County of Sonoma (PERB 2772MA)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SONOMA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS’
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-1816-M
Case No. SF-CE-1817-M
PERB Decision No. 2772a-M
February 28, 2023
SONOMA COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v.
COUNTY OF SONOMA,
Respondent.
Appearances: Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver by Timothy K. Talbot and Zachery
A. Lopes, Attorneys, for Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association; Mastagni
Holstedt by Kathleen N. Mastagni Storm, Taylor Davies-Mahaffey, and Spencer M.
Shure, Attorneys, for Sonoma County Law Enforcement Association; Liebert Cassidy
Whitmore by Richard C. Bolanos and Marek Pienkos, Attorneys, for County of
Sonoma.
Before Banks, Chair; Shiners, Krantz, and Paulson, Members.
DECISION
SHINERS, Member: These consolidated cases are before the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) on remand from the California Court of
Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 3. In County of Sonoma (2021) PERB

2
Decision No. 2772-M (Sonoma I), we held that the County of Sonoma violated the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) and PERB Regulations by placing Measure P on
the November 2020 ballot without providing the exclusive representatives of its
non-managerial peace officers, Charging Parties Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs’
Association (DSA) and Sonoma County Law Enforcement Association (SCLEA)
(collectively Associations), notice or an opportunity to meet and confer over
Measure P and its effects.1 As a remedy, we issued cease-and-desist and notice
posting orders, and declared the offending Measure P provisions void and
unenforceable as to Association-represented employees.
After the County appealed, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Board’s conclusion
that the County violated the MMBA by failing to meet and confer over the effects of
certain Measure P provisions on Association-represented employees’ terms and
conditions of employment. (County of Sonoma v. Public Employment Relations Board
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 167, 186-189 (Sonoma II).) The court also affirmed PERB’s
jurisdiction over unfair practice charges filed by employee organizations representing
“peace officers” as defined in Penal Code section 830.1. (Id. at p. 192.)
The court, however, annulled the Board’s conclusion that the County violated
the MMBA and PERB Regulations by failing to afford the Associations notice and
failing to meet and confer upon their request over the decision to place certain
Measure P provisions on the ballot. (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 174,
192.) Specifically, the court held that PERB erred by failing to apply the test from
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. All further
undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. PERB Regulations
are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 31001 et seq.

3
Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623
(Claremont) to determine whether the provisions had “a significant and adverse effect
on the wages, hours, or working conditions” of Association-represented employees.2
(Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.) The court also annulled the Board’s
order declaring certain Measure P provisions void and unenforceable, finding the
order exceeded PERB’s remedial authority. (Id. at pp. 189-192.)3 Nevertheless, the
court upheld PERB’s authority to declare the County Board of Supervisors’ (BOS)
resolution that placed Measure P on the ballot void and unenforceable. (Id. p. 192.)
The court remanded this matter to the Board to reconsider these two issues in
light of the court’s decision. (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 191-193.) Soon
after receiving the court’s remittitur, the Board asked the parties to provide
supplemental briefing on the remanded issues. The parties filed simultaneous
supplemental briefs on December 2, 2022.
In accord with the court’s remand order, we have reviewed the entire
administrative record in light of the court’s opinion and the parties’ supplemental
briefing. As explained below, we conclude that the County violated the MMBA and
PERB Regulations by not giving the Associations notice and an opportunity to meet
and confer over certain Measure P amendments before placing the measure on the
2 Notably, in litigating this matter before the ALJ and the Board, the County did
not urge PERB to apply Claremont. Instead, it argued that matters of police-
community relations are categorically outside the MMBA’s scope of representation.
After the Board rejected that argument, the County pivoted to arguing to the Court of
Appeal that the Board erred by not applying Claremont.
3 We accordingly vacate sections I.B.i. and II.B. of Sonoma I, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2772-M, as well as the decision’s remedial order.

4
November 2020 ballot. As a remedy, we order the County to cease and desist from
such conduct in the future and to post a notice of its violations.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND4
The County Board of Supervisors Places Measure P on the November 2020 Ballot
In September 2016, the BOS adopted Ordinance No. 6174 establishing the
Independent Office of Law Enforcement Review and Outreach (IOLERO) under the
Sonoma County Code (SCC). IOLERO’s general duties under Ordinance No. 6174
were to audit Sheriff’s Office administrative investigations, accept allegations of
Sheriff’s Office employee misconduct from the public, provide policy recommendations
to the Sheriff’s Office, increase transparency of Sheriff’s Office policies, procedures,
and operations, and conduct outreach and engage the community to strengthen the
relationship between the community and law enforcement. Ordinance No. 6174
specifically prohibited IOLERO from: (1) conducting its own investigations of alleged
misconduct; (2) interfering with the powers and duties of the Sheriff; (3) compelling by
subpoena testimony or the production of documents; (4) disclosing confidential
personnel file information; and (5) deciding Sheriff’s Office policy, directing activities,
or imposing discipline.
On June 23, 2020,5 the BOS authorized an ad hoc committee “to explore
possible amendments to the IOLERO ordinance” “within the limitations imposed by the
California Constitution and the Government Code,” with the goal of allowing the BOS
4 We recount here only the facts pertinent to the issues on remand. For a full
recitation of the facts, see Sonoma I, supra, PERB Decision No. 2772-M, pp. 3-22.
5 All further dates are in 2020, unless otherwise indicated.

