia. LPS, on the other hand, deals with residents who are
temporarily and involuntarily committed to a psychiatric institution.
Much of the work in the PA-PG agency is performed by the Deputy PA-PG series of
classifications, which includes Deputy I, Deputy II, and Senior Deputy. 	The Deputy I position
is considered a probationary training position to prepare the incumbent for transition into the
Deputy II or Senior Deputy position. Although the position description for the Deputy I
position states that the transition to Deputy II is supposed to occur within 12 months, multiple
witnesses testified that there is no fixed timeframe for promotion. More than one third of all
Deputies were not promoted within 12 months.
Typical responsibilities for the Deputy classification could include managing assets,
paying bills and other expenses, inventorying personal and real property, testifying at legal
proceedings involving the resident or the resident's estate, and selling assets at public auction.
Performance of these duties involves both field work and office work. For example, a Deputy
may need to visit a residence to inventory property to either protect those assets or to prepare
them for sale at a public auction. In addition, Deputies must maintain records for each
individual that could include medical expenses, court filings, and other important information
relating to clients' property or medical condition.
Deputies in the two units perfom1 similar job duties but there are some notable
differences. 	Typically, LPS clients are only under PA-PG conservatorship temporarily, which
means Deputies have more-strict timelines for acting in those cases. 	Probate clients, on the
other hand, may be under conservatorship for the rest of their lives.
John Claxton's 2007-2008 Employment at PA-PG
Claxton began working at the PA-PG as a Deputy I on December 18, 2007. He
described it as a promotion from the Probation department. Approximately five other
4

individuals were hired into the same position around that time. The County has not since hired
anyone else into the Deputy I classification. Claxton was assigned to the Probate unit.
As part of the PA-PG training regimen at the time, new Deputy I's were initially given
large reading assignments. Based on the estimates given by the different witnesses, the
reading assignments took between a week and a month to complete. At the same time, new
Deputies also "shadowed" more senior staff during their field work, such as attending
inventories of property, public auctions, or court proceedings.
During this time, Claxton was supervised by Chief Deputy PA-PG Tim Beason.
Claxton received generally good feedback from Beason, who even suggested that he would
promote Claxton ifhe himself was promoted. Claxton did not receive a fonnal performance
evaluation.
Some other senior staff had some concerns about Claxton's work. Deputy II Gema
Aranda did not feel that Claxton took her instructions seriously based on a conversation she
had with him about a piece of real estate. Aranda recalled instructing Claxton to have the PA-
PG Property Manager position handle real property profiles. Claxton stated that he could look
up property profiles because he was a licensed real-estate agent. Aranda instructed Claxton to
follow the PA-PG procedures. 	Claxton did not deny that this exchange occurred, but stated
that he always followed the procedures for looking up property. Aranda reported her concerns
to Claxton's supervisor.
In April 2008, PA-PG Manager of Administrative Services Ann Barlow received an
anonymous letter claiming that Claxton was still using a badge he had been issued from the
County Probation department. Claxton claimed that he lost the badge. 	Claxton was placed on
paid administrative leave on April 18, 2008. Barlow then began an investigation into the
badge allegation, which included interviewing Claxton and other staff and examining
5

Claxton's computer usage. As a result of its investigation, Barlow concluded that Claxton still
possessed his Probation department badge and that he lied about losing it. Barlow also
determined that Claxton used his PA-PG computer during the work-day for personal reasons,
including performing work for his private real-estate business. On June 18, 2008, the County
issued Claxton a Notice oflntent to Discharge his employment, effective July 7, 2008.
The 2008 Grievance
In July 2008, Claxton filed a grievance over the discharge. That grievance went to
binding arbitration in January 2009 to detennine whether the County had reasonable cause to
discharge Claxton. The arbitrator found that Claxton still possessed his Probation department
badge and also used his PA-PG computer for non-work purposes. He also found that Claxton
was dishonest when he was asked about both issues. The arbitrator nevertheless held that the
discharge was inappropriate because he found inconsistencies in the County's position and in
the testimony of County witness, Beason. For instance, Beason testified as to knowing of both
the badge issue and allegedly poor performance by Claxton, but he did not take any action on
them until Barlow independently discovered the same issues. In addition, the arbitrator
credited testimony that other PA-PG employees used County computers for personal reasons as
well but were apparently not disciplined. The arbitrator thus issued the following award:
The appeal [of the discharge] is sustained. Claxton is entitled to
reinstatement with restoration of back pay and benefits for all the
time he was removed, minus six months. Pursuant to A1i. X, Sec.
8, subd. B.2.c.3, "[r]estoration of pay and benefits shall be
subject to reimbursement of all unemployment insurance and
additional outside earning, which the appellant received since the
date of the discharge."
Upon reinstatement, the Department may place Claxton on a
reasonable performance improvement plan.
6

