In re L.R. CA1/2 filed 6/30/26

Filed 6/30/26 In re L.R. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.R., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

NAPA COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.

A175558

(Napa County Super. Ct. No. 24JD000016)

In June 2024, appellant K.H. (mother)’s then two-year-old daughter, L.R., was removed from her care due to her issues with substance abuse. Mother subsequently entered a residential treatment program, and the Napa County Health and Human Services Department (department) recommended that mother’s reunification services be continued to the 12-month review. Shortly after leaving her treatment program, mother relapsed, was taken into custody on criminal charges, and her reunification services were terminated. Mother again entered the same treatment program, and then filed a petition alleging a change in circumstances. After a hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, and shortly thereafter terminated mother’s parental rights and selected adoption as L.R.’s permanent plan. Mother argues that denial of her petition was error, that the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial relationship exception to adoption did not apply, and that the department’s inquiry into L.R.’s possible Native American ancestry was inadequate. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Initial Petition
On June 10, 2024, the department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Codesection 300, subdivision (b)(1) with respect to then two-year-old L.R. The petition alleged that mother “has untreated mental illness, demonstrating disorganized,paranoid, and illogical thought processes and violent fits of rage within her home which impairs herability” to care for L.R.; that she had a “documented history of untreated substance abuse issues, including the abuse ofheroin and methamphetamine during her pregnancy and after she delivered [L.R.]”; that she “leaves [L.R.] alone inside the home while [she] goes outside to smoke marijuana”; and that “the father, [J.R.], knew or reasonably should have known that the mother has untreatedmental illness and or substance abuse, as he stated on 6/07/2024 that he has been concerned about themother’s mental stability and suspected the mother of abusing substances for at least two months, basedon her paranoia, accusing him of putting cameras in the home, hearing strange men in the home, andoverall secretiveness.”
The petition was prompted by a referral made on May 16. And according to the detention report filed June 11, law enforcement received a call on May 16 “reporting that the mother was in the apartment yelling,breaking the blinds, with [L.R.] in the apartment,” and the caller believed“mother was under the influence and...on drugs.” When law enforcement arrived, mother “stated that she knew somebody would call, and that she was trying to kill a bunch of flies that had gotten into herapartment.”
On May 19, law enforcement received another call “reporting that the mother wasthrowing things off her patio in a ‘fit,’ that she had erratic behavior, and that the caller believed themother was in a ‘drug induced psychosis.’ The caller stated that the mother was banging on the walland yelling, opening the door and yelling outside as well. When law enforcement arrived, the motherreported being upset over a relationship issue she refused to disclose. [L.R.] was sleeping at thistime. The mother was assisted with finding her vehicle which had been towed and she was upset aboutit.”
According to the June 11 detention report, a social worker met with mother on May 29, and “[d]uring this interaction, [she] appeared to have disorganized and paranoid thoughts and delusions, and made contradictorystatements.” When asked whether she used substances, mother answered “‘not often,’” and when asked whether she used“‘meth, heroin, and cocaine,’”she responded, “‘onlyrecreationally,’ when she was out with friends,” and stated “she does not have any drugs in the home.” When “asked again, at a later time,” ifshe“used anything such as cocaine, or meth, [mother] stated ‘not in a long time,’ and [that] she tries not to use anything.[She]...later stated she only uses marijuana, including edibles, smoking outsidewhile [L.R.] is inside, and putting CBD lotion on. The mother denied using any other substances.”
L.R.’s Removal
On June 6, the juvenile court issued a protective custody warrant pursuant to section 340, and that same day L.R. was placed in a resource home.
Mother was not present at the detention hearing held on June 11. At that hearing, the juvenile court appointed counsel for mother, ordered L.R. detained, and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing for July 2.
The jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was ultimately held on July 25, with mother again absent. The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true,ordered L.R. removed from mother’s care, and ordered reunification services for both parents. The court authorized supervised visitation at a “minimum of three hours per week.”That same day, mother was by arrested by the Napa Police Department on various charges, including burglary and taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and subsequently spent 19 days in jail.
On September 20, mother was arrested by Napa policeonvarious charges.And on December 17, she pleaded nocontest to receiving stolen property(Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), resisting a peace officer(Pen. Code, §148, subd. (a)(1)), and burglary (Pen. Code, §459).
The Six-Month Review Hearing
Mother remained in custody until January 23, 2025, the date set for the six-month review hearing, which hearing she attended via Zoom. Mother’s counsel indicated that mother had been released from custody and would be entering the Archway inpatient residential substance abuse treatment program in Napa County. The department had recommended that reunification services be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set. Mother’s counsel indicated that she wanted a contested hearing, which the juvenile court set for February 27. That same day, mother entered the Archway program, with an expected graduation date by “mid-March 2025.”
