Patel v. Patel CA1/3 filed 6/22/26

Filed 6/22/26 Patel v. Patel CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

ABDUL PATEL and ZARINPATEL,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
NASIR PATEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
A173079

(San FranciscoCounty
Super. Ct. No. CGC23608427)

This matter arises from a dispute over profit distributions in a hotel business run byhusband and wife Abdul Rashid Patel and Zarin Patel(collectively, “respondents”) and Abdul’s nephew Nasir Patel.Respondents filed an action against Nasir, which includeddirect and derivative claims for violation of Penal Code section 496 and breach of fiduciary duty, and a direct claim for elder abuse, among others. After a 14-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in respondents’ favor on most of their claims. Nasir challenges the exclusion of certain evidence at trial and thesufficiency of evidence to support several of the court’s rulings and findings. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondents filed their action against Nasir in August 2023. The trial included testimony from various individuals, including Abdul (then 86 years old), Zarin (then 77 years old), respondents’ daughter May, accountants and bookkeepers who had done work for the hotel business, a forensics accountant, and a damages expert. Nasir and his financial expert also testified. The relevant testimony and evidence included the following.
As a youth,Nasir and his siblings lived with respondentsinthe Baker Hotel, a single residency occupancy (“SRO”) hotel respondentsoperated. Respondents also owned the Valley Motel in Concord. In 1985 or 1986, Nasir started working for the Baker Hotel and, over the next few years, learned from respondents how to run an SRO business.
In 1994, an opportunity arose to purchase a sublease in the Broadway Hotel, an 81-unit SRO hotel, from Abdul’s friend Harry Ming. Ming was seeking $40,000 or $50,000 for the sublease but did not want to sell it to Nasir, who was only 21 years old at the time. Mingultimately agreed to do soafter Abdul contributed $40,000toward the purchase and agreed to be Nasir’s business partner. Abdul agreed to this arrangement because he wanted to help Nasir, who was his brother’s son. Nasir borrowed $22,000 for this transaction, giving $10,000 of this amount for the purchase of the sublease and $12,000 to his uncle as reimbursement.
Abdul and Nasir agreed to a 50-50 partnership in the business and an equal division of the hotel earnings, with Nasir agreeing to handle management of the hotel because of Abdul’s health issues. Both individuals’ names were on the hotel bank account, but Nasirwas responsible for the financial records which included handwritten rent revenuereceipt books, hotel registration cards, and a cash journal documenting hotel expenses, all of which Nasir kept at the hotel.
After assuming the lease, Nasir and his siblings movedinto the Broadway Hotel. Nasir lived in the manager’s apartment for about 10 years, but moved out of the hotel after starting a family.
In 2004, Nasir and Abdul incorporated the Broadway Hotel as Broadway Hotel, Inc. (“BHI”).Nasir was appointed as the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), and Abdul was appointedSecretary of the Board of Directors. Respondents’ daughter May understood that the parties agreed to have Nasir serve as CEO and CFO because he was “operating the property” and“in control of the finances,” and that Abdul would be available to assist Nasir if needed. Nasir and respondents’ living trust (the “Patel Trust”) each received one million shares of BHI. As trustees of the Patel Trust, respondents are authorized to use its assets in whatever manner they want during their lifetimes.Notwithstanding BHI’sincorporation, the parties’ dealings remained largely informal and did not include participation in formalities such as director or shareholder meetings.
Around 2005 or 2006, Abdul was diagnosed with lymphoma. He also had other health conditions that rendered him unable to work. In 2012, Abdul underwent a major surgery after which his health began to further decline. Zarin spent most of her time caring for Abdul, despite having her own health issues. May also helped care for Abdul in addition to working 10 to 15 hours a week to help her parents with their businesses.
Between 1994 and 2014, Nasir provided Abdul with sporadic hotelprofit distribution payments, including payments of approximately $50,000 in 1999 andapproximately $100,000 in 2001. But there was a period of around five to seven years when, according to May, Nasir paid no distributions to Abdul. This occurredduringthe time when Abdul was experiencing more limitations due to his health issues. According to May, Abdul expressed confusion as to why he was not receiving profit distributions even thoughNasir was able to purchase other properties around this same time. Abdul and May ultimately met with Nasir, which resulted in Nasir paying Abdul $182,272 in 2011, around $50,000 in 2012, and around $50,000 in 2013.
