State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services) (PERB 2465S)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION LOCAL 1000,
Charging Party,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES),
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-277-S
PERB Decision No. 2465-S
December 30, 2015
Appearance: California Department of Human Resources by Joanna Yum, Labor Relations
Counsel, for State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services).
Before Martinez, Chair; Huguenin and Gregersen, Members.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, Chair: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the State of California (California Correctional Health
Care Services) (CCHCS) to a proposed decision (attached) by a PERB administrative law
judge (ALJ). The complaint and underlying unfair practice charge allege that the CCHCS
interfered with the right of an employee, Caesar Kindipan (Kindipan), to be represented by his
exclusive representative, Service Employees International Union Local 1000 (Local 1000), at a
meeting to present and discuss his performance evaluation and a counseling memorandum, as
well as interfered with the corresponding right of the exclusive representative to represent its
members. CCHCS's conduct is alleged to have violated the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act),
section 3519, subdivisions (a) and (b). 1
1 The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512 et seq. Unless otherwise
noted, all statutory references are to the Government Code. Section 3519 of the Dills Act
provides, in pertinent part:

It shall be unlawful for the state to do any of the following:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to
discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or
otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because
of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter ....
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed to them by
this chapter.
A formal hearing was held on June 30, 2015. Post-hearing briefs were filed on
August 28, 2015, and the proposed decision issued on September 18, 2015. The ALJ
concluded that CCHCS did not interfere with employee rights by failing to permit the
attendance of a union representative at Kindipan's performance evaluation tl}eeting,2 but
did interfere with employee rights by issuing Kindipan an overbroad directive to cease.sending
e-mails to other nurses.3 CCHCS timely filed exceptions to the proposed decision. Local 1000
filed no response.
CCHCS does not except to the factual findings or conclusions oflaw, only to the
Proposed Order and Notice. The record as a whole supports the factual findings. The Board
2 The ALJ concluded that the meeting was not investigatory, nor did it involve highly
unusual circumstances, and therefore no right to union representation attached. (NLRB v.
J. Weingarten, Inc. (1975) 420 U.S. 251, as adopted by PERB in Rio Hondo Community
College District (1982) PERB Decision No. 260; Redwoods Community College Dist. v. Public
Employment Relations Bd. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 617.)
3 During the meeting, Kindipan's supervisor instructed him to stop forwarding here-
mail communications to nurses "who had nothing to do with the subject of the original e-mail
communication." (Proposed Dec., p. 9.) Kindipan's supervisor did not clarify her directive to
distinguish between e-mails Kindipan sent to his union steward and e-mails Kindipan sent to
nurses in general. The ALJ concluded that it is reasonable that Kindipan would construe the
directive to cease sending e-mails to nurses as a restriction on his union-related activity.
(Proposed Dec., p. 21.)
2

adopts that section of the proposed decision relati.ng to the overbroad directive4 as the decision
of the Board itself, except the Board finds merit in CCHCS's exceptions and modifies the
Proposed Order and Notice as explained below.5
CCHCS Exceptions
There are three main exceptions to the Proposed Order and Notice. First, the proposed
decision concludes in substance that CCHCS interfered with employee rights, an "a" violation,
by issuing an overbroad directive to Kindipan to stop sending e-mails to nurses. The conduct
subject to the cease and desist order corresponds to that conclusion in that it orders the
respondent to cease and desist from "[i]nterfering with employees' rights." As CCHCS points
out in its exceptions, however, the prefatory paragraph in the Proposed Order refers to a "b"
violation, rather than an "a" violation, and the cease and desist order contained in the Notice
describes both an "a" and a "b" violation.
4 The discussion of the overbroad directive begins on page 18 with a sentence that
refers to Kin9ipan's "right to union representation." The right involved in this section of the
proposed decision, however, is more aptly described as the right to participate in union-related
activities. (Dills Act, § 3515.)
5 The panel agrees with the ALJ that CCHCS interfered with employee rights by issuing
Kindipan an overbroad directive to cease sending e-mail messages to other nurses. There are
undeveloped, differing views amongst the panel members about whether CCHCS interfered
with employee rights by failing to pennit the attendance ofKindipan's union representative at
a meeting to present and discuss his performance evaluation and a counseling memorandum.
These differences notwlthstanding, exceptions not specifically urged are waived. (PERB Reg.
§ 32300, subd. (c).) The issue ofKindipan's entitlement to a union representative has not been
excepted to or argued by the parties, is not before us on appeal and therefore will not be
discussed further. The Board itself is not, however, compelled by the absence of exceptions on
specific issues to adopt the proposed decision, whether in whole or in part. In this instance,
given the absence of specific exceptions and given the differing views of the panel members,
we decline to adopt that section of the proposed decision addressing the issue whether
Kindipan's right to union representation was interfered with by CCHCS, beginning on page 14
below the Conclusions of Law heading and continuing through the middle of page 18. The
Board's decision to not adopt this section of the proposed decision should not be given any
particular meaning and does not constitute a change in precedent.
3