Both parties agree that the arbitrator detennined, for all intents and purposes, that Claxton
should receive a six month suspension and then be brought back to work at the PA-PG with
back-pay and an Improvement Plan.
Claxton's Reinstatement
Claxton returned to the PA-PG office on Friday, May 1, 2009. The PA-PG was short-
staffed that day, so there were some issues regarding his work station and re-inputting him into
the County's payroll system. Claxton was temporarily assigned to work in one of the PA-PG's
four conference rooms, which was not a typical workspace. Barlow explained that Claxton
was assigned to the conference room because the County had not yet cleared out a cubicle for
him and because she felt that Claxton would need space to read through the training materials
he missed while he was away from PA-PG.
That morning, Beason issued Claxton an "Improvement Plan" specifying Claxton' s
work schedule and break times. The document also gave specific instructions about how to
report deviations from his assigned schedule to his supervisor. After returning from lunch that
day, Claxton brought a newspaper with him to read. Beason objected to his reading the
newspaper during the workday. Roberge instructed Claxton not to interact with other Deputies
and to come to her with questions.
Later in the day, Beason issued Claxton a second "Improvement Plan," stating that
Claxton had violated both the County Information Technology (IT) policy as well as the
County's Code of Ethics. The document also noted that Claxton had misused County time and
resources and was untruthful. Claxton was directed to "read and memorize" the County's IT
policy and Code of Ethics. Claxton was also directed to read through training materials on
various subjects, including ethics, the Probate Code, intestate succession, and powers of
attorney. Beason did not give Claxton a timeframe for completing the task.
7

On May 2, 2009, Claxton took two weeks off to take a pre-planned vacation. 	Shortly
after his return, Beason informed Claxton that he would be supervised by Supervising Deputy
Sheila Roberge and that she would issue him a new Improvement Plan. Around that time,
Claxton was assigned to work in a cubicle in the same general workspace as other deputies.3
His assigned cubicle was next to Roberge's. At the time, Roberge had recently been named the
Supervising Deputy of the newly created Internal Audit unit at the PA-PG. As part of her
duties, Roberge had some responsibility over developing PA-PG training materials. Roberge
did not supervise any other employees.
On May 29, 2009, Roberge issued Claxton another Improvement Plan. In that
document, Roberge described her observations that he did not review reading materials
assigned to him in great detail. Roberge also infonned Claxton that he would be assigned to
work in the LPS unit because those cases were less likely to involve real estate issues.
Roberge later testified that LPS cases also required less work away from the office. Roberge
instructed Claxton to adhere to his schedule, to not misuse County time or equipment, and to
be truthful.
Claxton's primary work from May to July 2009 was reading various training materials
from the time he was away from the office. He received 26 reading assignments in all. Part of
the reason for the high volume ofreading was because the PA-PG changed its training
procedures significantly earlier that year.
According to Roberge, Claxton responded to this assignment sarcastically, making
comments such as "that will take me 20 minutes to read, or "I'm done, what else do you have
for me?" Roberge testified that Claxton did not seem engaged and also did not appear to
At some point, the County assigned Claxton to work in another conference room,
typically used for interviewing PA-PG clients. The timing and the duration that Claxton was
assigned to this workspace was not made clear for the record.
8

appreciate the seriousness of the work of the PA-PG. However, Roberge never tested or
otherwise evaluated Claxton on his familiarity with the reading material other than to ask him
ifhe had any questions for her.
Starting in July 2009, the County assigned Claxton to reorganize and remove
extraneous paperwork from other deputies' case files. According to Roberge, the purpose of
the assignment, called "purging" case files, was to familiarize Claxton with different
documents from LPS case files as well as teach Claxton about PA-PG' s new filing protocols.
Claxton considered the assignment to be more simplistic, describing it as merely removing all
the documents from before a certain date. However, Claxton admitted to being unfamiliar with
many of the documents he encountered.in his review.
All other Deputies were responsible for purging files. Typically, the other Deputies met
as a group for a "purging party" where they purged documents from their case files for hours at
a time. It was not typical for purging files to be a Deputy's only job assignment. Purging was
Claxton's primary assignment from July until November 2009.
According to Roberge, Claxton did not perform this task well. She would speak to
Claxton or leave him notes regarding mistakes he made only to see Claxton repeat similar
mistakes again. Claxton does not deny either making mistakes in his purging assignment or
receiving feedback about his mistakes from Roberge.
On October 19, 2009, Claxton filed a grievance contending that the County failed to
comply with the arbitrator's back-pay award. That grievance did not resolve until July 2010.
In November 2009, the County assigned Claxton to collect various clients' benefits
cards, such as Medicare, Medi-Cal, or private insurance cards, from other Deputies, scan
them, then place them in the appropriate client case file. According to Roberge, the purpose of
the assignment was to familiarize Claxton with the PA-PG filing system, including how to
9

