P. v. Castillo CA1/4 filed 6/29/26

Filed 6/29/26 P. v. Castillo CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
IAN ALBERT ALINEA CASTILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.

A172129

(Solano County
Super. Ct. No. VCR240317)

A jury convicted defendant Ian Castillo of first degree murder. In this appeal, Castillo argues that the jury instructions on provocation and voluntary manslaughter by imperfect self-defense violated due process by requiring him to prove that he acted in imperfect self-defense. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion under Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c) (section 1385(c)) by refusing to strike an enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (§12022, subd. (b)(1)). We find no error and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The People filed an information charging Castillo with the murder of David A. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The information alleged that Castillo personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) (section 12022(b)(1)).
Trial Testimony
Deanna B. and her adult son, David A., lived in separate apartments in the same building. Deanna B. was a good work friend of Castillo’s mother. Two to three months before the charged offense, Deanna B. helped Castillo find an apartment in the building where she and her son lived.
Many witnesses testified that David A. had serious mental health issues, and a psychiatrist testified that David A. had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. At some point in time, David A. told Deanna B. that he thought Castillo was a pedophile, but Deanna B. had no reason to believe that was true. David A. also told Deanna B. that his second-story window was broken, and, after an incident on September 6, 2022 (the September 6 incident), David A. told Deanna B. that he thought Castillo had entered his apartment without taking anything and fixed the window.
The September 6 Incident
At approximately 7:27 p.m., Ross M., who lived in the same apartment building as David A. and Castillo, heard a commotion and looked out of his apartment window. He saw David A. pursuing Castillo, who was “running, and he was trying to use his little tiny little pepper spray to keep [David A.] away from him as he was running around the car.” In Ross M.’s opinion, David A. appeared angry and “it was pretty clear that he wanted to put hands on [Castillo].” Ross M. called Ronnie F., the building manager, who worked nearby. Ross M. said that Castillo seemed shocked after the incident, but not angry. Ross M. did not see the interactions between David A. and Castillo prior to seeing the two run around the car, and he saw nothing after they disappeared around a corner.
Ronnie F. arrived at the apartment building to find “there was like a fight going on . . . between” Castillo and David A. Ronnie F. “didn’t see any fighting, just mostly yelling.” Castillo had a knot on his forehead. David A. was yelling, he was “pretty angry,” and he told Castillo, “I’ll beat your ass again.” Castillo did not say anything, but he appeared to be frightened and had a knot the size of a tennis ball on his forehead. Shortly thereafter, Castillo’s mother arrived. Ronnie F. told Castillo to calm down and let it go, and Castillo said to his mother, “Can’t let it go.”
Deanna B. testified that she came out of the apartment building to find that Castillo and David A. had an altercation, but she did not see the incident. Ronnie F. and Castillo’s mother were already there. Deanna B. went over to Castillo to apologize for her son’s behavior, and Castillo said, “I’m sorry, Miss Deanna. It’s not over.” Deanna B. testified that David A. apologized to Castillo, although David A. did not say what he was apologizing for. She could not recall Castillo’s response, but David A. said, “That’s why I whooped your ass.” Deanna B. told police that David A. told her he had asked Castillo if he was “messing with kids.”
David A.’s ex-wife, Jennifer A., testified that David A. called her on the night of September 6, 2022, and said that he got into a fight with someone in his building. David A. said that this person threatened his life and his son’s life. He described things as being fine while he and this person smoked and talked, then at some point in the conversation things turned, David A. was pepper sprayed, there was a physical altercation, and this person threatened the lives of David A. and his children. David A. told Jennifer A. that he had been attacked during the incident.
After Castillo was arrested, he told police that David A. accused him of breaking into David A.’s apartment as they smoked on the street in front of a store, and David A. asked if Castillo went to church. When Castillo tried to leave, David A. became aggressive and raised his voice. David A. said something that “kinda escalated [Castillo].” Castillo “got threatened,” and he was walking with David A. following. Castillo could not remember what David A. was saying at that point, and Castillo was telling David A. not to “mess with” him; Castillo said he was “about to walk inside,” but he ended up going to his car to get pepper spray. Castillo told David A. he would pepper spray him, David A. pushed Castillo, and Castillo pepper sprayed David A. David A. “got mad” after being pepper sprayed and started clenching his fists. Castillo continued, “So, uh, I end up, you know, following [David A.]” David A. either pushed Castillo or Castillo tripped, and David A. began punching Castillo. Castillo’s trial testimony was similar.