Finding merit in CCHCS's exceptions on this issue, the Board modifies the Proposed
Order and Notice to reflect the conclusions of law reached in the proposed decision by:
(1) revising the prefatory paragraph in the Proposed Order to refer to an "a" violation rather
than a "b" violation; and (2) revising the cease and desist order in the Notice to mirror the
cease and desist order in the Proposed Order.
Second, the Proposed Order requires that the Notice be posted "at all work locations
where notices to employees in Service Employees International Union Local 1000 customarily
are posted." This posting requirement is not limited to any particular state bargaining unit
represented by Local 1000 or any particular department or agency within the state. CCHCS
argues that the proposed posting requirement arguably requires statewide posting even though
the violation is limited to one instance of interference at one institution, CCHCS's Correctional
Training Facility in Salinas, California.
Finding merit in CCHCS's exceptions on this issue, the Board modifies the Proposed
Order to require posting of the Notice at all CCHCS's Correctional Training Facility work
locations where notices to employees represented by Local 1000 customarily are posted. 6
6 Posting copies of the remedial order in unfair practice cases effectuates the policies
and purposes of California's labor relations statutes. (See, Placerville Union School District
(1978) PERB Decision No. 69.) "[I]t is important that the employees affected by this decision
and order be notified of their rights under the EERA [Educational Employment Relations Act]
and the findings of the Board in relationship thereto. Posting copies of the order will inform
the District's employees that the District's conduct ... violated the EERA." (Id. at p. 12;
EERA is codified at§ 3540 et seq.) Under the specific facts of this case, including the fact that
the violation to be remedied does not involve contract language applicable to the entire
bargaining unit, the Board finds that the employees represented by Local 1000 employed at
CCHCS's Correctional Training Facility are the employees affected by the decision and order
for posting requirement purposes. (See, State of California (Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation) (2012) PERB Decision No. 2282-S [respondent ordered to post notice where
violation to be remedied occurred, i.e., at CDCR's California Correctional Institution work
locations where notices to employees are customarily posted].)
4

Under a different set of facts, a broader system- or unit-wide notice may be warranted.
(See, State of California (Department of Mental Health) .(1990) PERB Decision•No. 840-S,
p. 5, fn. 3 [although the order and statement of violation in notice is limited to one facility, "it
is appropriate to require that the notice be posted systemwide, as the violation to be remedied
herein concerns contract language applicable to the entire unit, whose members are employed
on a systemwide basis"]; State of California (Departments of Personnel Administration,
Banking, Transportation, Water Resources and Board of Equalization) (1999) PERB Order
No. Ad-300-S.)
Last, the electronic notice posting requirement contained in the Proposed Order differs
in scope from the physical paper notice posting requirement. It requires posting of the Notice
by electronic means customarily used by the Respondent to communicate with its employees in
the bargaining unit and with the employees in the Department of State Hospitals, Correctional
Training Facility in Salinas, California.7 As CCHCS argues in its exceptions, the electronic
notice posting requirement is not intended to broaden the reach of the posting order. Rather, it
is intended "to reach the same employees as would be exposed to paper notices posted by
traditional means." (City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, p. 45.)
Finding merit in CCHCS's exceptions on this issue, the Board modifies the Proposed
Order to conform the scope of the electronic notice posting requirement to the scope of the
physical notice posting requirement.
7 On or around December 1, 2014, Kindipan left employment with CCHCS, and began
working for the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) at the Salinas Valley State Prison. The
respondent herein is CCHCS, a division within the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, not DSH. Apart from being Kindipan's current place of employment, DSH has
no other readily apparent connection to this case. To ensure publication of the notice to all
affected employees, in addition to requiring physical and electronic posting, CCHCS shall, to
the best of its ability, individually notify Kindipan by mailing the Notice to him at his last
known or forwarding address. (See, Antelope Valley Community College District (1979)
PERB Decision No. 97.)
5

ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, and the entire record in the
case, it is found that the State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services)
(CCHCS) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act), Government Code section 3519,
subdivision (a), by issuing an overbroad directive to Registered Nurse Caesar Kindipan
(Kindipan) to cease e-mailing other nurses with regard to workplace issues.
Pursuant to section 3514.5, subdivision ( c), of the Government Code, it hereby is
ORDERED that CCHCS, its governing board and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with employees' rights to participate in union-related
activities by issuing overbroad directives to cease e-mailing coworkers with work-related
issues.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE DILLS ACT:
1. 	Within ten (10) workdays of the service of a final decision in this matter,
post at all CCHCS's Correctional Training Facility work locations where notices to employees
in the bargaining unit represented by Service Employees International Union Local 1000
(Local 1000) customarily are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. The
Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of the CCHCS, indicating that it will comply
with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a period of thirty (30)
consecutive workdays. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not reduced
in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other material. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, the Notice shall be posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and
6

other electronic means customarily used by the CCHCS to regularly communicate with its
employees in the bargaining unit at the Correctional Training Facility in Salinas, California.
To ensure publication of the notice to affected employees, in addition to requiring physical and
electronic posting of the Notice, CCHCS shall individually notify Kindipan by mailing the
Notice to him at his last known or forwarding address, or by any other means of notification
reasonably devised to ensure that he is advised of his rights and remedies under this Decision.
CCHCS, its governing board and its representatives shall take reasonable steps to ensure that
the posted Notice is not reduced in size, defaced, altered, or covered by any material.
2. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board or the General
Counsel's designee. CCHCS shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by the General
Counsel or his/her designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order shall be
concurrently served on Local 1000.
Members Huguenin and Gregersen joined in this Decision.
7

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-277, Service Employees
International Union Local 1000 v. State of California (California Correctional Health Care
Services), in which all parties had the right to participate, it has been found that the State of
California (California Correctional Health Care Services) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act,
Government Code section 3512 et seq. when it interfered with employee Caesar Kindipan's
right to participate in union-related activities by issuing an overbroad directive for him to cease
e-mailing coworkers with his workplace concerns.
Dated:
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
Interfering with employees' rights to participate in union-related activities by
issuing overbroad directives to cease e-mailing coworkers with work-related
issues.
--------- STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES)
By: Authorized Agent
--------------
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST
.THIRTY (30) CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION LOCAL 1000,
Charging Party,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONAL HEAL TH CARE SERVICES),
Res ondent.
UNFAIR PRACTICE
CASENO. SF-CE-277-S
PROPOSED DECISION
(September 18, 2015)
Appearances: Theresa Witherspoon, Staff Attorney, for Service Employees International
Union Local 1000; California Department of Human Resources, by Joanna Yum, Labor
Relations Counsel, for State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services.
Before Alicia Clement, Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above-referenced unfair practice charge was filed on September 17, 2014. The
allegations in the original charge include that the Respondent interfered with the rights of an
employee to be represented by the employee organization of his choice as well as the
corresponding right of the exclusive representative to represent its members, a so-called
"Weingarten"1 violation, in violation of Dills Act section 3519, subsections (a) and (b ). An
amended charge was received on Octa ber 8, 2014, which provided additional facts but no new
legal theories. Respondent filed a response to the charge on October 20, 2014, denying any
violation of the Act. On January 9, 2015, PERB issued a complaint for a violation of the Dills
1 (Weingarten, supra, 420 U.S. 251, quoting Quality Manufacturing Co. (1972) 195
NLRB 197, 199.)