locate different case files. 	Overall, Roberge did not feel that Claxton was ready to be
promoted to Deputy II due to his work perfonnance and attitude. Barlow had the same
opinion. She was particularly troubled by the fact that the arbitrator found that Claxton lied
about his Probation badge during both the PA-PG investigation and during the arbitration."
Barlow felt this finding could have adverse consequences because Deputies are sometimes
required to testify in court on PA-PG matters.
Claxton did not perform this duty to Roberge's satisfaction either. According to
Roberge, Claxton would sometimes be unable to locate the correct file for certain benefits
cards and, instead of seeking assistance, would simply put the cards back where he found them.
Claxton did not deny doing so.
In December 2009, Claxton was assigned to oversee the case files of another LPS
Deputy who was out on extended leave. Claxton was primarily tasked with reviewing
incoming mail regarding the other deputy's cases and to bring issues that needed immediate
attention to Roberge for action. Claxton was not authorized to act upon the cases himself.
According to Roberge, Claxton perfonned this duty to her satisfaction. Overall, Roberge did
not feel that Claxton was ready to be promoted to Deputy II due to his work performance and
attitude. Barlow had the same opinion. She was particularly troubled by the fact that the
arbitrator found that Claxton lied about his Probation badge during both the PA-PG
investigation and during the arbitration." Barlow felt this finding could have adverse
consequences because Deputies are sometimes required to testify in court on PA-PG matters.
On or around December 18, 2009, Claxton requested OCEA's assistance in discussing
his Improvement Plans with Roberge. A meeting was arranged and Roberge agreed to include
"core and customized competencies" in his Improvement Plan, and to have regular meetings
with Claxton about his work.
10

The 2009-2010 Budget Shortfall and Layoffs
The County experienced budget shortfalls throughout the latter part of the decade. As a
result, the County Executive Officer (CEO) cut the budgets of various County departments,
including the PA-PG.4 The PA-PG initially addressed these cuts by spending down its reserve
funds, eliminating vacant positions, and cutting other expenses. The PA-PG also eliminated
supervisory and warehouse positions. Barlow initially believed that these cuts were sufficient
to address its needs for the 2009-2010 fiscal year, but in September 2009, the CEO informed
Barlow of the need for additional drastic cuts. At that point, the PA-PG management team
detem1ined that layoffs were necessary. 	Many other County departments were also
considering layoffs as well.
The PA-PG management team decided to conduct the layoffs in a manner that would
least impact the PA-PG clientele and staff. In reviewing the various PA-PG positions, Barlow
concluded PA-PG social workers often performed work that was redundant with other services
most of their clients receive elsewhere. Among the various Deputy positions, Barlow
concluded that the Deputy I classification was the most expendable because that position
operated with the least amount of autonomy and handled less complex cases. At that time,
Claxton was the only Deputy I.
On November 23, 2009, the PA-PG ultimately decided to lay off all three of its social
workers and its only Deputy I, Claxton. These 4 positions were among more than 270 laid off
County-wide. 	Claxton's layoff was effective January 20, 2010. 	Claxton filed a grievm1ce
concerning the layoff on January 20, 2010. That grievance is currently in abeyance.
The CEO is the officer in the County responsible for managing the County's various
agencies. Regarding finances, the CEO allocates funds to each agency but is not involved in
how each agency uses the money.
11

