In re J.A.-M. CA1/1 filed 6/30/26

Filed 6/30/26 In re J.A.-M. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re J.A.-M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.

A174004

(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. 25JD00031,
25JD00032, 25JD00033)

In this appeal, F.S. (Father) challenges the orders made at the detention hearing, a restraining order hearing, and the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing. He contends those orders are void because they were made by a commissioner without the parties’ stipulation that the matter may be heard and decided by a temporary judge. Father further argues his due process rights were violated because he did not receive adequate notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. We agree that Father was denied due process and accordingly reverse the jurisdictional findings and disposition orders. We otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
Initial Dependency Proceedings
In March 2025, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) received reports that Father’s three children, nine-year-old J.A.-M., six-year-old F.A.-M., and four-year-old H.A.-M.,“were unsafe in the care of [Father] due to his severe mental health issues.” According to the Department’s detention report, asocial worker subsequently met with Father, who presented as “paranoid, and possibly manic.” He purportedly made several comments that made the social worker “fear his perception of reality.”The children’s mother, K.T. (Mother), was living with Father at that time and told the social worker that Father had “always been delusional” and was “now involving the children in his delusions.” She showed the social worker recordings, which, according to the social worker, showed Mother being “verbally and emotionally abused” by Father in front of the children, Father throwing objects at Mother, and Father ripping objects off the wall. The children reported feeling unsafe around Father. Father refused to work with the Department to develop a safety plan for the children and asserted he was “a sovereign citizen and libertarian and would not be signing documentation.” The Department helped Mother and the children move to a confidential location.
In April 2025, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition for the children, alleging jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Codesection 300, subdivision (b)(1) (serious physical harm and failure to protect) and subdivision (c) (serious emotional damage) based on Father’s mental health symptoms. Father appeared in propria persona at the April 2, 2025 detention hearing and asked for a continuance on the ground that he was “served fraudulent papers.” After questioning Mother about the children’s paternity, the juvenile court elevated Father to the status of presumed father and asked him if he wanted a one-day continuance. Father responded in the affirmative. Father also made several bizarre statements during the hearing, prompting the Department’s counsel to raise concerns as to whether Father understood the nature of the dependency proceedings. After some back and forth between Father and the court, the court found that Father understood the nature of the proceedings, and it continued the matter for one day.
Near the end of the hearing, Mother’s counsel requested a temporary restraining order based on remarks Father made “regarding taking the children to Germany.” Father appeared to admit the allegation. Thejuvenile court granted a temporary restraining order and informed Father he was to have no contact with the children “until we can have a hearing.” In setting the date for the restraining order hearing, the court officer stated, “[W]e can return... for two dates. The juris dispo would be set on April 30th. That’s over the 21-day mark. Both parties agreed to that,....” The court responded that “[Father] will need to have the length of the restraining order be within the statutory authority.” The court thus set the restraining order hearing for April 23, 2025. It also ordered Father to move out of the family home within two days. No further mention was made of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Father did not appear at the continued hearing the next day. The juvenile court ordered the children detained from Father.
The Restraining Order Hearing
Father appeared at the April 23, 2025 restraining order hearing. He asserted “a formal challenge to the jurisdictional of this court to proceed in any capacity over matters involving custody, visitation, restraining orders or seizures of natural heirs.” The juvenile court advised Father to “reconsider representing [himself]” in the matter and “overruled” his objection to jurisdiction.
Regarding Mother’s request for arestraining order, the Department’s counsel first noted that Father had been arrested for violating the temporary restraining order. Counsel said the children were present during the incident. Father interjected, claiming counsel’s assertion was “[l]ies. Fabricated lies.” Counsel also noted Father “has not been responsive to the social worker at all,” and the Department “need[ed] an updated mailing address for the father.” Mother’s counsel said Mother would testify that the paternal grandmother had contacted Mother and had asked for Father’s mail and personal property. In response to these arguments, Father said he had “filed papers.” Thejuvenile court refused to accept his papers, however, because they were not served on the other parties. The court granted Mother’s request for a three-year restraining order prohibiting Father from contacting Mother or the children or from coming within 1000 yards of the family’s home. After the matter was adjourned, Mother’s counsel asked, “April 30th, 10:00 a.m.?” The court simply responded, “Yeah.”
