Children of Promise Preparatory Academy (PERB 2558E)

________________________
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD THE
INGLEWOOD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
CHILDREN OF PROMISE PREPARATORY
ACADEMY,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CE-5876-E
LA-CE-6013-E
PERB Decision No. 2558
March 27, 2018
Appearances: Bartsch & Haven by Duane Bartsch, Attorney, for Children of Promise
Preparatory Academy; California Teachers Association by Jean Shin, Attorney, for Inglewood
Teachers Association.
Before Gregersen, Chair; Banks and Winslow, Members.
DECISION
WINSLOW, Member: These cases are before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on exceptions to proposed decisions by two PERB administrative law judges
(ALJs) concluding that the Children of Promise Preparatory Academy (COPPA or Academy)
violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA)1 by refusing to bargain in good
faith. The complaints alleged that during two different school years the Academy engaged in
surface bargaining and refused to provide relevant information to the Inglewood Teachers
Association (Association or ITA) in violation of EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (c).
The Academy excepts to both proposed decisions on the merits, and also excepts to the
ALJ’s refusal to recuse himself from Case No. LA-CE-6013-E.
1 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. All further undesignated
code sections refer to the Government Code.

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Although these cases were litigated separately, we have consolidated them for purposes
of our decision. The Board has discretion to “consolidate charges as it deems appropriate.”
(PERB Reg. 32612, subd. (d).)2 In determining whether to consolidate charges for disposition
by a single decision, the Board considers both fairness and administrative economy (Los
Angeles Unified School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 473), and whether the charges
involve similar issues (see, e.g., Los Angeles Community College District (1981) PERB
Decision No. 167). Because these cases involve the same parties and share many issues, we
have consolidated them for this decision.
With respect to both cases, the Board has reviewed the hearing records in their entirety,
including the hearing transcripts and exhibits, and the parties’ briefs before the ALJs. The
Board has considered the issues on appeal raised by the Academy in its exceptions and the
Association’s brief in opposition to those exceptions. Based on this review, the Board
concludes that the proposed decisions are adequately supported by the evidentiary records, are
well reasoned and consistent with all relevant legal principles. We therefore adopt and affirm
the proposed decisions, including their findings of fact and conclusions of law, as the decision
of the Board itself as supplemented by the following discussion of the Academy’s exceptions.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL SUMMARY COMMON TO BOTH CASES3
The Association filed a petition to become the exclusive representative of the
Academy’s certificated employees in January 2013. Although PERB determined that the
Association had adequate proof of support among those employees, COPPA refused to
2 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.
3 Some of the facts included in this summary were determined in previous Board
decisions involving the same parties. PERB may take official notice of its own records.
(El Monte Union High School District (1980) PERB Decision No. 142.)
2

voluntarily recognize the Association, asserting that the proposed bargaining unit was
inappropriate because it contained alleged management employees, and that it doubted whether
the Association had majority support. COPPA further argued that unionization would interfere
with efficient operation of the school.
PERB investigated the petition pursuant to PERB Regulation 33230. During a
settlement conference regarding the petition, COPPA asked the Board agent to recuse herself,
and she did so. When a second Board agent was assigned and issued an Order to Show Cause
why the Association should not be certified as the exclusive representative, COPPA requested
that this Board agent be disqualified because COPPA had not consented to his assignment.
(Children of Promise Preparatory Academy (2013) PERB Order No. Ad-402 (Children of
Promise I).) The Board agent refused to recuse himself and issued an order certifying the
Association as the exclusive representative. (Ibid.)
After the certification order issued on August 5, 2013, the Association asked to
commence negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). COPPA refused to
negotiate because it had appealed the Board agent’s certification order to the Board itself and
had requested a stay of that order. PERB denied the stay request on October 4, 2013 (Children
of Promise Preparatory Academy (2013) PERB Order No. Ad-401) and affirmed the
certification order on November 6, 2013 (Children of Promise I, supra, PERB Order
No. Ad 402).
Facts of Case No. LA-CE-5876-E
On August 28, 2013, while COPPA’s appeal from the Board agent’s certification of
ITA was pending, Jeffery Good (Good), a staff member of the California Teachers Association
(CTA) responsible for advising ITA, wrote to Carleton Lincoln (Lincoln), the chief executive
3

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officer of COPPA, demanding to bargain for an initial contract on behalf of ITA. Good offered
several dates for that purpose. Lincoln did not reply until nearly a month later, stating that any
meeting would be premature, given COPPA’s appeal and request for stay.
Although COPPA’s request for stay was denied on October 4, 2013, there is no
evidence of any communication between ITA and COPPA until early November, when Good
again e-mailed Lincoln asking for bargaining dates. The following day Duane Bartsch
(Bartsch), COPPA’s attorney, responded by offering Good several dates in December 2013.
Those dates fell during the winter vacation period for COPPA employees and were therefore
unacceptable to ITA, which Good conveyed to Bartsch on November 8, 2013. This
commenced a series of e-mail exchanges between the two, including one in which Bartsch
again offered the December dates previously rejected by Good. Bartsch suggested dates in
February 2014. Good responded by asking to meet in January. Bartsch claimed the January
dates “do not work for us.”4 The parties ultimately settled on February 14, 2014, to begin
negotiations.
In the meantime, Good wrote to COPPA on December 18, 2013, asking for several
categories of financial information, including State Department of Education P-1 and P-2
reports, adopted and revised 2013-2014 Form J-200 Series (all funds) Budget, 2012-2013
unaudited actuals, including exhibits, and the 2011-2012 audit. These documents were
necessary, as explained by Good at the hearing, to establish COPPA’s total revenue and
operating expenses so that ITA could intelligently formulate its own bargaining proposals.
4 At the hearing, COPPA offered evidence that Bartsch was involved in a civil trial in
January, but he never explained that to Good while they were trying to schedule bargaining
dates.
4

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The Association also asked for copies of individual employment contracts for COPPA
employees, including administrators and teachers, and for information regarding health and
welfare benefits available to COPPA employees. The request cited both EERA and the
California Public Records Act (CPRA)5 as authority for ITA’s entitlement for this information.
ITA asked for a response by January 7, 2014.
On December 24, 2013, Bartsch responded on behalf of COPPA, stating that it was not
required to provide this information to ITA. Bartsch asked that Good provide him with
specific authority that would justify any future information requests. No information was
provided before the parties’ first bargaining session on February 14, 2014.
At the bargaining session Bartsch reiterated COPPA’s position that EERA did not
entitle ITA to the requested information, and again asked Good to provide him with legal
authority for the request. Good responded by sending a copy of Stockton Unified School
District (1980) PERB Decision No. 143 (Stockton). Bartsch expressed doubts about the
applicability of Stockton, since it was 35 years old, and pre-dated the inception of charter
schools.
COPPA eventually produced most of the requested documents around May 2, 2014.6
By that time, the parties had held two bargaining sessions.
The February 14, 2014 Bargaining Session
Prior to this meeting Bartsch informed Good that the management team would consist
of himself, Lincoln and Trena Thompson (Thompson), a COPPA manager, and “any staffer,
teacher, or parent who wants to attend.” Good responded that any decision to broaden the
5 The CPRA is codified at Government Code section 6250, et seq.
6 ITA did not receive any administrator employment contracts or plan summary
information regarding health benefits.
5

