* * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * City and County of San Francisco (PERB 2958M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
MUNICIPAL ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION
OF SAN FRANCISCO, TEAMSTERS
LOCAL 856,
Charging Party,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-2157-M
PERB Decision No. 2958-M
April 25, 2025
Appearances: Beeson, Tayer & Bodine by Susan K. Garea, Attorney, for Municipal
Attorneys Association of San Francisco, Teamsters Local 856; Sloan, Sakai, Yeung &
Wong by Timothy G. Yeung and David Kahn, Attorneys, and Renne Public Law
Group, by Jonathan V. Holtzman and Arthur A. Hartinger, Attorneys, for City and
County of San Francisco.
Before Banks, Chair; Krantz and Krausse, Members.
DECISION
KRANTZ, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB or Board) on both parties’ exceptions to a proposed decision issued by an
administrative law judge (ALJ). The operative facts arose while Charging Party
Municipal Attorneys Association of San Francisco, Teamsters Local 856 (MAA) was
negotiating for a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Respondent City
and County of San Francisco (City). MAA proposed MOU language that would require
the City to show just cause for terminating MAA-represented attorneys and would
further require that attorney layoffs proceed in reverse-seniority order. The City
* * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * *

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acknowledged that the job protection proposals involved mandatory subjects of
bargaining under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).1 But the City refused to agree
to the job protection proposals and, critically, refused to submit these issues to binding
interest arbitration under the impasse resolution procedures set forth in the San
Francisco City Charter (Charter).
MAA filed an unfair practice charge against the City while bargaining was still
underway, and PERB’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC) issued a complaint
alleging multiple MMBA violations. The complaint primarily alleged that the City:
(1) refused to bargain over MAA’s job protection proposals and refused to submit
these proposals to interest arbitration as the Charter requires, thereby violating MMBA
sections 3506.5(c) and 3509(b), among other sections; and (2) adopted or enforced
an unreasonable local rule that conflicts with the MMBA by failing to allow interest
arbitration over MAA’s job protection proposals and imposing an unlawful deadline for
parties to submit proposals.
MAA did not pursue its claim about the submission deadline. In any event, we
addressed the deadline’s legality in City and County of San Francisco (2020) PERB
Decision No. 2691-M (CCSF I) and City and County of San Francisco (2023) PERB
Decision No. 2858-M (CCSF II). Accordingly, we do not further discuss that claim.
Among the remaining issues in dispute, the threshold issue is whether the
Charter allows or disallows interest arbitration over MAA’s job protections proposals. If
the Charter affords MAA the right to engage in interest arbitration over its job
1 The MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

3
protection proposals, then the City violated the Charter, and by extension the MMBA,
meaning there is no need to decide whether the MMBA permits a local agency to
establish an interest arbitration mechanism that excludes job protection proposals.
The ALJ ruled in MAA’s favor on the threshold issue (as well as on the complaint’s
bad faith bargaining claim), and therefore found no need to determine whether the
MMBA permits an employer to adopt an interest arbitration mechanism that excludes
job protection proposals.
Having reviewed the record de novo, we affirm the above-described
conclusions of the ALJ, though our analysis does not entirely match the proposed
decision. We notably reverse one significant conclusion in the proposed decision.
Specifically, as part of analyzing three Charter provisions the City relied on to support
its position, the ALJ found a Charter provision to be facially inconsistent with the
MMBA to the extent it states that attorneys “shall serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.” We interpret the provision differently from the ALJ, and for that
reason we do not find it facially inconsistent with the MMBA.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The City, which is both a charter city and county under California law, is a
public agency within the meaning of MMBA section 3501(c). The City Charter
establishes, among other City agencies, a Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
CSC’s primary duty is to oversee the City’s civil service merit system.

4
MAA, an exclusive representative within the meaning of PERB Regulation
32016(b),2 represents Unit 31, a bargaining unit comprising six attorney classifications
working primarily in the City Attorney’s Office, the District Attorney’s Office, and the
Public Defender’s Office. More than 80 percent of Unit 31 attorneys fall within title
code 8177, which is a “deep class,” meaning that attorneys progress annually along a
16-step salary scale rather than moving to higher attorney classifications. Job
responsibilities advance as employees progress through the scale.
City appointing authorities (normally department heads) hire and fire attorneys.
In this case, the most relevant department heads are three elected officials: the
District Attorney, the Public Defender, and the City Attorney.
In 2024, MAA affiliated with Teamsters Local 856. The bargaining unit’s primary
impetus for affiliation was employees’ concern over job protections after a turnover in
elected department heads led to a series of terminations that certain employees
perceived to be retaliatory and/or political in nature.
In our below factual findings, we cover the most relevant Charter provisions and
local rules, the parties’ bargaining history over job protections prior to 2024, and finally
the 2024 negotiations at issue in this case.
I. 	Relevant Charter Provisions and CSC Rules
Appendix 8 to the Charter (commonly referred to as “A8”), titled “Employment
Provisions,” is one of multiple Charter sections that make up the City’s local rules
regarding employee and labor relations.
2 PERB Regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8,
section 31001 et seq.

5
Charter section A8.409-3 states, in relevant part:
“A8.409-3 OBLIGATION TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
“Notwithstanding any other ordinances, rules or regulations
. . . , [the City and unions representing City employees]
shall have the mutual obligation to bargain in good faith on
all matters within the scope of representation as defined by
[MMBA] section 3504, relating to the wages, hours, benefits
and other terms and conditions of [City] employment,
including . . . agreements to provide binding arbitration of
discipline and discharge; provided, however that, except
insofar as they affect compensation, those matters within
the jurisdiction of the [CSC] which establish, implement and
regulate the civil service merit system shall not be subject
to bargaining under this part: the authority, purpose,
definitions, administration and organization of the merit
system and the [CSC]; policies, procedures and funding of
the operations of the [CSC] and its staff; the establishment
and maintenance of a classification plan including the
classification and reclassification of positions and the
allocation and reallocation of positions to the various
classifications; status rights; the establishment of
standards, procedures and qualifications for employment,
recruitment, application, examination, selection, certification
and appointment; the establishment, administration and
duration of eligible lists; probationary status and the
administration of probationary periods, except duration;
pre-employment and fitness for duty medical examinations .
. .; the designation of positions as exempt, temporary,
limited tenure, part-time, seasonal or permanent;
resignation with satisfactory service and reappointment;
exempt entry level appointment of the handicapped;
approval of payrolls; and conflict of interest. As to these
matters, the [CSC] shall continue to be required to meet
and confer pursuant to state law.”
Charter section A8.409-4, titled “Impasse Resolution Procedures,” provides for
mediation and/or binding interest arbitration when the City and a recognized union