Jurisdiction and Disposition
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department recommended the juvenile court declare the children dependents and order family maintenance services for Mother. As for Father, the Department requested that he receive services “under the children’s case plan as he is not entitled to Family Reunification Services” due to “the recommendation of Family Maintenance to the mother.” The Department also recommended that the court find visitation with Father would be detrimental to the children. The report further stated that the social worker had attempted to contact Father five times since the detention hearing, with “no response” from Father. When the social worker attempted to speak to Father at the restraining order hearing, Father said “she had no authority or jurisdiction to speak to him.”
To support the Department’s recommendations, the report set forth many of the same facts contained in the detention report,plus some facts from a recent interview with Mother regarding the allegations in the dependency petition. Additionally, the report noted that Father “has continuously violated” the restraining order. The report alleged that on one such incident, Father had to be forcibly detained by law enforcement after he had parked outside Mother’s home and was yelling “insults, sexually offensive comments, and other threats.” The report also detailed the family’s child welfare history and Father’s criminal history. The children reported feeling safe and happy living with Mother and indicated they did not want to see Father. The social worker concluded the children were “demonstrating specific behaviors that indicate fear of the father and emotional dysregulation at the thought of contact with him.”
Father did not appear at the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing on April 30. As a result, the juvenile court found father waived his advisement of trial rights and proceeded in his absence. The other parties submitted on the Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report. The court adopted the recommendations of the Department and found J.A.-M., F.A.-M., and H.A.-M. to be children described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c). The court also found that visitation with Father would be detrimental to the children.
Father’s Section 388 Petition
Approximately two months later, Father filed a section 388 petition to set aside the juvenile court’s findings and orders made at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Father alleged he was not served with the “JV-100 petition,” was not given notice of the “April 2, 2025 jurisdictionalhearing,”was not given an opportunity to respond to the detention report, call or cross-examine witnesses, or present evidence, and was “denied the right to contest jurisdiction.” He requested that the court “[r]estore [his] custodial and parental rights pending a lawful and noticed hearing.”
The juvenile court summarily denied Father’s petition, reasoning that Father was in court on April 2, 2025, at which time his request for a one-day continuance was granted and he was personally served with a minute order notifying him of the continued hearing, but he failed to appear for the continued hearing. The court further found that Father was given notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing at the restraining order hearing, was personally served with a copy of the minute order for the restraining order hearing reflecting the dateof the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, and was properly served with the Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report, which stated the date and time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court appointed counsel to represent Father. Father’s counsel subsequently requested a hearing, which was held on July 24, 2025. At the hearing, Father requested that he represent himself.When the court mentioned that he did not appear for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Father claimed he did not know about the hearing. He said, “I wasn’t sure if there’s any notice. I got nothing.” The court responded that Father “would’ve left with a copy of the minutes” at the restraining order hearing. Father said he “was given nothing” and was not served with any documents regarding the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The court claimed it announced at the restraining order hearing that the jurisdiction/disposition hearing was set for April 30, which Father refuted. The court ultimately denied Father’s request to represent himself.
DISCUSSION
Father’s contentions on appeal are that (1) his due process rights were violated because he was not given proper notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, and (2) the orders made at the detention hearing, the restraining order hearing, and the jurisdiction/disposition hearing must be reversed because the judicial officers presiding over those hearings failed to announce that they were commissioners and failed to acquire Father’s stipulation to the commissioners acting as temporary judges.We agree with Father’s first contention but conclude he forfeited the latter argument.
Forfeiture of Father’s Arguments
The Department argues that because Father filed an appeal from the July 24, 2025 order, he forfeited his right to raise notice and commissioner stipulation issues arising from the April 3, 2025 detention order, the April 23, 2025 restraining order hearing, and the April 30, 2025 jurisdiction/disposition hearing. As the Department correctly asserts, “‘[a]n appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’” (Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1396.) This “waiver rule” protects the “dominant concerns of finality and reasonable expedition.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 207.) The Department further contends Father forfeited his notice arguments by failing to object to the alleged defects in notice in the juvenile court.