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process beyond management and bargaining unit representatives “should be made
collaboratively at the table.”
When the ITA bargaining team arrived at the agreed-upon venue, they learned it was in
a church sanctuary, in the same church that shares space with one of COPPA’s school sites.
The non-bargaining team observers consisted of congregants of this church, one of whom was
on COPPA’s governing board. Good testified that the Association team was heckled by the
observers and that Bartsch played to the crowd by disparaging the Association by launching
into diatribes about how public employee unions have ruined public education and how ITA in
particular had destroyed the Inglewood Unified School District.7
ITA began the bargaining session by proposing ground rules, including limiting the
time period of caucuses, being on time for negotiations, providing 48-hour notice of guests
who would be present, signing off on tentative agreements throughout the bargaining process,
and focusing on issues, not personalities. Bartsch responded that ITA’s proposal was “silly”
and explained during the administrative hearing that the Association could not have taken its
own proposal seriously because Peter Somberg (Somberg), ITA’s president, admitted to being
late on one occasion and had also admitted to referring to Bartsch by a profane epithet in an e-
mail.8 COPPA further argued in its closing brief to the ALJ and in its exceptions that it
believed the proposal to be on time was insulting and racially insensitive, since COPPA is
located in a predominantly African-American and Latino neighborhood. However, COPPA
did not raise these concerns during negotiations with ITA.
7 These findings were not excepted to.
8 Somberg apologized to Bartsch when he learned his e-mail had been accidentally sent
to Bartsch.
6

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In addition to its ground rules proposal, ITA also presented a comprehensive initial
package of proposals on subjects including work year, organizational security, Association
rights, class size, grievance procedures, and salary. Good had to persuade the COPPA team to
stay and listen to ITA’s explanation of its proposals. COPPA did not present a formal proposal
at this session, but its initial reaction, one repeated at subsequent sessions, was that COPPA
would never give up its right to “act unilaterally with employees.” Instead of a traditional
proposal, COPPA presented written responses it had presumably gleaned from parents,
community members and/or staff in response to its posed question: “How can the Union help
COPPA?” These responses included such ideas as finding a new site, buying books for the
students, renovating the teachers’ lounge, and getting parents to attend more parent meetings.
The Second Session—March 5, 2014
In a self-described effort to build trust, ITA presented revised proposals on both ground
rules and its substantive proposal. The new ground rules proposal omitted the item regarding
signing off on tentative agreements throughout the bargaining process. The new substantive
proposal was reduced from a comprehensive proposal for an entire collective bargaining
agreement to five stand-alone subjects which Good testified he thought would be non-
controversial, including term of agreement, definitions, organizational security, Association
rights, and a savings clause.
COPPA did not have any initial proposal or a counterproposal to any of these
proposals. Both Lincoln and Bartsch said COPPA would never agree to any type of dues
deduction.9 Bartsch again read aloud from the suggestion box, and would not commit to
9 EERA section 3543.1, subdivision (d) establishes the right of the exclusive
representative to have membership dues for bargaining unit members deducted from their
7

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presenting any proposal or counterproposal at a future bargaining session, although COPPA
informed ITA approximately a month later that it would have a proposal by April 21, 2014, the
next agreed-upon meeting date.
Subsequent Meetings in the 2013-2014 School Year
At COPPA’s request, the April session was re-scheduled for May 2, 2014, and COPPA
presented its first substantive proposal. The highlights of this proposal include:
The parties recognize that the COPPA teachers have signed
documents seeking to de-certify [sic] the Union, and that
August 5, 2014 will be the one year date of the Union
certification, at which time the COPPA teachers may file their de-
certifcation [sic] documents with the Public Employees Relations
Board [sic] to de-certify [sic] the Union.[10]
[¶. . . ¶]
3. JOB DUTIES
. . . COPPA, depends on employee cooperation, assistance and
enthusiasm in performing . . . additional work, and reserves the
right to alter or change job responsibilities, reassign or transfer
job positions, or assign additional job responsibilities.
[¶ . . . ¶]
4. EMPLOYEE STATUS
[¶ . . . ¶]
. . . Recognizing that no school ever terminated a good teacher,[11]
and that the sole purpose of COPPA is to educate children who
have been failed by the existing public school system, all teacher
paychecks. In addition, the exclusive representative may require the employer to deduct fair
share service fees from unit members’ paychecks. (§ 3546, subd. (a).)
10 This was a prefatory paragraph preceding the substantive proposals.
11 The underscored phrase also appeared in multiple other sections of COPPA’s
proposed CBA.
8

employment will be at-will and will be for one school year’s
duration. . . .
5. AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT POLICY
. . . COPPA reserves the right to change a teacher’s position, title,
job responsibilities, benefits, compensation level, or any other
terms and conditions of employment at any time, within its sole
discretion, with or without cause or advance notice. COPPA also
reserves the right to impose discipline against a teacher of
whatever type and for whatever reasons that COPPA, in its sole
discretion, determines appropriate without compromising the at-
will nature of employment.
[¶…¶]
14. SOLICITATIONS AND MEETINGS ON SCHOOL
PREMISES
[¶…¶]
3. Teachers may not post notices on COPPA premises at any
time.
4. Teachers may not hold meetings of non-school/COPPA
related groups or organizations on COPPA premises at any time.
[¶…¶]
26. TEACHER SALARIES
COPPA and its teachers shall enter into individualized
compensation agreements based solely on teacher merit and
COPPA will have sole and absolute authority to set teachers’
compensation. . . .
[¶…¶]
32. DURATION OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT
This Agreement is in effect until the teacher’s [sic] vote to de-
certify [sic] the Union, but in no event will this Agreement or any
provisions of this Agreement be in effect later than September 1,
2014.
9

At the hearing, Good explained that the proposals’ references to decertification
demonstrated COPPA’s contempt for ITA. According to Good, COPPA management solicited
a teacher to collect teachers’ signatures for a petition to decertify ITA, a point not disputed by
COPPA. Good believed the teachers were intimidated into signing the petition because they
were at-will employees and believed that if their signature was not on the petition, that fact
would be quickly relayed to either Lincoln, Thompson, or Bartsch, and their employment
would be at risk.
ITA did not agree to any of COPPA’s proposals and did not submit any further
proposals of its own. The parties agreed to meet in September 2014.
The administrative hearing in this case took place before the September 2014
bargaining session.
Facts of Case No. LA-CE-6013-E
Bargaining Conduct in 2014-2015
By September 2014, ITA was represented by a new CTA staff representative, Andrew
Staiano (Staiano), who replaced Good. The parties met on September 29, 2014, and COPPA
presented a proposal that was nearly identical to the one it presented at the May 2, 2014
bargaining session. As with the previous proposal, this one referred to a decertification
petition that would be filed after August 5, 2014 and proposed a termination date of
September 1, 2014, a date already passed. Other proposals would permit the Academy to
change a teacher’s title, pay, benefits “or any other terms and conditions of employment at any
time, within its sole discretion, with or without cause or advance notice,” and prohibit teachers
from holding meetings with non-Academy related groups on Academy premises at any time.
10

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After nearly six hours of bargaining that day, COPPA indicated that the proposal it had
presented earlier was not its most recent proposal, and that changes would be forthcoming.
However, it refused to inform ITA what those changes would be, or explain why it had failed
to present its most recent proposal. The session ended when the Association determined it
could not continue without the most recent proposal.
Over the course of the next two months, two sessions were held, resulting in an
agreement in principle on just one subject: a recognition article. The Association submitted
proposals on due process, discipline, and grievance procedures, and asked for
counterproposals. COPPA failed to respond to those proposals. By December 17, 2014, the
parties had agreed in principle to four articles: agreement and recognition, work year,
workday, and class size. Following this bargaining session, ITA asked the Academy to sign
off on each of these articles.12 On January 12, 2015, Bartsch replied that he did not believe
“we’ve quite reached an agreement,” pleading the need to research a couple of issues but
asserting the lack of time to do so due to other commitments. There was no follow up from the
Academy, and no further bargaining sessions were held in 2014-2015.
Requests for Information
2014-2015 School Year
At the September 29, 2014 bargaining session, Staiano verbally asked that COPPA
produce three categories of information: (1) teachers’ names and contact information (i.e.,
their personal phone numbers, home mailing addresses, and e-mail addresses); (2) teachers’
employment agreements; and (3) teachers’ evaluation rubric. COPPA did not object to the
12 Staiano testified that ITA agreed to COPPA’s proposed language on recognition,
work year, and class size.
11