5
“to adopt amendments to the IOLERO Ordinance by mid to late October.” In
furtherance of this goal, the committee would solicit input from various “stakeholders”
in three “phases” lasting through November or December of 2020.
An ad hoc committee charter was presented to the BOS on July 14, but the
BOS postponed considering the charter to its August 4 meeting. During the August 4
meeting, the County Administrator’s Office and County Counsel presented the BOS
with a proposed “Evelyn Cheatham IOLERO Initiative.” The Summary Report
accompanying the proposed initiative gave the BOS three options: (1) place the
proposed initiative on the November 3, 2020 election ballot, (2) introduce the
proposed changes as amendments to the existing IOLERO ordinance for direct
adoption by the BOS, or (3) approve the ad hoc committee charter. The BOS did not
act on the proposed initiative but instead called a special meeting for August 6 to
consider what action to take.
At the August 6 special meeting, the BOS voted to call a special election to
submit the proposed initiative to voters and to consolidate the special election with the
statewide general election on November 3, 2020. The County did not provide the
Associations written notice or an opportunity to meet and confer over Measure P
before the BOS voted on August 6. Despite not receiving formal notice, shortly before
the August 6 meeting, both DSA and SCLEA sent the BOS letters demanding to meet
and confer over Measure P prior to the BOS making a final decision. DSA and SCLEA
subsequently renewed their requests after the August 6 vote. In response to DSA’s
and SCLEA’s post-August 6 demands to bargain, the County asserted a management
right to place Measure P on the ballot but offered to meet and confer over any effects
of the measure within the scope of representation.

6
The County Registrar of Voters subsequently designated the proposed initiative
as Measure P and placed it on the November 3, 2020 general election ballot, where it
passed by a majority vote.
The Disputed Measure P Amendments
The court’s remand order directed PERB to consider whether the following nine
provisions of Measure P fall within the MMBA’s scope of representation:
SCC, § 2-392(d)(2): “[P]rovide independent investigations
of employees of the sheriff-coroner where an investigation
by that office is found by IOLERO to be incomplete or
deficient in some way.”
SCC, § 2-394(b)(3): “Act as a receiving and investigative
agency for whistleblower complaints involving the
sheriff-coroner . . . any whistleblower complaints received
or investigated by IOLERO shall not need to be reported by
IOLERO to the sheriff-coroner, including the Internal Affairs
Division.”
SCC, § 2-394(b)(4): “Make discipline recommendations, as
appropriate, for officers subject to IOLERO investigations.”
SCC, § 2-394(b)(5): “As part of the process of review, audit
and analysis, IOLERO may, among other things:
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“ii. 	Directly receive all prior complaints for the involved deputy,
previous investigation files (including Brady investigations)
and the record of discipline for each complaint;
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“vii. 	Where in the opinion of the director, the investigation of a
complaint or incident by the sheriff-coroner is incomplete or
otherwise deficient, conduct an independent investigation of
the matter, to the extent deemed necessary by the director;
“viii. 	Where the investigation involves an incident resulting in the
death of a person in custody of the sheriff-coroner or results

7
from the actions of an employee, conduct an independent
investigation of the matter; and
“ix. 	Independently subpoena records or testimony, as the
director deems appropriate, to complete an adequate
investigation. Among other sources of legal authority, such
subpoena power is delegated from that held by the board of
supervisors, to be used at the discretion of the director.”
SCC, § 2-394(e): “The sheriff-coroner shall cooperate fully
with IOLERO by providing direct, unfettered access to
information of the Sheriff’s Office, in order to facilitate
IOLERO’s receipt, review and audit of complaints and
investigations; IOLERO’s independent investigation of
incidents; as well as IOLERO’s review of policies, practices,
and training. Among the sources of information to which the
sheriff-coroner shall provide such access to IOLERO are
the following:
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“2) 	Any database or other computer application, or physical
files, containing employee personnel records, investigations
of complaints against employees, investigations of claims
filed against the Sheriff’s Office under the California Claims
Act, including Brady investigations and the record of
discipline with each complaint file or audit or investigations
related to lawsuits filed against the County because of any
action or inaction of an employee of the Sheriff’s Office;”
SCC, § 2-394(f): “The director shall be provided access by
the sheriff-coroner to personally sit in and observe the
investigative interviews of any complainant or witness in, or
deputy who is a subject of, an administrative investigation,
upon request by the director.”
The Parties’ Letters of Agreement
On June 23, 2022, the same day the Court of Appeal issued Sonoma II, the
County, DSA, and SCLEA issued a jointly-drafted written statement entitled, “County
of Sonoma, labor groups reach agreement of law enforcement oversight measures.”

8
The joint statement recounted that the parties had bargained for over a year “to
implement the voters’ will, ensure that IOLERO’s expanded authority represented
smart and effective law enforcement oversight, and treat the associations’ members
fairly.” The joint statement further recounted that the parties had reached an
agreement that “meets all of these goals,” and that “IOLERO now has the authority to
conduct independent investigations of serious instances of alleged misconduct, with
greater access to and cooperation with Sheriff’s Office internal investigations.” The
joint statement linked to a County website containing nearly identical Letters of
Agreement (LOAs) that the County reached with DSA and SCLEA earlier in June
2022.
Each of the LOAs included, among other terms, the following relevant
provisions, with only non-material differences in numbering:
“IV. 	IOLERO REVIEW, AUDIT AND ANALYSIS OF
SHERIFF’S OFFICE ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(A) Audit Process and Procedures
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(vi) In reviewing the Sheriff’s Office investigation, IOLERO
Staff who have successfully completed the required
background check for employment with IOLERO, will have
the ability to search all completed Sheriff’s Office citizen
complaint investigations and all Sheriff’s Office completed
administrative investigations in [the Sheriff’s Office
Investigations Management database] AIM . . .
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(viii) Unit members may be directly contacted by IOLERO
as part of IOLERO’s efforts to ensure the completeness and