Father acknowledges he did not timely appeal the prior orders but asks this court to reach the merits of his appeal anyway “on the basis he was not given proper notice of the hearing that was conducted by a commissioner without [his] knowledge or stipulation.”He further claims he “raised this issue within a reasonable time after the hearing.” We agree with Father in part.
The waiver rule should not be applied if “due process forbids it.” (In re Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) “First, there must be some defect that fundamentally undermined the statutory scheme so that the parent would have been kept from availing himself or herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.... Second, to fall outside the waiver rule, defects must go beyond mere errors that might have been held reversible had they been properly and timely reviewed,” or else the waiver issue would “turn... into a review on the merits.” (Id. at pp. 208–209.) Other factors may also weigh in the analysis. (See id. at p. 208 [declining to “try to catalogue all circumstances that might allow relaxation of the waiver rule”].) Our consideration of this constitutional issue is de novo. (In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183.)
In re A.K. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 252 is instructive. There, the father was not given proper notice of the jurisdiction and disposition hearings. (Id. at pp. 267–268.) The social services agency contended that the father’s appeal was untimely because it was made more than 60 days after disposition, and that the waiver rule and forfeiture principles applied to the father’s appeal because he failed to raise his arguments with the juvenile court. (Id. at p. 268.) The appellate court rejected the agency’s arguments, noting that the father “did not receive proper notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, and did not receive proper notice of the importance of those hearings,” and he “raised concerns (to varying degrees of specificity) in the juvenile court.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that the father’s “efforts... reflect that, to the extent he could do so, he timely raised below the defects he raises in this appeal.” (Id. at p. 269.)
We conclude Father’s due process challenge is not forfeited on appeal. Like the father in In re A.K., and as discussed in more detail below, Father did not receive adequate notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing or of the importance of that hearing. Nonetheless, Father filed a section 388 petition approximately two months later, seeking to vacate the jurisdictional findings and disposition orders on the ground that he did not receive notice of the “April 2, 2025 jurisdictional hearing, violating WIC § 291 and due process.” While it is unclear from the petition whether Father was claiming he lacked notice of the April 2, 2025 detention hearing or of the April 30, 2025 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court addressed both claims in denying Father’s petition. Then, at the very next hearing, Father informed the court he did not receive notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Although Father did not specify the defects in notice, it is clear from his responses to the court that he was claiming he did not receive any notice of the hearing.
Even if Father did not timely or adequately raise his due process challenge in the juvenile court, we “would excuse that failure in light of the fundamental due process issues implicated by this appeal.” (In re A.K., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 269; see In re Christopher L. (2020) 56Cal.App.5th 1172, 1183, fn. 4 [“We need not determine whether Father forfeited these arguments, however, because even if he did, we would exercise our discretion to address Father’s appeal, which raises fundamental due process issues”].)
We do not reach the same conclusion for the commissioner stipulation issues Father raises on appeal. As mentioned, Father argues the judicial officers who presided over the detention hearing, the restraining order hearing, and the jurisdiction/disposition hearing failed to inform the parties that they were commissioners and failed to acquire the parties’ stipulation to the commissioners acting as temporary judges, as required by the California Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure section 259. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §21; Code Civ. Proc., §259, subd. (d); In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 91; In re Marriage of Djulus (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1044.) Orders made by a commissioner are void absent a stipulation by the parties. (In re Marriage of Djulus, at pp. 1048–1049.)
Even if Father’s commissioner stipulation claims are meritorious, Father does not contend these issues implicate his due process rights, nor have we located any authority to support such a proposition. Raising “‘issues... involv[ing] the important constitutional and statutory rights’ ” alone does not justify relaxing the waiver rule. (In re Janee J., supra, 74Cal.App.4th at pp. 206, 208.)