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latter two categories, but maintained that the ITA was not entitled to the teachers’ contact
information.
Several e-mail exchanges ensued regarding the employment contracts and evaluation
rubric. COPPA provided these documents on November 6, 2014. However, COPPA refused
to provide teachers’ home addresses and telephone numbers, based on its assertion that CPRA
does not permit disclosure of this information where the public employee has requested that it
not be disclosed. On November 21, 2014, the Academy gave ITA the home addresses and
personal phone numbers of two teachers who had not objected to disclosure. As the ALJ
noted, it appeared that as of this date, only six teachers had objected to disclosure, leaving
eight who did not object.13 Thus, COPPA withheld contact information for six teachers who
did not object to disclosure.
2015-2016 School Year
In August 2015 the Association renewed its request for teachers’ names, addresses and
telephone numbers. This request was amended on September 15, 2015 to include teachers’
employment contracts and evaluation rubric, which COPPA provided on October 28.
On November 16, 2015, the Academy provided a list of teachers currently employed
along with the home addresses and telephone numbers of two teachers who did not object to
disclosure. This time the list omitted the contact information of at least one teacher who had
not objected to disclosure.
13 The record contains ten notes from teachers requesting non-disclosure. Two were
dated October 28, 2014, five were dated November 7, 2014, and three were undated. One of
the teachers who submitted an undated request testified that she submitted it sometime in
November 2014.
12

Decertification Petition
On January 29, 2015, a group of COPPA employees filed a petition to decertify the
Association. By March 16, 2015, a Board agent had determined that the petition was timely
and accompanied by a sufficient showing of support. However, on March 25, 2015, the
Association filed the charge in Case No. LA-CE-6013-E, and requested the decertification
election be stayed pending resolution of the charge. This request was granted by the Board
agent and later affirmed by the Board itself. (Children of Promise Preparatory Academy
(2015) PERB Order No. Ad-428.)
PROPOSED DECISIONS
Case No. LA-CE-5876-E
The ALJ identified four issues for resolution in this case: Did COPPA fail and refuse
to negotiate in good faith by (1) declining to schedule bargaining dates because of its pending
appeal and request for stay in the representation case certifying ITA as exclusive
representative, (2) failing to respond to ITA’s request for information for five months, (3)
refusing to consider ITA’s proposal for ground rules, and (4) engaging in surface bargaining?
Each of these was answered in the affirmative by the ALJ.
Regarding COPPA’s refusal to meet until resolution of its appeal of the administrative
determination, the ALJ noted that nothing in PERB Regulation 32370 permits a party to
presume that the mere filing of an appeal and request for stay actually stays the effectiveness
of the order. Administrative determinations are effective upon issuance, so ITA was the
certified exclusive representative as of August 28, 2013. Because COPPA made no showing
that ITA had lost the support of the bargaining unit, it had no justification to delay
negotiations, according to the ALJ.
13

The ALJ also determined that ITA’s request for information pertained to COPPA’s
budget and operating expenses and was presumptively relevant. The ALJ reviewed PERB’s
well-settled precedent on the duty to promptly provide information relevant to negotiations and
then considered COPPA’s defense, viz., that ITA did not provide “specific” authority for the
employer’s duty to turn over this financial information, and when it did provide such authority
in the form of a copy of Stockton, supra, PERB Decision No. 143, Bartsch expressed doubts as
to its continued viability because it pre-dated the advent of charter schools in California. The
ALJ noted that there is no question that EERA applies to charter schools and that the duty to
provide information is well settled. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that COPPA’s delay of
five months in responding to ITA’s information request was unreasonable and unjustified, and
a per se violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.
The ALJ also determined that COPPA had violated its duty to bargain in good faith by
refusing to bargain over ground rules:
COPPA did not show any willingness to engage in the process of
determining procedural rules for negotiations by presenting a
counter proposal on the subject, or seriously entertaining any
facet of ITA’s ground rule proposals. Saying that COPPA would
only agree to “non-silly” items, without discussing what those
might be, is insufficient to demonstrate an open mind on the
subject of ground rules and demonstrates a flippant attitude
toward the bargaining process. . . . [T]he conduct can only be
described as the equivalent of a flat refusal to bargain, which
violates the duty to negotiate in good faith.
Addressing COPPA’s contention that it was excused from responding to the
proposed ground rule to be on time, because it was culturally insensitive, the ALJ noted
that this argument was raised in COPPA’s closing brief, but not expressed to ITA at the
bargaining table. She observed, “Had that happened, perhaps there could have been
some progress made toward a mutual understanding.”
14

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Finally, the ALJ concluded that COPPA had engaged in surface bargaining and
had no intent to reach agreement with ITA, based on the following findings:
the initial delay in scheduling bargaining during the appeal of case
number LA-RR-1213-E; the per se refusal to bargain over
proposed ground rules; the failure and refusal to make counter-
proposals and significant delay in presenting its own initial
proposal; the unexcused delay of five months to provide necessary
and relevant information to ITA; the obstructionist conduct and
delay tactics employed by the chief negotiator during negotiations;
and the statements about never giving up the right to act
unilaterally coupled with the references to decertification in its
only substantive proposal. Accordingly, the totality of
circumstances show that COPPA engaged in sufficiently egregious
conduct to frustrate negotiations.
In addition to PERB’s customary cease-and-desist order, the ALJ ordered COPPA to
meet and discuss with ITA whether there were any outstanding items from the December 2013
information request that exist but have not already been furnished to ITA.14
Case No. LA-CE-6013-E
Before addressing the merits of the complaint in this case, the ALJ noted that in its
closing brief, the Academy renewed its motion—originally made on the first day of hearing—
to disqualify the ALJ based on his prior employment in private practice advocating on behalf
of unions generally and CTA in particular. He considered this renewed motion procedurally
defective because it was not submitted under oath, as required by PERB Regulation 32155,
subdivision (c), and denied it on that basis.15 The ALJ nevertheless considered the motion on
14 In the body of the proposed decision, the ALJ noted that in circumstances similar to
this case, PERB has ordered the respondent to cease and desist from violating the law and
“bargain with the charging party upon demand. . . . Those remedies are warranted here and are
so ordered.” However, the order to COPPA to bargain with ITA upon demand did not appear
in the proposed order.
15 This procedurally defective motion was made in February 2016, nearly two-and-a-
half years after Children of Promise I, supra, PERB Order No. Ad-402 issued, clearly
establishing that requests for disqualification must be made under oath.
15

its merits and determined that it still failed. The ALJ explained that he had never represented
or advised a party to this case, i.e., ITA, and that although he had previously represented CTA,
CTA was only an affiliate of ITA, and therefore not a party to this case.
As to the Academy’s argument that the ALJ’s past employment with a union-side law
firm disqualified him, the ALJ noted that past employment alone is insufficient to justify a
finding that a judge is prejudiced in favor of or against either party.
Information Requests
Based on PERB precedent holding that home addresses and telephone numbers of
bargaining unit members are presumptively relevant (Golden Empire Transit District (2004)
PERB Decision No. 1704-M, p. 8 (Golden Empire)), yet acknowledging that an employer may
be excused from providing such information where it compromises employee privacy, the ALJ
concluded that the Academy was required to provide the contact information of the employees
who had not objected to its disclosure. With respect to the teachers who had objected,
however, the ALJ determined that the balancing test articulated in County of Los Angeles v.
Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905 (County of
Los Angeles) tips in favor of non-disclosure. The ALJ distinguished County of Los Angeles
and Golden Empire—in which the disclosure of contact information was required—on the
grounds that the bargaining unit in this case is small, the teachers are not geographically
dispersed, and they do not work different shifts from one another. The Association
successfully contacted these employees in the past by using e-mails and on-campus meetings.
There was nothing in the record showing these means of communication were inadequate.
Consequently, the ALJ determined that COPPA violated EERA by refusing to furnish the
16