6
reach a bargaining impasse.3 The parties engage in the mediation and/or arbitration
process before a board comprising one member that the City appoints, one member
that the union appoints, and a neutral third member, who is typically a labor arbitrator.
(CCSF II, supra, PERB Decision No. 2858-M, p. 3.) We commonly refer to “the
arbitrator” as shorthand for the full three-member board, because the neutral
arbitrator’s vote usually decides all disputed topics. (Id. at pp. 3-4.)
If the parties reach impasse and are unable to reach agreement through
mediation, the arbitrator must direct each party to submit “a last offer of settlement on
each of the remaining issues in dispute.” (Charter, § A8.409-4(d).) The arbitrator then
resolves each disputed issue based on factors listed in the Charter and need not
accept either party’s full package of proposals. (Ibid.) The arbitrator’s decisions are
final and binding on the parties. (Ibid.)
City voters added sections A8.409-3 and A8.409-4 to the Charter in 1991, when
they voted in favor of Proposition B. (CCSF I, supra, PERB Decision No. 2691-M,
p. 8.) Prior to placing Proposition B on the ballot, the City bargained over its terms with
a coalition of City unions. (Ibid.) The lead negotiators for the union coalition came from
the largest City union, which was affiliated with the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU).
Charter section 10.101, titled “General Powers and Duties,” states that the CSC
“shall adopt rules, policies and procedures to carry out the civil service merit system
3 For a more complete discussion of the relevant Charter provisions and their
history, see CCSF I, supra, PERB Decision No. 2691-M, pp. 5-11. As noted there, the
Charter contains separate sections (including alternate interest arbitration provisions)
for transit employees, police officers, deputy sheriffs, and firefighters. (Id. at pp. 6, 29.)

7
provisions of this charter” including rules regarding applications, examinations,
eligibility lists, appointments, transfers, layoffs, and other matters concerning the merit
system.
Charter section 10.104, titled “Exclusions From Civil Service Appointment,”
states, in relevant part:
“All employees of [the City] shall be appointed through
competitive examination unless exempted by this Charter.
The following positions shall be exempt from competitive
civil service selection, appointment and removal
procedures, and the person serving in the position shall
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority:
[¶] . . . [¶]
“13. All attorneys, including an attorney to the Sheriff and
an attorney for the Tax Collector, City Attorney’s and
District Attorney’s investigators, hospital chief
administrators, physicians and dentists serving in their
professional capacity (except those physicians and dentists
whose duties are significantly administrative or
supervisory)[.]”
The CSC maintains a set of rules, which includes Rule 114.25, as follows:
“Sec. 114.25 Exclusions from Civil Service
Appointment
“All permanent employees of the City and County shall be
appointed through the civil service process by competitive
examination unless exempted from the civil service
examination and selection process in accordance with
Charter provisions. Appointments excluded by Charter from
the competitive civil service examination and selection
process shall be known as exempt appointments. Any
person occupying a position under exempt appointment
shall not be subject to civil service selection, appointment,

8
and removal procedures and shall serve at the pleasure of
the appointing officer.”
II. 	Bargaining History over Requirements for Attorney Terminations
Prior to 2024, the parties had repeatedly bargained, and in certain instances
used the Charter’s interest arbitration mechanism, regarding proposals to strengthen
or relax requirements relating to attorney terminations. In the 1990s or early 2000s,
the parties added a Severance Pay article to their MOU. This article imposed two
types of requirements regarding attorney terminations. First, it required the City to
provide 30 days’ notice or 30 days’ pay in lieu of notice when terminating an attorney.
Second, it specified the levels of severance attorneys would receive upon termination.
This portion of the article began by stating:
“Due to the unique job responsibilities of the attorneys and
the attorneys' status in the City as exempt from civil service
selection, appointment and removal procedures (as
provided by the Charter), the City and MAA agree to the
following: In addition to the notice or pay in lieu thereof
provided above, a represented attorney in an attorney job
code who is removed or released from City service by his
or her Appointing Officer shall receive the following
severance benefit in exchange for a release signed by the
represented attorney and MAA of any and all contractual
claims that the attorney or MAA may have against the City,
(including any officer or employee thereof.)”
The article then set forth a schedule of severance payments based on years of
service.
In the 2005 negotiation cycle, the parties submitted competing proposals to
modify the Severance Pay article. The City proposed to add the following new
language to the severance article: “Notwithstanding the provisions in this MOU that
would otherwise entitle an attorney to severance pay, attorneys shall not be entitled to

9
severance pay if the termination or change in job code stems from an attorney's
misconduct.” The City further proposed that “disputes concerning whether misconduct
occurred in connection with severance pay may be submitted to expedited arbitration.”
MAA’s 2005 proposal, in contrast, would: (1) excuse the City from paying severance if
it afforded an attorney certain due process protections and proved gross misconduct
in a neutral, binding hearing; and (2) authorize the hearing officer to order backpay,
reinstatement, and expungement of discipline if the hearing record “exonerated” the
attorney. After weighing the factors required by the Charter, the interest arbitrator
rejected the City’s proposal and instead added MAA’s proposal to the MOU.
In 2019, the parties again needed an interest arbitrator to resolve a bargaining
impasse over dueling proposals to modify the Severance Pay article. In that instance,
the City sought to require attorneys to sign a general release in exchange for
severance pay, while MAA proposed to retain existing language, which required a
release of MOU claims rather than a general release. The arbitrator adopted the City’s
general release proposal.
In 2022, MAA proposed due process rights and other job protections for
bargaining unit attorneys who are subject to termination. In doing so, MAA addressed
employee concerns based on a recent change in district attorney leadership and
another anticipated change. The City rejected the proposal, and City Chief Negotiator
Charles Sakai stated that it was ineligible for interest arbitration. Soon after,
discussion turned to meeting the attorneys’ concern in other ways, and the parties
were able to reach an agreement to enhance severance benefits, leading to a new,
two-year MOU.

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The Severance Pay article, as modified by the 2005 and 2019 interest
arbitration awards, as well as the 2022 enhancement that the parties successfully
bargained, remains in the current MOU.
III. 	The Parties’ 2024 Negotiations
In January 2024, the City and MAA began negotiating a successor agreement
to replace their expiring two-year MOU.4 Even before formal bargaining commenced,
the parties selected a neutral arbitrator and scheduled dates for mediation and interest
arbitration throughout April, in case negotiations reached an impasse.
The parties left most economic issues for separate but simultaneous bargaining
between the City and the Public Employees Committee (PEC), a coalition of unions
representing City employees. The City and MAA thus bargained over all issues that
were not a part of PEC negotiations, meeting by videoconference for nine sessions.
On February 12, at the parties’ second session, MAA submitted its Proposal 1,
which stated that all discipline must be “for just cause and progressive,” and specified
procedures, including written advance notice of any proposed suspension, demotion
or termination. The proposal also made discipline subject to grievance and binding
arbitration, while excluding disciplinary action from the MOU’s management rights
clause. MAA Chief Negotiator Matt Finnegan explained to the City that Proposal 1 was
MAA’s top priority, and that MAA was categorically not proposing to place attorneys
under the civil service merit system. Rather, Finnegan explained, MAA proposed
MOU-based procedures for attorney terminations that were entirely distinct from the
4 All further dates refer to 2024 unless otherwise stated.