In sum, we conclude Father has forfeited the commissioner stipulation issues but not his due process challenge based on inadequate notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Due Process Notice Issues
Father contends he was not given proper notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing because the Department did not send him written notice of the hearing and the juvenile court’s “oral” notice was “not explicit and clear” and did not advise Father of the nature of the hearing orof the consequences of a failure to appear for the hearing.
Reviewing the issue de novo (In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.183), we agree the notice was deficient in those respects. Notice of the jurisdiction hearing must be given to the parents and must include, among other things, the date, time, and place of the proceeding, a statement of the “nature of the hearing,” “including what will be decided therein,” and a statement that if the party “fail[s] to appear, the court may proceed without them.” (§291, subd. (d)(1)–(6); In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 746.) Here, Father was not represented by counsel until after the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The record does not reveal that the Department provided Father with notice of the hearing in compliance with section 291. At most, the record indicates the juvenile court may have provided Fathera copy of the minute order from the restraining order hearing, which noted only the date and time of the “Juris/Dispo” hearing. While the court concluded Father was properly served with the Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report, the record shows the report was mailed to the address that Father was ordered to move out of a few weeks earlier. Moreover, the “oral notice”at the April 2 and April 23 hearings was unclear as to whether a hearing had, in fact, been set for April 30, 2025, and did not disclosethe nature of the hearing or the consequences of a failure to appear. Thus,there is a strong possibility Father did not have actual notice of the date and time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Evenif Father was aware that a hearing was set for April 30, 2025, nothing in the record suggests he was aware of the nature of the hearing or of the consequences of a failure to appear.
We further agree that such defects amount to a violation of Father’s due process rights. In the dependency context, parents have a due process right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. (In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792,807.) “A parent’s fundamental right to adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard in dependency matters involving potential deprivation of the parental interest [citation] has little, if any, value unless the parent is advised of the nature of the hearing giving rise to that opportunity, including what will be decided therein. Only with adequate advisement can one choose to appear or not, to prepare or not, and to defend or not.” (In re Stacy T. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424.) Therefore, it is not sufficient to merely inform the parent of the date and time of a hearing; the parent has a due process right to be informed of the nature of the hearing so that the parent may make an informed decision whether to appear and contest the matter. (In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4that p. 751 [“a parent whose child may be found subject to the dependency jurisdiction of the court enjoys a due process right to be informed of the nature of the hearing,... in order that he or she may make an informed decision whether to appear and contest the allegations”]; In re Stacy T., at p. 1424.)
Indeed, thedefects in notice here were consequential. They deprived Father of the opportunity to make informed decisions as to whether to appear at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, to call, confront, and cross-examine witnesses, and to present his own evidence.(See In re Stacy T., supra, 52Cal.App.4th at p. 1424; In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 620 [“[d]ue process includes the right to be heard, adduce testimony from witnesses, and to cross-examine and confront witnesses”].)As a result, the juvenile court made jurisdictional findings and disposition orders based solely on the Department’s reports, leading to the court declaring the children dependents of the court, removing the children from Father, and denying Father reunification services.
Notwithstanding the defects in notice, the Department claims it made “reasonable efforts” to “confirm that [Father] received notice even when he kept refusing to cooperate.” We acknowledge the record indicates the Department attempted to contact Father by phone and while he was in jail after he was ordered to move out of the family home, and Fathereither did not respond or refused to speak to the social worker.The Department also noted during the restraining order hearing that it needed an updated mailing address for Father. But the Department did not press the issue after the court failed to address it.Nor does the record reveal any other efforts the Department took to provide Father with notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing or to ascertain his current whereabouts. Father’s refusal to communicate with the Department does not excuse the Department from its duty to act diligently to serve Father with notice of hearings. (See In re Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 309 [“‘[s]ocial services agencies... are bound by law to make every reasonable effort in attempting to inform parents of all hearings’ ”]; County of Orange v. Carl D. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 429, 439[“[t]he county has a constitutional responsibility to use due diligence to notify absent parents” of dependency hearings].)