contact information for teachers who had not objected to disclosure, but not by refusing to
divulge the home addresses and telephone numbers of those teachers who had objected.
Regarding the evaluation rubric and employment contracts, the ALJ noted that COPPA
did not dispute the relevance of such documents and ultimately did provide them to ITA. But
the delay of one month in 2014 and over two months in 2015 was unexplained and constituted
an unreasonable delay, according to the ALJ.
Surface Bargaining
Viewing its bargaining conduct in its totality, the ALJ concluded that COPPA engaged
in surface bargaining. He based this conclusion on several recognized indicia of surface
bargaining, including engaging in dilatory tactics, making predictably unacceptable proposals,
failing to make counterproposals, and reneging on previously agreed-upon terms.
COPPA’s dilatory tactics, according to the ALJ, included notifying ITA on
September 29, 2014, after nearly six hours of bargaining, that COPPA’s proposal was not its
most recent one, and then refusing to identify what changes it intended to make in the
proposal.
The September 29, 2014 proposal was also predictably unacceptable for two reasons,
according to the ALJ. It sought to retain managerial discretion on all mandatory subjects of
bargaining and sought to prevent teachers from holding meetings with groups such as the
Association on campus at any time. Given the Academy’s refusal to provide the Association
with teachers’ contact information, the ALJ concluded that the Academy “should have known
that the Association would not agree to a proposal extinguishing its right of access to the
campus and the right of bargaining unit members to engage in concerted activity during non-
work time.”
17

Moreover, the ALJ determined, the Academy failed to offer counterproposals or
explain why the Association’s proposals were objectionable. When the Association asked the
Academy to sign tentative agreements on the few subjects the parties had agreed to, the
Academy denied there was agreement and delayed responding, supposedly to do further
research. COPPA never did present revised proposals or explain its objections to the
previously agreed-upon language.
Based on all of this conduct, the ALJ concluded:
. . . the Academy’s conduct shows it was merely going through
the motions under the belief that the Association would be
decertified once the certification bar in EERA section 3544.7,
subdivision (b), had expired. In addition to the conduct described
above, this is also evidenced by its insistence that the collective
bargaining agreement reference a decertification petition that had
yet to be filed (and would not be filed for months) and by its
desire to have the collective bargaining agreement terminate no
later than September 1, 2014—a month before the parties’
bargaining session on September 29, 2014, and presumably by
when the Academy believed the Association would be
decertified.
The ALJ ordered COPPA to cease and desist negotiating in bad faith and to provide the
Association with a current list of bargaining unit members, and with home addresses and
telephone numbers for those members who had not objected to the disclosure of their home
contact information. COPPA was also ordered to provide ITA with current copies of the
teacher employment agreement and evaluation rubric.
18

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DISCUSSION
Adequacy of COPPA’s Exceptions
In both cases COPPA excepts to many of the ALJs’ factual findings.16 PERB
Regulation 32300, subdivision (a)(3), requires an excepting party to “[d]esignate by page
citation or exhibit number the portions of the record, if any, relied upon for each exception.”
Dozens of COPPA’s exceptions are to findings of fact in the proposed decision. For example,
the first three exceptions to the proposed decision in Case No. LA-CE-6013-E concern the
interchange between the Association and COPPA regarding the Association’s requests for
information. Each of these exceptions asserts that the proposed findings do not “reflect the
true facts.” Yet COPPA fails to cite to any record evidence in support of these assertions.17
We therefore reject and will not consider those exceptions to findings of fact that fail to
comply with PERB Regulation 32300, subdivision (a)(3).
Turning now to COPPA’s exceptions that do comply with our regulations, we explain
below the basis for finding no merit in those exceptions.
Case No. LA-CE-5876-E
COPPA excepts to each of the legal conclusions in the proposed decision, but mainly
repeats arguments made to the ALJ and provides no legal or factual basis for overturning the
proposed decision.
16 The Association did not except to either of the proposed decisions and urged that
each of COPPA’s exceptions be rejected as baseless.
17 In contrast, some exceptions are accompanied by citations to the hearing transcript
and exhibits, e.g., exception numbers 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, etc., in Case No. LA-CE-6013-E.
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Refusal to Negotiate
COPPA contends that the ALJ erred by failing to recognize that COPPA’s appeal and
request for stay of PERB’s certification of the Association as exclusive representative excused
the Academy from meeting promptly with the Association while the appeal and request were
pending. We reject this exception.
It is well settled that a blanket refusal to bargain is a per se violation of the statutory
duty to bargain in good faith (Gonzales Union High School District (1985) PERB Decision
No. 480, proposed decision, pp. 39-40), and an unreasonable delay is treated as an outright
refusal to bargain (Fresno County In-Home Supportive Services Public Agency (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2418-M, p. 15). There is no basis to excuse COPPA’s delay in bargaining based
on its appeal of PERB’s certification decision. As the ALJ correctly noted, an appeal from an
administrative determination does not automatically stay that decision, which is considered
final and effective upon issuance. (Poway Unified School District (2015) PERB Decision
No. 2441, p. 8.)18 Nor was the matter stayed while COPPA’s request for a stay was pending
before the Board.
COPPA also contends that it was excused from negotiating with ITA because it had a
good faith doubt as to ITA’s majority status. We reject this exception and conclude that such a
doubt would not excuse COPPA’s refusal to bargain in August 2013.
Although there is no PERB precedent directly on point, in the private sector there is a
conclusive presumption that a newly-certified exclusive representative enjoys majority support
18 Contrast administrative determinations with proposed decisions after a hearing. The
latter are governed by PERB Regulation 32305, which provides in pertinent part: “Unless a
party files a timely statement of exceptions to the proposed decision, the decision shall become
final on the date specified therein.” Thus, a proposed decision only becomes final if no
exceptions are filed.
20

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within the bargaining unit for a reasonable period of time, usually for a year after certification.
This rule has long been applied by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and approved
by numerous federal courts.19 (Virginia Mason Medical Center v. NLRB (9th Cir. 2009) 558
F.3d 891, 894; Small v. Avanti Health Systems, LLP (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3d 1180, 1195;
Brooks v. NLRB (1954) 348 U.S. 96, 104; Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc. (1962) 138 NLRB
292.) As explained in Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB (1996) 517 U.S. 781, 786, the
presumption is based on a need for stability in collective bargaining relationships. The
presumption addresses:
our fickle nature by “enabl[ing] a union to concentrate on
obtaining and fairly administering a collective-bargaining
agreement” without worrying about the immediate risk of
decertification and by “remov[ing] any temptation on the part of
the employer to avoid good-faith bargaining” in an effort to
undermine union support.”
(Ibid., quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB (1987) 482 U.S. 27, 38, brackets
in original.)
Balancing the need for stability in labor relations with honoring employee freedom to
choose their exclusive representatives (or not), EERA establishes certain bars to elections or to
employers’ grant of voluntary recognition. For the 12 months following an employer’s lawful
recognition of an employee organization as the exclusive representative, an employer may not
recognize another employee organization, and PERB may not hold a representation election.
(§§ 3544.1, subd. (d), 3544.7, subd. (b)(2); PERB Reg. 32754, subd. (a) [requiring dismissal of
a petition for a representation election if the result of another representation election has been
19 When interpreting EERA, it is appropriate to take guidance from cases interpreting
the National Labor Relations Act and California labor relations statutes with parallel
provisions. (McPherson v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 293, 306;
see also Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608.)
21