9
fairness of the Sheriff-Coroner’s investigation, to include
any supervisor of an employee who is the subject of the
investigation under review . . .
“At the conclusion of IOLERO’s review, audit and analysis
of the investigation, the IOLERO Director may provide
advice and/or recommendations to the Sheriff’s Office in an
individual case-specific report . . .
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“(C) Case-Specific Reports
“(i) Case-specific reports are confidential communications
among the IOLERO Director and the Sheriff’s Office, and
will be maintained by IOLERO as confidential peace officer
records in accordance with Penal Code sections 832.5,
832.7 and 832.8.
“(ii) Should the IOLERO Director conclude that a Sheriff’s
Office investigation was incomplete, biased or otherwise
deficient, the case-specific report shall identify the bases
and reasons for that conclusion. If IOLERO intends to
independently investigate the facts of the subject
investigation it deems incomplete or otherwise deficient,
IOLERO will notify the Sheriff of its intention as part of the
case-specific report.
“(D) Independent Investigations
“(i) IOLERO may initiate an independent investigation
under either of the following circumstances:
“a. The case-specific report concludes that the Sheriff’s
Office investigation was incomplete or otherwise deficient;
“b. The investigation involves an incident resulting in the
death of a person in custody of Sheriff’s Office personnel or
results from the actions of Sheriff’s Office personnel.
“(ii) IOLERO’s independent investigation shall not take
place until the Sheriff’s Office investigation is referred to
IOLERO as described under section IV (A) (v) above.
IOLERO’s independent investigation will not in any way

10
interfere with the Sheriff’s Office investigation or any
criminal investigation into the matter.
“(iii) In furtherance of conducting an independent
investigation, IOLERO may:
“a. Contact complainants, witnesses, and/or custodians of
evidence to elicit relevant information. Such contact of
bargaining unit members will take place during regular
business hours whenever possible. IOLERO does not have
the authority to direct any unit member’s activities that may
be requested by IOLERO under this sub-part.
“b. Subpoena testimony and/or documents as deemed
necessary pursuant to Ordinance 6333 and Government
Code section 25303.7.
“(iv) Following the completion of an independent
investigation, the IOLERO Director may provide a
supplemental case-specific report to the Sheriff’s Office,
which may include discipline recommendations, as
appropriate, for unit members subject to IOLERO’s
investigation. The supplemental case-specific report will be
maintained by IOLERO as a confidential peace officer
personnel record. IOLERO will not retain, nor disclose, any
physical or digital copies of the underlying investigative file
that it accessed through the Sheriff’s Office that IOLERO
relied on in preparing the supplemental case-specific
report.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“VI. EFFECT AND FULL UNDERSTANDING
“The provisions of this Letter of Agreement are subject to
and to be read with County Ordinance 6333 and the
Operational Agreement executed by and between IOLERO
and the Sheriff’s Office pursuant to Section 2-394(d) of
Ordinance No. 6333. To the extent the provisions of this
Agreement conflict with provisions in Ordinance No. 6333

11
or the Operational Agreement, the provisions of this Letter
of Agreement will control as permitted by applicable law.
“Any alteration, variation, waiver or modification of any
terms or provisions contained in this Letter of Agreement
shall be effectuated as authorized by and in accordance
with California Government Code section 3500 et. seq., and
the County’s Employee Relations Policy and Procedure.”
DISCUSSION
I. 	Mootness
Our request for supplemental briefing asked the parties to brief the impact, if
any, of the June 2022 LOAs on the issues on remand. The County argues that the
LOAs render this entire matter moot, while the Associations contend the matter is not
moot because the County has initiated bargaining over revisions to the LOAs. For the
following reasons, we find this matter is not moot.
“A case in controversy becomes moot when the essential nature of the complaint
is lost because of some superseding act or acts of the parties.” (Amador Valley Joint
Union High School District (1978) PERB Decision No. 74, p. 5 (Amador).) “A charge that
an employer’s unilateral change to a particular term or condition of employment was
unlawful does not become moot merely because the parties reach agreement on that
term or condition in subsequent negotiations. [Citation.] Only when the agreement
clearly settles the issue of whether the respondent’s conduct was unlawful or explicitly
waives the charging party’s right to pursue the charge will PERB find a case moot under
these circumstances.” (County of Riverside (2010) PERB Decision No. 2132-M, p. 7.)
An actual dispute remains between the parties even if their subsequent agreement
narrows the available relief. (Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2017) PERB
Decision No. 2524-M, pp. 13-14.)

12
As discussed in Part III, post, the LOAs do substantially impact the appropriate
remedy. But they did not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether the Measure P
amendments were within the scope of representation or whether the County had a
duty to meet and confer with the Associations before placing the amendments on the
November 2020 ballot. Because there remains a live controversy over these issues,
and because the public interest is served by clarifying the parties’ rights and
obligations (Amador, supra, PERB Decision No. 74, p. 5), this matter is not moot and
we will proceed to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute.
II. 	Obligation to Meet and Confer over the Disputed Measure P Amendments
MMBA section 3505 requires a public agency to meet and confer in good faith
with representatives of recognized employee organizations concerning matters within
the scope of representation. It is an unfair practice for a public agency to refuse or fail
to comply with this obligation. (§ 3506.5, subd. (c).) Of particular relevance here,
public agencies must comply with the MMBA’s meet-and-confer requirements before
submitting to voters an initiative affecting matters within the scope of representation.
(Boling v. Public Employment Relations Board (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 915 (Boling);
People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984)
36 Cal.3d 591, 597-601 (Seal Beach).)
A unilateral change to a matter within the scope of representation is a per se
violation of the duty to meet and confer in good faith. (County of Merced (2020) PERB
Decision No. 2740-M, pp. 8-9.) To prove a prima facie case of an unlawful unilateral
change, a charging party must show that: (1) the employer changed or deviated from
the status quo; (2) the change or deviation concerned a matter within the scope of
representation; (3) the change or deviation had a generalized effect or continuing

13
impact on represented employees’ terms or conditions of employment; and (4) the
employer reached its decision without first providing adequate advance notice of the
proposed change to the union and bargaining in good faith over the decision, at the
union’s request, until the parties reached an agreement or a lawful impasse. (County
of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Decision No. 2799-M, pp. 15-16.)
In the Court of Appeal, the County challenged only the second element of the
unilateral change test—whether the change in policy concerns a matter within the
scope of representation. After finding the Board erred in its scope of representation
analysis, the court declined to address whether the County failed to give the
Associations adequate notice and opportunity to meet and confer before deciding to
place Measure P on the ballot. We address each issue in turn.6
A. 	Scope of Representation
The MMBA defines “scope of representation” as “all matters relating to
employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, except, however, that
the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or
organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order.” (§ 3504.)
The “merits, necessity, or organization” language of MMBA section 3504 recognizes
“the right of employers to make unconstrained decisions when fundamental
6 The County did not challenge on appeal our conclusions that the other two
elements of the unilateral change test were satisfied, i.e., that the disputed Measure P
amendments changed policy and had a generalized effect or continuing impact on
bargaining unit members’ terms or conditions of employment. Consequently, those
conclusions are binding under the law of the case doctrine. (See Shopoff & Cavallo
LLP v. Hyon (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1518, fn. 18 [findings not challenged on
appeal are binding on remand under law of the case principles].)