Act section 3519, subsections (a) and (b). An informal settlement conference was held on
March 26, 2015, but the matter was not settled. A formal hearing was held on June 30, 2015.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Caesar Kindipan (Kindipan) was hired as a Registered Nurse (RN) at the Department of
State Hospitals, Correctional Training Facility (CTF) in Salinas, California, in April 2011. He
began working at the Salinas Valley State Prison in December 2014. The events in question all ·
occurred while Kindipan was assigned to the CTF. The CTF is comprised of three separate
medical facilities, labeled Central, North, and South facilities.
At all times relevant to this charge, Allan Joachim was the Chief Nurse Executive for
CTF. Among his duties, Joachim is responsible for assigning the Supervising Registered
Nurses (SRNs) to supervise particular Registered Nurses (RNs), a task that includes writing
annual performance evaluations for and collecting time sheets from the RNs. In making these
assignments, Joachim's goal is to assign the employee to a supervisor who is around them the
most. He also acknowledges that it is important not to overload any SRN with too many
supervisees, and occasionally this means assigning an SRN to an RN who is not working the
same shift or in the same facility as the SRN. In his words, "[i]t's not ideal, but it's better than
overloading one supervisor." In such a scenario, Joachim thinks it's feasible for the SRN to
draft a performance review of the RN who is assigned a different shift based on the RN's
documentation, input from the SRNs who are on duty and able to observe the RN regularly,2
and also from the supervisor's e-mail contacts with the RN.
2 Respondent distinguishes between the SRN assigned for purposes of conducting
annual performance evaluations for RNs and the SRN on-duty on a particular shift who
supervises RN s during that shift.
2

Joachim also maintains the organizational chart for CTF, a task that requires periodic
updates due to personnel and staffing changes. Joachim testified that it is possible that the
organizational chart may not always reflect the most recent changes because he will only
generate a new organizational chart when there are a sufficient number of personnel and
staffing changes to justify the work it takes for him to complete the task. He did state,
however, that he informs the SRNs of changes in staffing as they occur, and an employee who
is confused about who their current supervisor is may seek clarification from any SRN.
For example, Joachim created a new organizational chart on September 17, 2013, that
assigned SRN II Mary Hartman to supervise Kindipan. Joachim created a new organizational
chart on July 17, 2014, which indicates that Dierdra Camarillo was Kindipan's supervisor.
Camarillo worked second watch from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. in South facility. 	What the July 2014
organizational chart does not show is that Camarillo was assigned as Kindipan' s supervisor
five months earlier, in February 2014. Joachim asserts that the change ofKindipan's
supervisor was necessitated because Kindipan works in a relief position and is assigned to
work third watch from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. in South facility two days, then third watch in Central
facility for three days. Because of their different schedules and assignments, Kindipan and
Camarillo were in the same location at the same time for only a few hours each week.
On July _9, 2014, Kindipan worked an overtime shift that started at 6 a.m. in the
Outpatient Health Unit. Sometime before noon, Camarillo approached him and requested that
he join her in the conference room where she intended to administer his annual performance
review. SRN Beverly Grant was also present at the meeting. What occurred at this meeting is
highly disputed between the parties, and became the basis for this unfair practice charge. In
3

the retelling of the events at this late-morning meeting on July 9, 2014, I present each party's
separate version.
Kindipan recalls that, at approximately 11 :40 a.m., Grant and Camarillo approached
him in the Outpatient Health Unit and asked him to follow them to the conference room so he
could receive his performance evaluation. Although Camarillo had e-mailed Kindipan in
February to inform him that she was his supervisor, he had never met her before she
approached him about this meeting. It struck Kindipan as unusual to be called into a meeting
with two supervisors, especially as he had never worked with Camarillo before that day. Once
there, they presented him with a written copy of his performance appraisal summary. When he
saw that all the categories had been marked "Improvement needed for performance to meet
standards," he immediately requested that he be permitted to call his union representative,
James Kinney. Because he had seen Kinney on the premises earlier in the day, Kindipan knew
Kinney could be summoned. Grant and Camarillo denied his request and told him that he
didn't need a union representative. When Kindipan attempted to leave the conference room to
summon Kinney himself, Grant and Camarillo told him ifhe left the room, he would be
disciplined. He admits that, at the time, he did not read the comments on the performance
appraisal, but that he has since read the entire document.
The comments on the performance appraisal include many of the concerns that
Kindipan recalls having been questioned about during the meeting. For example, in the
category, "Quality of Work," the document reads, "I have observed several 7362's that were
done incorrectly even after protocol training 05/5/2014-05/09/2014 [sic] Dental 7362's sent
straight to MR only no signature no date." Under the categories for "Meeting Work
Commitments," and "Analyzing Situations," the appraisal states, "I have observed you do not
4