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certified within the previous 12 months].) These recognition and election bars are primarily
directed at attempts by competing organizations or by employees to dislodge the newly-
established exclusive representative, and not at employer actions. Nevertheless, these bars
reflect the same values articulated in the federal cases cited above, viz., the need to give the
new exclusive representative “breathing room” to bargain an initial collective bargaining
agreement. Consequently, we conclude that it is appropriate to follow this private sector law
as consistent with the purposes of EERA. We hold that an employee organization recognized
or certified as the exclusive representative enjoys a conclusive presumption of majority support
for a one-year period following recognition or certification, and an employer may not refuse to
bargain with an exclusive representative during that period of time.20
Even if this conclusive presumption did not apply, COPPA’s reliance on Levitz
Furniture Company of the Pacific, Inc. (2001) 333 NLRB 717 (Levitz) for its contention that it
was excused from negotiating with ITA because it had a good faith doubt as to its majority
status is misplaced. Levitz holds that an employer may withdraw recognition from an
incumbent union only where the union has actually lost the support of the majority of
employees. Good faith doubt is not sufficient.21 The employer may defeat a post-withdrawal
refusal-to-bargain allegation if it shows the union’s actual loss of majority status. (Id. at
20 We do not intend by this presumption to preclude the Board from extending the one-
year period if the employer’s unlawful conduct has denied the union a fair opportunity to
bargain. (Mar-Jac Poultry (1962) 136 NLRB 785; Lamar Hotel (1962) 137 NLRB 1271. See
also Redondo Beach City School District (1980) PERB Decision No. 140.)
21 PERB’s only decision touching on this issue, Pittsburg Unified School District
(1983) PERB Decision No. 318, predates Levitz, supra, 333 NLRB 717 and follows the
NLRB’s prior rule that good faith doubt is a valid defense to a refusal to bargain. (Pittsburg at
p. 24.) However, we need not decide whether to overrule Pittsburg and follow Levitz,
especially in the absence of more comprehensive litigation of the issue, because neither case
applies to the facts of this case.
22

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p. 717.) Levitz is of no help to COPPA because there was no showing that ITA had actually
lost majority support.22 Levitz also made clear that the rule applied only in cases where there
have been no unfair labor practices committed that tend to undermine employees’ support for
the representative, adhering to the NLRB’s well-established policy that “employers may not
withdraw recognition in a context of serious unremedied unfair labor practices tending to cause
employees to become disaffected from the union.” (Id. at p. 717, fn. 1.)23
It is uncontested that COPPA refused to bargain with ITA for approximately three
months immediately following ITA’s certification as exclusive representative.24 For the
reasons discussed above, COPPA’s asserted doubt about ITA’s majority status did not excuse
its refusal to bargain. We therefore affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that COPPA violated its duty
to bargain by refusing to meet with the certified exclusive representative of its employees.
(Gonzales Union High School District, supra, PERB Decision No. 480, proposed decision,
pp. 39-40; Fresno County In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2418-M, p. 18.)
22 It is also unnecessary for us to consider COPPA’s exception number 8, which asserts
that “there was and is a showing that the Union did not have majority support of the unit.”
COPPA relies entirely on its assertion that the “Academy’s teachers have been trying and are
still trying to decertify the Union but the Union and PERB won’t let them.” (Exceptions,
LA-CE-5876-E, p. 7.) However, COPPA provides no citation to the record for this claim, and
we therefore deny this exception. Moreover, there was no evidence presented in Case No.
LA-CE-5876-E that teachers were attempting to decertify ITA. The decertification petition
was not filed until January 2015, well after the events of this case occurred. That petition
could not justify the refusal to bargain in August 2013.
23 We leave for another day to determine whether the unfair practices found in the two
cases before us undermined employee support for ITA. But it certainly cannot be said that
COPPA has not committed serious unfair practices.
24 Lincoln initially explained to Good that bargaining would be “premature” while
COPPA’s appeal and request for a stay was pending before the Board itself. After the Board’s
decision denying COPPA’s request for stay issued on October 4, 2013, COPPA made no effort
to start negotiations. Good initiated contact in early November.
23

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Requests for Financial Information
COPPA excepts to the ALJ’s determination that it violated EERA by delaying five
months in providing the requested information to ITA, claiming that the Association did not
really want the documents, as evidenced by purported statements made by the Association in a
PERB settlement conference. COPPA further asserts that it was not required to provide the
requested information because Good did not provide Bartsch with specific legal authority to
justify the request.
These exceptions are frivolous. The duty to provide relevant information was
established under EERA as early as 1980 with Stockton, supra, PERB Decision No. 143. It is
not incumbent on the Association to educate COPPA as to its basic, obvious and well-settled
duty under EERA and private sector labor law to provide relevant information. To hold
otherwise would effectively excuse an employer’s ignorance of the law. (Cf. Landmark
Family Foods, Inc. (2011) 356 NLRB 1357, 1365, fn. 28.) COPPA also cannot avail itself of a
defense that the ITA spokesperson failed to cite to him precise legal authority for this duty,
especially when COPPA discounted the valid authority—Stockton—that Good commended to
Bartsch’s attention. The ALJ correctly determined that a delay of five months in providing this
information violated EERA, as an unreasonable delay is tantamount to a failure to provide
information to which the requestor is entitled. (Compton Community College District (1990)
PERB Decision No. 790, pp. 5-6; Petaluma City Elementary School District/Joint Union High
School District (2016) PERB Decision No. 2485, p. 20.)25
25 COPPA’s exceptions in Case No. LA-CE-5876-E continue to assert that the CPRA,
which the Association also cited as authority for its requests, does not apply to charter schools.
The ALJ correctly concluded that the duty imposed by EERA to provide necessary and
relevant information is not affected by the CPRA. COPPA offers no explanation for its
24

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It is also well-established that statements made in settlement conferences, including
those convened by PERB, are inadmissible as evidence in an administrative hearing. (PERB
Reg. 32176.) Therefore COPPA’s assertion regarding ITA’s statements or conduct in a
settlement conference cannot be a basis for an exception.
Refusal to Negotiate Ground Rules
The ALJ determined that COPPA flatly refused to negotiate over the Association’s
ground rules proposal. COPPA’s exceptions acknowledge that it did not seriously consider the
proposal. (Exceptions, p. 28 [“. . . as to whether the Academy ever seriously entertained the
Union’s proposed ground rules—the answer is No” (emphasis in original)].) However, it
argues that it was not required to do so, because one of the proposed ground rules—that the
parties be on time to bargaining sessions—was demeaning and racially tinged, and because the
proposed ground rule for a 15-minute mid-morning break was “silly.”
These arguments are unavailing. COPPA did not raise its objection to the punctuality
ground rule to ITA when the ground rules were proposed, or any other time during
negotiations. Had it done so, ITA would have had the opportunity to alter its proposal, explain
that a ground rule requiring punctuality is typical in labor negotiations, or provide other
explanation for this facially neutral proposal that purportedly caused offense. Having
foreclosed the possibility of such dialogue, COPPA cannot defend on the ground that the
proposal was “silly” or “racially-tinged.”
As for COPPA’s objection to the 15-minute break ground rule, COPPA was free to
propose an alternative rule or take the position that such a rule was unnecessary. So long as
sincerely held and supported by “rational arguments that are communicated during
contrary argument in Case No. LA-CE-6013-E that the CPRA does apply to charter schools to
prevent disclosure of employee contact information to ITA.
25