14
management or policy choices are involved.” (Building Material & Construction
Teamsters’ Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 663 (Building Material).)
As we recently clarified in City and County of San Francisco (2022) PERB
Decision No. 2846-M:
“In determining whether an employer’s decision is within the
scope of representation under MMBA section 3504, we first
determine into which of three categories of managerial
decisions the decision falls: (1) ‘decisions that “have only
an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment
relationship” and thus are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining,’ such as advertising, product design, and
financing; (2) ‘decisions directly defining the employment
relationship, such as wages, workplace rules, and the order
of succession of layoffs and recalls,’ which are ‘always
mandatory subjects of bargaining’; and (3) ‘decisions that
directly affect employment, such as eliminating jobs, but
nonetheless may not be mandatory subjects of bargaining
because they involve “a change in the scope and direction
of the enterprise” or, in other words, the employer’s
“retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to
employment.” (County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision
No. 2594-M, p. 18 (Orange), quoting International Assn. of
Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment
Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 272-273 (Richmond
Firefighters).)
“When a decision falls into the third category, we first
determine whether the decision has ‘a significant and
adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions
of the bargaining-unit employees’ that ‘arises from the
implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy
decision.’ (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638; Orange,
supra, PERB Decision No. 2594-M, pp. 19-20.) If both
requirements are met, we determine whether ‘the
employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking in
managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to
employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action
in question.’ (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 638;

15
Orange, supra, PERB Decision No. 2594-M, pp. 17, 19-
20.)”
(City and County of San Francisco, supra, PERB Decision No. 2846-M, pp. 17-18.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the Board’s determination that the disputed
Measure P amendments fall into the third category under this framework because the
County has a substantial interest in increasing transparency and fostering community
trust in policing and correctional services. (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 181-182.) We therefore must determine whether the decision to place the disputed
Measure P amendments on the ballot had “a significant and adverse effect on the
wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees.” (City and
County of San Francisco, supra, PERB Decision No. 2846-M, p. 18.)
As an initial matter, we reject the County’s contention that the Court of Appeal
effectively determined that the disputed Measure P amendments did not significantly
and adversely affect employment terms. The court’s discussion did not amount, as the
County implies, to a conclusion that the disputed amendments were outside the scope
of representation. Rather, the court left that question open: “We cannot say the
Measure P provisions ‘invariably raises [sic] disciplinary issues’ for which mandatory
decision bargaining is required. (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 634, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d
69, 139 P.3d 532.) Application of the first prong of the Claremont test here was
necessary to determine whether the decision to place Measure P on the ballot was
within the scope of representation.” (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 185.) The
court’s remand order also shows the court made no legal conclusions on scope of
representation that are binding on PERB: “On remand, PERB must determine whether
the decision to place [the disputed Measure P amendments] on the ballot was within the

16
scope of representation under the MMBA as analyzed under Claremont, supra,
39 Cal.4th at page 638, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69, 139 P.3d 532.” (Id. at pp. 192-193.) The
Court of Appeal thus explicitly did not resolve whether the disputed Measure P
amendments significantly and adversely affected employment conditions and thus
whether the County had an obligation to meet and confer.7
1. 	Significant and Adverse Effect Analysis
Neither Claremont nor any other decision announces a uniform standard for
determining whether an effect on employment conditions is “significant and adverse.”
Indeed, this critical determination is necessarily context-specific. But there is one
overarching consideration applicable irrespective of context: we must review all
relevant circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable employee. (See Long
Beach Police Officer Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 996, 1011
[finding change in investigatory practice to be within the scope of representation
because police officers “may well have a fear, albeit a phantom fear,” of punitive
action] (Long Beach); County of Santa Clara (2022) PERB Decision No. 2820-M, p. 8
7 In a similar vein, the County argues that under the law of the case doctrine,
PERB is bound by the Court of Appeal’s “findings and conclusions regarding the
record evidence.” But the court made no factual findings on the two issues on remand.
On both issues, the court concluded that PERB incorrectly applied existing law to the
facts. (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 185, 191.) We thus are free on remand
to make any factual findings that are supported by the record. (See Healdsburg Union
High School District and Healdsburg Union School District/San Mateo City School
District (1984) PERB Decision No. 375, p. 5 [on remand from the California Supreme
Court’s decision approving PERB’s test for determining whether subjects not
specifically enumerated by the Educational Employment Relations Act (§ 3540 et seq.)
are within the scope of representation, the Board applied the test to the facts of the
case and made new factual findings].)

