P. v. Brown CA1/2 filed 6/29/26

Filed 6/29/26 P. v. Brown CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRODERICK URIAH BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.

A172848

(Humboldt County Super. Ct.
No. CR2401489)

After pleading guilty to felony stalking, Broderick Uriah Brown was sentenced to probation for three years with conditions. On appeal, Brown contendsthe trial court’s imposition of a probation condition requiring him to submit to alcohol testing was unreasonable because it was not related to his future criminality. We agree and strike the challenged condition.
BACKGROUND
Brown and T.B. were in a relationship that ended in 2018. On May 2, 2024, T.B.’s motherleft her home with the front door unlocked for about 45 minutes. When T.B.’smother returned, she discovered a handwritten note in T.B.’s room. The note read: “Hey, [T.B.] I stopped by your house ‘uninvited.’. . .The best way to go where you want to go is head backwards. Your old room looks way better now. Next time you are here, remember to call the police with your mom. She could be on Lost Coast Outpost if you are not quick. Anyways, when you are done storming the KBR just know that your flushed face wasn’t forgotten atall. . . .As I recounted my memories of you. There is plenty, but there are -- but they are all layered below the fact that I wasn’t truly in love with you. Love Broderick.”
Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy Joe Rogers was dispatched to T.B.’s mother’s home. T.B. told Rogers she was “scared” by the note and “feared that [Brown] was going to up the antics.” She stated thatshe had not been in contact with Brown for months. But since the end of their relationship, T.B. received multipleharassing text messages from “one to three” unknown numbers signed “Broderick.” One of the messages stated,“I hope you get shot in the head one day.”
A few days later, Brown was arrested. In his postarrest interview,Brown spoke “nonsensically,” “going off topic and talking about. . . satellites and him being targeted.” Brown admitted that he texted T.B.“a couple of times” after their relationship ended. When questioned whether he sentT.B. threatening text messages, Brown accused T.B. of texting herself. Brown also spoke of lasers and accused T.B. of “using satellites to target and monitor him” and “recording his movement and voice.”
On May 8, 2024, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Brown with felony first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1), felony stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor aggravated trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b); count 3).
On December 16, 2024, after being held to answer at a preliminary hearing and the filing of an information, Brown entered into a negotiated disposition in which he pled guilty to felony stalking, count 2.
In its presentencing report, the probation department represented that in his statement to them,Brown, who was 29 years old at the time, began experimenting at age 14 with “multiple substances including alcohol, cannabis, psilocybin mushrooms, and LSD.”Brown stated that he had previously used ecstasy (his “preferred drug”) and cocaine (“at social outings”) but stopped using them at ages 24 and 25, respectively.According to the report, Brown was “not worried about drug use while on probation due to it being a behavior he participated in more fully . . . during his younger years.” Brown “admitted to a history of substance use that continued up to the end of 2023.” Brown’s criminal history included in the report listed one prior convictionfor misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103) in 2017; it did not include any reference to alcohol or drug-related offenses.
Ultimately, the report recommendeda grant of probation withmultiple sentencing conditions including: “12. [Brown] shall totally abstain from the use of alcoholic beverages and shall not have in their possession or under their custody or control any alcoholic beverages”; and “13. [Brown] shall submit to chemical testing for the use of alcohol at any time as directed by probation officer or other law enforcement officer.” Other recommended conditions included the direction that Brown not use or possess any “non-prescribed controlled substance”; “not traffic in controlled substances nor associate with any person using or trafficking in controlled substances;” restricted the amount of marijuana Brown could possess; required Brown to “submit to chemical testing for the use of controlled substances”; and mandated an “alcohol/drug assessment.”
At the January 13, 2025 sentencing hearing,Brown requested probation condition 12 concerning alcohol abstention be stricken because “there is no history of alcohol abuse. It has nothing in the facts related to this.” The People opposed striking the condition because Brown “needs to undergo an [alcohol and other drug] assessment. So, before he should be allowed to take intoxicants, they should make sure there is no problem that he has with the intoxicants because . . . intoxicants were a big part of his life so far.” Defense counsel replied, “I don’t know that there’s any facts that support that.” The discussion did not include any mention of condition 13related to alcohol testing.
The sentencing court accepted the terms of the negotiated disposition, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on felony probation for three years, adopting all of the recommended conditions of probation except condition 12. In doing so, the court stated,“I have read the probation report with regards to substance abuse as well as the factual summary here. I will agree to strike term number 12.”
Brown appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Forfeiture
As an initial matter, we address and reject the Attorney General’s argument that Brown’s failure to object to the alcohol testing condition forfeited the issue on appeal. “[N]either forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic,” and appellate courts have discretion to review otherwise forfeited challenges. (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)Here, we exercise our right to decide the appeal on its merits, “in order to eliminate the need to address [appellant’s] alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182Cal.App.4th 902, 928.) We now turn to the reasonableness of condition 13.