bargaining,” such a position would not be a refusal to bargain or evidence of bad faith.
(Fresno County In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority, supra, PERB Decision
No. 2418-M, p. 50; County of San Luis Obispo (2015) PERB Decision No. 2427-M, p. 29.)
COPPA was not free, however, to ignore the proposals or reject them categorically as “silly.”
We join with the ALJ in concluding that COPPA’s conduct regarding proposed ground rules
was the equivalent of a flat refusal to bargain.
Surface Bargaining
In excepting to the ALJ’s conclusion that COPPA’s conduct evinced an intent to delay
negotiations, COPPA repeats many of its objections to the ALJ’s findings and conclusions
regarding COPPA’s per se violations of the duty to bargain: its delay in providing relevant
information, its initial refusal to bargain, and its refusal to negotiate over ground rules. Having
already rejected COPPA’s exceptions to those findings and conclusions, we affirm the ALJ’s
conclusion that those per se violations are also evidence of bad faith. (City of San Jose (2013)
PERB Decision No. 2341-M, p. 23.)
COPPA further objects to the ALJ’s conclusion that its proposals taken from input from
community members and parents were not legitimate proposals concerning negotiable terms
and conditions of employment. COPPA argues that proposing that ITA contribute financially
to employment conditions and the hiring of staff was a legitimate proposal, given that ITA had
stated that its goals included helping students and being a partner with the Academy in its
mission to educate students. None of COPPA’s exceptions to the ALJ’s factual findings which
support her conclusion that it engaged in surface bargaining cite to the evidentiary record. We
therefore deem any implicit exceptions to those factual findings to be waived. (PERB
Reg. 32300, subd. (a)(3).)
26

Nor has COPPA asserted any legal reason to disturb the ALJ’s conclusion that it
engaged in surface bargaining. COPPA’s conduct was a textbook example of an employer’s
concerted effort to thwart and delay negotiations. The ALJ surmised that some of COPPA’s
conduct was due to the inexperience of its negotiators and advisors. Whether this was so is
irrelevant to what ensued—a pattern of delay and obstruction that frustrated good faith
bargaining from the moment ITA requested to meet in August 2013 to the last meeting before
this hearing occurred. We reject COPPA’s contention that its proposals satisfied its duty to
bargain. As described above, these proposals had nothing to do with matters within the scope
of representation. Coupled with COPPA’s refusal to make counterproposals to ITA’s
proposals on subjects such as class size, work year, and grievance procedures, there is no doubt
that COPPA’s proposals were interposed solely to avoid negotiations over those matters it had
a duty to bargain about.
For all these reasons, we affirm the proposed decision in Case No. LA-CE-5876-E.
Case No. LA-CE-6013-E
Motion to Disqualify ALJ
COPPA excepts to the ALJ’s refusal to disqualify himself, in response to COPPA’s
motion made at the beginning of the administrative hearing and renewed in COPPA’s closing
brief. The ALJ denied the motion on both procedural and substantive grounds.
PERB Regulation 32155, subdivision (c), governing motions to disqualify, permits any
party to request a Board agent to disqualify himself “whenever it appears that it is probable
that a fair and impartial hearing or investigation cannot be held by the Board agent to whom
the matter is assigned.” The request shall be written, or if oral, reduced to writing within
24 hours of the request. “The request shall be under oath and shall specifically set forth all
27

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facts supporting it.” Subdivision (d) of PERB Regulation 32155 sets forth procedures for an
appeal of a Board agent’s refusal to recuse himself. Within ten days of the Board agent’s
decision not to disqualify, the requesting party may file with the Board itself a request for
special permission to appeal the ruling of the Board agent. If permission is not granted, the
requesting party may file an appeal after the hearing and issuance of the Board agent’s
decision, “setting forth the grounds of the alleged disqualification along with any other
exceptions to the decision on its merits.” (PERB Reg. 32155, subd. (d).)
The ALJ was correct that COPPA failed to comply with the procedures governing
requests for disqualification.26 The initial motion was oral, but not followed by a written
motion within 24 hours of the oral motion. The person asserting the facts purportedly in
support of the motion was not under oath.27
The basis of COPPA’s request for disqualification was the ALJ’s previous employment
at a law firm that represented labor unions, including CTA. According to COPPA, CTA was a
party to this case. It also contends that the ALJ’s bias was evidenced by an alleged webpage28
describing the ALJ as “an advocate who is ‘always on the side of the union.’” (Exceptions,
p. 4.) The ALJ acknowledged that, while employed at his former firm, more than three years
26 COPPA argues that the ALJ’s ruling that its request was procedurally defective
demonstrates his bias. Because the ALJ’s ruling was correct, as we explain below, we reject
this argument. But we note that even if the ALJ had ruled incorrectly on this issue, this would
not be evidence of bias. (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control District (2009) PERB
Decision No. 2031-M, pp. 24-25.)
27 Although COPPA did not seek special permission from the Board itself to appeal the
ALJ’s refusal to disqualify himself, it did set forth the grounds for the alleged disqualifications
in its exceptions. The issue is therefore properly before us. (Gonzales Union High School
District (1984) PERB Decision No. 379, pp. 2-3, fn. 3.)
28 COPPA submitted into evidence a purported webpage from the ALJ’s former law
firm describing him as an advocate for unions. However, this document was not authenticated
as to when it was retrieved and lacked a URL or a date.
28

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before he presided over this hearing, he had represented members and affiliate chapters of
CTA, as well as other unions.
PERB Regulation 32155, subdivision (a), sets forth several bases for disqualification of
Board members or Board agents from deciding or otherwise participating in cases, the relevant
ones to this case being:
(3) When, in a case or proceeding, he or she has been attorney or
counsel for any party; or when he or she has given advice to any
party upon any matter involved in the proceeding before the
Board; or when he or she has been retained or employed as
attorney or counsel for any party within one year prior to the
commencement of the case at the Board level.
(4) When it is made to appear probable that, by reason of
prejudice of such Board member or Board agent, a fair and
impartial consideration of the case cannot be had before him or
her.
There was no evidence supporting a claim that the ALJ should be disqualified under
PERB Regulation 32155, subdivision (a)(3). He stated that he had never acted as counsel or
advised the Association, and left his former law firm in 2013, when he began employment at
PERB. COPPA asserts that the ALJ’s former work on behalf of CTA disqualifies him from
hearing this case because the Association is “the same as” CTA, pointing to the denomination
of the charging party as “Inglewood Teachers Association, CTA/NEA.” Although PERB has
consistently held that CTA is not the same organization as its affiliates,29 CTA’s relationship
29 When PERB has considered CTA’s alleged liability for unfair practices by its
affiliates, it has held that CTA is not the exclusive representative of the employees of a school
district—its affiliate is. Therefore CTA is not the same organization as the exclusive
representative. (California Teachers Association (Bussman)(2009) PERB Decision No. 2047,
p. 4 and cases cited therein; see also Fresno Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision
No. 208, pp. 23-24 [CTA has no obligation to bargain in good faith with a school district
because it is not the exclusive representative of district employees].) This approach is
consistent with California law, which generally recognizes that affiliate labor organizations are
considered separate legal entities. (Montaldo v. Hires Bottling Co. (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 642,
29