On February 26, the department filed an addendum report, indicating that since being at Archway, mother “has engaged in NA/AA meetings and has engaged with her counselor to set goalstowards her recovery and sobriety,” “attended visits with [L.R.] and has demonstrated the ability to be attentive to [L.R.]’s needs,” and “demonstrates eagerness and commitment towards achieving her case plan goals and reunifying with [L.R.].” Accordingly, the department recommended that mother receive family reunification services for another six months. At the hearing on February 27, the juvenile court followed the department’s recommendation, continued reunification services, and set a 12-month review hearing for August 12. The court also advised mother that if L.R. was not returned to her care at the 12-month hearing, a section 366.26 hearing and loss of her parental rights might result, so “this next phase that you’re in right now is, asyou know, hugely important.So just keep it up, keep workingyour case plan, and we’ll see you back here at the nexthearing date.”
On March 24, mother graduated fromthe Archway program, and was referred to Alcohol and Drug Services(ADS) in Napa County. She completed an assessment on April 3 and a treatment planning session on April 9, but did not attend her scheduled individual or group therapy sessions on April 15. On April 8, mother admitted to using methamphetamine, and a random urinalysis test was administered which subsequently came back positive. On May 2, mother was “discharged from ADS outpatient treatment due to violating hercontract, admitting to ‘a couple of relapses’ and no show on any of her scheduled UA tests andsessions.” She “was referred to residential treatment,” but refused to attend.
During the period between March 26 and May 22, mother attended 8 of 17 scheduled visits with L.R.
The Department’s Section 388 Petition
On May 23, the department filed a section 388 petition, requesting that the court terminate mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing, arguing in the accompanying report that mother’s “history of substance abuse, her approximate three months of sobriety while incarcerated andtwo months in Archway highlights her struggles to maintain sobriety outside of a controlled setting,” and that L.R.’s “requirements for permanency, stability, and safety must be prioritized.”The juvenile court ordered a hearing on whether to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing on the petition for May 27.
On May 24, mother was charged with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§459, 460, subd. (a)), grand theft (Pen. Code, §487, subd. (a)), and second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §459, 460, subd. (b)), and incarcerated in Napa County at some point in June.
On July 15, a hearing was held on the department’s section 388 petition. After mother’s counsel indicated she wished to object and submit on the petition, the juvenile court granted it, terminated mother’s reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing for November 6.
Mother was in custody in Napa County until September, when she was briefly granted mental health diversion, found out of compliance with it, and then remanded back into custody. And on October 31, mother was again admitted to the Archway program, with an expected graduation date of January 30, 2026.
Mother’s Section 388 Petition
On December 5, mother filed a section 388 petition, requesting that the juvenile court reinstate reunification services, “pause or cancel” the section 366.26 hearing, and order a bonding study. In support, the petition stated that mother had been released from jail, was in compliance with court-supervised mental health diversion, was taking parenting classes, was “scheduled for an assessment to determine further aftercare for her recovery from alcohol,” and was “in the process of obtaining stable employment and housing.”She addedthat she had “maintained visitation with the child,”“includ[ing] having a picnic with her recently in which the child stillrecognizes the mother and child relationship, calling her mommy and hugging her.” Her petition attached a short declaration, including photos that “reflect our family life, our bond, and the lovingenvironment I strive to maintain.”
At a brief hearing on December 9, the juvenile court found that mother had established a prima facie case and set an evidentiary hearing on the petition for January 8, 2026.
The Hearing on Mother’s Petition
The hearing on mother’s section 388 petition took place as scheduled on January 8, 2026. Mother was the only witness in support of her petition, and the department’s only witness was Madison Abrojena, the social worker who wrote the department’s section 366.26 report.
Mother testified that she had enrolled in the Archway program on October 31, 2025, and would graduate on January 30. At the time, she had been sober from all substances for 110 days. She had recently become engaged, and after her graduation, she planned to move in with her fiancé and his parents, where she and her children had lived before. No one in the house used illegal substances, but her “boyfriend’s father . . . has a beer or two after work,” which she did not think would affect her ability to maintain her sobriety because she had not had a drink in “many, many years” and alcohol was not her “drug of choice.” She had shared custody of her 11-year old son and so “he’ll be coming home, and I’m hoping my daughter gets to come home as well.”
While at Archway, mother had been attending outside meetings with Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous, therapy, and been “been attending medicine management, andworking on coping skills, emotional regulation, andhealthier patterns.” She planned to continue these programs after graduation. She was not yet “working the steps in AA,” but planned to and was looking for a sponsor.
Mother also testified to the relationship between her children, that her son was “really happy” and “ec[s]tatic to have a little sister,” and that they “got along very well.”