ISSUE
Did the County lay off Claxton in retaliation for participating in the grievance process
and/or requesting the assistance ofOCEA?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Timeliness of the Charge
The County contends that the case must be dismissed as untimely. PERB is prohibited
from issuing a complaint with respect to any charge based upon an alleged unfair practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge. (Coachella Valley Mosquito
and Vector Control District v. Public Employment Relations Board (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072.)
The charging party bears the burden of demonstrating that the charge is timely filed.
(Tehachapi Unified School District (1993) PERB Decision No. 1024; State a/California
(Department a/Insurance) (1997) PERB Decision No. I 197-S.5)
In this case, the PERB complaint alleges that the County terminated Claxton' s
employment by layoff effective January 20, 2010. This means, under normal circumstances,
that the statute of limitations in this case runs from January 21, 2010 until July 20, 2010. 	(See
SEIU-United Healthcare Workers West (Scholink) (2011) PERB Decision No. 2172-M.) The
instant charge was not filed until February 11, 2011. This means that the case is untimely
unless an exception to the statute of limitations applies.
Under the equitable tolling doctrine:
"the statute oflimitations is tolled during the period of time the
parties are utilizing a non-binding dispute resolution procedure if:
(1) the procedure is contained in a written agreement negotiated
by the parties; (2) the procedure is being used to resolve the same
dispute that is the subject of the unfair practice charge; (3) the
charging party reasonably and in good faith pursues the
5 When interpreting the MMBA, it is appropriate to take guidanc~ from cases
interpreting the National Labor Relations Act and California labor relations statutes with
parallel provisions. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608.)
12

procedure; and (4) tolling does not frustrate the purpose of the
statutory limitation period by causing surprise or prejudice to the
respondent."
(County of Riverside (2011) PERB Decision No. 2176-M, quoting Long Beach Community
College District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2002.)
All of these elements are present in this case. 	OCEA filed a grievance, pursuant to the
parties' MOU, on Claxton's behalf, over the layoff on January 20, 2010. 	The parties actively
participated in the process until October 28, 2010, when the arbitrator placed the case in
abeyance, where the matter remains today. No evidence shows that either party participated in
the matter in bad faith or was adversely affected by addressing Claxton's layoff in both the
grievance in in the instant unfair practice charge.
The County raises no argument disputing the application of the equitable tolling
doctrine. Rather, the County contends that the statute oflimitations period should begin before
January 20, 20 I 0, because OCEA claims that Claxton was the victim ofretaliation datingback
to May I, 2009. This argument is unpersuasive based on a plain reading of the PERB
complaint. According to the complaint, the primary issue in this case is whether the County
terminated Claxton's employment on or around January 20, 20 I 0, in violation of the MMBA.
PERB has unan1biguously found that the statute of limitations for a "charge alleging
termination for protected activities does not begin to run until the date of actual termination."
(Regents of the University of California (2004) PERB Decision No. 1585-H.) Accordingly, the
County's argument that the statute of limitations should begin prior to January 20, 2010 is
rejected. 6 Thus, it is concluded that the statute of limitations period in this case began on
6 Nothing precludes PERB from considering events occurring outside the statute of
limitations period as background evidence of the employer's lawful or unlawful motive.
(Trustees of the California State University (2008) PERB Decision No. 1970-H, citing
California State University, Long Beach (1991) PERB Decision No. 893-H; North Sacramento
School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 264.)
13

January 20, 2010 and was tolled for a sufficient period of time under the equitable tolling
doctrine to make the case timely.
Retaliation for Protected Activities
OCEA alleges that Claxton was laid off in retaliation for MMBA-protected activities.
To demonstrate that an employer discriminated or retaliated against an employee in violation of
Government Code section 3506 and PERB Regulation 32603(a), the charging party must show
that: 	(1) the employee exercised rights under the MMBA; (2) the employer had knowledge of
the exercise of those rights; (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (4)
the employer took the action because a/the exercise of those rights. 	(Novato Unified School
District (1982) PERB Decision No. 210 (Novato USD).)
Facts relating to several of these elements are not in dispute. The County admitted that
Claxton engaged in MMBA-protected activity by participating in the MOU grievance process
first from July 2008 until April 2009 regarding his 2008 termination from employment and
again from October 2009 through July 20 IO regarding proper compliance of the April 2009
arbitration award. It is further undisputed that in December 2009, Claxton sought OCEA's
assistance regarding his Improvement Plans. PERB has previously found such activity to be
protected. (City of Santa Monica (2011) PERB Decision No. 2211-M; County of Riverside
(201 !) PERB Decision No. 2184-M, citing City a/Modesto (2009) PERB Decision
No. 2022-M.) The undisputed evidence also shows that multiple County representatives,
including Barlow, Beason, and Roberge, were aware ofClaxton's protected activities.7
The County also admits that it terminated Claxton's employment by layoff effective
January 20, 2010. This amounts to an adverse employment action for purposes of stating a
7 No evidence was presented that the CEO or other representatives responsible for
determining the necessity of County-wide budget cuts were aware ofC!axton's activities.
14