follow protocol and policies regarding your 7362's. Even after protocol training was
provided," and "I have observed you not completing your documentation for your 7362's.
Even after protocol training was provided," respectively.
The 7362 is a document that is used by inmates to request medical services. The RN
takes the form from the inmate and assigns the inmate's complaint to a particular category like
"medical," "dental," or "mental," and places the form in the corresponding receptacle so that
the inmate's complaint may be assessed for appropriate further action. Grant and Camarillo
accused Kindipan of placing an unknown quantity of 7362s in the wrong receptacle. Several
of the examples of incorrect placement of 7362s were taken from North facility. They asked
Kindipan if he'd attended the in-service training on the proper way to complete the 7362, and
he responded that he had. He also raised the concern that the boxes in which the forms are
placed after completion are open to all RNs, and often the RNs submit forms on behalf of
coworkers or move the forms from one box to another. Furthermore, if Grant and Camarillo
had concerns with Kindipan's assignment of the forms to one particular box or another, they
should have raised this concern at some point before his annual performance evaluation.
Under the category labeled "Work Habits,'' the document states, "I have observed
several closeouts & Med Recon used as scratch paper. Need to use appropriate scratch paper.
Write neat and legible. If last column is used start another piece of paper for your close outs
do not write at bottom of the page." Medication Reconciliation Forms ("Med Recons" or
MRFs) are used to track and record medication for a specific patient. Grant and Camarillo
accused him of using MRFs as scratch paper. Kindipan explained that MRFs can be printed
out in unlimited quantities, and it was common practice to use them as note paper to take down
a patient's symptoms, in order to later relay those symptoms to a doctor.
5

After administering his performance appraisal, Camarillo presented Kindipan with an
Employee Counseling Record (ECR). The ECR contains the following relevant statements:
On June 30th I notified all staff whenall 998's were due. I
copied and pasted Audrey Jones e-mail regarding all information
related to 998's and the timeline and expectations. You
continued to send me e-mails disputing the information provided
to you. (See attachments) I did not receive your 998 unitl July
3rd. I had to go pick up your 998 at the SRN's office in central
only to have to return it to you for corrections. When you were
done with the corrections again you left it in the SRN' s office in
central. I picked up your 998 July 8th when I was informed by
Lozada SRN that it was there on her desk. Your 998 did not get
turned in until July 9th. This is unacceptable.
[... ]
As per the Memo from Spearman and e-mail from Audrey Jones
and several e-mails from your supervisor D. Camarillo you are to
turn in your 998 by the 1st business day after payday to your
designated supervisor D. Camarillo SRN II or in her office box
or slip under her office door. 	[Emphasis in original.]
At the bottom of the form, it contains the following "Action Plan": "You will turn in
your 998 every month on time, on or before the 3rd [sic] business day after payday.
Completed in [its] entirety with correct codes where indicated."
998s are employee timesheets. Grant and Camarillo raised a concern about Kindipan's
failure to give his 998s to Camarillo in person as well as the fact that he often turned them in
late. He explained that because he works a different shift and splits his week between two
locations, it is difficult to find Camarillo to give her the form. For that reason, he has asked
other RNs to deliver the forms on his behalf.
During the course of the meeting, Kindipan asked no fewer than five times to have a
union representative present. He was also concerned about his patients, who had been left in
the Outpatient Health Unit without an RN present-just LVNs. At one point, Grant and
6

Camarillo wanted to know why he was answering them, and he stated, "So how can I defend
myself when you don't want me to give, you don't want me to have a representative." They
told him to stop emailing Kinney, and that they would write him up ifhe did. The meeting
concluded with him asking for copies of the evidence they produced, which included the 7362s
and 998s, as well as a copy of the employee counseling record, and they told him he didn't
need copies. Instead of Kindipan's signature there is a handwritten notation in place of the
employee signature which states, "Kindipan refused to sign." It is noteworthy that there are no
positive comments anywhere on the evaluation.
Immediately after the meeting, Kindipan returned to the Outpatient Health Unit to
check on his patients. From there, he proceeded to Kinney's office, located on another floor.
He stayed with Kinney for approximately 20 minutes, discussing the meeting. Kindipan
suffered heart palpitations and shaking in response to the meeting, and reported these
symptoms to LVN Ruben Escolta at approximately 6: 15 that evening. Escolta took his vital
signs and reported on a 7219 (workplace injury form) that Kindipan had an elevated blood
pressure of 157/104. This was much higher than his usual blood pressure of 115/65. In
describing the circumstances of the injury or unusual occurrence, Escolta quotes Kindipan as
saying, "I can not concentrate on my job, because of extream [sic] anxiety, from the evaluation
I had earlier today [with] SRN 2 Camarillo, and SRN 2 Grant. I have never had [high] blood
pressure before." Kindipan completed his double shift that day.
At 10:49 p.m. that day, Kindipan drafted an e-mail that he subsequently sent to a
number of coworkers and superiors throughout the California Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation, describing the morning meeting. In the e-mail, Kindipan states, in part:
At approx. 1140 while working in OHU 2nd Fl Infirmary with 15
patients under SRN2 Totorelli. SRN Camarillo and SRN Grant
7

summoned me to report at the Conference Room here at 2nd
Floor Infirmary, they called for the OHU C.O. to open the locked
room. I went inside the room and the 2 SRNs ask me to sit and
informed me about the outcome of my Yearly Evaluation, while
I'm looking at my Eval I saw that everything on the "I" box was
checked means Improvement Needed for Performance ... which is
very poor evaluation ....
My personal opinion:
I believed that this Poor Evaluation against me is a form of
hatred, retaliation and despair due to the fact that I'm telling the
truth when you see our communications through e-mails
especially with SRN Grant. When you speak for the truth and
just your boss does'nt [sic] like you, that's what I'm experiencing
right now.
Their evidence supporting the evaluation is very light, no weight
and without jurisdiction, there's no nursing-patient issues. I
never have a Gross Negligence, Mal practice, or even a simple
nursing errors like, medicine errors. I never get involved in
disciplinary actions nurse- patient interactions.
I even told them that I have no previous evaluation on the year
2012 and 2013 but still they proceeded with the meeting. I asked
them for a copy of the documents/ papers ( 7362s and med recon)
as their evidence but they both said No, I dont need them ....
Ms Grant also did the 998 ECR which again out of her
jurisdiction since she's not my Supervisor. I have e-mails about
this 998 with Ms. Camarillo also which she disagrees, we have to
remember also that 998 is our salary from our hard work and if it
delays then of course we dont get our money on the right date,
but anyway I'm not complaining about delays, but why Ms.
Camarillo is so very particular about this, I even told her by
phone that next time I do my best to reach her and hand my 998
personally since we dont have the same schedule, building area
and shift, but still Ms Grant did this ECR of 998. I'm supposed
to be the one complaining.
Camarillo had been an SRN II at CTF Soledad for five years before leaving on May 21,
2015. She began supervising Kindipan in February 2014 and notified him of that fact by e-
mail. The only interactions with Kindipan that she can recall, other than the July 9 meeting,
were by e-mail.
8