Video surveillance recorded the beginning of the incident and showed David A. and Castillo having a conversation, then an argument started. Video showed Castillo pepper spraying David A., after which the two went around the corner for a couple of minutes; their interaction while they were around the corner was not recorded.
The Murder
On September 8, 2022, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Deanna B. went to David A.’s apartment. She found several ripped Bible pages in front of the door and noticed blood spatter on the pages; she thought that David A. may have had a mental breakdown. She retrieved her spare key and attempted to enter the apartment. Deanna B. was only able to open the door “6 to 8 inches and then the door hit David [A.], something.” She reached in and touched his leg, but he did not react and his leg was cold. Deanna B. then knocked on Ronnie F.’s door across the hall. Ronnie F. and Deanna B. entered David A.’s apartment, where they found his body.
The police were dispatched to David A.’s apartment. Officer Samaniego observed blood spatter outside David A.’s apartment and in the hallway across from the door. Samaniego found David A. lying on his back unresponsive in a pool of blood, with blood all over the walkway leading to where David A. was positioned in the apartment.
Detective Callison observed a large stab wound in David A.’s chest. Based on the position of the body and the presence of blood spatter in the hallway, Callison concluded that the person who stabbed David A. was most likely standing immediately outside the front door to David A.’s apartment in the hallway when the stabbing occurred. Callison received information regarding Castillo’s possible involvement at some point, and he observed blood outside the door to Castillo’s apartment. Police later recovered a chef’s knife and two steak knives from Castillo’s apartment.
A forensic pathologist testified that David A. died from a sharp object that cut through two ribs and pierced the right ventricle of his heart. He testified that, “in general it takes quite a bit of force” to cut through a rib.
David A.’s apartment building had both exterior and interior surveillance cameras. Surveillance video showed that Castillo walked into the front door of the apartment building carrying a glass beer bottle at approximately 12:13 a.m. on September 8, 2022. Castillo walked down the hall, took a drink from the bottle, then poured beer on the floor in front of David A.’s apartment door.
Castillo reappeared approximately six minutes later. He walked down the hallway and stopped in front of David A.’s apartment. He leaned towards the apartment door with his ear close to the door and stood there for about seven seconds.
At approximately 12:29 a.m., Castillo approached David A.’s apartment holding pages and a cover from a Bible. He placed the pages and Bible cover on the ground in front of the door and started walking away. After taking a few steps, Castillo paused, turned around, and quickly moved back towards the apartment. He made a single stabbing motion toward the door and then walked away. Surveillance video showed Castillo exiting the apartment building holding a knife. At 12:33 a.m., Castillo drove away in a green BMW.
The Police Interview and Trial Testimony
Police detained and interviewed Castillo after David A.’s death, and a video recording of this interview was introduced at trial.
On September 7, 2022, Castillo finished his shift at a restaurant between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. and bought beer and cigarettes before returning to his apartment. Castillo denied seeing David A. that night.
Detective Callison showed Castillo a photo from the surveillance video, and Castillo then admitted that he dropped a Bible in front of David A.’s apartment because David A. had been talking about God. Castillo said that David A. opened his door at that moment, and Castillo ran away. Callison explained that the full surveillance video showed otherwise, and Castillo admitted that he “dashed towards” David A. to spook him with a beer in his hand, but nothing else.
Detective Callison told Castillo he had something other than a beer in his hand, and Castillo admitted that he held a chef’s knife. He said he tried to scare David A., but he didn’t intend to kill him. Castillo initially acknowledged that he “technically” stabbed David A., but said he just meant to push him away and the knife slipped. Castillo then provided another account of how David A. died: “Grab two beers. Went out, uh, back to my place, drank. Uh, so basically drink and smoke. Uh, ripped up the Bible in my apartment, uh, threw it in front of his door. And, um, within five seconds after that he opens his door. Um, uh, I had a knife on me. And I basically stabbed him, uh, and then, um, ran away.” Castillo claimed he had the knife to cut chicken wings he had planned to go buy, but he also later said he was going to use the knife on a burger.