prima facie case for retaliation. (Regents of the University a/California (Los Angeles) (2008)
PERB Decision No. 1995-H.)
The remaining element of a prima facie case is whether there is direct or circumstantial
evidence of a causal connection, or nexus, between Claxton's protected activities and his
layoff.
Evidence of Nexus
The closeness in time between the charging party's protected activities and the adverse
action is an important circumstantial factor in determining the employer's motive. (North
Sacramento School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 264.) Here, Claxton's January 20,
2010 layoff was close in time to at least some of his protected activities, namely the
October 19, 2009 grievance. 	Claxton's earlier grievance activity, from July 2008 to April
2009, occurred close in time to May 2009, which was when OCEA contends the County began
a pattern of conduct culminating in Claxton' s unlawful layoff. Temporal proximity between an
employee's protected activities and an employer's adverse actions is probative, but not
detenninative, circumstantial evidence of a causal connection between the two events. (County
of Riverside (2009) PERB Decision No. 2090-M.)
Regarding other evidence of nexus, OCEA offered nothing disputing that the County
had an economic need for laying off employees in January 2010. Nor did OCEA present
evidence or argument challenging the County's conclusion that the Deputy I and the Social
Worker positions were the most expendable under the circumstances. A superficial review of
these facts might lead one to conclude the inquiry is at an end, that there was no evidence of
unlawful motive. However, OCEA's theory of the case is somewhat more complex. OCEA
claims that once Claxton was reinstated, he only received menial job assignments that gave
him no realistic opportunity to promote to Deputy II. According to OCEA, this was part of a
15

larger strategy to lay Claxton off eight months later, in January 2010. The County, on the
other hand, maintains that all of Claxton's Improvement Plans and job assignments served two
basic purposes: 	(1) to allow Claxton to demonstrate his trustworthiness, given the arbitrator's
findings that he was dishonest about his computer usage and his Probation department badge;
and (2) to train Claxton to promote to a Deputy II with an LPS caseload that did not involve
real property issues. Accordingly, this proposed decision will examine whether Claxton'sjob
assignments indicate that the County had an unlawful motive when selecting the Deputy I
position for layoff. 8
There is evidence in the record that some of Claxton's job assignments lacked a real
training purpose. For instance, when Claxton was first reinstated, Beason issued him an
Improvement Plan requiring that he "read and memorize" the County's policies on information
technology and ethics. Barlow admitted that committing lengthy County policy statements to
memory was not a reasonable training assignment, but she downplayed the significance of
Beason' s use of the word "memorize" as unintentional. However, Barlow did not write this
Improvement Plan, she only "spoke with" Beason about it. Thus, her characterizationof
Beason's intent is speculative. Moreover, in the next line of the Improvement Plan, Beason
directs Claxton merely to "read" other training documents. Beason's use of the term "read and
memorize" in one sentence m1d "read" in the next suggests that his word choice was indeed
intentional. By the County's own admission, this assignment was inconsistent with the
County's stated purpose of training Claxton to promote to Deputy II. An employer's
8 In conducting this examination, it must be stressed that it is beyond the scope of this
proceeding to decide whether the assignment of these duties, in-and-of-themselves, constituted
retaliation under the MMBA. 	That claim was not alleged in the PERB complaint,nor did
OCEA seek leave to amend the complaint. Moreover, such a claim shouldnot be addressed
under PERB's unalleged violation doctrine because raising these claims for the first time now
would be untimely. 	(See County of Riverside (2010) PERB Decision No. 2097-M.)
16

inconsistent explanations for its conduct could be evidence of an unlawful motive. (State of
California (Department of Parks and Recreation) (1983) PERB Decision No. 328-S.)
In addition, there is evidence that the County intentionally kept Claxton isolated from
other PA-PG staff. According to the County, this was to ensure continuity in Claxton's
training, but this explanation is antithetical to the method used to train virtually every other
Deputy. The overwhelming evidence on this issue showed that "shadowing" other Deputies
was a significant aspect of new Deputies' training. Claxton did not have a single shadowing
opportunity after his reinstatement. This is also inconsistent with the County's position that it
was attempting to train Claxton.
Claxton's other assignments did have specific training purposes, but were nonetheless
suspicious due to their duration. 	For example, multiple witnesses testified that reviewing and
purging case files would train a Deputy to understand the contents of a file and why certain
actions were taken in a case. In Claxton's case, purging also helped fan1iliarize him with the
LPS unit and with PA-PG's new filing system. However, purging was Claxton's primary
assignment from July until November 2009. None of the other Deputies that testified said they
were required to purge files for the length of time that Claxton had this assignment. The
unusual length of this assignment suggests that the assigmnent was not purely for training
purposes.
However, mere poor training and personnel practices is not sufficient to carry OCEA's
burden in this case. (See City of Santa Monica, supra, PERB Decision No. 2211-M; City of
Alhambra (201 I) PERB Decision No. 2161-M.) OCEA must also show that the Claxton's
assignments were part of a concerted effort to lay him off in January 2010. The
uncontroverted evidence shows that no one involved in assigning Claxton work was aware of
the need for layoffs until September 2009, after all of the above-referenced assignments and
17