Camarillo prepared for her meeting with Kindipan by copying e-mails and 7362s that
were referenced in the performance appraisal. She then asked Grant to join her in the
conference room, apparently as an observer. Camarillo's recollection of the events of the
meeting are as vague as Kindipan's are vivid. She had difficulty remembering the date when
the meeting took place, and believes it was late morning when it began. This was only the
second evaluation she'd administered at CTF, and she can't recall if she gave Kindipan
advance notice of the meeting. She does recall that, once in the conference room, she and
Kindipan sat across from each other at the conference table while Grant sat at the back of the
room working on unrelated paperwork.
According to Camarillo, the concern she raised with the 7362s was that they had been
completed incorrectly or not at all-it had nothing to do with which box he placed the forms
in, as Kindipan recalled. She can't recall the specific reasons that his 7362s were deemed
incorrect. She cited concerns regarding the MRF because a doctor had raised the concern to
her with regard to one ofKindipan's MRFs. The doctor had complained that the MRF he
received from Kindipan was confusing and Camarillo was directing Kindipan on the proper use
of the form. 	She never asked Kindipan about his training during the meeting, but did instruct
him to stop forwarding her e-mail communications to nurses who had nothing to do with the
subject of the original e-mail communication. She never specifically told him to stop emailing
Kinney.
Camarillo chose to address the issue of the 998s in a separate counseling memorandum
because it didn't fit into any of the categories on the performance evaluation. Her intent in
providing him with the counseling memorandum was to explain her expectations to him with
regard to handing in his 998s on time.
9

According to Camarillo, all she did was go over Kindipan's evaluation and ask him if
he had any questions. She recalls that, almost from the start, Kindipan began to challenge her
assertion that she was his supervisor and continually interrupted her to dispute her examples of
his below-standard performance. Camarillo disputes Kindipan' s assertions that he repeatedly
requested union representation. In her recollection, Kindipan asked once, toward the end of
the meeting, ifhe could speak with Kinney. In response to his request; Camarillo stated,
"you're more than welcome to talk to him, let's finish this, I'll give you copies of this, and
then you can go talk to him." Her recollection is that she provided Kindipan with copies of all
the documents she had at the meeting.
Sometime after the conclusion of the meeting, Camarillo learned that Kindipan had sent
an e-mail to Joachim and others, complaining about the performance evaluation. She learned
about the e-mail when Joachim contacted her with a request that she provide him with a written
explanation of Kindipan's concerns.
Grant's recollection of the meeting generally corroborates Camarillo' s. She attended
Kindipan's evaluation because Camarillo requested her presence for "support." The only
preparation she did for the meeting was to ask one of the LVN s to watch Kindi pan's patients
while they were in the meeting, with instructions to summon them if they had a concern. Grant
had supervised Kindipan in the past, but had never issued him a performance evaluation.
Grant did not hear Kindipan mention Kinney by name during the meeting, but does recall that
Kindipan got up from the table at one point with the intent of leaving the room. According to
Grant, Kindipan's stated reason at the time was in order to check on his patients. She
addressed him directly to inform him that his patients were being looked after and that he was
bordering on insubordination. She did not state that he would be written up for his behavior.
10

She also recalls that Kindipan was constantly interrupting Camarillo and would not allow her
to explain the process to him and why she had convened the meeting. She recalls generally
that there was a concern raised that Kindipan had sent a number of e-mails to a large volume of
people and he was instructed not to do that.
James Kinney learned about the meeting when Kindipan came to his office immediately
after the meeting. Kinney is a job steward, district bargaining representative, and a negotiating
committee member for the union and was on-duty during the time of the events in question.
Kindipan .was distraught-visibly trembling and very upset-when he approached Kinney to
seek his advice. Kinney recalls that K:indipan stated that both Grant and Camarillo had
questioned him during the meeting. Kinney recounted at least one incident prior to the July 9
meeting in which he (Kinney) had been called in to a meeting with two managers, and had
been granted a union representative in response to his request for one. In his estimation, it is
unusual to have two managers in a meeting with one employee, and that circumstance alone
warrants the presence of a union representative on behalf of the employee. After the July 9
meeting, Kinney and Kindipan met on a number of occasions and exchanged many e-mails.
After the July 9 meeting, Kindipan began consciously avoiding working overtime shifts
that would bring him in contact with Grant or Camarillo. Prior to July 9, he was accustomed to
working between ten and twelve overtime shifts per month. However, during the months of
July, August, September, October and November, Kindipan worked significantly fewer
overtime shifts in an effort to avoid working the same shifts as Grant or Camarillo.
On August 18, 2014, as the result of an investigation that was initiated by Kindipan' s
complaint to Joachim, Joachim rescinded the July 9 performance appraisal. In its place,
11