Detective Callison asked Castillo how he felt about killing David A., and Castillo said that he felt vindicated and “surprisingly okay.” He analogized the stabbing to a decisive move in a game of chess: “You know, like for example if you know, um, there’s a strong piece that’s playing aggressive if you don’t eliminate that problem, that problem will checkmate you at the end.”
At trial, Castillo testified that, when he walked by David A.’s apartment on the night of the murder, he could hear David A. aggressively ranting about the Bible inside the apartment. Castillo splashed beer on the front door to signify that David A. needed to “cool down.” He said the following about why he left ripped Bible pages in front of the apartment door: “I basically wanted to let him know whatever you’re talking about, this is it I guess. And, you know, I’m hearing you, you know.”
As Castillo walked away, David A. opened his apartment door and said, “What the fuck is this.” Castillo “felt timid and like scared or I had to keep my guard up.” He turned around and saw David A. had a silver pointy object in his hand. David A. was advancing closer to the door, and Castillo recalled that David A. had threatened him on two previous occasions and beat him up. He became afraid that David A. would kill him or inflict great bodily injury, and he believed that the only way to protect himself was to use his knife on David A. He did not know his knife could cut through ribs and had no idea that he had stabbed David A. in the heart.
Castillo acknowledged that he had given the police multiple versions of the events leading to David A.’s death because he had been “discombobulated” at the time. Castillo also explained that at the time of the stabbing, he was carrying a 10-inch chef’s knife to cut the burgers he had planned to order.
The jury convicted Castillo of first degree murder and found the section 12022(b)(1) allegation to be true. The court sentenced him to prison for an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on the murder count, plus one year on the enhancement, and Castillo filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Jury Instruction Challenge
Governing Law and Standard of Review
Castillo contends that the trial court’s homicide instructions—specifically, CALCRIM Nos. 522 and 571—misstated the law and did not require the People to prove malice and the absence of imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him of murder. We review questions of law and the instructions de novo (People v. Howard (2024) 104Cal.App.5th 625, 661), and we disagree.
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.” (§ 192, italics added.) “Thus, the ‘distinguishing feature [between the two offenses] is that murder includes, but manslaughter lacks, the element of malice.’ [Citation.] Malice exists when ‘an unlawful homicide was committed with the “intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature” [citation], or with awareness of the danger and a conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 252.)
“However, California law recognizes two circumstances where ‘a finding of malice may be precluded, and the offense limited to manslaughter, even when an unlawful homicidewascommitted with intent to kill’ [citation]: (1) when a person kills ‘“‘in a “sudden quarrel or heat of passion” [citation], or . . .[(2) when a person] kills in “unreasonable self-defense”—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘These mitigating circumstances reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter “by negating the element of malice that otherwise inheres in such a homicide.” ’ ” (People v. Schuller, supra,15Cal.5th at p. 252.) “[W]hen imperfect self-defense [or sudden quarrel/heat of passion] is at issue in a murder case, the People must prove the absence of that circumstance ‘beyond a reasonable doubt . . . to establish the . . . element of malice.’ ” (Schuller, at p. 253; accord, Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, 704.) California’s standard jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571) properly include this requirement. (Schuller, at p. 254.)
“ ‘The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense.’ ” (People v. Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 660.) “ ‘[O]nce a trial court undertakes to instruct on a legal point, it must do so correctly.’” (Ibid.) But a trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise an accurate statement of the law. (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “The challenged instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” [Citation.] “We of course presume ‘that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 661.)
The Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury withCALCRIM No.500(“Homicide: General Principles”);CALCRIM No. 505(“Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another”); CALCRIM No.520(“First or Second Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought”);CALCRIM No.521(“First Degree Murder”);CALCRIM No. 522(“Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder”); and a version ofCALCRIM No.571(“Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect Defense of Another —Lesser Included Offense”).
Read together, the latter two instructions informed the jury that a killing that would otherwise be murder is “reduced” to manslaughter when a person kills by acting in imperfect self-defense. (CALCRIM No. 522 [“Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter”]; CALCRIM No. 571 [“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect self defense”].) CALCRIM No. 571 concludes by stating, “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in imperfect self defense. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.” The court also instructed the jury to pay careful attention to its instructions and to consider the instructions together.
Castillo did not object to the above instructions.