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with the Association has no bearing on whether the ALJ should have been disqualified from
presiding over this case because there was no evidence that he had served as an attorney or
counsel for CTA or ITA in this case, had advised CTA or ITA “upon any matter involved in
the proceeding before the Board,” or that he had been retained as counsel for either CTA or
ITA “within one year prior to the commencement of the case at the Board level.”
The ALJ was therefore correct in noting that his prior representation of CTA does not
require his disqualification in this case. (See Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr. (2010)
355 NLRB 234, 238 [denying motion for recusal of NLRB member who formerly worked for
international union merely because the case involved a local chapter of the same union].)
COPPA additionally contends that the ALJ should have disqualified himself because of
his prior employment as an advocate on behalf of unions in general. The ALJ correctly relied
on a recent decision by this Board in which we considered a similar argument from a union
attorney. In County of Tulare (2016) PERB Decision No. 2461a-M, we rejected the argument
that a Board member who was previously employed by a management-side law firm was
presumptively biased against the unions who were adversaries of the clients of that law firm.
As the ALJ succinctly stated, County of Tulare stands for the following proposition: “Past
employment alone is insufficient to justify a finding that a Board agent is prejudiced in favor
of a client of his former employer or against an adversary of that client.” County of Tulare
remains good law, and on that basis, as well as the reasons articulated by the ALJ, we reject
649 [unincorporated local union was “separate and distinct” from its affiliate, the American
Federation of Labor]; see also Killeen v. Hotel & Restaurant Emp. Intern. Alliance &
Bartenders’ Intern. League of America (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 87, 91 [by-laws and constitution
of a parent association are binding on affiliated labor associations “in the nature of a
contract”]; Oil Workers Intern. Union, CIO v. Super. Ct. (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 561
[international organization’s power to authorize a strike did not make the organization “legally
responsible and amendable for acts done by its members or by one of its Locals in contempt of
the authority of a court”].)
30

COPPA’s exceptions to the ALJ’s refusal to disqualify himself. (See also Children of Promise
I, supra, PERB Order No. Ad-402, p. 20; Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981)
28 Cal.3d 781, 790 [“The right to an impartial trier of fact is not synonymous with the . . . right
to a trier completely indifferent to the general subject matter of the claim before him. . . . This
long established, practical rule is merely a recognition of the fact that anyone acting in a
judicial role will have attitudes and preconceptions toward some of the legal and social issues
that may come before him”].)
Requests for Information
Although the ALJ agreed with COPPA’s claim that it lawfully withheld the personal
contact information for those teachers who requested non-disclosure, COPPA excepts to the
cases on which the ALJ relied to reach his conclusion. We reject these exceptions, as the ALJ
correctly analyzed the issue: whether the employer was obligated to give the Association the
home addresses, personal telephone numbers, and e-mail addresses of all bargaining unit
members, regardless of personal requests for non-disclosure. After discussing PERB’s
decisions in Golden Empire, supra, PERB Decision No. 1704-M, p. 8 and Bakersfield City
School District (1998) PERB Decision No. 1262, p. 19, as well as the California Supreme
Court’s treatment of the same issue in County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th 905, the ALJ
balanced the interest of the Association with the privacy interests of the employees. Given the
facts in this particular case, the ALJ determined that the balance weighed in favor of protecting
the privacy of those employees who requested non-disclosure. The Association does not
except to this finding, and we adopt it as our own, as it is limited to the facts of this case and is
not a mistake of law that requires correction by the Board. (City of Inglewood (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2424-M, p. 7, fn. 12.)
31

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COPPA also excepts to the ALJ’s conclusion that it unreasonably delayed providing the
Association teachers’ employment contracts and evaluation rubrics, noting that COPPA
offered no justification for a delay of one month in 2014 and more than two months in 2015.
This exception declares that it “is factually incorrect” that COPPA offered no justification for
the delay, but then fails to cite to any portion of the record in support of this assertion. As
discussed above, because this exception fails to comply with PERB Regulation 32300, we will
not disturb the ALJ’s findings and conclusions on this point.30
Surface Bargaining
COPPA takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that it had no genuine desire to reach
agreement with the Association and that it made predictably unacceptable proposals. In
particular, COPPA asserts that its proposal to reserve the discretion to change a teacher’s title,
pay, benefits “or any other terms and conditions of employment at any time, within its sole
discretion, with or without cause or advance notice,” is permissible under Los Angeles Unified
School District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2326 (LAUSD). We disagree with COPPA’s
reading of LAUSD.
In LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2326, the issue was whether the employer
committed a per se violation of the duty to bargain by insisting to impasse and then imposing a
proposal giving it unfettered discretion to reduce the length of employees’ work days and work
30 COPPA’s exceptions regarding this issue also refer to the parties’ discussions at a
PERB settlement conference. No evidence of those discussions is in the record before us, and
as explained above, such evidence is inadmissible under PERB Regulation 32176. Therefore,
we reject COPPA’s reliance on these discussions.
32

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years. The Board determined that because the proposal concerned a mandatory subject of
bargaining, it was not a per se violation to insist upon it to impasse.31
This case involves a different issue and a different type of violation. The issue is not
whether COPPA’s proposal was lawful per se, but whether it may be considered in an analysis
of the totality of circumstances, as evidence that COPPA was simply “going through the
motions” of bargaining without having a good faith intent to reach agreement with the
Association. Making proposals that are predictably unacceptable to the other party is a well-
established indicium of bad faith bargaining. (San Bernardino City Unified School District
(1998) PERB Decision No. 1270 (San Bernardino), adopting proposed decision at pp. 83-84
[employer’s opening proposal to eliminate longstanding organizational security provision was
predictably unacceptable].) A proposal may be predictably unacceptable—and serve as
evidence of surface bargaining—even if it is substantively lawful. (Oakland Unified School
District (1983) PERB Decision No. 326 (Oakland), p. 38 [employer was “not required to offer
more than demanded by the Education Code,” but the fact that “counterproposals made little
concession” to the union’s demands, “when viewed in the context of the negotiating process, is
one aspect demonstrating the District’s bad faith”].)
We agree with the ALJ that COPPA’s proposal was predictably unacceptable—and
therefore evidence of surface bargaining—because it sought to arrogate to the employer
unlimited discretion on virtually all mandatory subjects: benefits, compensation, job
responsibilities, “or any other terms and conditions of employment.” As the NLRB explained
in finding a similar proposal to be evidence of surface bargaining, “[s]ince unions are
31 However, because the proposal limited the union’s right to bargain over mandatory
subjects, it was a per se violation for the employer to impose it following the exhaustion of
impasse procedures.
33

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statutorily guaranteed the right to bargain over any change in any term or condition of
employment, the Union could do just as well with no contract at all.” (Radisson Plaza
Minneapolis (1992) 307 NLRB 94, 95.) The fact that the proposal here, like the proposal
considered in LAUSD, supra, PERB Decision No. 2326, was lawful to the extent it concerned a
mandatory subject of bargaining does not alter the analysis.
Moreover, COPPA’s proposal for unlimited discretion over teachers’ terms and
conditions of employment was only one of the proposals the ALJ determined was predictably
unacceptable. COPPA also proposed that the Association forfeit its statutory right of access to
the work place and teachers’ statutory right to associate with their exclusive representative
during non-working hours at the work place. (§§ 3543.1, subd. (b); 3543, subd. (a).) Coupled
with COPPA’s refusal to give the Association the personal contact information of bargaining
unit members, it is apparent that a proposal banning the Association from the work site, the
only remaining avenue of access to employees, would be predictably unacceptable.32
32 Some PERB cases have declined to find a proposal predictably unacceptable on the
grounds that there was no evidence establishing that the proposal was unacceptable (City of
Roseville (2016) PERB Decision No. 2505-M (Roseville), pp. 32-33) or that the unacceptable
nature of the proposal was not made clear at the table (Redwood City School District (1980)
PERB Decision No. 115 (Redwood)). In Roseville, the employer proposed that employees
begin paying the full “employee contribution” toward their pension benefits. The union
claimed this was unacceptable because the employer was not proposing any offsetting financial
incentive. In Redwood, the employer proposed a 5 percent shift differential. The union
claimed this was unacceptable because it could not accept less than 6.25 percent.
Roseville and Redwood are distinguishable from this case. COPPA’s proposals
indicated not just disagreement over substantive terms, but an unwillingness to accept the
Association’s role as the bargaining representative of COPPA’s employees.
In this regard, we are persuaded by Oakland, supra, PERB Decision No. 326, and
San Bernardino, supra, PERB Decision No. 1270. In both cases, the proposals were
determined to be predictably unacceptable on their face. And in fact, the proposals in those
cases were far less egregious than COPPA’s proposal in this one.
34