Joachim drafted a performance appraisal that rated Kindipan as meeting expectations in all
categories, without comment.
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
In order to determine if Kin di pan had a right to union representation at the· July 9, 2014
meeting, I must first determine what actually transpired at the meeting. This task is made
difficult by the fact that none of the witnesses presented a version of the events that is
complete and reliable. My task in this case is to test the quality of each witness's recollection
based on factors like their admission of facts, the effect of bias on their testimony, the quality·
of their recollection, their testimonial consistency, the presence or absence of corroboration,
and their demeanor.
·
Kindipan's recollection is vivid, but he recalls not so much the facts of the events so
much as he recalls his emotional response to the events. He was immediately on the defensive
and attempted to flee the setting. His physical reaction to the stress of the situation was
extreme and there is no suggestion that he was malingering or exaggerating his response. He
was truly distraught. His general recollection of the meeting is accurate, in the sense that the
topics that he claims to have been interrogated about were indeed the subject of written
commentary in the evaluation. But in his retelling, he often confused the order of events, and
tended to veer off the topic of the question asked, making it difficult to ascertain whether he
truly had the ability to recall specifics of the meeting.
On the other hand, Grant and Camarillo both claim that the meeting was hardly worth
remembering, given the very ordinariness of the event. In her own retelling, Camarillo
apparently thought nothing of administering a negative performance evaluation, and a
disciplinary memorandum assertedly based on her observations of his work performance, to an
12

employee whom she had never met, let alone one whose work she had personally observed.
Nevertheless, she is apparently able to recall with certainty that Kindipan never requested a
union representative during the meeting. Grant's presence at the meeting was treated by both
Grant and Camarillo as an afterthought. Camarillo was fairly dismissive of Grant's presence,
stating that she was merely seated in the room and completing unrelated paperwork during the
majority of the interaction between Kindipan and Camarillo. Grant herself seemed unsure of
the reason for her presence in the room, except for some vague need to "support" Camarillo.
Given that the events were so unremarkabie, it is curious that both Grant and Camarillo can
state with.such certainty that Kindipan never requested a union representative during the
meeting.
Each of the participants' interpretations of the meeting seem fanciful in some respects
and alternately embellished or stripped of detail to support the speaker's position. The truth
lies somewhere in between. However, the following conclusions are essentially undisputed.
The meeting was conducted during the late morning at a time and place where Kindipan was
not ordinarily scheduled to work. He was called into the meeting with no notice, and he had
never before met Camarillo. Camarillo delivered a negative performance evaluation and a
counseling memorandum on matters that had never before been brought to Kindipan' s
attention. Because none of his previous supervisors had given him a performance evaluation,
he had no basis upon which to compare the circumstances of this performance evaluation.
Camarillo discussed with Kindipan the comments on his evaluation, and he felt the need to
defend himself against what he perceived to be accusations of misconduct. Kindipan made it
known to both Grant and Camarillo that he was displeased with Camarillo's assessment of his
performance, that he wanted to leave, that he wanted to talk to Kinney and also that he wanted
13

to go check on his patients. Grant informed Kindipan that his attempts to curtail the meeting
bordered on insubordination but stopped short of threatening discipline. Camarillo instructed
Kindipan to cease e-mailing other nurses, and Kinney is a nurse. Camarillo did not clarify her
directive to distinguish between e-mails he sent to Kinney as the union steward and
representative versus e-mails he sent to nurses in general. Finally, it is clear that Camarillo's
purpose for convening the meeting was to deliver these documents to Kindipan, and Camarillo
attempted to prevent Kindipan from providing an explanation or justification for the conduct
complained of in the documents. Neither Camarillo nor Grant threatened discipline or actually
disciplined Kindipan as a result of his speech or conduct during the meeting.
ISSUE
Whether Respondent violated the statute when Grant and Camarillo refused to permit
Kindipan to summon a union representative to the July 9 meeting.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
An employee required to attend an investigatory interview with the employer is entitled
to union representation where the employee has a reasonable basis to believe discipline may
result from the meeting. (National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten (1975) 420 U.S. 251
(Weingarten).) 3 In United States Postal Service (1980) 252 NLRB 61, 63, the NLRB noted the
Supreme Court's prior approval of its shaping of the "contours and limits of the statutory right"
as follows:
First, the right inheres in 7' s guarantee of the right of employees
to act in concert for mutual aid and protection ....
3 PERB adopted the Weingarten rule in Rio Hondo Community College District (1982)
Decision No. 260.
14

Second, the right arises only in situations where the employee
requests representation. In other words, the employee may
forego his guaranteed right and, if he prefers, participate in an
interview unaccompanied by his union representative.
Third, the employee's right to request representation as a
condition of participation in an interview is limited to situations
where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will
result in disciplinary action ....
Fourth, exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate
employer prerogatives. The employer has no obligation to justify
his refusal to allow union representation, and despite refusal, the
employer is free to carry on his inquiry without interviewing the
employee and thus leave the employee the choice between having
an interview unaccompanied by his representative, or having no
interview and foregoing any benefits that might be derived from
one.
Fifth, the employer has no duty to bargain with any union
representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory
interview ....
In 2012, the NLRB adopted an ALJ's decision in which the ALJ noted that, despite the
fact that the rule had been law for four decades, "[t]he Board and the courts ... have had
difficulty in determining under what circumstances a reasonable basis exists for believing that
the investigatory interview will result in disciplinary action." (El Paso Healthcare System,
Ltd. (2012) 358 NLRB No. 54, p. 12.) The ALJ went on to provide the following summary:
Thus, even a conversation between a supervisor and an employee
about improving the employees' production may trigger
Weingarten rights if sufficiently linked to a real prospect of
discipline for poor production. Moreover, Weingarten rights are
applicable even at a disciplinary interview if the employer
engages in investigatory conduct 'beyond merely informing the
employee of a previously made disciplinary decision.'
Furthermore, the Board has held that where an employer informs
an employee of a disciplinary action then questions the employee
to seek information to bolster that decision, the employee's right
to representation applies.
15