Analysis
Castillo maintains that CALCRIM Nos. 522 and 571 misstate the law and relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof to prove murder by indicating that murder is “reduced” to manslaughter, which Castillo maintains told the jury to look to him “to disprove malice and prove a theory of manslaughter.” Castillo contends that, by focusing on reduction and setting out the requirements for imperfect self-defense, these instructions improperly “set murder as the default, and place[ ] the burden squarely on the defense to shift the needle downward.” Notwithstanding Castillo’s failure to object to the jury instructions, we reach the merits of Castillo’s claim of error (People v. Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 661), and we reject his claim for the reasons set forth post.
In People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1 (Parker), the defendant presented an argument similar to Castillo’s. As is relevant here, the defendant in Parker challenged CALJIC No.8.42 (heat of passion), which stated that an unlawful killing can be “ ‘reduce[d]. . . from murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion’ ” and defined legally adequate provocation based on heat of passion. (Parker, at p.70 & fn. 22.) In a separate jury instruction, CALJIC No. 8.50, the jury was told that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that the killing was not committed in the heat of passion. (Parker, at p.70.) Echoing Castillo’s claim, the defendant in Parker asserted that CALJIC No. 8.42 “improperly permitted jurors to presume murder was the default offense and could be reduced or excused by certain mental states, the presence of which were defendant’s burden to prove.” (Parker, at p. 70.) Our Supreme Court disagreed. The court observed that it had previously “upheld the propriety” of CALJIC No. 8.42, and it found that the instructions as a whole explained that the prosecution bore the burden of proof to disprove heat of passion, and jurors are presumed to follow the given instructions. (Parker, at p. 71.)
In Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th 237, our Supreme Court held that the erroneous failure to give an imperfect self-defense instruction amounted to an incomplete instruction on the elements of murder subject to the “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” standard of error under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (Schuller, at pp. 243, 254.) In doing so, our high court reviewed Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. 684, which held that the government must prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury instruction that placed the burden of proving heat of passion on the defendant was unconstitutional. (Mullaney, at pp. 702–704.) This same rule applies to imperfect self-defense (Schuller, at p. 253), and Schuller observed that California’s standard jury instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 570 & 571) properly include the requirement that the prosecution disprove sudden quarrel, heat of passion, and imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Schuller, at p. 254.)
Next, in Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at page 661, our colleagues in the Sixth District rejected an argument akin to Castillo’s—that California’s standard homicide jury instructions (including CALCRIM Nos. 500, 520, 521, 522, 570, & 571) “omitted an element of murder or misstated the burden of proof on heat of passion and imperfect self-defense.” To the contrary, Howard recognized that CALCRIM No. 520 accurately instructed the jury on malice, and the statements in CALCRIM Nos.570 and 571 that murder was “reduced” to manslaughter were accurate statements of the law. (Howard, at pp. 661–662.) Likewise, these instructions correctly informed the jury that the People bore the burden of proving the absence of imperfect self-defense and heat of passion. (Id. at p. 662.) And the court told jurors to “ ‘[p]ay careful attention to all of [its] instructions and consider them together.’ ” (Ibid.)
Considering the above authorities and the jury instructions here, we conclude there was no error. The standard jury instruction on murder (CALCRIM No. 520) stated that, to find a defendant guilty of murder, the People had to prove that Castillo acted with malice aforethought. And the imperfect self-defense jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 571) clearly instructed that the People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castillo did not kill as the result of imperfect self-defense, concluding,“If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.” (See Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p.254 [persuasive dicta stating California’s standard jury instructions properly include requirement that People disprove imperfect self-defense beyond reasonable doubt].)
Nor, as Castillo argues, did the jury instructions shift the burden of proof to the defendant because they use the word “reduce.” Here, Parker’s reasoning is instructive. In Parker, CALJIC No. 8.42 informed the jury, in part: “To reduce an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of the character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act under the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Parker, supra, 13Cal.5th at p. 70, fn. 22.) Although the instruction spoke of reducing murder to manslaughter, our high court rejected the defendant’s argument that CALJIC No. 8.42 suggested to the jury that murder was the “default offense and could be reduced or excused by certain mental states, the presence of which were defendant’s burden to prove.” (Parker, at p. 70.) Instead, read as a whole, the instructions properly instructed the jury that the People had the burden to disprove heat of passion, with “[n]othing in CALJIC No[.] 8.42 alter[ing]” this mandate. (Parker, at pp.70–71.) Similarly here, while CALCRIM Nos. 522 and 571 use the term “reduce,” the jury was properly instructed that the People had the burden to prove malice and disprove imperfect self-defense. And the jury was instructed that the People’s failure to disprove imperfect self-defense required jurors to acquit Castillo of murder.