other actions were already underway.9 The timing of these facts, undisputed by OCEA,
undermine OCEA's claim that job duties originally assigned to Claxton in June and July were
part of an effort to not promote him and eventually lay him off. Thus, additional evidence of
nexus is needed to establish a prima facie case.
OCEA's Other Asserted Evidence of Nexus
OCEA contends that the statements of County Counsel Leon Page present further
evidence of an unlawful motive. 	Claxton's attorney testified at the hearing that Page told her
that Claxton should expect to continue to be isolated from others and should not expect his job
duties to change. However, there is insufficient infomrntion in the record to conclude that
Page was acting as an agent for either the PA-PG or the County when he made those
comments. "' Actual authority' is that which an employer intentionally confers upon the agent,
or intentionally or negligently allows the agent to believe himself or herself to possess."
(Chula Vista Elementary School District (2004) PERB Decision No. 1647, citing Inglewood
Teachers Assn. v. PERE (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 767.) Apparent authority, on the other hand,
"may be found when the employer has knowledge of its employee's activities and fails to
repudiate or disavow them or where the employer engages in additional acts in furtherance of
the agent's conduct that signify that it has ratified the employee's conduct." (West Contra
Costa County Healthcare District (2011) PERB Decision No. 2164-M, citing Los Angeles
Un/fied School District (2004) PERB Decision No. 1657, Compton Un/fied School District
(2003) PERB Decision No. 1518, Antelope Valley Community College District (1979) PERB
Decision No. 97.)
9 As explained above, no evidence was presented that the County CEO was aware of
Claxton's protected activities, meaning there is insufficient information to conclude that the
CEO's conduct was retaliatory. (See Oakland Unified School District (2009) PERB Decision
No. 2061; California State University (San Francisco)(l986) PERB Decision No. 559-H.)
18

Here, very little was presented about Page's involvement in PA-PG or County
operations. Aside from Barlow's brief comment that the County Counsel's office negotiated
Claxton's reinstatement date, no evidence showed that either the PA-PG or the County in
general intentionally conferred Page with any authority about Claxton's employment.
Similarly, no evidence was presented that anyone in the PA-PG or the County was aware of
Page's statements to Claxton's attorney. Thus, there was no opportunity for County
representatives to ratify or otherwise take steps in furtherance of Page's comments.
Accordingly, OCEA has not demonstrated that Page had either actual or apparent authority to
bind either the PA-PG or the County.
Moreover, because Page did not testify, his comments are hearsay, which is insufficient
to establish a matter of fact, unless that evidence would be admissible over the opposing
party's objection. (PERB Regulation 32176; County of Riverside, supra, PERB Decision No.
2090-M.) Evidence Code section 1222 provides for an exception to the hearsay rule for
statements made by a person authorized to speak on the subject matter at issue. However, this
section has been interpreted to apply only to '"high-ranking organizational agents who have
actual authority to speak on behalf of the organization."' (Thompson v. County of Los Angeles
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 154, 169, quoting Snider v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
1187, 1203.) In that case, the court concluded that statements from an attorney investigator did
not amount to an admission for purposes of Evidence Code 1222 because there was no
indication that he occupied a high-ranking position in the cmmty's hierarchy. (Id.) 	Likewise,
in this case, no evidence was presented about any role Page has within the PA-PG hierarchy.
Nor was evidence presented that he is a high-ranking official elsewhere in the County.
Accordingly, OCEA has not proven that this, or any other hearsay exception applies to Page's
19