In Titanium Metals Corp., ... the Board held that an employer
unlawfully denied an employee's request for a union
representative at a meeting, even though the expressed purpose of
· the meeting was simply to inform the employee of a decision
regarding discipline that the employer had already made. The
Board found that the employee had a right to a union
representative's presence because the employer went beyond its
stated purpose by interrogating and searching the employee for
newsletters in an attempt to support its decision to discipline him.
(Id. at p. 13, internal citation omitted.)
In this case, I find that the meeting that was convened by Camarillo on July 9, 2014,
was not investigatory. Camarillo' s testimony that all she did was present the performance
appraisal to Kindipan and ask him if he had any questions, is corroborated in part by
Kindipan's own testimony. According to Kindipan, Grant and Camarillo wanted to know why
he was answering them and he responded that he needed to defend himself since they wouldn't
allow him to have a union representative present. This exchange is telling in that it
demonstrates both that Grant and Camarillo were not seeking responses to questions as well as
the fact that Kindipan was made aware of this fact. Additionally, there are no subjects that
Kindipan recalls having been interrogated about which were not also noted on his performance
appraisal, such that there is no indication that Grant or Camarillo were seeking information
regarding Kindipan' s work performance beyond that which had already been documented.
Under the circumstances, I must find that this was not an investigatory meeting, and no right to
union representation may be justified on that basis.
In addition to the NLRB's holding that a right to union representation attaches to an
investigatory meeting, PERB has found that a right to union representation may be held to
exist, in the absence of an objectively reasonable fear of discipline, only under "highly unusual
circumstances." (Redwoods Community College District v. Public Employment Relations
16

Board (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 617 (Redwoods).) The finding of"highly unusual
circumstances" in the Redwoods case was based on the requirement that the employee attend a
meeting that she no longer sought over her appeal of a negative performance rating; the fact
that the interview was investigatory and formal; the interview was held by a high-ranking
official of the employer; and the hostile attitude of the official toward the employee. In this
sense, the Redwoods case is like the cases cited in El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd., supra, 358
NLRB No. 54, where a Weingarten right attaches to a meeting if the employer engages in
investigatory conduct beyond merely informing the employee of a previously made
disciplinary decision.
Despite the element of an investigative intent by the employer in the Redwoods case,
the Board recently·stated that California law extends the right of representation to employer-
initiated meetings held under "highly unusual circumstances," i.e., meetings that are not
"investigative" or "disciplinary" per se. (Capistrano Unified School District (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2440.) In this case, however, I find that Redwoods does not apply, and Kindipan
had no right to union representation at the July 9, 2014 meeting. Performance appraisals are a
routine part of the employ~ent setting, as are counseling memoranda. PERB has long
accepted that these conversations do not give rise to a right to have a union representative
present. (See Rio Hondo Community College District (1982) PERB Decision No. 260,
violation found because in addition to notifying the employee of the discipline, the employer
engaged in a give-and-take discussion offering to modify the discipline, and Placer Hills
Union School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 377 where a violation was found because in
addition to discipline, the employee was asked to provide an immediate written response to the
discipline.) The administration of the July 9, 2014 meeting was far from ideal. Camarillo
17

scheduled the meeting according to her own convenience, apparently, and failed to give
Kindipan advance notice, either that his performance unsatisfactory, or that the meeting was
going to take place when it did. These factors created needless and avoidable stress for
Kindipan. However, poor supervisory practices do not necessarily give rise to a violation of
the Act. The fact that two supervisors were present at the meeting, in itself, does not give rise
to a right to a union representative and Charging Party has presented no basis for its assertions
otherwise. Accordingly, the allegation that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to
permit Kindipan to have a union representative at the July 9, 2014 meeting is hereby
dismissed.
Notwithstanding the above, I find that the employer interfered with Kindipan's right to
union representation when Grant and Camarillo made the sweeping directive to Kindipan that
he cease emailing other nurses. The test for whether a respondent has interfered with the rights
of employees under the Dills Act does not require that unlawful motive be established, only
that at least slight harm to employee rights results from the conduct. In State of California
(Department of Developmental Services) (1983) PERB Decision No. 344-S, citing Carlsbad
Unified School District (1979) PERB Decision No. 89 and Service Employees International
Union, Local 99 (Kimmett) (1979) PERB Decision No. 106, the Board described the standard
as follows:
[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful interference,
the charging party must_ establish that the respondent's conduct
tends to or does result in some harm to employee rights granted
underEERA.
Under the above-described test, a violation may only be found if the Dills Act provides the
claimed rights. In Clovis Unified School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 389, the Board
18

held that a finding of coercion does not require evidence that the employee actually felt
threatened or intimidated or was in fact discouraged from participating in protected activity.
In the area of employer rules and directive, PERB does not look favorably on broad,
vague directives that might chill lawful speech or other protected conduct. (Los Angeles
Community College District (2014) PERB Decision No. 2404; State of California
(Employment Development Department) (1999) PERB Decision No. 1365-S.) Similar to
PERB's analysis, in determining whether a work rule violates section 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, the
NLRB asks whether the employer rule would tend to chill employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights. (Lafayette Park Hotel (1998) 326 NLRB 824, 825, enfd. (D.C. Cir. 1999) 203
F .3d 52.) If the rule explicitly restricts section 7 rights, it is unlawful. (Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia (2004) 343 NLRB 646, 646.) If it does not, "the violation is dependent upon a
showing of one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to
prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights." (Id. at p. 647.) In any of
these circumstances, the employer rule will be found unlawful unless the employer establishes
a legitimate and substantial business justification for the rule that outweighs the infringement
on protected rights.
Cases decided under the NLRA have similarly found that blanket rules prohibiting
discussion of employment conditions violate protected rights. (Flex Frac Logistics, LLC and
Silver Eagle Logistics, LLC, Joint Employers and Kathy Lopez (2012) 358 NLRB No. 127
[employer interfered with protected rights by maintaining an overly broad confidentiality
rule].) "[E]mployees should not have to decide at their own peril what information is not
lawfully subject to such a prohibition." (Hyundai America Shipping Agency, Inc. (2011) 357
19