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merit system’s procedures, which do not cover attorneys. Finnegan further explained
that MAA’s proposal was like one that Alameda County had recently negotiated for its
district attorneys, and that Alameda County’s charter is like the City’s Charter, in that it
exempts from its merit system employees working in the District Attorney’s office. The
record reflects that Finnegan was correct in these assertions.
When MAA presented Proposal 1, City negotiators were dismissive, stating that
it was “happening again,” thereby referencing MAA’s 2022 proposal. The City told
MAA’s negotiators that Proposal 1 conflicted with the employees’ at-will status and
that any matter concerning attorneys’ employment status is “carved out” from the
Charter’s impasse procedures.
On February 28, MAA e-mailed the City a memo from its attorney, Susan
Garea, titled “Legal Opinion re San Francisco Attorneys.” The memo asserted that
under the City’s interpretation, the Charter would violate the MMBA.
The parties discussed Proposal 1 again at their seventh bargaining session on
March 11. Sakai acknowledged that the proposal fell within the MMBA’s scope of
bargaining, but he claimed it was ineligible for interest arbitration under the Charter.
Also on March 11, Sakai e-mailed the City’s response to the legal memo MAA had
provided on February 28. This response stated, in part, that:
“The City has not taken the position that Proposal #1 is
outside the scope of bargaining under the MMBA, nor has
the City refused to bargain Proposal #1. Instead, as the City
has done any time MAA has raised just cause rights in the
past, and as is permitted under the MMBA, the City has
rejected Proposal #1 and proposed instead that the parties
maintain the status quo.”

12
Sakai’s response further explained the City’s view that attorneys’ ethical and
professional obligations made them unique and “that attorneys have a special
relationship with their appointing authorities and clients that warrants their exempt,
i.e., at[-]will, appointment status.” Sakai also urged that MAA “should respect the will
of the voters expressed in Section 10.104” and argued that “internal and external
comparability data will not support just cause rights for the City’s attorneys, and
certainly would not support just cause rights and a severance benefit.”
Critically for this case, Sakai then stated the following position:
“While the City will negotiate Proposal #1 in good faith
consistent with all processes under the MMBA, please be
advised that the City will not submit any proposal that would
alter the attorneys’ exempt/at-will status to the impasse
resolution procedures under Charter Section A8.409-4.
Section A8.409 establishes City policy and procedures for
bargaining between the City and the recognized employee
organizations representing City employees on matters
within the scope of representation under the MMBA. This
City-specific bargaining process is a layer on top of
bargaining requirements under the MMBA, and includes
impasse resolution procedures involving mediation and
then binding interest arbitration. See Charter §A8.409-4.
The MMBA’s mandatory impasse resolution procedures
culminate in advisory fact-finding. The MMBA does not
require binding interest arbitration for impasse resolution.
Thus, interest arbitration as an impasse resolution
mechanism is solely available as provided in the City’s
Charter.”
On March 21, the parties met for a bargaining session regarding Proposal 1.
Sakai reiterated that the City would bargain over MAA’s proposal but would not agree
to submit it to the Charter’s impasse resolution procedures. Rather, Sakai asserted
that if the parties reached impasse over Proposal 1, MAA had the right to require the

13
City to engage in non-binding fact-finding under MMBA section 3505.4. MAA
responded that the City had an obligation both to bargain over job protections and, if
needed, to engage in interest arbitration over job protection issues.
On March 26, Finnegan e-mailed Sakai to address his argument that attorneys
have professional obligations that warrant at-will status, and Sakai’s expectation that
“internal and external comparability data would not support just cause rights for the
City’s attorneys.” To counter both arguments, Finnegan forwarded Sakai the results of
a comparability study MAA performed, demonstrating that many public attorneys at
comparable California cities and counties have job protections via civil service merit
systems or negotiated MOU provisions.
By March 29, PEC bargaining had reached an agreement on economic terms.
However, Proposal 1 remained in dispute between the City and MAA, as did certain
other non-economic issues. In a series of e-mail messages, the parties continued to
disagree whether Proposal 1 was eligible for interest arbitration. The parties also
disagreed over MAA’s Proposal 14, which sought to add seniority-based layoff
protections, among other provisions. As with Proposal 1, the City acknowledged that
Proposal 14 fell within the MMBA’s scope of bargaining but stated that it was ineligible
for interest arbitration.
Sakai offered to submit Proposals 1 and 14 (collectively, the job protection
proposals) to a “separate but concurrent” mediation before Paul Roose, the interest
arbitrator. However, Sakai made clear that the City would not agree to engage in
binding interest arbitration over the job protection proposals. Finnegan disagreed and
reiterated that MAA was not proposing to place Unit 31 attorneys under the civil

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service merit system. Sakai stated that while the City rejected Proposal 1, it would
“look forward to any modifications that the MAA wishes to make.”
For issues in dispute other than the job protection proposals, the parties
submitted their competing proposals to Roose. On April 25, the parties reached
agreement on those issues, obviating the need for an interest arbitration decision. The
agreement explicitly left open the dispute over job protection proposals, as follows:
“The Union has filed PERB Charge No. SF-CE-2157-M. If
the PERB Board issues a decision on the merits on or
before October 30, 2026, the MOU will reopen on the issue
of job protections and the parties will proceed consistent
with PERB's decision. The Parties will bargain for a period
of thirty (30) days and then will proceed to applicable
impasse procedures before Paul Roose within ninety (90)
days of the PERB Decision. Nothing in this provision will
preclude either party from pursuing a judicial appeal of
PERB’s decision or a court order to stay or void any
arbitration award under the Charter impasse resolution
process.”
At no point in the parties’ negotiations did the City offer to make the CSC, or a
representative thereof, available for bargaining over MAA’s job protection proposals.
Sakai admits that he never spoke with any of the CSC’s commissioners, or any other
representative of the CSC, about those proposals.
IV. 	Procedural History
MAA filed this unfair practice charge against the City on April 1. After OGC
issued a complaint, the City filed an answer denying the material allegations and
asserting multiple affirmative defenses. The parties engaged in a virtual formal hearing
before the ALJ, and thereafter the ALJ granted the City’s unopposed request to take
official notice of, inter alia, the city charters for the City of Oakland and the City of San