In sum, we agree withHoward and find the jury instructions given were consistent with the law, did not omit an element of murder, and did not misstate the burden of proof on malice or imperfect self-defense. (Howard, supra, 104Cal.App.5th at pp. 661–662.) It is not reasonably likely that the jury believed the defense bore the burden to prove that Castillo acted in imperfect self-defense. (Ibid.)
The Section 12022(b)(1) Enhancement
Castillo argues that the court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the section 12022(b)(1) enhancement. Specifically, he contends that the court failed to afford “great weight” (§ 1385(c)) to two purportedly applicable mitigating circumstances—that “application of an enhancement could result in a sentence over 20 years” and that the current offense was connected to“priorvictimization” (§ 1385(c)(2)(C), (E)). For the reasons set forth post, we conclude the court did not err by finding these mitigating factors inapplicable.
Additional Background
In his sentencing memorandum, Castillo requested probation and that the court strike the section 12022(b)(1) enhancement under section 1385(c)(2)(C) and (E). Castillo argued that “application of this enhancement would guarantee a sentence of over 20 years, as Mr. Castillo is already facing a minimum of 25 years in state prison.” And he argued that the offense was connected with prior victimization because allegedly uncontroverted trial testimony established that David A. attacked Castillo the night before he died.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the court could take into account aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 for purposes of Castillo’s requests for probation and to strike the section 12022(b)(1) enhancement. The prosecutor argued that the crime involved great violence and planning under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a), and Castillo’s violent conduct indicated a serious danger to society under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b). In addition, the prosecutor urged the court to consider Castillo’s less than truthful testimony and statements to the police, his blaming the victim for the situation, and his lack of remorse and failure to take responsibility.
Defense counsel argued that Castillo had minimal prior criminal history, with no strikes or “real violent offenses[.]” Counsel submitted on that argument and the arguments he made in Castillo’s sentencing memorandum. Castillo also briefly spoke and urged the court to recognize that he was innocent and acted in self-defense.
The court ruled, “Well, this is a sad case. Obviously[,] this murder resulted in great loss to the victim and the victim’s family, all the people that have been touched by this. With that, having reviewed the sentencing memorandum on both sides and the probation report, although the defendant is technically eligible for probation, the Court denies probation. [The] Court finds the aggravating factors listed in the probation report outweigh the mitigating factors. There are no unusual circumstances. The Court finds this was a particularly brutal and vicious murder. The victim was vulnerable at the time as he was surprised, and the defendant has shown no remorse that I can see. So because of those factors I don’t find any unusual circumstances, nor if I had the discretion would I grant probation in this case. I don’t think it’s appropriate given the facts. Similarly[,] I would deny striking the 12022 (b)(1) enhancement. Again, I don’t find any of the factors lend towards using my discretion to strike that. So I would deny that as well, so for the conviction for a violation of [s]ection 187, murder in the first degree, the defendant will serve [an] indeterminate term of 25 years to life, consecutive to that a determinant [sic] term of one year pursuant to [section] 12022 (b)(1).”
Governing Law
Under section 1385, except if dismissal is prohibited by an initiative statute, a trial court “shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385(c)(1).) In making this determination, “the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances” listed in the statute apply. (§1385(c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these [mitigating] circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385(c)(2).)
In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 (Walker), our high court resolved a disagreement between lower courts as to whethersubdivision (c)(2) of section1385created a rebuttable presumption in favor of striking an enhancement when a mitigating circumstance in subparagraphs (A) to (I) was proven. (Walker, at pp. 1028–1029, 1031 [describing disagreement].)Walkerclarified that if a defendant proves a mitigating circumstance identified in subparagraphs (A) to (I) of subdivision(c)(2) “the plain language ofsection1385(c)(2)doesnoterect a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.” (Walker, at p. 1033, italics added.) Instead, “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029.)
We review a trial court’s decision regarding whether to strike or reduce an enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371.) “‘“[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at pp.376–377.) But “ ‘an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect legal standard.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.)