Respondents, however, were not satisfied with the ongoing inconsistency of the profit distributions. In 2014, they verbally agreed with Nasirthat Nasir would provide them with steady, monthly payments (“the 2014 Agreement”). These monthly payments were initially set at $2,500 but eventually increased to $4,000. Zarin testified these payments would be made against BHI profits but did not comprise the entirety of respondents’ share of the profits. Nasir, on the other hand, testified the monthly amount represented the entirety of Abdul’s share of the profits because Nasir was managing the hotel operations and absorbing the expenses for building upkeep.
After the parties entered into the 2014 Agreement, Nasir made monthly deposits to respondents’ account until December 2020.While making such monthly distributions, Nasir also wrote monthly checks in the same amount to himself. Nasir also took additional profit distributions for himself, even though one of his former accountants (Charles Sterck) advised him in 2017 not to take more distributions than other shareholders. Sterck testified that Nasir’s excess withdrawals for himself were recharacterized as shareholder loans so the distributions to Nasir and Abdul would be equal for accounting purposes.
From 2014 to 2020, Zarin occasionally tried to obtain information regardingBHI’s financial situation but received little or no response.Abdul also requested financial information for BHI, such as information regarding the hotel’s cash earnings, but Nasir never provided it.
In December 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Nasir stopped making monthly distributions to respondents. In a text, Nasir told Zarin that business was “really slow,” that he hoped it would “pick up next month,” and that he had to loan $9,900 to the BHI account. The following month, Zarin texted Nasir to follow up about the lack of BHI deposits because she and Abdul needed money due to losses they were suffering in another property they managed. Nasir responded the “[s]ituation [was] very bad,” but promised to resume payments when things improved.
Around this time, May stepped in to help her parents with financial matters given their health issues. May began corresponding with Nasir about BHI because she and Nasir had a good relationship. May also testified that her father told her at one point he “wanted to do something for [her],” that he wanted her and Nasir to work together because they “respect each other,” and that he “absolutely” wanted the BHI profits to go to her.
Notwithstanding Nasir’s representations that business at BHI was slow, May noticed in 2021 that BHI’sSchedule K-1s for the 2020 tax year indicated BHI actually had a higher net business income in 2020 than in 2019. In October, May emailed Nasir aboutthe large discrepancy between the income reported on the 2020 K-1s, on which the parties were paying taxes, and the disbursementsher parents received for that year. Specifically, May noted her parents were paying taxes on $78,622 (i.e., their 50 percent share of the BHI income) but had received only $40,000 in disbursements. May asked Nasir to clarify with his accountant that the 2020 K-1 figures were correct.
May received no response from Nasir over the next two months. In December 2021, she askedNasir to speak withhisaccountant because she wanted to ensure that Nasir and her parents were not paying more taxes than they should for BHI. May inquired about how business at BHI was doing given that business had picked up relative to her parents’ other properties. May additionally asked Nasir how much money he had put into BHI and mentionedNasir could always ask Abdul for financial helpgiven that BHI was a partnership. Nasir, however, became increasingly defensive when May asked for information regarding BHI. May made more attemptsin January and February of 2022 to get BHI’s financial information, but was unsuccessful. At most, Nasir expressed hope that business would pick up soon so he could restart the monthly distributions to respondents.
Around June 2022, May’s name was added to the BHI bank account with paperwork indicating she was a Vice President of Broadway Hotel. However, May stated she never actually had a role in the corporation, never managed it, and never took a “single penny” from the hotel as the hotel needed that money.
In September 2022, May reached out to Nasir after he told her he had lent $150,000 to BHI. Because May was unable to confirm that loan based on her review of the BHI bank account transactions, she and Abdul wanted to take a look at the BHI finances together with Nasir. At this time, May requested that Nasir send her BHI’s financial information for the past ten years so she could make sure “the recordkeeping was clear” and “done properly,” and could determine the amounts Nasir had distributed to her parents. Nasir, however, claimed he was very busy and would respond later. The following year, respondents filed this action.
According torespondents’ damages expert Frank Wisehart,Nasir had undeposited cash receipts which showed that $833,950 in cash should have been deposited in the BHI bank account between 2019 and 2023 (consisting of $846,482 in undeposited cash less BHI’s cash payments totaling$12,533). Wisehart arrived at this figure by using two years of cash receipt information obtained from the handwritten receipt books Nasir kept stored at the Broadway Hotel and by making reasonable estimates for the two years for which there were no receipt books.Further, in reviewing the Broadway Hotel rent checks, Wisehart observed there were 47 checks totaling $65,906 from Brilliant Corners, a community group that paid rent for some tenants; these checks had been written out to Nasir personally and were never deposited into the BHI account. None of this income information was available to the accountants who prepared BHI’s tax returns because the funds had never been deposited in the BHI account.