15
Jose. The ALJ received two rounds of briefing from each party before issuing the
proposed decision on October 24. This appeal ensued.5
DISCUSSION
When resolving exceptions to a proposed decision, the Board applies a de novo
standard of review. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2629-M, p. 6.)
However, to the extent that a proposed decision has adequately addressed issues
raised by certain exceptions, the Board need not further analyze those exceptions.
(Ibid.) The Board also need not address alleged errors that would not affect the
outcome. (City of San Ramon (2018) PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 5.)
Part I below addresses the threshold question of whether the City complied with
its Charter. We find that the City failed to do so. Part II addresses the complaint’s bad
faith bargaining claim, and Part III discusses the proper remedy.
I. 	Violation of MMBA Section 3509(b) by Failure to Follow Charter
Under the MMBA, a local agency may adopt reasonable rules and regulations
about resolution of collective bargaining disputes. (§ 3507(a)(5).) Charter section
A8.409-4, which provides for interest arbitration, is such a local agency rule on
resolution of bargaining disputes. Indeed, the Court of Appeal noted as much in City
5 With its exceptions, the City asked us to take official notice of the CSC’s rules
and language from MOUs covering other employees who “serve at the pleasure” of
the appointing authority and do not fall within the merit system, such as physicians.
We grant this unopposed request pursuant to the standards set forth in Evidence
Code section 452. The City has also requested oral argument. We typically deny such
requests when the record before us is adequate, the parties availed themselves of the
opportunity to brief all pertinent issues, and the briefs are sufficiently clear as to make
oral argument unnecessary. (CCSF I, supra, PERB Decision No. 2691-M, p. 3, fn. 4.)
Applying this standard, we deny the City’s oral argument request.

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and County of San Francisco v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 39
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 938, 944 [“The City concedes that section A8.409-4 is a rule
adopted by a public agency within the meaning of section 3507”] (CCSF v. Operating
Engineers).
MMBA section 3509(b) makes it unlawful to violate a reasonable local rule
adopted under section 3507, and section 3509(b) further provides that PERB shall
process any such claim as an unfair practice charge. This means that a party must
normally use PERB’s unfair practice process to challenge any alleged violation of a
local rule adopted under section 3507. (CCSF v. Operating Engineers, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at p. 944.) A party seeking to enforce a local rule cannot eschew filing an
unfair practice charge in favor of filing a lawsuit in superior court. (Id. at pp. 944-950.)
Thus, in CCSF v. Operating Engineers, when the City filed a petition to compel
arbitration against a union for refusing to engage in interest arbitration and thereby
allegedly violating Charter section A8.409-4, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim. (Ibid.) This was true even though the City’s petition did not frame
its claim as an unfair practice and did not mention the MMBA. (Id. at p. 945 [PERB’s
exclusive jurisdiction derives from the conduct at issue rather than how a party
chooses to describe or challenge such conduct].)6
6 One year after CCSF v. Operating Engineers, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 938, the
Legislature amended the MMBA to add section 3509(e)—later redesignated as section
3509(f)—which vested superior courts with jurisdiction over actions involving interest
arbitration between a local agency and a union representing firefighters. (See Stats.
2008, ch. 712, § 2; City of San Jose v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 230
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 408, 419 [discussing amendment to transfer jurisdiction to
courts for interest arbitration matters involving firefighters]; see also Stats. 2024,
ch. 242, § 1 [adding new subdivision to section 3509 and redesignating three existing

17
subdivisions].) Because the current case does not involve a union representing
firefighters, PERB has exclusive jurisdiction.
The threshold claim in this case is that the City, by refusing to submit job
protection proposals to interest arbitration, violated its Charter and thereby violated
MMBA section 3509(b). The City concedes that the job protection proposals are a
mandatory bargaining topic under the MMBA. However, citing three Charter sections,
the City contends that the Charter nonetheless excludes these proposals from interest
arbitration.
In San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 653 (Fire Fighters v. CCSF), the California Supreme Court held that
when interpreting the Charter to discern whether it exempts a proposal from interest
arbitration, the “primary guide” is the Charter’s “plain meaning.” (Id. at p. 671.) We
apply this approach, examining the three Charter sections upon which the City relies.
A. Charter Section A8.409-4
Charter section A8.409-4, titled “Impasse Resolution Procedures,” details the
interest arbitration mechanism applicable to employee groups other than police
officers, deputy sheriffs, firefighters, and transit employees. Pursuant to subsection
A8.409-4(a), the interest arbitration mechanism broadly covers “disputes pertaining to
wages, hours, benefits, or other terms and conditions of employment which remain
unresolved after good faith bargaining,” while two other subsections set forth
exceptions. Specifically, subsection A8.409-4(h) states that interest arbitration does
not apply to “any proposal pertaining to the right to strike,” while subsection A8.409(g)
excludes “any rule, policy, procedure, order or practice which relates or pertains to the

18
purpose, goals or requirements of a consent decree, or which is necessary to ensure
compliance with Federal, State or local laws, ordinances or regulations.”
The Charter’s analogous dispute resolution mechanism for police officers,
deputy sheriffs, and firefighters, found in section A8.590-5, contains three exceptions
to interest arbitration. First, subsection A8.590-5(g)(1) excludes disputes regarding
crowd control policies. Second, subsection A8.590-5(g)(2) excludes procedures or
practices related to citizens’ complaints, as well as matters relating to “disciplinary
procedures that apply to disciplinary actions involving members of the San Francisco
Police Department and Fire Department.” Third, subsection A8.590-5(g)(3) details an
exception relating to compliance with external laws and consent decrees, making it
akin to the above-described exception in subsection A8.409-4(g).7
The City fails to recognize the import of Charter subsections A8.409-4(g)-(h)
and A8.590-5(g)(1), (2), and (3). These explicit, narrow exceptions to interest
arbitration show that Charter drafters were fully aware how to remove matters from
interest arbitration, and in fact did so for a limited set of disciplinary matters—those
related to police officers, deputy sheriffs, and firefighters. Yet there is no exclusion for
attorney discipline. Indeed, while section A8.409-4 is quite lengthy—detailing interest
arbitration provisions over the course of 13 paragraphs comprising 1650 words—it
7 Charter subsection A8.590-5(g)(3) was the exception at issue in Fire Fighters
v. CCSF, supra, 38 Cal.4th 653. The decision does not indicate any dispute over
whether a superior court action was jurisdictionally appropriate to resolve whether the
exception applied. We express no opinion on that question, other than to note that
while Charter subsection A8.409-4(g) indicates that questions regarding the exception
are subject to litigation “in a court of competent jurisdiction,” the comparable exception
in Charter subsection A8.590(g)(3) contains no such language.