statements. For these reasons, Page's statements do not provide additional persuasive evidence
of nexus.
OCEA also asserts that the County treated Claxton far differently from other PA-PG
Deputies. An employer's disparate treatment may be evidence of an unlawful motive.
(Omnitrans (2008) PERB Decision No. 1996-M.) For example, in San Joaquin Delta
Community College District (1982) PERB Decision No. 261, the Board found that an
employer's decision to reassign a campus police officer to its grounds crew was evidence of
nexus in light of the severity of the change in responsibility and in comparison to other
employees similarly situated to the employee in question.
In contrast, PERB declines to find evidence of nexus where the charging party fails to
demonstrate that he was treated differently from other "similarly situated" employees.
(Sacramento City Unified School District (2010) PERB Decision No. 2129 (Sacramento City
USD).) 	In Sacramento City USD, the Board found no basis for concluding an employee was
treated disparately where no evidence was presented regarding other substitutes who had been
guilty of similar misconduct (tardiness).
In this case, it is undisputed that the arbitration decision resulted in, essentially, a six-
month suspension without pay for Claxton. No evidence was presented about assignments
given to any other disciplined employees. Thus, there is no adequate basis for concluding
whether Claxton was treated disparately when compared to similarly situated employees.
Accordingly, this does not provide additional evidence of nexus.
OCEA also contends that Claxton's Improvement Plans did not provide him with the
appropriate information and feedback, according to the PIP manual. An employer's failure to
follow existing procedure may be evidence of nexus. 	(Omnitrans, supra, PERB Decision
No. 1996-M.) However, in State of California (Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation)
20

(2010) PERB Decision No. 2136-S, the Board found there was no departure from an
employer's probationary performance evaluation standards where the record showed that the
policies for such evaluations were only followed sporadically.
In this case, Barlow testified that the PA-PG used the PIP manual only as a guideline
and did not follow it strictly. The evidence presented supports this testimony. For example,
under the terms of the PIP manual, because Claxton's appointment to Deputy I was considered
a promotion, he was supposed to receive a mid-cycle review after three months. He did not
have any performance evaluation. This was during the time that Claxton felt he was being
considered for a promotion by Beason. Moreover, according to the PIP manual, it is the
responsibility of the employee to make sure the timelines and other procedures in the PIP
manual are being adhered to. According to the record, Claxton first raised his concerns about
the Improvement Plans in December 2009, at which point Roberge agreed to modify his
Improvement Plan. This appears generally consistent with the PIP manual. No evidence was
presented about other how other Improvement Plans were administered. Under these
circumstances, OCEA has not shown that the Improvement Plans departed significantly from
existing procedure.
Based on these facts, there is insufficient evidence of a nexus between Claxton' s
assignments and the eventual decision to lay off the Deputy I position. OCEA has therefore
not met its burden of proving a prima facie case for retaliation.
The County's Burden of Proof
Even if OCEA established a prima facie case, the County would have met its burden of
proving that retaliation was not the true cause of Claxton' s termination. If the charging party
can establish all the elements of a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same course of action
21

even if the charging party did not engage in any protected activity. (Trustees of the California
State University (2000) PERB Decision No. 1409-H, citing Novato, supra, PERB Decision No.
210, Martori Bros. Distributors v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 721.) In
other words, the issue is whether the adverse action would have occurred "but for" the
protected acts. (County of Riverside, supra, PERB Decision No. 2090-M.) However, the
focus of this analysis "is not whether the employer had a lawful reason for the action but
whether it took the action for an unlawful reason." (Baker Valley Unified School District
(2008) PERB Decision No. 1993, citing McFarland Unified School Dist. v. PERE (1991)
228 Cal.App.3d 166, 169.)
In Riverside Unified School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 639 (Riverside USD),
the Board found that an employee's discipline was not because he participated in the grievance
process, but because of his persistent failure to perform assigned tasks in a satisfactory manner.
Likewise in City of Santa Monica, supra, PERB Decision No. 2211-M, the Board found that an
employee's unacceptable performance record was sufficient to prove that he was not
terminated for protected activity. In contrast, in Baker Valley Unified School District, supra,
PERB Decision No. 1993, the Board found that an employer's non-renewal of a probationary
teacher based on alleged perfonnance problems was pretext for retaliation where there was no
evidence of prior documented performance concerns.
In this case, it cannot be said that "but for" Claxton' s protected activities, he would
have been promoted m1d therefore protected from layoff. 	Claxton's supervisor, Roberge,
testified she felt that Claxton was often careless with his work and did not appear to take his
assignments seriously. For instance, Roberge often found mistakes in Claxton's work and she
informed him of his errors both in meetings and in writing. Roberge found that Claxton
continued to repeat the same mistakes. In addition, Claxton typically did not have questions
22