17
[materiality of unilateral change is assessed “through the eyes of a reasonable
employee”].)
As to the first term, “significant” means “large or important enough to have an
effect or to be noticed.” (Significant, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/significant [as of
Feb. 27, 2023].) Consistent with that definition, Claremont found no significant effect
on police officers’ working conditions where the amount of time per shift officers took
to complete racial profiling study forms “was de minimis.” (39 Cal.4th at pp. 638-639.)
As to the second term, Claremont provides no guidance for determining whether
a significant effect is also “adverse.” But long-settled precedent holds that an employer
action is adverse whenever a reasonable employee in the same circumstances “would
consider the action to have an adverse impact on the employee’s employment.”
(Newark Unified School District (1991) PERB Decision No. 864, pp. 11-12.) We find
this well-established standard equally applicable to determining adverse effects under
Claremont.
Under the reasonable employee standard, the effect of a change need only be
reasonably foreseeable to be considered “significant and adverse.” As the California
Supreme Court observed in Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651—the decision
from which Claremont drew the “significant and adverse” standard: “The cases have
established that the bargaining unit can be adversely affected without any immediate
adverse effect on any particular employee within that unit.” (Id. at p. 662.) Again,
long-standing PERB precedent provides a useful standard here. As we recognized in
Trustees of the California State University (2012) PERB Decision No. 2287-H:

18
“Because bargaining over effects contemplates that
negotiations will occur prior to implementation of the
non-negotiable decision, the parties must assess the
effects of the decision prospectively, without the benefit of
hindsight. The effects must be reasonably likely to occur,
not proven to have already occurred.”
(Id. at p. 14, italics in original; see Rio Hondo Community College District (2013)
PERB Decision No. 2313, p. 5 [“When approaching effects bargaining, parties must
anticipate changes yet to flow from the employer’s decision”].) Consistent with these
authorities, in analyzing whether a management decision has “a significant and
adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions” of bargaining unit
employees, we examine whether such an effect was reasonably foreseeable at the
time the decision was made, not whether the effect was certain to occur as a result of
the decision. And we consider this issue through the eyes of a reasonable employee
in the same circumstances.
Applying these standards, we find that the disputed Measure P provisions
significantly and adversely affect Association-represented employees’ working
conditions by creating a second, independent investigatory path. Before Measure P,
IOLERO only had authority to audit Sheriff’s Office misconduct investigations after
they were complete; it had no authority to conduct its own investigations. Measure P
gave IOLERO new authority to: (1) conduct an independent investigation when the
Sheriff’s Office investigation “is found by IOLERO to be incomplete or deficient in
some way” (SCC, §§ 2-392(d)(2), 2-394(b)(5)(vii)); (2) directly receive and investigate
whistleblower complaints against Sheriff’s Office personnel (SCC, § 2-394(b)(3)); and
(3) independently investigate deaths of individuals in Sheriff’s Office custody or
caused by Sheriff’s Office personnel (SCC, § 2-394(b)(5)(viii)). IOLERO may

19
recommend discipline based on any of these investigations. (SCC, § 2-394(b)(4).)
While an independent IOLERO investigation may or may not ultimately lead to an
officer’s discipline, for the following reasons employees would reasonably view it as
significantly and adversely affecting terms and conditions of employment in several
ways.
First, new investigative procedures adversely affect employment when they
create a potential for discipline that did not previously exist. For instance, in Murphy
Diesel Co. (1970) 184 NLRB 757, the employer unilaterally changed the process to
investigate tardiness and absenteeism by adding a new requirement that employees
use a company form to submit a written explanation for being tardy or absent. (Id. at
p. 759.) Although the form did not alter existing criteria for discipline, the National
Labor Relations Board found that “the new requirements, all of which exposed the
employees to a jeopardy which had not prevailed under the preexisting rules, vitally
affected employee tenure and conditions of employment generally and were therefore
matters which were not subject to unilateral employer control.”8 (Vernon Fire Fighters
v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802, 816, quoting Murphy Diesel Co., supra,
184 NLRB at p. 763, internal quotations omitted.) California courts have reached
similar conclusions with respect to new investigative procedures that exposed
employees to greater potential for discipline. (See, e.g., Holliday v. City of Modesto
(1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 528, 540 [holding that mandatory drug testing policy was within
8 Although federal judicial and administrative precedent is not binding on PERB,
it often provides persuasive guidance in construing California’s public sector labor
relations statutes. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2670-M, p. 19,
fn. 20 & p. 28; Capistrano Unified School District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2440,
p. 15.)

20
the scope of representation]; Long Beach, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 996, 1011 [holding
that the city’s change to a past practice of allowing police officers to consult with a
union representative or attorney before filing an officer-involved shooting report was
within the scope of representation].)
By subjecting County peace officers to potential investigation by a second
entity, Measure P increases the potential for discipline. Indeed, one of the stated
purposes of Measure P was to increase accountability among County law
enforcement, implicitly by increasing the threat of discipline for misconduct. Moreover,
even if no discipline ultimately issues, when IOLERO completes an independent
investigation, it will maintain the supplemental case-specific report as a confidential
peace officer personnel record. Reasonable employees would find the existence of
such a personnel record to be significant and adverse. (See, e.g., State of California
(Department of Youth Authority) (2000) PERB Decision No. 1403-S, adopting
proposed decision at p. 33 [“[A] reasonable person would consider a performance
report that included substandard ratings for ‘relationships with people’ and ‘analyzing
situations and materials’ to have an adverse impact on his/her employment”];
California Union of Safety Employees (Coelho) (1994) PERB Decision No. 1032-S,
p. 12 [fact that complaint and investigation did not result in action being taken against
employee by his employer does not eliminate adverse impact where “a reasonable
person” would “be concerned about the potential adverse effect”].)
Second, by subjecting County peace officers to a potential second investigation
even if a first investigation has cleared them, these Measure P amendments adversely
affect wages and promotional opportunities. Hearing testimony established that an
officer who is under investigation will not be appointed to a specialty assignment or

21
promoted. In such circumstances, the officer would not receive additional pay that
comes with the specialty assignment or promotion. And the loss of the specialty
assignment or promotional opportunity could adversely impact the officer’s career
development.9
Measure P also adversely affects Association-represented employees’ wages
regardless of whether they are the subject of the investigation or only a witness.
SCC § 2-394(b)(5)(ix) delegates to IOLERO the BOS’ authority to subpoena
testimony. But Measure P is silent about whether any employee subpoenaed by
IOLERO to testify in an investigation will be paid if the interview takes place outside of
the employee’s duty hours. Thus, it is foreseeable that an employee called to testify
during off-duty hours would not be paid for that time.
Two of the disputed Measure P amendments involve the evidence available to
IOLERO. SCC § 2-394(b)(5)(ii) allows IOLERO to “[d]irectly receive all prior
complaints for the involved deputy, previous investigation files (including Brady10
investigations) and the record of discipline for each complaint.” SCC § 2-394(e)(2)
grants IOLERO access to those same materials as well as employee personnel
9 Indeed, the Public Safety Officers’ Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBR;
§ 3300 et seq.) requires that an investigation be completed and notice of proposed
discipline issued within one year of the start of the investigation “to ensure that an
officer will not be faced with the uncertainty of a lingering investigation.” (Mays v. City
of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 322.)
10 A Brady list contains the names of “officers whom [law enforcement]
agencies have identified as having potential exculpatory or impeachment information
in their personnel files—evidence which may need to be disclosed to the defense
under Brady [v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83] and its progeny.” (Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 36.)