Analysis
Whether the mitigating circumstance under section 1385(c)(2)(C) applies where Castillo would be given a 25-years-to-life sentence (§ 190, subd. (a)) is a matter of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Torres (2025) 113Cal.App.5th 88, 93 (Torres).) Our colleagues in the Third District recently concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) does not apply where the defendant will receive a 25-years-to-life sentence for first degree murder (Torres, at p. 93), and we agree.
Section 1385(c)(2)(C) is triggered when “the application of the enhancement ‘could result’ in a sentence of over 20 years.” (Ibid.) Looking to dictionary definitions (Walker, supra, 16Cal.5th at p.1035; Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93), the verb “result” means: “to proceed or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/result> [as of June 29, 2026].) “Application” means “an act of putting something to use.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/application> [as of June 29, 2026].) Under the statute’s plain language then, the sentence that exceeds 20 years must arise from “[t]he application,” or imposition, of the enhancement. (§ 1385(c)(2)(C).) This did not occur here, as Castillo’s first degree murder sentence itself exceeded 20 years. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp.92–93.)
Castillo argues Torres was wrongly decided because “‘[r]esult’ ” also means ‘conclusion,’ which encompasses situations...where the over-20-year sentence without the enhancement becomes even longer following imposition of the enhancement.” The defendant in Torres made a similarly unconvincing argument. (Torres, supra, 113Cal.App.5th at pp.92–93.) Using the dictionary definitions of the relevant terms, the “conclusion” at issue is the sentence over 20 years, and, under the statutory language, this “conclusion” arises from the act of using (or imposing) the enhancement. Thus, Castillo’s argument is not supported by the plain language of the statute. Castillo alternatively contends that the legislative history suggests that this statutory factor applies in any case where the sentence would be longer than 20 years. He acknowledges, however, that our role in interpreting a statute ends where, as here, the plain language is clear. We agree with Torres that, under section 1385(c)(2)(C)’s plain language, a sentence exceeding 20 years does not “result” from the application of the enhancement when the sentence already exceeds 20 years without the enhancement. (Torres, at p. 93.)
Next, Castillo has not established that the court abused its discretion in concluding that section 1385(c)(2)(E) did not “lend towards using” the court’s discretion to strike the section 12022(b)(1) enhancement. For section 1385(c)(2)(E) to apply, the court had to conclude that “prior victimization or childhood trauma” “is connected” to the current offense. (Ibid.) “ ‘Prior victimization’ means the person was a victim of intimate partner violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking, or the person has experienced psychological or physical trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. A court may conclude that a defendant’s prior victimization was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, medical records, or records or reports by qualified medical experts, the court concludes that the defendant’s prior victimization substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.” (§1385(c)(6)(B).)
Here, the court could have reasonably found that Castillo did not prove that he “experienced . . . physical trauma” that “substantially contributed to [his] involvement in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1385(c)(2)(E).) Without discussing the statutory text, Castillo highlights that he received a large lump on his forehead from David A. during the September 6 incident. The statute, however, requires “prior victimization.” (§1385(c)(2)(E) & (B).) The first three categories of persons who fall within the statutory definition are people who were “victim[s] of intimate partner violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking.” (§ 1385(c)(6)(B).) And the ensuing statutory examples of the types of physical or psychological trauma that constitute “prior victimization” include “abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1385(c)(6)(B).) Thus, the statutory text requires that the defendant be the victim of another’s acts, not the aggressor.
The evidence did not compel the court to conclude that David A. had victimized Castillo. Even accepting that David A. hit Castillo during the September 6 incident, Castillo’s testimony that David A. attacked him after the two went around the corner was not so credible that the court was required to believe him. Some circumstantial evidence supports Castillo’s version of events—for example, Ross M. testified that David A. looked angry when he was chasing Castillo, and Deanna B. testified that David A. apologized to Castillo. On the other hand, David A. did not state why he apologized to Castillo and Castillo pepper sprayed David A. Jennifer A. testified that David A. said he was attacked, pepper sprayed, and Castillo threatened his life; and David A. told his mother that he tried to run away from the confrontation, but Castillo pursued him. Castillo admitted that he followed David A. around the corner before David A. hit Castillo, and the surveillance video admitted as an exhibit at trial showed Castillo following David A. around the corner. On this record, the court could reasonably have determined that section 1385(c)(2)(E) did not apply because the evidence did not show whether David A. was the aggressor in the physical confrontation around the corner or whether he acted defensively at that point in response to Castillo’s pursuit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Castillo (A172129)