19
includes only two narrow exceptions to the broad definition of covered topics found in
subsection (a). Neither exception excludes MAA’s job protection proposals from
interest arbitration.
Perhaps recognizing that the Charter’s interest arbitration provisions afford the
City no colorable basis for its argument, the City relies more heavily on two other
Charter sections related to labor and employment. We consider each of those
provisions in turn.
B. Charter Section A8.409-3
As noted above, when considering alleged exceptions to an interest arbitration
provision, plain meaning is our primary guide. (Fire Fighters v. CCSF, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 671.) The plain language of Charter section A8.409-3 broadly declares
that the City must “bargain in good faith on all matters within the scope of
representation as defined by [MMBA] section 3504, relating to the wages, hours,
benefits and other terms and conditions of [City] employment, including . . .
agreements to provide binding arbitration of discipline and discharge.” (Emphasis
supplied.) There is a carve-out, however, as follows:
“Except insofar as they affect compensation, those matters
within the jurisdiction of the [CSC] which establish, implement
and regulate the civil service merit system shall not be
subject to bargaining under this part: the authority, purpose,
definitions, administration and organization of the merit
system and the [CSC]; policies, procedures and funding of
the operations of the [CSC] and its staff; the establishment
and maintenance of a classification plan including the
classification and reclassification of positions and the
allocation and reallocation of positions to the various
classifications; status rights; the establishment of standards,
procedures and qualifications for employment, recruitment,
application, examination, selection, certification and

20
appointment; the establishment, administration and duration
of eligible lists; probationary status and the administration of
probationary periods, except duration; pre-employment and
fitness for duty medical examinations . . .; the designation of
positions as exempt, temporary, limited tenure, part-time,
seasonal or permanent; resignation with satisfactory service
and reappointment; exempt entry level appointment of the
handicapped; approval of payrolls; and conflict of interest. As
to these matters, the [CSC] shall continue to be required to
meet and confer pursuant to state law.”
(Charter, § A8.409-3 (emphasis supplied).)
Section A8.409-3—both in its broad inclusion and specific CSC carve-out—
undercuts the City’s position in multiple respects. First, even for employees who fall
under the civil service merit system, the broad inclusion explicitly covers “agreements
to provide binding arbitration of discipline and discharge.” And while the carve-out
reserves to the CSC the duty to bargain over matters that “establish, implement and
regulate the civil service merit system,” the lengthy list of such matters that follows
includes very few termination-related topics, even for employees under the merit
system. For instance, the CSC has the duty to bargain over matters related to “conflict
of interest,” “probationary status and the administration of probationary periods,”
“resignation with satisfactory service,” and “the designation of positions as exempt,
temporary, limited tenure, part-time, seasonal or permanent.” (Charter, § A8.409-3.)
These matters touch on termination but do not exclude the explicitly included topic of
“binding arbitration of discipline and discharge.” Thus, even if attorneys fell within the
merit system, the City could not argue that there was a carve-out for MAA’s job
protection proposals.

21
In any event, attorneys have never been subject to the civil service merit
system, and MAA has never proposed adding attorneys to that system. Indeed, the
City’s own witness, CSC Commissioner Kate Favetti, agreed that “the rules that the
[CSC] establishes with respect to all of the various carve-outs listed are not applicable
to attorneys.” Similarly, a 2018 memo from the CSC to department heads explicitly
discusses attorneys, noting that that the CSC “play[s] no role with respect to these
appointments.”
The City notes that the carve-out covers “status rights” and “the designation of
positions as exempt.” (Charter, § A8.409-3.) But exemptions or other status issues
under the civil service merit system are different from MOU-based arbitration of
discipline and discharge. The City’s position is akin to arguing that the merit system
preempts any MOU-based job protections. That is not true even for employees within
the merit system, and it is even less true for employees who fall outside the merit
system.
The City also cites to CSC Rule 114.25. The City waived any such argument by
not raising it before the ALJ. (Los Angeles County Superior Court (2018) PERB
Decision No. 2566-C, p. 12 [noting well-established rule that the Board will not
normally review a matter never raised before the ALJ].) Even had the City not waived
its argument, we would still reject it on the merits. It is the Charter that has exempted
attorneys from the civil service merit system, since at least 1932. CSC Rule 114.25
simply relies on that pre-existing Charter exemption, as Favetti acknowledged. The
CSC has no power to change attorneys’ exemption from the merit system, and Rule
114.25 does not suddenly make binding arbitration of attorney discipline a carved-out

22
issue. Rather, as explained above, MAA’s proposal for MOU-based job protections are
entirely distinct from the merit system and its exemptions.
The plain language of section A8.409-3 also poses a third, independent
problem for the City’s argument. Specifically, while the City admits its duty to bargain
over MAA’s job protection proposals and posits that section A8.409-3 excludes those
proposals from interest arbitration, section A8.409-3 is not the portion of the Charter
that contains actual exceptions to interest arbitration; as noted above, those
exceptions are found in Charter subsections A8.409-4(g) and (h). Section A8.409-3,
rather than defining what topics are ineligible for interest arbitration, broadly defines
the duty to bargain while stating that the CSC must handle bargaining as to certain
topics pertaining to the merit system. This is evident from the section’s language and
from how the section’s title (“Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith”) differs from the title
of section A8.409-4 (“Impasse Resolution Procedures”).
There is yet another fatal flaw in the City’s reasoning: its representatives failed
to take the actions that would be proper if, for the sake of argument, the
CSC carve-out actually applied to MAA’s job protection proposals. Specifically, the
final sentence of the CSC carve-out states that the CSC is the bargaining entity for
those matters falling under the carve-out. (Charter, § A8.409-3 [“As to these matters,
the [CSC] shall continue to be required to meet and confer pursuant to state law”].)
This sentence comports with statute and precedent. (See MMBA, § 3500(a) [MMBA
does not “supersede” local civil service systems and is, rather, intended to
“strengthen” such systems]; Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court
(1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 62-65 [civil service commission must bargain about matters