Further, as Father notes, it does not appear from the record that the juvenile court complied with section 316.1, subdivision (a), which requires the court to advise parents that the mailing address they provide the court will be used “for notice purposes unless and until the parent... notifies the court or the social services agency of a new mailing address in writing.” (§316.1, subd. (a).) Thus, Father’s failure to provide the court with an updated mailing address after he was ordered to move out of the family home does not excuse the court “in mailing notice... to an address it knew was no longer good.” (In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1243; see id. at pp. 1240–1243 [mother had good cause excusing her failure to timely file a writ petition where court mailed notice to an address at which mother could not be reached and failed to inform mother of the importance of updating her mailing address].) As such, we agree with Father that notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing did not satisfy due process.
Finally, we conclude the defects in notice were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See In re Vanessa M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1132 [constitutional due process violations in dependency context require application of the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard].)
First, the record indicates that if Father had adequate notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, he would have appeared and testified as to the relevant factual allegations, presented his own evidence, and/or cross-examined Mother and the social worker who prepared the reports. (In re Stacy T., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426 [considering, in assessing prejudice, whether mother would have appeared and testified on her own behalf if she had notice that the settlement conference would “accelerate into the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings”]; §355, subd. (b)(2), (c)(1).) In his section 388 petition, Father denied the detention report’s factual allegations, “reserve[d] [his] full right to rebut all allegations,” and claimed his eldest child felt “safest, most loved and emotionally supported” with Father. He also attempted to file papers ahead of the restraining order hearing, contested the court’s jurisdiction at the hearing, and indicated that the social worker’s version of events regarding his alleged violation of the temporary restraining order was untrue.
Second, the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under subdivisions (b)(1) and (c) of section 300 was not conclusive. In fact, there appears to be littleevidence in the Department’s reports indicating Father presented “a substantial risk”of “serious physical harm or illness” to the children at the time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. (§300 subd. (b)(1), italics added; see In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 113 [concluding father’s violation of restraining order “did not demonstrate a risk of physical harm to the children justifying the assertion of jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of section 300”].) Moreover, no testimony was heard at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing nor was any evidence admitted, and the factual allegations in the reports were based on statements made by Mother, the social worker, and the children, as relayed by the social worker who prepared the reports.None of the reports contained any statements or evaluations from medical professionals indicating the children were suffering from “serious emotional damage” or were at risk of such.(§ 300, subd. (c).) Thus, had Father appeared and testified on his own behalf and/or cross-examined Mother and the social worker who prepared the reports, the jurisdictional findings would likely depend on the court’s credibility determinations. (See In re M.M. (2015) 236Cal.App.4th 955, 964 [“[t]he Department’s position ignores the vital role that live testimony plays in a court’s assessment of credibility and its evaluation of conflicting evidence”].)
Since we cannot speculate as to the substance and effect of the parties’ testimony, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defects in notice were harmless. (See In re Stacy T.,supra, 52 Cal.App.4that p. 1426; In re R.O. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 586, 593–594 [denial of contested jurisdiction hearing not harmless because “Mother could have provided the juvenile court with context concerning the allegations of the petition” and her current circumstances and “could have cross-examined the social worker on the contents of the jurisdiction report or offered other evidence”]; In re Vanessa M., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133 [concluding violation of father’s due process right to be heard was not harmless where father disputed the jurisdiction allegations; “it would be entirely speculative to decide that additional testimony from Father would not have been useful to the court in resolving the credibility disputes present”].)
In sum, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings must be reversed. Such reversal, in turn, necessitates reversal of the disposition orders. (See In re Jesus M., supra,235 Cal.App.4that p.114.) We note, however, that “[o]ur conclusion... does not mean the [Department] cannot try again. Indeed, it is entirely possible valid grounds exist for the state to assume jurisdiction over these children and indeed it may be in the children’s best interests for this to happen.” (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 392.) Moreover, the restraining order issued prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing remains in place, as the court was not required to make jurisdictional findings under section 300 before issuing a restraining order. (§213.5, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition orders are reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
BANKE, Acting P.J.

_________________________
SMILEY, J.

Sonoma County Human Services Department v. F.S. / A174004