even when given a complex reading or other assignment. Once again, Roberge informed
Claxton of her concerns, but Claxton's performance did not improve.
Claxton denies meeting with Roberge face-to-face more than once, but does not deny
receiving feedback from Roberge in some fashion. More importantly, Claxton does not deny
Roberge's critique of his work performance. Claxton's own testimony is also consistent with
Roberge's impressions. For example, Claxton described his assignment to examine and purge
LPS case files as simply removing everything before a certain date. This description ignores
the training component of the assignment. Multiple PA-PG staff testified that purging case
files helps Deputies become familiar with different types of documents and furthern10re
familiar with the new system for maintaining files. 	Claxton admitted to being unfamiliar with
"quite a few" of the documents contained in LPS case files.
Likewise, Claxton described his assignment for scanning benefits cards simply as
"alphabetiz[ing] and fil[ing] documents." Once again, this description ignores the training
purpose of the assignment, which was to learn where different case files were located. The
undisputed evidence shows that Claxton, in fact, was unable to locate certain files and
therefore sometimes failed to complete his scanning assignments properly.
Claxton also described his training assignments. For instance, he characterized a
mandatory PA-PG training about safety protocol flippantly as "just ... the office training."
On the whole, my own impression of Claxton during the hearing is consistent with
Roberge's assessment. I believe that that he did not perform his work in earnest and felt
entitled to be promoted to Deputy II. An employee's failure to perform job duties adequately
is sufficient to rebut the prima facie case for retaliation. (Riverside USD, supra, PERB
Decision No. 639; City of Santa Monica, supra, PERB Decision No. 2211-M.) Moreover,
Claxton's poor attitude towards his work and his apparent failure to grasp or appreciate his
23

training provides a reasonable explanation for both the relatively long duration of each
assignment and the County's decision to not promote him. Based on these circumstances,
OCEA's assertion that Claxton would have been promoted absent the County's retaliation
remains speculative.
OCEA may believe that Claxton's poor perfom1ance was justified under tl1e
circumstances due to the menial nature of his work. In County of San Joaquin (Health Care
Services) (2003) PERB Decision No. 1524-M (San Joaquin), the Board found that an employer
was not justified in disciplining an employee for acting inappropriately during an investigation
of his work performance when the circumstances surrounding the employer's investigation
itself was unprecedented and appeared unjustified. The Board concluded that an employer
may not provoke an employee to the point that he or she commits some kind of professional
indiscretion and then discipline the employee for that conduct. (Id., citing Trustees of Boston
University v. NLRB (1977) 548 F.2d 391, 393.)
The present case, however, arises under different circumstances. Unlike in San
Joaquin, supra, PERB Decision No. 1524-M, Claxton was found to have actually committed
serious misconduct by both a PA-PG investigation and by an independent arbitrator. The
arbitrator expressly concluded that some kind of remedial perfonnance plan was needed.
Thus, OCEA cannot contend that Claxton was provoked by unjustified County action. In
addition, as explained above, PERB has consistently found that an employee's sub-standard
performance constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination. (Riverside
USD, supra, PERB Decision No. 639; City of Santa Monica, supra, PERB Decision No.
2211-M.) Under these facts, Claxton cannot cure his own undisputed performance deficiencies
24

by claiming that the assignments themselves were too basic. 10 Therefore, this argument is not
persuasive.
PROPOSED ORDER
Orange County Employees Association has not established that the County of Orange
retaliated against John Claxton for engaging in protected activities. Therefore, the
Public Employment Relations Board complaint and underlying unfair practice charge in
LA-CE-667-M are hereby DISMISSED.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed
Decision and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement of exceptions with the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days of service of this
Decision. The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement of exceptions should identify by
page citation or exhibit number the portions of the record, if any, relied upon for such
exceptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32300.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB
business day. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code,
1°Furthermore, applying the holding in in San Joaquin, supra, PERB Decision No.
1524-M to the instant case would contravene the recognized labor relations principle of"obey
now, grieve later." (See Specialized Distribution Management (1995) 318 NLRB 158, 161
[holding that employees were not entitled to disregard directives from their employer, even if
they felt the employer was unjustified].) No grievance was filed over Claxton's job
assignments.
25

§ 11020, subd. (a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile
transmission before the close of business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet
which meets the requirements of PERB Regulation 32135(d), provided the filing party also
places the original, together with the required number of copies and proof of service, in the
U.S. mail. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, §§ 32090 and 32130.)
Any statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concunently with its
filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall accompany each copy served
on a party or filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32300, 32305, 32140,
and 32135, subd. (c).)
26