23
under its jurisdiction].) But the City never referred any proposals to the CSC for
bargaining or suggested that MAA do so. Sakai also admitted that the City’s
bargaining team did not consult with the CSC before bargaining over MAA’s job
protection proposals. Rather, the City’s negotiators bargained over the job protection
proposals. This evidence further confirms that the job protection proposals do not fall
within the CSC carve-out.
In each of the above respects, the City’s argument is at odds with the Charter’s
language. The City thus faced a substantial burden to prove that, contrary to the
Charter’s plain meaning: (1) the CSC carve-out covers the specific topics found in
MAA’s proposals (binding arbitration of discipline and discharge, as well as layoff in
seniority order); (2) the carve-out covers these topics even for employees who do not
fall within the merit system, and who are seeking MOU-based job protections wholly
apart from the merit system; (3) if the carve-out somehow could apply to MAA’s job
protection proposals, it nevertheless vests the City with the bargaining duty rather than
reserving it to the CSC; and (4) the carve-out makes the job protection proposals
ineligible for interest arbitration under Charter section A8.409-4, even though that
section contains specific, narrow exceptions that simply do not apply, and section
A8.409-3 is explicitly about defining what areas are reserved to the CSC for
bargaining rather than about interest arbitration exceptions.
The City has not carried any, much less all, of these burdens. Part of its effort to
do so involved calling two witnesses with at least limited knowledge of Proposition B
and its 1991 enactment. The first witness was Favetti, but as noted above, she

24
confirmed that CSC rules on the various carve-out functions do not apply to
attorneys.8
The second witness was Carol Isen. In 1991, Isen represented International
Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers Local 21 in negotiations between
the City and the SEIU-led union coalition. Isen later began working for the City in
2003, and she currently serves as the City’s Human Resources Director. Isen
supported one of the City’s arguments—that the CSC carve-out was an exception to
interest arbitration. However, even if this were the correct view of the carve-out, it
would not help the City overcome any of the other respects in which its argument
contravenes the Charter’s plain language. In fact, on cross examination Isen testified
in MAA’s favor, agreeing that there is no carve-out for binding arbitration of discipline
and discharge.
Isen also significantly undercut the City’s position in another way, by testifying
that the carve-out’s purpose was to preserve certain aspects of the CSC’s role prior to
Proposition B. Notably, the CSC never had any role with respect to discipline or
discharge of Unit 31 attorneys. It would be nonsensical to surmise that the parties who
bargained over Proposition B, and the voters who enacted it, “preserved” something
that never existed in the first place.
8 In testimony that conflicted with both parties’ arguments to a degree, Favetti
interpreted Charter section 10.104 to mean that the City has no authority to bargain
over job protections for attorneys. This view contradicted the City’s position that it has
authority to bargain over MAA’s job protection proposals. In any event, as discussed
at pages 26-31, post, we do not read section 10.104 the same way, and indeed it says
nothing about either bargaining or interest arbitration.

25
Moreover, to the extent that we go beyond the Charter’s plain meaning and
consider Isen’s testimony as part of the early 1990s history of Proposition B, there is
significant other evidence to analyze as well: materials the City sent to voters before
they passed Proposition B. These documents show no intent to carve-out discipline
and discharge for any employees, much less for attorneys who are not part of the
merit system. Moreover, the materials show an extremely broad intent to allow interest
arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes, thereby discouraging strikes, without any
hint that job protection proposals (or any other matter related to attorney terminations
or discipline) would be exempt from interest arbitration.9
For the above reasons, Charter section A8.409-3 does not exclude MAA’s job
protection proposals from interest arbitration.
9 Describing the CSC carve-out, the voter materials merely stated: “Proposition
B would not affect the civil service provisions on hiring and promotions.” (emphasis
supplied.) Meanwhile, numerous provisions in the voter materials broadly stated the
right to interest arbitration as a means to reduce strikes, including: “If parties could not
reach agreement through collective bargaining, each side would submit a final offer on
disputed issues to an arbitration board”; “Proposition B requires binding arbitration for
peaceful resolution of labor disputes”; “Proposition B will preclude strikes through the
use of the peaceful method of arbitration”; “Proposition B requires that disputes be
resolved by arbitration, not strikes”; and “Proposition B will bring San Francisco in line
with other Bay Area cities and counties who already allow their workers to negotiate
through collective bargaining and binding arbitration.” The City’s theory would
contravene these statements in every respect. Indeed, under the City’s theory, even
though MAA chose to avail itself of interest arbitration, it would simultaneously have
retained the right to strike over its job protection proposals. (See City and County of
San Francisco (2023) PERB Decision No. 2867-M, p. 33 [Charter section A8.409-4(a)
requires union to choose between interest arbitration and economic striking in a single
negotiation cycle] [judicial appeal pending].)

26
C. Charter Section 10.104
Charter section 10.104, titled “Exclusions from Civil Service Appointment,”
covers a variety of City employees, including: attorneys, investigators, physicians,
dentists, assistant law librarians, curators, teaching instructional aides, and
paraprofessional aides. Section 10.104 states that these positions “shall be exempt
from competitive civil service selection, appointment and removal procedures,” and
that “the person serving in the position shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.” There is no question this provision exempts attorneys from the civil service
merit system. But that does not help the City establish its position that job protection
proposals are fully bargainable but ineligible for interest arbitration. One central
problem for the City is that if section 10.104 represents a Charter mandate that
attorneys must be “at will” and the City has no discretion on that issue, then the City
could not concede, as it has, that it is authorized to negotiate over just cause
protections. Instead, the City would have to deny any such discretion, which it
acknowledges would violate the MMBA.
Having conceded that section 10.104 leaves the City discretion to negotiate
over job protections, it would be fanciful for the City to suggest that section 10.104
carves out such protections from interest arbitration. Indeed, section 10.104 does not
mention interest arbitration. Moreover, as discussed ante, the Charter’s interest
arbitration provisions broadly cover bargaining disputes as to mandatory bargaining
topics, subject only to specifically enumerated exceptions that are plainly not
applicable here. Looking primarily at the “plain meaning” of the Charter (Fire Fighters
v. CCSF, supra, 38 Cal.4th 671), section 10.104 does not support the City’s position.