22
records, “investigations of claims filed against the Sheriff’s Office under the California
Claims Act,” and “investigations related to lawsuits filed against the County because of
any action or inaction of an employee of the Sheriff’s Office.” These amendments
might not significantly and adversely affect terms and conditions of employment if
IOLERO was merely reviewing such evidence as part of its pre-existing audit function.
However, that is not the case. A reasonable employee would find these provisions
significant and adverse because they are part and parcel of the separate, independent
investigations that Measure P authorizes IOLERO to conduct even after the Sheriff’s
Office has already cleared an officer or otherwise concluded its investigation. Further,
although the parties’ June 2022 LOAs provide that IOLERO does not retain these
materials after it completes its investigation, that limitation only exists because the
County negotiated with the Associations while litigating this matter. A reasonable
employee at the time Measure P was placed on the ballot could not assume that
management would implement such protections absent collective bargaining.
In contrast, we conclude that the provision allowing the IOLERO Director “to
personally sit in and observe” the Sheriff’s Office’s investigative interview of a subject
officer (SCC, § 2-394(f)) was not within the scope of representation because a
reasonable employee would not find the addition of a single additional qualified
observer, on its own, to be significant and adverse.11 (Cf. Berkeley Police Assn. v. City
11 The Associations argue that SCC § 2-394(f) is adverse because it expands
the number of interrogators at the investigative interview from two to three. On its face,
SCC § 2-394(f) only allows the IOLERO Director “to personally sit in and observe” the
interview; it says nothing about the Director interrogating the subject officer. Since the
Associations presented no extrinsic evidence that SCC § 2-394(f) was intended to
grant the Director authority to interrogate the subject or that IOLERO intended to

23
of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 937-938 [city had no duty to bargain over
decision to allow citizen review commission member to observe police department
board of review hearings and, conversely, to send a police department representative
to citizen review commission meetings].) Accordingly, we dismiss the complaint
allegation related to this amendment.
For these reasons, we conclude that all but one of the disputed Measure P
amendments had a reasonably foreseeable “significant and adverse effect” on
Association-represented employees’ working conditions as of August 6 when the BOS
decided to place Measure P on the November 2020 ballot.
2. 	Balancing Management’s Interests with the Benefits of Bargaining
Having found the disputed Measure P amendments had “a significant and
adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit
employees” that “arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or
policy decision,” we must determine whether “the employer’s need for unencumbered
decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-
employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.” (City and County of
San Francisco, supra, PERB Decision No. 2846-M, p. 18.) Past decisions have
summarized the balancing test as analyzing whether an issue is “amenable to” or
“suitable for” bargaining. (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 637-638; Rialto Police
implement the provision in that manner, we take the provision’s language at face
value.

24
Benevolent Assn. v. City of Rialto (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1306-1307 & 1309.)
Investigation and discipline lie at the core of traditional labor relations and are
particularly amenable to collective bargaining—both for peace officers and other
employee groups. (Long Beach, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 1011; see also
Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 634 [while drug testing is inherently tied to
discipline and therefore subject to bargaining, police department’s requirement that
officers collect data on racial profiling involved no clear disciplinary aspects].) But in
cases involving law enforcement agencies, the countervailing management interest is
unique given that peace officers “exercise tremendous power in the name of the
public.” (Fisk et al., Reforming Law Enforcement Labor Relations (Aug. 2020) Cal.
L.Rev. Online, p. 3.)
On the continuum of possible measures to enhance police accountability or
improve police-community relations, management’s need for unencumbered
decisionmaking tends to outweigh the benefit of bargaining in relation to measures
focused squarely on public safety and community relations, such as revising
use-of-force policies, implementing a racial profiling study, or requiring officers to wear
body worn cameras. (See, e.g., Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 632-634 & fn. 6
[city had no duty to bargain over racial profiling study, as it was not related to
discipline, though bargaining could be required if city were to begin disciplining officers
for racial profiling]; San Francisco Police Officers’ Assn. v. San Francisco Police Com.
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 676, 684-690 [city had no duty to bargain over decision to
revise use-of-force policy, but did bargain over the policy’s impact on discipline]; San
Jose Peace Officer’s Assn. v. City of San Jose (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 935 [city had no
duty to bargain over decision to adopt a new use-of-force policy].)

25
Much of Measure P fell within this ambit of management prerogative, and
indeed the Associations do not challenge those provisions. The Associations instead
focus their claims on amendments involving investigation and discipline. As noted
above, such provisions are presumptively subject to decision bargaining for all
employee groups, including peace officers. (Long Beach, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1011.) However, because peace officers sometimes use force—a unique aspect of
their role in society—the scope of representation balancing test in law enforcement
cases can turn on factors that do not matter for other employee groups. Most notably,
a law enforcement agency generally has no decision bargaining obligation for an
isolated change to an unwritten past practice related to peace officer investigations,
where the practice was more protective than POBR. (Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1625, 1643-1645
[distinguishing Long Beach, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 996 and finding no decision
bargaining duty for change to practice allowing peace officers present during a
deputy-involved shooting to consult collectively prior to being interviewed, where past
practice was unwritten and more protective than POBR] (ALADS); Association of
Orange County Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Orange (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 29, 41-46
[finding no decision bargaining duty for change to unwritten past practice allowing
peace officers pre-interview access to their investigative files, because neither POBR
nor parties’ contract required access at that stage] (AOCDS).)12
12 While ALADS, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 1625 and AOCDS, supra, 217
Cal.App.4th 29 found it relevant to assess whether a practice was written or unwritten,
that question has little salience when the practice in question does not relate to use of
lethal force. (See, e.g., City of Santa Maria (2020) PERB Decision No. 2736-M, p. 18
[unwritten past practice was sufficiently longstanding to constitute an established