Upon reviewing BHI bank statements from 2019 to 2023,respondents’ forensics accountant Suzanne Eikel-PawlawskiconcludedNasir used the BHI account for a “substantial amount” of personal expenses. Such expenses included annual charges for a Ring doorbell (which is typically for residential and not hotel use), personal Apple products, bank overdraft charges that should not have been incurred if the hotel revenue listed in the revenue logs had been deposited in the BHI account, personal Amazon Prime and Prime Video subscription fees and gym memberships, $16,000 in meals and entertainment expenses, $1,000 in a cryptocurrency transaction, and $449,057.24 in unexplained credit card payments.
Nasir admitted at trial that some of the hotel’s rent revenue was not deposited in the BHI bank account but was, instead, deposited in other bank accounts under his name,purportedly as repayment for money he had loaned to BHI. Nasir did not denyhe used BHI funds for personal expenses. But he believedthe BHI accountwas his own accountwith funds he was entitled to use as he wished. His counsel also elicited testimony from Abdul that respondents had a number of other financial assets, including properties in San Francisco, Concord, and India.
At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court issued a statement of decision in which it ruled in favor of respondents’directclaims forviolation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c),breach of fiduciary duty, and financial elder abuse. Finding that respondents suffered $372,564.65 in damages, the court ordered Nasir to pay respondents a total of $1,117,693.95 pursuant to the treble damages provision under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c). The court also ordered Nasir to deposit all cash, checks, and other receipts derived from BHI operations into the BHI account; to maintain all receipts; and to properly account for all business income and expenses.
Discussion
Nasir contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain text messages between him and May, and that the evidencewas insufficient to support liability and recovery on any of respondents’ claims and the award oftreble damages.
Many of Nasir’s contentions, however, are impossible to evaluate because his briefing and presentation of the issues are lacking.Nasir frequently fails to include, discuss, or cite key portions of the recordand relevant evidence, and instead presentsan incomplete and one-sided presentation of the evidence. For example, Nasir claims on appeal that at trial, respondents “mainly relied” on their own testimony and that of their daughter May, while omitting any mention of the testimony provided by respondents’ experts regarding Nasir’s appropriation of BHI funds and his use of these funds for his own personal expenses. Nasir also neglects to provide cogent legal arguments supporting a number of his challenges on appeal.
As will be evident, post, these deficiencies are consequential.It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a “trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) For challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, an appellant must “set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218, italics added.) An appellant must also supply the reviewing court with a cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citations to the record. (Countyof Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 463 (County of Los Angeles).)Failures to fairly discuss the evidence presented or to provide a reasoned argument supported by relevant legal authority effectively amount to a forfeiture of any claims of error. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247; In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)
Mindful of these principles, we proceed to Nasir’s contentions.
Exclusion of Text Messages
Nasir claims that at trial he sought the admission of twotexts May sent him. In one text,May supposedly stated that “ ‘[g]oing forward [Nasir should] just consider that Daddy [i.e., Abdul] had given [her] Broadway shares instead of [sic] Naeem.’” In another text, May reportedly said, “ ‘Daddy told me he beta [sic] I could not do anything for you so you can have my share from Broadway because he knows we get along.’ ”Nasir contends the trial court erroneously excluded these textsas inadmissible hearsay when they should have been admitted as party admissions under Evidence Code section 1222.In assertingthis errorwas prejudicial, Nasir contends the text evidence was critical to his defense that respondents lacked standing to bring their elder abuseand other claims because they no longer owned their shares in BHIbut had, instead, transferred them to May. Nasir’s argument is deficientand flawed.
At the outset, we observe Nasir does not provide any transcript citations showing either that he sought to admit the above-referenced text messages or thatthe trial court made rulings on the matter. Instead, Nasir cites a portion of the trial transcript where his counsel sought to introduce a different text message from May asking Nasir about an outstanding bill for the Broadway Hotel, to which respondents objected on hearsay grounds.In the context of the discussion around this text message,Nasir’s counsel contended that May’s statements were a party admission. Though the court found May was not a party to the case, itultimately overruled the hearsay objection to this particular text messagesincethe statement was being offered for its effect on the listener. But nowhere in the cited exchange was there any mention of the text messages Nasir now claims were improperly excluded or mention of a related ruling. Nasir’s failure to provide adequate citations to the recordprecludes any meaningful review. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p.463.)