The ALJ also relied on several other facts, aside from the predictably unacceptable
nature of the Academy’s proposals, to conclude that the Academy was “weaving otherwise
unobjectionable conduct into an entangling fabric to delay and prevent agreement.” (Muroc
Unified School District (1978) PERB Decision No. 80, p. 13.) As the ALJ found, the
bargaining conduct was characterized by delays, refusals to make proposals or
counterproposals, and reneging on tentative agreements. Although some of COPPA’s
exceptions challenge these findings, these exceptions are among those that do not comply with
our regulations. Thus, there was ample evidence that COPPA had no intent to reach agreement
with the Association and that it was in fact “running out the clock” until the Association could
be decertified. We therefore reject these exceptions, and affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that
COPPA engaged in surface bargaining.
REMEDY
PERB has broad remedial powers to effectuate the purposes of the EERA. EERA
section 3541.5, subdivision (c) states:
The board shall have the power to issue a decision and order
directing an offending party to cease and desist from the unfair
practice and to take such affirmative action, including but not
limited to the reinstatement of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this chapter.
In both of these cases COPPA has been found to have engaged in an overall course of bad faith
conduct in bargaining through both per se refusals to bargain and under a surface bargaining
theory. In similar circumstances, PERB has ordered that the respondent cease and desist from
violating the law and bargain with the charging party upon demand. (Anaheim Union High
School District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2434, proposed decision, p. 100; Stockton, supra,
PERB Decision No. 143, pp. 33-34.) This is especially appropriate here where the Association
35

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was certified as the exclusive representative in August 2013 and the Board has determined that
COPPA has failed to bargain in good faith over an initial collective bargaining agreement.
The existence of a decertification petition, which was stayed pending resolution of Case
No. LA-CE-6013-E, does not counsel against a bargaining order here. The mere filing of a
decertification petition, without more, does not excuse an employer from the duty to bargain in
good faith. (Pittsburg Unified School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 318, p. 23.) As
observed by the NLRB in RCA del Caribe (1982) 262 NLRB No. 116:
While the filing of a valid [decertification] petition may raise a
doubt as to majority status, the filing, in and of itself, should not
overcome the strong presumption in favor of the continuing
majority status of the incumbent and should not serve to strip it of
the advantages and authority it could otherwise legitimately
claim.[33]
To remedy COPPA’s failure to timely provide relevant information to the Association, it
is appropriate to order it to cease and desist from the offending conduct and provide ITA with
an up-to-date list of bargaining unit members and the home addresses and telephone numbers
for those who have not objected to such disclosure. (City of Burbank (2008) PERB Decision
No. 1988-M.) COPPA is further ordered, within 10 days after this decision becomes final, to
meet and discuss with ITA whether there are any outstanding items from the December 18,
2013 request that exist and therefore should be produced. Any item so identified must be
promptly furnished to ITA upon request.
In addition, we order COPPA to post a notice to employees of its violations.
33 Although the Board has stayed the processing of the decertification petition filed by
COPPA employees on January 29, 2015, pending resolution of Case No. LA-CE-6013-E, we
make no determination as to that petition here, including whether COPPA’s unfair practices
tended to cause employees’ disaffection with ITA, and, if so, at what point an election may be
held after the unfair practices found here have been remedied.
36

ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this
case, it is found that Children of Promise Preparatory Academy (Academy) violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA), Government Code section 3543.5,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), by refusing to provide the Inglewood Teachers Association
(Association) with necessary and relevant information and by engaging in an overall course of
bad faith conduct in bargaining with the Association.
Pursuant to Government Code section 3541.5, subdivision (c), it hereby is ORDERED
that the Academy, its governing board, and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Failing to provide timely and complete responses to the Association’s
requests for necessary and relevant information
2. 	Negotiating with the Association in bad faith.
3. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by the Association.
4. 	Denying the Association the right to represent employees.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF EERA:
1. Within ten (10) workdays of a final decision in this matter, provide the
Association with: (1) an up-to-date list of the names of bargaining unit members; (2) an up-to-
date list of the home addresses and telephone numbers of bargaining unit members who have
not objected to the disclosure of their home contact information; (3) an up-to-date copy of the
teacher employment agreement; and (4) an up-to-date copy of the teacher evaluation rubric.
The Academy shall also meet with the Association within ten (10) workdays and discuss
37

whether there are any outstanding items from the December 13, 2013 information request and
produce any information that has not already been produced.
2. Upon request by the Association, commence negotiations in good faith for a
collective bargaining agreement. Such request must be made within twenty (20) days of
receipt of this decision.
3. Within ten (10) workdays of the service of a final decision in this matter,
post copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix at all work locations where notices to
certificated employees are customarily posted. The Notice must be signed by an authorized
agent of the Academy, indicating that the Academy will comply with the terms of this Order.
Such posting shall be maintained for a period of thirty (30) consecutive workdays. The Notice
shall also be posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means
customarily used by the Academy to communicate with certificated employees. Reasonable
steps shall be taken to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced, or covered
with any other material.
4. Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order shall be
made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or the General
Counsel’s designee. The Academy shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by the General
Counsel or his/her designee. All reports regarding compliance with this Order shall be
concurrently served on the Association.
Chair Gregersen and Member Banks joined in this Decision.
38

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case Nos. LA-CE-5876-E and LA-CE-6013-E,
Inglewood Teachers Association v. Children of Promise Preparatory Academy, in which all
parties had the right to participate, it has been found that the Children of Promise Preparatory
Academy (Academy) violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA),
Government Code section 3540 et seq., by refusing to provide the Inglewood Teachers
Association (Association) with necessary and relevant information and by engaging in an
overall course of bad faith conduct in bargaining with the Association.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Failing to provide timely and complete responses to the Association’s
requests for necessary and relevant information.
2. 	Negotiating with the Association in bad faith.
3. 	Interfering with employees’ right to be represented by the Association.
4. 	Denying the Association the right to represent employees.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF EERA:
1. 	Within ten (10) workdays of a final decision in this matter, provide the
Association with: (1) an up-to-date list of the names of bargaining unit members; (2) an up-to-
date list of the home addresses and telephone numbers of bargaining unit members who have
not objected to the disclosure of their home contact information; (3) an up-to-date copy of the
teacher employment agreement; and (4) an up-to-date copy of the teacher evaluation rubric.
The Academy shall also meet with the Association within ten (10) workdays and discuss
whether there are any outstanding items from the December 13, 2013 information request and
produce such documents if they have not already been produced.
2. 	Upon request by the Association, commence negotiations in good faith
for a collective bargaining agreement. Such request must be made within twenty (20) days of
receipt of this decision.
Dated: _____________________ 	CHILDREN OF PROMISE PREPARATORY
ACADEMY
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST THIRTY
(30) CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.