P. v. Anderson CA1/2 filed 8/14/26

Filed 8/14/26 P. v. Anderson CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DONALD SHAWN ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

A174135

(Lake CountySuper. Ct.
No. CR971498)

Following jury and court trials, defendant Donald Shawn Anderson was found guilty of arson during a state of emergency,and found to have suffered five prior “strike” convictions for arson.Defendant filed a request to dismiss his prior strike convictions (Romero motion).The trial court denied the request and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison pursuant to the Three Strikes law.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying hisRomero motion. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Current Charges and Convictions
In an amended information, the Lake County District Attorney charged defendant with two counts of arson, allegingheunlawfully set fire to a structure and forest land located at Siegler Canyon Road in Lower Lake, California, on or about September 22, 2024 (Pen. Code,§ 451, subd. (c); count 1), and he unlawfully set fire to a structure and forest land located at New Long Valley Road in Clearlake Oaks, California, on or about October 2, 2024 (ibid.; count 2). For both counts, it was alleged that defendant committed the arson during, and within an area proclaimed by the Governor to be, a state of emergency pursuant to Government Code section 8625.(§ 454, subd. (a)(2).)
The district attorney alleged defendant had been convicted of five prior serious or violent felonies.(§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) Specifically, it was alleged that in 2004, defendant was convicted of five counts of arson of a structure or forest land (§ 451, subd. (c)) with the offenses committed on four separate dates in August and September 2003. The district attorney also alleged various circumstances in aggravation.
A jury trial began on April 30, 2025. On May 9, the jury informed the court it had reached a verdict on count 2 and was hopelessly deadlocked on count 1. The jury found defendant guilty of count 2 and found the special allegation true. The trial court declared a mistrial as to count 1 and subsequently dismissed the count on the prosecution’s motion.
Defendant elected to proceed by court trial on the allegations regarding prior strike convictions and aggravating circumstances. The trial court found defendant had five prior strike convictions for arson. The court also found true two circumstances in aggravation: defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), and defendant had served a prior prison term (id., rule 4.21(b)(3)).
Defendant’s Romero Motion
On June 2, 2025, defendant filed a “[r]equest that the court strike prior strikes which are over ten years old.”He requested that the court strike four of the five prior strike convictions, so that he would be sentenced as if he had one prior strike conviction, which would double the punishment. Defendant argued such “punishment is reasonable given the fact the prior conviction is over 20 years old.”He also argued, “This case turned on circumstantial evidence, and the Defendant believes that there was bias on the part of the investigators from CAL FIRE which led them to fit the evidence into their theory. The Defendant has not been involved in any other criminal cases for a significant time period.”
Probation Report
On June 9, 2025, the Probation Department submitted a presentence investigation report and recommendation (probation report). The probation report documented defendant’s criminal history, which included juvenile wardships for offenses including arson and battery;adult convictions of arson, burglary, and other offenses in 2004 that resulted in a sentence of 17 years, eight months in state prison;a burglary conviction in 2014 with a sentence of two years, eight months in state prison; and an attempted theft conviction in 2016 with a sentence of two years in state prison. Defendant was 41 years old;he reported using illicit substances in his early teenage years, and he reported prior to his incarceration that he had been using methamphetamine daily for approximately one year; he lived with his girlfriend of 21 years.
The Probation Department recommended that defendant be sentenced to 25 years to life in prison pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A) of the Three Strike law.
Sentencing Hearing and Court Ruling
At sentencing on August 4, 2025, the trial court stated it had reviewed defendant’s Romeromotion and the probation report. The prosecutor opposed the Romero motion, arguing it would not be in the interests of justice to dismiss any of the strike offenses, “given the amount of time he’s spent incarcerated and now picking up effectively the same offense as hishistory would reflect.”
The trial court confirmed with defense counsel that defendant was in custody from 2004 to 2014 and noted that, “soon after being released, he committed another second-degree burglary” and returned to prison, “[a]nd then he committed another offense or offenses” and “was convicted of those charges in April of 2016 and sentenced to serve two years in state prison.”Defense counsel acknowledged defendant’s current offense was “of the same variety” as his prior strike convictions, but stated, “he has been law abiding and has not committed any other offenses within ten years.”
The trial court observed thatafter defendant was convicted of the five strike offenses in 2004, he spent more than half of the intervening years in state prison. The court continued: “And although he has not committed an offense in an eight-year period after being released from prison, and it may be less than eight years, but during that period of time after 2016 to 2024, that is not such a lengthy period of time that the Court can find that this defendant is outside the spirit of the three-strikes law. For that reason, the Romero motion is denied.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison.
DISCUSSION
A.Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The Three Strikes law “establishes a sentencing norm”; “it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).) A trial court may dismiss a prior strike felony conviction under the Three Strikes law on its own motion “in furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.)
In ruling on a Romero motion, a trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [Three Strike law’s sentencing] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).)
“[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, ‘the sentencing norms [established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce [] an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular case. [Citation.]
“But ‘[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations. [Citation.] Where the record is silent [citation] or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance’ [citation]. Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack’ [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
“[A]lthough a trial court is required to state on the record its reasons for striking a prior conviction (§1385, subd. (a)), there is no similar statutory requirement of an on-the-record statement of reasons when a court declines to strike a prior.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560.) In “the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary,” we presume the trial court considered the relevant factors in ruling on a Romero motion. (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).)
B.Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion “without considering all the relevant factors.” (Bolding and capitalization omitted.) He argues the court “failed to consider the state’s interest in maintaining [him] in prison until the age of 67, when the same punitive purpose could have been served by imposing a Two-Strike sentence of 14 years.” He also accuses the trial court of ignoring facts in the probation report, such as that he was in a stable, long-term relationship and had a supportive family life, and disregarding the remoteness of his prior strike offenses and his eight years of crime-free living.
Defendant’s arguments fail to show the trial court abused its discretion. We presume the court considered the relevant factors unless the record affirmatively demonstrates misunderstanding. (Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.) The mere fact that the court discussed certain factors “does not mean that it considered only” those factors. (Ibid.) Defendant fails to point to anything in the record affirmatively demonstrating the trial court misunderstood the law. (See People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988 [to establish abuse of discretion in sentencing, the appellant “ ‘must “affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion” ’ ”].)
Here, the trial court properly considered whether “this defendant is outside the spirit of the three-strikes law” and found that he is not. For a trial court to dismiss a strike conviction under section 1385, it must find extraordinary circumstances; for a reviewing court to find that no reasonable person “could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme[, those circumstances] must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) We cannot say defendant’s circumstances are “even more extraordinary” (ibid.) such thatfourof his five prior strike convictions of arsonmust be dismissed as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.