II.The Imposition of Alcohol Testing Condition
Brown challenges the imposition of probation condition 13, which required him to submit to alcohol testing, as unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). He contends the condition “does not make sense” because the court struck condition 12 that prohibited him from consuming or possessing alcohol. Brown requests we strike the alcohol testing condition or remand the matter to the trial court for clarification. We agree with Brown’s argument and strike condition 13.
On appeal, “We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) “That is, a reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.)
“A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. . . .’ ” (Lent, supra, 15Cal.3d at p. 486.) The Lent test “is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin, at p. 379.) The “conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime” as long as they are “reasonably directed at curbing [an offender’s] future criminality.” (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 404–405.) But there must be a strong connection between “the burdens imposed by the challenged condition and a probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history.” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7Cal.5th 1113, 1120.)
The parties agree that alcohol use was not the direct cause of Brown’s conviction and is not itself criminal, so there is no dispute that the first two Lent prongs have been satisfied. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) They disagree solely on the third Lent prong: whether alcohol testing is reasonably related to Brown’s future criminality. (Ibid.)In the context of the record before us, we conclude it is not.
The presentencing report documented prior alcohol use more than a decade before the stalking incident, mostly in Brown’s teen years. And while the report included “alcohol” in the list of “substances” Brown acknowledged previously using socially, itdid not document alcohol abuse, nordid it represent that Brown’s prior criminal conviction involved alcohol or was spurred by the use of alcohol.
Notably, when asked to strike condition 13 requiring Brown to abstain from drinking alcohol, the sentencing court freely did so without any apparent reservation. This striking shows the court was notconcernedthatBrown’s alcohol consumption had the potential for abuse or was likely to lead to future criminality. As such, because Brown was allowed to possess and consume alcohol, there was no rational need to test Brown for alcoholconsumption as a condition of probation. (See People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 922, 928, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Welch(1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236–237 [court struck a probation condition that appellant not possess or consume alcohol or frequent places where alcohol was sold because there was “no factual indication in the record that the proscribed behavior . . . is reasonably related to future criminal behavior”].)Therefore, we conclude the testing condition here has no deterrent effect on Brown’s future criminality and is unreasonable.
The Attorney General asks us to follow the logic of People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 792–793, where, after a conviction for the unlawful possession of a dirk or dagger, the court of appeal upheld the trial court’s imposition of a condition prohibiting the possession or use of alcohol because it was reasonably related to preventing future crimes. The Attorney General argues the alcohol testing condition is reasonablebecause Brown might “drink to the point that his inhibitions are lowered or judgment is impaired, which could lead to him engaging in criminal activity.” But Cota is distinguishable first because it challenged only the imposition of an alcohol abstention condition, not the imposition of an alcohol testing condition after an alcohol abstention condition had been stricken. Second, unlike Brown,Cota had a “well documented” history of substance abuse and controlled substance-related convictions that supported the court of appeal’s statement, “there is an empirical nexus between drugs and alcohol.” (Ibid., citing People v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84, 87.)
The Attorney General further contends Brown’s prior conviction for reckless driving demonstrates his prior alcohol use led to criminal behavior and justifies alcohol testing even if Brown is not required to abstain from drinking. For support, the Attorney General cites Brown’s statements to competency evaluators that he was previously stopped for or convicted of driving under the influence. But these prior statements, one of which was characterized by the evaluator as “vague and confusing”, are not determinative as they do not specify the use of alcohol (as compared to other controlled substances), do not match the criminal history set forth in the presentencing report, and did not appear to concern the trial court when it struck condition 12. Thus, without additional information, the existence of a reckless driving conviction does not explain why mandatory alcohol testing is necessary to minimize the future criminality of someone legally permitted to drink alcohol. We therefore do not find that imposing an alcohol testing requirement here satisfies Lent’s third prong.
In sum, the lack ofreliable evidence that alcohol was a factor in Brown’s past or current criminality and the fact that the court permitted Brown to possess and consume alcoholwhile on probation means condition 13 fails under Lent’s third prong because alcohol testing was not reasonably related to Brown’s future criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Becausethe court’s imposition of condition 13 was therefore an abuseof discretion, we order it stricken. (In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901 [“In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in this court and affirmed as modified”].)

DISPOSITION
Probation condition 13 requiring alcohol testing is ordered stricken.The order is otherwise affirmed.

DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, ACTING P.J.

MILLER, J.