In any event, Nasir offers no cogent argument or legal authority for his belief that text messages such as the ones May supposedly sent him can trigger a transfer of share ownership in a corporation. Indeed, the record otherwisereflectsthat the Patel Trust owns the BHI shares and that respondents, as trustees,are authorized to use these shares in whatever manner they wish during their lifetime.Given the absence of any factual and legal substantiation of Nasir’s argument, we see no basis for relief.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Nasir argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial court’s rulings that he had violated Penal Code section 496, had engaged in financial elder abuse, had breached his fiduciary duty towards respondents, and had acted with malice, oppression, and fraud as required forthe alternative punitive damages award (see ante, fn. 5).We disagree.
On appeal, we review a trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Ctr., LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1010, 1016.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is of ponderable legal significance,reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value, and substantial proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1006.) “We view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving every conflict to the [sic] support the judgment.” (Jonkey v. Carignan Construction Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 20, 24 (Jonkey).) We do not weigh conflicts or disputes in the evidence. (Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582, 596.) Instead, “[o]ur authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.” (Ibid.) “If substantial evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if facts exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).)
The burden of demonstrating the absence of substantial evidence rests squarely on the appellant. (Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 598 (Symons).) To this end, an appellant must “ ‘fairly summarize the facts in the light favorable to the judgment,’ ” and set forth all the material evidence on a point and not merely his or her own evidence. (Ibid.) Without a fair summary of the evidence, the error is deemed forfeited. (Ibid.)
PenalCode Section 496
As relevant here, Penal Code section 496 (“section 496”) defines the crime of theft and makes it unlawful for any person toknowingly receive, conceal, sell, or withhold stolen property. (Id., subd. (a).) Any person injured by a violation of this statute may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages and may alsorecover reasonable attorney fees and costs. (Id., subd. (c).) To prove a theft under section 496, a plaintiff must establish criminal intent on the part of the defendant beyond “ ‘mere proof of nonperformance or actual falsity.’ ” (Siry Inv., L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 361–362.) Innocent or inadvertent misrepresentations are insufficient to establish the requisite criminal intent. (Ibid.) However, evidence that a defendant acted with “careful planning and deliberation” is sufficient. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court found the “great weight of the evidence” demonstrated that, “through planning and deliberation,” Nasir obtained BHI’s corporate assets in a manner constituting theft under section 496. Among other things, the court observed that Nasir took checks tendered as payment for the rental of Broadway Hotel rooms and repeatedly directed the funds to his own accounts, failed to report or account for them, and spent them on his own personal expenses, all while knowing the funds were intended for corporate purposes.
The court also rejected as “unsupported by the weight of the evidence” Nasir’s claim that he had a right to these funds because the parties agreed in 2014 that respondents would receive a monthly $4,000 draw and Nasir would keep the rest of the profits. Instead, the court found ample evidence that the parties agreed each shareholder would receive equal monthly distributions. The court further stated that in the absence of an agreement regarding the handling of profits in excess of the distributions, the profits should be split among the shareholders in proportion to their ownership interest in the corporation. Had Nasir actually believed the parties’ agreement was as he claimed, the court deduced, then he would not have ceased making monthly payments to respondents in December 2020 because the purported agreement would have required these payments regardless ofcorporate profits.
Nasir contends the evidence was insufficient to establish criminal intent under section 496 because there were“ambiguities” regarding the handling of BHI profits that exceeded the $4,000 per month distribution agreement. On this point, Nasir asserts that until respondents stopped receiving the monthly distributions, they never sought a true up of the Broadway Hotel profits despite knowing from their experience as SRO operators that the net profits from the hotel could not have been identical every month. Nasir contends this fact weighs heavily in favor of a finding that respondents had agreed to receive only the fixed $4,000 per month and no more. He also contends the damages should have been limited to treble the damages of $152,000 thatrespondents suffered through the missed monthly payments, instead of the $372,564.65 damages figure used by the court. Nasir’s argumentsare not well taken.
Among other things, Zarin testified her understanding of the 2014 Agreement was that the monthly distribution payments would be made against BHI profits but would not comprise the entirety of respondents’ share of the profits. And contrary to Nasir’s contention that respondents never sought a true up until he stopped making monthly distribution payments in December 2020, Zarin testified she tried to inquire about the BHI profits both in December 2017 and a few months before the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Nasir’s former accountant also testified that he had advised Nasir in 2017 to not take more distributions than other shareholders, and that the excess distributions to Nasir were recharacterized as repayment of shareholder loans.