27
In any event, serving “at the pleasure” of management has no single, uniform
meaning, as it leaves open what protections management may adopt relative to the
positions in question. Thus, while employees serving at the pleasure of management
normally have no property interest giving rise to constitutional due process, they are
fully able to avail themselves of job protections that may be in place by MOU or by any
other lawful policy. (Bishop v. Wood (1976) 426 U.S. 341, 345 [employee who “held
his position at the will and pleasure” of a local agency had “no right to continued
employment,” but employee’s removal was conditioned on compliance with
procedures set out in the local agency’s procedures]; Mervin v. Federal Trade
Commission (D.C. Cir. 1978) 591 F.2d 821, 828-830 [government attorney who
“served at the pleasure of his superiors,” had “no property right to continued
employment cognizable under the due process clause,” but had the right to pursue
administrative remedies to enforce protections afforded under an administrative
manual and a regulation regarding layoff order.]; accord Bogacki v. Bd. of Supervisors
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 771, 775-777 [employees who served “at the pleasure of their
department heads” were, nonetheless, afforded certain dismissal appeal procedures].)
As the above precedent illustrates, the fact that employees serve at the
employer’s pleasure nonetheless means that the employer can establish protections.
In fact, the City has conceded not only that it has the power to agree to just cause
protections in bargaining, but also that it has the power to delegate to an arbitrator
discretion over such issues. As the City wrote in a brief to the ALJ:
“[T]o the extent MAA seeks contractual ‘job protections’—
such as just cause rights—the City has the ability (but not
the duty) to voluntarily agree to certain changes. (See
Taylor v. Crane (1979) 24 Cal.3d 442 [holding that

28
notwithstanding Charter provision vesting employee hiring
and removal in the city manager, city could delegate its
discretion to an arbitrator].) So, under the Charter ‘carveout’
as well as state law while the City could agree in the first
instance to delegate its discretion to a third party arbitrator
over this issue, any such delegation of that discretionary
authority cannot be imposed on the City.”
This concession helps to illustrate that, in truth, the City’s position turns entirely on its
unsupported assumption that the CSC carve-out excludes MAA’s job protection
proposals from interest arbitration. With that assumption disproven, section 10.104
adds no support to the City’s claim that the Charter makes attorney job protections
ineligible for interest arbitration.
The City’s bargaining history with MAA is one example of how an employer can
negotiate certain protections for employees who serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Those protections—which focus on severance—are just one
formulation. Indeed, the City’s chief negotiator conceded that looking at comparable
entities might reveal that those who have better just cause protections may receive
less severance, and vice versa.
Similarly, the City’s MOU covering physicians—who also “serve at the pleasure
of the appointing authority” pursuant to Charter section 10.104—further illustrates the
range of protections that are subject to negotiation and/or interest arbitration.
Specifically, the physicians’ MOU includes provisions that: (1) afford terminated
physicians a choice between receiving severance or receiving specified due process
procedures; and (2) require the City to consider seniority and performance in deciding

29
upon physicians to be laid off, while specifying that such decisions are subject to the
MOU’s grievance procedure.10
The physicians’ example also highlights the extent to which section 10.104
covers a wide variety of employee categories. For that reason, it is not surprising that
“serving at the pleasure” of the appointing authority will involve different specifics for
distinct groups. Indeed, the title of section 10.104 (“Exclusions from Civil Service
Employment”) confirms that its purpose is to exclude employees from civil service
merit protections rather than to specify what alternate job protections may result from
bargaining and interest arbitration, or from policy determinations for unrepresented
employees.
We therefore reverse the ALJ’s conclusion that Charter section 10.104 is
facially unlawful. Another factor leads us to the same conclusion: California Supreme
Court precedent, like PERB precedent, requires harmonizing the Charter with the
MMBA wherever possible. (Building Material & Construction Teamsters’ Union
v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 665 [noting important goal of harmonizing the San
Francisco City Charter with the MMBA, if possible]; accord CCSF I, supra, PERB
Decision No. 2691-M, pp. 31, 43; City and County of San Francisco (2017) PERB
10 While the City argued that other local agency examples show that attorneys
must be at will, such comparators help MAA, not the City. The record includes
evidence of local agency attorneys in comparable California cities and counties,
including certain attorneys who benefit from civil service merit protections, and others
who are exempt from such protections and instead benefit from collectively bargained
just cause protections. Notably, Charter subsection A8.409-4(d) requires the interest
arbitrator to consider specified factors, including “terms and conditions of employment
of employees performing similar services,” and further requires that the arbitrator
“shall issue written findings on each and every one of the above factors as they may
be applicable to each and every issue determined in the award.”

30
Decision No. 2540-M, p. 15, fn. 7.) As we proceed to discuss, the ALJ erred in not
harmonizing the Charter and the MMBA.
The ALJ correctly noted that a local rule cannot define the scope of bargaining
in a manner that conflicts with the MMBA (Huntington Beach Police Officers’ Assn.
v. City of Huntington Beach (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 492, 499-503), and that “both the
procedures and the criteria for imposing discipline” are mandatory bargaining topics.
(Healdsburg Union High School District and Healdsburg Union School District/San
Mateo City School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 375, p. 69.) This includes
proposals that require employers to show cause for imposing discipline. (Id. at
pp. 69-70; accord Cerritos Community College District (2022) PERB
Decision No. 2819, pp. 27-29; City of Davis (2016) PERB Decision No. 2494-M,
pp. 28-30; Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District (2012) PERB Decision No. 2262,
p. 12.) Indeed, investigatory and disciplinary procedures “lie at the core of traditional
labor relations” and are “particularly amenable to collective bargaining.” (County of
Sonoma (2023) PERB Decision No. 2772a-M, p. 24.)
Here, Charter section 10.104 can exist in harmony with the MMBA principle that
disciplinary procedures and criteria fall within the scope of bargaining. As explained
above, having attorneys serve at the appointing authority’s pleasure nonetheless
means that the City can establish protections by regulation, policy, or MOU, including
provisions negotiated with MAA or directed as part of the Charter’s broad interest
arbitration mechanism for resolving bargaining disputes.11
11 Because Charter section 10.104 is facially valid, we do not address the City’s
home rule defense, other than to note that the home rule doctrine “does not alter the
fact that a city’s charter must be consistent with the MMBA.” (CCSF I, supra, PERB

31
Decision No. 2691-M, p. 21, fn. 18; see also City and County of San Francisco, supra,
PERB Decision No. 2867-M, p. 42 [judicial appeal pending]; City and County of San
Francisco (2017) PERB Decision No. 2536-M, pp. 22-25.)
Lastly, we are mindful that when interpreting a local agency’s charter providing
for interest arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes, we must normally “require
arbitration on the full range of negotiable issues.” (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 623.) Failure to do so “would not only erroneously curtail
arbitration but would invite the very labor strife which the charter provisions seek to
prevent.” (Ibid.) A local agency seeking to exempt a matter from interest arbitration
under its charter should draft the exemption with this principle in mind, as well as the
principle that we normally look to the charter’s plain meaning in assessing an alleged
exemption. While the Charter features clear examples of such exemptions (see pages
17-19, ante), there is simply no Charter provision that exempts MAA’s job protection
proposals from interest arbitration.
For the foregoing reasons, MAA’s job protection proposals were eligible for
interest arbitration under the City Charter. Therefore, the City violated its Charter and
MMBA section 3509(b) by refusing to engage in interest arbitration over the job
protection proposals. This conduct also derivatively violated MMBA sections
3506.5(a), (b), and (e), and amounted to an unreasonable enforcement of a local rule
in violation of PERB Regulation 32603(g). We concur with the ALJ that there is no
need to decide whether the MMBA permits a local agency to establish an interest
arbitration mechanism that excludes job protection proposals, because the Charter
does not exclude such proposals from interest arbitration.