26
Here, Measure P was a broad sea change consisting of many interrelated
changes, creating an independent investigatory path even after County peace officers
have been cleared in a Sheriff’s Office’s investigation. This is quite different from
changes to discrete, unwritten investigatory procedures more protective than POBR.
The several challenged Measure P amendments allowing repeat investigations
of the same officers over an extended period—thereby significantly and adversely
affecting their career trajectory—are prime examples of changes for which the benefit
of collective bargaining outweighs the short delay caused by requiring negotiations. In
fact, the LOAs show how bargaining can sensibly protect employees while still
meeting important public purposes. The record here therefore provides concrete
evidence that Measure P’s parallel investigatory track involves multiple significant
topics that are “amenable to resolution through the bargaining process.” (Claremont,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 637.)
To be sure, the MMBA’s bargaining obligation can slow down decision making
over law enforcement reforms that are mainly related to investigation and discipline of
peace officers. On the other hand, such deliberation has benefits. As demonstrated by
the parties’ LOAs, agreements that result from such negotiations may feature
improved content and foster employee buy-in, leading to more durable reform. (Fisk &
Richardson, Police Unions (2017) 85 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 712, 759-775.)
status quo].) Thus, where an alleged change to peace officers’ employment conditions
involves their pay, there is no cause to consider whether the practice was an unwritten
one more protective than POBR. (See, e.g., Riverside Sheriff’s Ass’n v. County of
Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1291 [approving PERB’s standard for
deciding whether a past practice is sufficiently consistent to constitute an established
status quo].)

27
Moreover, requiring negotiations does not give a public safety union a means to
block reform. As the Supreme Court has noted, in requiring negotiations over certain
decisions, the MMBA does not mandate that the parties reach an agreement, as “the
employer has ‘the ultimate power to refuse to agree on any particular issue.’”
(Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 630, quoting Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at
p. 665.) Thus, if the parties do not reach agreement, the employer may implement its
last, best, and final offer. (§ 3505.7.) And while in this case the County did not rely on
the MMBA’s emergency exception, that exception could curtail a law enforcement
agency’s bargaining obligation in unusual instances where the need to protect public
safety does not allow time for good faith bargaining. (§ 3504.5, subd. (b).)
For these reasons, we conclude that the following Measure P amendments are
within the scope of representation: those granting IOLERO authority to conduct
independent investigations of Sheriff’s Office employees (SCC, §§ 2-392(d)(2),
2-394(b)(3) & (5)(vii)-(viii) and deletion of language from SCC, § 2-394(c)(1)) and
recommend discipline of those employees (SCC, § 2-394(b)(4)); and those allowing
IOLERO to subpoena records or testimony in investigations (SCC, § 2-394(b)(5)(ix)
and deletion of language from SCC, § 2-394(c)(3)) and review an officer’s discipline
record, including all prior complaints (SCC, § 2-394(b)(5)(ii) & (e)(2)).
B. 	Notice and Opportunity to Meet and Confer over the Decision to Place
the Disputed Measure P Amendments on the November 2020 Ballot
MMBA section 3505 requires a public agency’s governing body or its designee
to “meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment with representatives of . . . recognized employee
organizations [and] consider fully such presentations as are made by the employee

28
organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a determination of policy or
course of action.” (Italics added.) Public agencies must comply with the MMBA’s meet-
and-confer requirement before submitting to voters an initiative affecting matters within
the scope of representation. (Boling, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 915; Seal Beach, supra,
36 Cal.3d at pp. 597-601.)
As the Court of Appeal found, the BOS made a firm decision to place
Measure P on the November 2020 ballot when it took that very action on August 6.
(Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 187.) The County did not give the
Associations advance written notice that the BOS was considering taking this action
on August 6. And although DSA and SCLEA learned immediately before the August 6
meeting of the BOS’ decision and demanded to meet and confer before the BOS took
action, the County ignored the Associations’ requests. On these facts, the Court of
Appeal affirmed our conclusion that the County did not provide the Associations notice
or an opportunity to meet and confer over the negotiable effects of the BOS’ decision
before implementation. (Id. at pp. 187-188.)
Having found PERB erred by not applying Claremont in its decision bargaining
analysis, the Court of Appeal did not address whether the County provided adequate
notice and opportunity to meet and confer over the decision to place Measure P on the
ballot. (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 185.) An employer’s obligation to
provide adequate notice and opportunity to meet and confer is identical for both “a
decision involving a negotiable subject [and] a negotiable effect of a non-negotiable
decision.” (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 12.) We thus
conclude that the same facts establishing a failure to give notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the negotiable effects of certain Measure P amendments also establish the

29
same failure with regard to the decision to place the disputed Measure P amendments
on the November 2020 ballot.
III. 	Remedy
MMBA section 3509, subdivision (b) authorizes PERB to order “the appropriate
remedy necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.” (Omnitrans (2010)
PERB Decision No. 2143-M, p. 8.) This includes the authority to order an offending
party to take affirmative actions designed to effectuate the purposes of the MMBA. (Id.
at p. 10.) A “properly designed remedial order seeks a restoration of the situation as
nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor practice.”
(Modesto City Schools (1983) PERB Decision No. 291, pp. 67-68.)
PERB’s standard remedy for an employer’s unlawful unilateral change is a
cease-and-desist order, notice posting, restoration of the status quo ante, and
appropriate make-whole relief including back pay and benefits with interest.
(Pasadena Area Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2444,
pp. 23-24.) “Restoring the parties and affected employees to their respective positions
before the unlawful conduct occurred is critical to remedying unilateral change
violations” to prevent the employer from gaining an unfair advantage in future
negotiations. (City of San Diego (2015) PERB Decision No. 2464-M, p. 40.)
On remand, the Associations urge us to restore the parties to the position they
were in prior to August 6 by invalidating the portions of the August 6 BOS resolution
placing the disputed Measure P amendments on the November 2020 ballot. While the
Court of Appeal confirmed PERB’s authority to declare a local governing body’s
resolution void and unenforceable (Sonoma II, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 192), we
find no reason to order such a remedy here in light of developments since our