NLRB No. 80, slip op. at p. 12; Flex Frac Logistics, LLC and Silver Eagle Logistics, LLC,
Joint Employers and Kathy Lopez, supra, 358 NLRB No. 127 [nothing about the employer rule
would reasonably indicate to employees that its prohibitions are limited].) As the NLRB
stated, "Board law is settled that ambiguous employer rules - rules that reasonably could be
read to have a coercive meaning - are construed against the employer." (Id., slip op. at p. 2.)
The NLRB goes on to explain:
This principle follows from the Act's goal of preventing
employees from being chilled in the exercise of their Section 7
rights - whether or not that is the intent of the employer - instead
of waiting until that chill is manifest, when the Board must
undertake the difficult task of dispelling it.
(Ibid.)
Cases decided under the NLRA consistently emphasize that central to the section 7
protections under the NLRA is the employee's right to communicate with coworkers about
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. And, an employer rule
prohibiting section 7 activity violates the law even if it never has been enforced. (Franklin
Iron & Medal Corp. (1994) 315 NLRB 819, 820.) In Los Angeles Community College District,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2404, the Board found a violation based on an employer's directive
to an employee not to discuss an ongoing investigation with other employees. The Board
stated that, if the right protected under EERA section 3543 to "form, join, and participate in the
activities of employee organizations" in matters concerning employer-employee relations is
infringed and employees are prohibited from discussing wages, hours, and working conditions
at the workplace, they are less equipped to make a free and informed choice about whether to
exercise their right under EERA section 3543 to form, join or participate in a union. This
rationale is equally applicable here.
20

In this case, Kindipan was called into a meeting for the purpose of informing him that
his performance was not meeting expectations in several respects. During the course of the
meeting he was warned that his attempt to leave the meeting bordered on insubordination, and
was instructed to cease emailing other nurses. Because he had attempted during the meeting to
summon his union steward, who is also a nurse, and was denied the right to do so, it is
reasonable that Kindipan would construe the directive that he cease emailing ''nurses" as a
restriction on his union-related activity. The Respondent has made much of the fact that
Kindipan sought the Kinney's help immediately after the meeting as evidence that he was not
discouraged from participating in protected activity. However, actual coercion or intimidation
has never been an element of the test for interference. (Clovis Unified School District (1984)
PERB Decision No. 389.)
In this case, Camarillo's poorly-timed and ill-conceived directive is easily construed in
a manner that is contrary to the Act. Prior Board decisions have made it clear that these kinds
of broadly-worded prohibitions on speech with coworkers should be construed against the
employer. (Los Angeles Community College District, supra, PERB Decision No. 2404; State
of California (Employment Development Department), supra, PERB Decision No. 1365-S.)
All other allegations have been dismissed.
REMEDY
Where it has been found that an employer unlawfully interfered with an employee's
right to participate in union-related activity, the appropriate remedy is a cease and desist order
and a posting. (State of California (Department of Corrections) ( 1995) PERB Decision
No. 1104-S.)
21

PROPOSED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in the
case, it is found that the State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services)
(Respondent) violated the Dills Act (Act), Government Code section 3519, subdivision (b).
The Respondent violated the Act by issuing a broad directive to Registered Nurse Caesar
Kindipan to cease emailing other nurses with regard to workplace issues.
Pursuant to section 3514.5, subdivision (c), of the Government Code, it hereby is
ORDERED that the State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services), its
governing board and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with employees' rights to participate in union-related
activities by issuing broad directives to cease emailing coworkers with work-related issues.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
1. 	Within ten (10) workdays of the service of a final decision in this matter,
post at all work locations where notices to employees. in Service Employees International
Union Local 1000 customarily are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix.
The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of the State of California (California
Correctional Health Care Services), indicating that it will comply with the terms of this Order.
Such posting shall be maintained for a period of thirty (30) consecutive workdays. Reasonable
steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered
with any other material. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the Notice shall be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means customarily
used by the State of California (California Correctional Health Care Services) to communicate
22

with its employees in the bargaining unit and with employees in the Department of State
Hospitals, Correctional Training Facility in Salinas, California. Pursuant to City of
Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351 and other applicable authority, the Respondent
shall identify and include in its electronic posting any and all affected employees, including
RN Caesar Kindipan, or use personal delivery or some alternative means of notification
reasonably devised to ensure that any and all affected employees are advised of their rights and
remedies under this Decision. The Respondent, its governing board and its representatives
shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the posted Notice is not reduced in size, defaced,
altered, or covered by any material.
2. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board),
or the General Counsel's designee. Respondent shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by
the General Counsel or his/her designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order
shall be concurrently served on the Service Employees International Union Local 1000.
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed
Decision and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement of exceptions with the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days of service of this
Decision. The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 3 22-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
E-FILE: PERBe-file.Appeals@perb.ca.gov
23

In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement of exceptions should identify by page
citation or exhibit number the portions of the record, if any, relied upon for such exceptions. (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32300.)
A document is considered ''filed" when actually received during a regular PERB business
day. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a) and 32130; see also Gov. Code,§ 11020, subd. (a).)
A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile transmission before the close of
business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet or received by electronic mail before
the close of business, which meets the requirements of PERB Regulation 32135(d), provided the
filing party also places the original, together with the required number of copies and proof of service,
in the U.S. mail. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds. (b), (c) and (d); see also Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, §§ 32090, 32091 and 32130.)
Any statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its
filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall accompany each copy served on a
party or filed with the Board itself. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32300, 32305, 32140, and
32135, subd. (c).)
24

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-277-S, Service Employees
International Union Local 1000 v. State of California (California Correctional Health Care
Services), in wh1ch all parties had the right to participate, it has been found that the State of
California (California Correctional Health Care Services) violated the Ralph C. Dills Act
(Dills Act), Government Code section 3512 et seq. when it interfered with employee Caesar
Kindipan's right to be represented by Service Employees International Union Local 1000 by
issuing a broad directive for him to cease emailing coworkers with his workplace concerns.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Interfering with employees' rights to participate in union-
related activities by issuing broad directives to cease
emailing coworkers with work-related issues.
2. 	Denying Service Employees International Union Local
1000 the right to represent its members.
Dated: --------- STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE SERVICES)
By: Authorized Agent
--------------
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEF ACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.