32
II. 	Bad Faith Bargaining Claim
Finally, we consider the complaint’s bad faith bargaining allegation and the
City’s countervailing argument that it engaged in lawful “hard bargaining.” Notably, this
argument fails if the totality of the circumstances shows that the respondent’s
bargaining conduct manifested bad faith. (Consolidated Irrigation District (2024) PERB
Decision No. 2905-M, p. 28.) The ultimate question is whether the respondent’s
conduct, when viewed in its totality, was sufficiently egregious to frustrate
negotiations. (Ibid.)
Here, the City engaged in bad faith bargaining when it repeatedly and
preemptively stated that MAA’s job protection proposals would be ineligible for interest
arbitration. These statements were misrepresentations and amounted to an
unsupportable and unilaterally announced ground rule that frustrated negotiations by
artificially separating job protection proposals from all the other issues under
discussion. (Cf. County of Ventura (2021) PERB Decision No. 2758-M, pp. 36-37
[county’s material misrepresentation evidenced bad faith bargaining]; City of Arcadia
(2019) PERB Decision No. 2648-M, p. 40 [employer may not unilaterally establish
ground rules]; City of San Jose (2013) PERB Decision No. 2341-M, pp. 19-20
[insistence on fragmented or “piecemeal” bargaining evidences bad faith because it
arbitrarily limits the range of possible compromises].) In these circumstances, we
reject the City’s claim that it engaged in lawful hard bargaining and instead conclude
that the City bargained in bad faith in violation of MMBA section 3506.5(c).

33
III. 	Remedy
As noted above, the parties pre-negotiated one aspect of how they would
comply with our decision when they agreed as follows: “If the PERB Board issues a
decision on the merits on or before October 30, 2026, the MOU will reopen on the
issue of job protections and the parties will proceed consistent with PERB's decision.
The Parties will bargain for a period of thirty (30) days and then will proceed to
applicable impasse procedures before Paul Roose within ninety (90) days of the
PERB Decision.”
Because this agreement effectuates the MMBA’s purposes, we incorporate it
into our remedial order along with a cease-and-desist order, make-whole relief, and
instructions for communicating the outcome of this case to employees.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB) finds that Respondent City and County of San Francisco (City) violated the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500 et seq., during
negotiations with Charging Party Municipal Attorneys Association of San Francisco,
Teamsters Local 856 (MAA). Specifically, the City violated and unreasonably applied
its Charter, failed to bargain and participate in impasse resolution procedures in good
faith, and interfered with protected union and employee rights, thereby violating MMBA
sections 3509(b) and 3506.5(a), (b), (c), and (e).
Pursuant to MMBA section 3509, we hereby ORDER that the City, its governing
board, and its representatives shall:

34
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing to allow MAA to submit job protection proposals to
interest arbitration under the City Charter’s impasse resolution procedures.
2. 	In any other way engaging in bad faith conduct in bargaining or
impasse resolution with respect to job protection proposals.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	(a) Within 90 days after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, reopen bargaining with MAA on the issue of job protections; and (b) bargain in
good faith for a period of 30 days unless the parties agree otherwise.
2. 	Absent an agreement reached by the close of negotiations
undertaken pursuant to paragraph B(1), participate with MAA in the impasse
resolution procedures set forth in the City Charter, in a manner consistent with this
decision. Unless the parties agree otherwise, Paul Roose shall serve as the neutral
arbitrator/mediator.
3. 	(a) Make MAA whole for extra bargaining costs and any wasted or
diverted resources (other than the costs of litigating this case) that the City’s MMBA
violations caused in substantial part; and (b) augment any monetary relief owed with
daily compound interest, at an annual rate of seven percent, accrued from the date of
harm until payment.
4. 	Within 10 workdays after this decision is no longer subject to
appeal, post at all work locations where notices to MAA-represented employees are
posted, copies of the Notice attached hereto as an Appendix. An authorized agent of
the City must sign the Notice, indicating that the City will comply with the terms of this

35
Order. The City shall maintain the posting for a period of 30 consecutive workdays.
The City shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size,
altered, defaced or covered with any other material. In addition to physically posting
this Notice, the City shall communicate it by electronic message, intranet, internet site,
and other electronic means the City uses to communicate with employees in Unit 31.12
5. 	Notify OGC of the actions the City has taken to follow this Order
by providing written reports as directed by OGC and serving such reports on MAA.
Chair Banks and Member Krausse joined in this Decision.
12 Either party may ask PERB’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to alter or
extend the posting period, require further notice methods, or otherwise supplement or
adjust this Order to ensure adequate notice. Upon receipt of such a request, OGC
shall solicit input from all parties and, if warranted, provide amended instructions to
ensure adequate notice.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-2157-M, Municipal Attorneys
Association of San Francisco, Teamsters Local 856 v. City and County of San
Francisco, in which all parties had the right to participate, the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB) found that Respondent City and County of San Francisco
(City) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code section 3500
et seq., during negotiations with Charging Party Municipal Attorneys Association of
San Francisco, Teamsters Local 856 (MAA). Specifically, PERB concluded that we
violated and unreasonably applied our Charter, failed to bargain and participate in
impasse resolution procedures in good faith, and interfered with protected union and
employee rights.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice, and we
will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Refusing to allow MAA to submit job protection proposals to
interest arbitration under the City Charter’s impasse resolution procedures.
2. 	In any other way engaging in bad faith conduct in bargaining or
impasse resolution with respect to job protection proposals.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO EFFECTUATE
THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	(a) Within 90 days after PERB’s decision is no longer subject to
appeal, reopen bargaining with MAA on the issue of job protections; and (b) bargain in
good faith for a period of 30 days unless the parties agree otherwise.
2. 	Absent an agreement reached by the close of negotiations
undertaken pursuant to paragraph B(1), participate with MAA in the impasse
resolution procedures set forth in the City Charter, in a manner consistent with PERB’s
decision. Unless the parties agree otherwise, Paul Roose shall serve as the neutral
arbitrator/mediator.
3. 	(a) Make MAA whole for extra bargaining costs and any wasted or
diverted resources (other than the costs of litigating this case) that our MMBA
violations caused in substantial part; and (b) augment any monetary relief owed with

2
daily compound interest, at an annual rate of seven percent, accrued from the date of
harm until payment.
Dated: _____________________ 	City and County of San Francisco
By: _________________________________
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST 30
CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.