30
Sonoma I decision. As the parties concede, the June 2022 LOAs resolved all
meet-and-confer issues arising out of the Measure P amendments we have found
could not be adopted or implemented without bargaining. While the LOAs contain
numerous relevant provisions, none are more important that those allowing IOLERO to
conduct independent investigations, thereby permitting the parallel investigatory path
at the core of the reasons multiple Measure P provisions fell within the scope of
representation. It would not effectuate the MMBA’s purposes to disturb that
agreement. (See City of Culver City (2020) PERB Decision No. 2731-M, p. 25
[declining to order restoration of the status quo ante where the parties had
subsequently agreed to the unlawfully changed policy in successor contract]; Region 2
Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee (2020) PERB Decision No. 2701-I,
pp. 57-58 [declining to order effects bargaining where the parties had subsequently
bargained over effects in successor contract negotiations].)
Significantly, any future changes to the LOAs (as well as new or changed
policies related to the topics covered therein) are subject to the MMBA’s
meet-and-confer obligation, and any failure to satisfy that obligation may be raised in a
future unfair practice charge. Furthermore, an order to cease and desist from placing
measures on the ballot that affect subjects within the scope of representation without
notice and meeting and conferring upon request with the Associations over the
decision or its effects prohibits the County from again engaging in the conduct we
found unlawful here.

31
For these reasons, we limit our remedial order to a cease-and-desist order and
notice posting.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire
record in this case, it has been found that the County of Sonoma (County) violated the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3505, and Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) Regulation 32603, subdivision (c) (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 31001 et seq.) when it failed and refused to meet and confer with the
Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association and Sonoma County Law Enforcement
Association (collectively, Associations) over the Board of Supervisors’ decision to
place Measure P on the November 2020 ballot and over the foreseeable negotiable
effects of that decision on employment conditions. By this conduct, the County also
interfered with the right of County employees to participate in the activities of an
employee organization of their own choosing, in violation of Government Code
section 3506 and PERB Regulation 32603, subdivision (a), and denied the
Associations their right to represent employees in their employment relations with a
public agency, in violation of Government Code section 3503 and PERB
Regulation 32603, subdivision (b).
Pursuant to Government Code section 3509, subdivision (a), it is hereby
ORDERED that the County, its governing board, and its representatives shall:

32
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing or failing to meet and confer in good faith with the
Associations before placing any matter on the ballot that affects subjects within the
scope of representation.
2. 	Interfering with bargaining unit members’ right to participate in the
activities of an employee organization of their own choosing.
3. 	Denying the Associations their right to represent employees in
their employment relations with the County.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Within 10 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post at all work locations in the County where notices to employees
represented by the Associations are posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as
an Appendix. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the Notice shall be
posted by electronic message, intranet, internet site, and other electronic means used
by the County to communicate with employees represented by the Associations. The
Notice must be signed by an authorized agent of the County, indicating that the
County will comply with the terms of this Order. Such posting shall be maintained for a
period of 30 consecutive workdays. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that
the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other
material.13
13 In light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the County shall notify PERB’s
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) in writing if, due to an extraordinary
circumstance such as an emergency declaration or shelter-in-place order, a majority
of employees at one or more work locations are not physically reporting to their work

33
2. 	Written notification of the actions taken to comply with this Order
shall be made to the General Counsel of the Public Employment Relations Board, or
the General Counsel’s designee. The County shall provide reports, in writing, as
directed by the General Counsel or designee. All reports regarding compliance with
this Order shall be served concurrently on the Associations.
Chair Banks and Members Krantz and Paulson joined in this Decision.
location as of the time the physical posting would otherwise commence. If the County
so notifies OGC, or if the Associations requests in writing that OGC alter or extend the
posting period, require additional notice methods, or otherwise adjust the manner in
which employees receive notice, OGC shall investigate and solicit input from all
parties. OGC shall provide amended instructions to the extent appropriate to ensure
adequate publication of the Notice, such as directing the County to commence posting
within 10 workdays after a majority of employees have resumed physically reporting
on a regular basis; directing the County to mail the Notice to all employees who are
not regularly reporting to any work location due to the extraordinary circumstance,
including those who are on a short term or indefinite furlough, are on layoff subject to
recall, or are working from home; or directing the County to mail the Notice to those
employees with whom it does not customarily communicate through electronic means.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-1816-M, Sonoma County
Deputy Sheriffs’ Association v. County of Sonoma, and Unfair Practice Case No. SF-
CE-1817-M, Sonoma County Law Enforcement Association v. County of Sonoma, in
which all parties had the right to participate, the Public Employment Relations Board
found that the County of Sonoma (County) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
(MMBA), Government Code section 3500 et seq., when it failed and refused to meet
and confer with the Sonoma County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association and Sonoma County
Law Enforcement Association (collectively, Associations) over the Board of
Supervisors’ decision to place Measure P on the November 2020 ballot and over the
foreseeable negotiable effects of that decision on working conditions.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we
will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing or failing to meet and confer with the Associations before
placing any measure on the ballot that affects subjects within the scope of
representation.
2. 	Interfering with bargaining unit members’ right to participate in the
activities of an employee organization of their own choosing.
3. 	Denying the Associations their right to represent employees in
their employment relations with the County.
Dated: _____________________ 	COUNTY OF SONOMA
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.