Taken together, the above evidenceamply supports the trial court’s finding that Nasir was not entitled to BHI’s excess monthly profits over $4,000. (See Jonkey, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 24 [viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and drawing every reasonable inference to support it].) Thus, even if there were some “ambiguities” in the 2014 Agreement and/or some testimony supporting Nasir’s version of the facts, reversal is not warranted. (See Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p.12.)
Financial ElderAbuse
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that “financial abuse” of an elder occurs when an individual “[t]akes,secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains” or “[a]ssists in taking,secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder...for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both” or “by undue influence.” For purposes of the statute, “a person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property when an elder or dependent adult is deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (c).)
Nasir contends the trial court erred in finding he acted with an intent to defraud respondents because the court “ignored” the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic had impacted BHI’s finances just as it had impacted respondents’ other hotel businesses. Nasir asserts this “critical factor” undercuts the court’s finding that his failure to make distributions to respondents was intentional as opposed to out of necessity.
Nasir’s showing on this claim is deficient. He fails in his burden to provide a fair summary of the record and to include all the material evidence relative to his challenge. (See Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) For example, in concluding in its statement of decision that Nasir acted with the intent to defraud, the trial court relied on evidence that Nasir took “substantial unauthorized distributions without providing equal distributions to the [Patel Trust as the] other 50% shareholder,” and that he hid the fact that funds were available while falsely representing to respondents that “times were tough and no funds were available for distribution.” Nasir makes no reference tothesetrial court findings;nor does he discuss the evidence that his appropriation of BHI funds occurred not only during the pandemic but also before and after it. Specifically, the record evidence indicates that from 2019 to 2023, Nasirobtained$846,482 in cash receipts for BHI but did not deposit the sums into the BHI account; at the same time,Nasir was spending substantial sums of money on what appeared to be his own personal expenses. Nasir’s failure to fairly address the evidence forfeitshis claims of error. (Symons, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.)
In any event, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Nasir acted with the intent to defraud respondents. As recounted above, Wisehart testified that from 2021 to 2023 there was approximately $846,482 in cash that Nasir never deposited into the BHI account. Likewise, there were 47 undeposited rental checks totaling $65,906 that had been written out to Nasir personally from the nonprofit organization Brilliant Corners. Notwithstanding these facts, Nasir repeatedly represented to respondents that business was slow and he was unable to make their distribution payments. Additionally, from October 2021 to September 2022, Nasir repeatedly rebuffed May’s attempts to obtain information regarding BHI’s finances when she began to investigate the discrepancies between the 2020 income reported for BHI and the distributions made to her parents, as well as the discrepancies between Nasir’s claimed loans to BHI and what he had actually deposited into the BHI account. All this evidence more than amply established the requisite intent.
Nasir next argues that, even if his intent to defraud was proved, the trial court should have found his criminal intent extended only to the unpaid monthly distributions. We cannot agree, as substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that respondents never agreed to forgo profits in excess of the monthly distributions.
Lastly, Nasir asserts respondents lacked standing to bring their financial elder abuse claim. He also contends respondents failed to establish harm fromhis failure to provide equal distributions of the BHI profits as evidence was presented at trial that respondents had “vast assets across the world.” Nasir devotes one paragraph to each of these contentions with minimal analysis. Nasir’s standing contention fails for the reasons discussed,ante. And he offers no cogent argument or legal support for his proposition that a plaintiff alleging elder abuse cannot establish harm if there is evidence that the plaintiff has other financial assets. As such, we deem these contentions of error forfeited. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Nasir contends the trial court erred in finding he owed respondents a fiduciary duty because he was not a majority shareholder in BHI. Citing inapposite case law, Nasir suggests that only majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders. Thatis not the case. As the trial court recognized in its ruling on this claim, it is well established that: “ ‘A director is a fiduciary. . . .So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders.’ ” (Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 108, italics added.) Here, Nasir focuses only on asserting he was not a controlling shareholder while ignoring the circumstance that, as a director, he owed a fiduciary duty to respondents as shareholders of BHI. (Ibid.) As such, Nasir’s challenge to this finding fails.
PunitiveDamages
Nasir argues the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that he acted with malice and fraud for purposes of respondents’ request for punitive damages. Nasir, however,provides no legal authority or analysis but merely contends there was little evidence of the requisite intent. He alsoreassertshis belief there were “significant ambiguities” regarding the monthly payment agreement and points out thatrespondents received a significant windfall from their initial $40,000 investment in the Broadway Hotel. These bald assertions do not amount to a cogent legal argument that legally undermines the court’s finding he acted with malice and fraud; thus, we deem this assertion forfeited. (See County of Los Angeles, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

Patel v. Patel(A173079)