During the “11 months . . . 14 months if you include Archway” that she had been incarcerated, mother would visit with L.R. twice a week on a “consistent basis,” although “due to the court proceedings” she had only been able to visit with her “once a month for the past three months.”
As to the circumstances that led to L.R.’s removal, mother testified that she “lived in a low income apartment complex, and . . . befriended the neighbors, which they were, I guess, not the best people to befriend. And I would have a lot of traffic in and out of my house.” When asked why her daughter was removed from her custody on cross-examination, she elaborated that “I was cleaning the house oneday, and the baby was sleeping, and I didn’t want to goall the way to the garbage can, and so I had a bottle,like of recycling of water bottles, and I guess therewas one glass in there. And I threw it over the balconyand it broke . . .[s]o I guessthat was considered erratic behavior.”
When asked what had changed since her daughter had been removed, mother answered that she was “no longer incarcerated”; her “mental health is much better than it was before”; she was “no longer using” and “in recovery”; and had learned coping skills, in order to “work through my recovery, and work throughthose unhealthy traumas to make me a better person, andultimately be a better parent to my kids.”
Madison Abrojena, a child protective services worker assigned to the case in October 2025, and the author of the section 366.26 report, testified that although she had not personally observed mother’s visits with L.R., from the reports she had read and conversations she had had about them, “[i]n general the visits are overall positive,” but “it seems...[L.R.] is...enjoying thetime with a friend, or an aunt. It’s not a caregiverrelationship.”
Abrojena did “monthly visits at the [resource] family home.And within these visits [L.R.] is actively trying to,engaging with the resource parent, calling her mommy,asking for attention, showing her artwork, showing hertoys, asking permission to do things within [the] house. Andshe feels...very comfortable there.”
When asked, “If you wanted to provide more reunificationservices, would you do that?,” Abrojena answered that the department was, by statute, “not able to provide more reunificationservices” because mother “has received 12 months of reunificationservices, and [L.R.] was two years old when she wasremoved.”
In Abrojena’s opinion, mother was not in a position to receive family maintenance services because although she “has been able todemonstrate sobriety within the construct of structuredsystems . . . like incarceration[] or residentialtreatment, her patterns of behavior show that when sheis outside those systems she is not able to maintainsobriety and stability for herself or her child.” She also opined that it would be detrimental to remove L.R. from her resource parents because she was “very attached” to them, and “without the mom showingthe real ability to keep her safe, we would be worriedthat she would, not only on be harmed or something wouldhappen to her in her mother’s care, but there would bean attachment disruption due to removing her from hercurrent caregivers.”
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
After the department’s counsel argued in favor of denying the petition and L.R.’s counsel agreed with that recommendation, and after a brief recess, the juvenile court denied the petition:
“The evidence establishes that [L.R.] was removed from Mother’s care in June of2024, and has remained continuously placed with thecurrent resource parents since that time. The Courtnotes that these caregivers were designated de factoparents as of September 19, 2025, and that the Child hasa substantial and secure bond with them. Refers to...them as mommy and daddy. And is comfortable and stablein their home.
“Social worker credibly testified thatremoval from this placement would constitute asubstantial attachment disruption for the child. TheCourt acknowledges and commends the Mother for hersignificant strides that she has made in her recovery;however, the evidence reflects that the Mother wasoffered and received the maximum 12 months of familyreunification services, which were terminated back inJuly of 2025 after her relapse and new criminal conduct.
“The Mother’s sobriety and engagement intreatment are recent and have occurred in highlystructured setting following prolonged incarceration.And therefore the Court finds that the Mother’scircumstances, while commendable, and I continue toencourage the Mother to continue in her recoveryefforts. They are changing, but not changed. And evenassuming a change in circumstances, the Court finds thatthe Mother has not met her burden to show that grantingadditional services, or notably delaying permanencywould be in the best interest of the Child. The Child’sneed for stability and permanency at this stageoutweighs the speculative benefit for furtherreunification at this point. [¶] Accordingly, the Section 388 Petition isdenied.”
The Section 366.26 Hearing
On January 13, the contested section 366.26 hearing was held, at which mother’s counsel argued in favor of guardianship as a permanent plan “based on the evidence that was presented at the hearing last week,” and that mother “has maintained visitation with [L.R.], she has abeneficial relationship with that child, the child hassiblings that it has a connection with and a heritage that . . . the mother canprovide that the foster family cannot.” Counsel for the department and L.R.’s counsel both opposed the request, arguing that the law favors adoption because it is more permanent.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincingevidence that L.R. was likely to be adopted, and: “The Court has considered whether any exceptionapplies under Section 366.26, and the Court finds that noexception has been established.” The court then terminated mother’s parental rights with respect to L.R.
Mother filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying
Mother’s Section 388 Petition
Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 388 authorizes the parent of a child who is a dependent of the juvenile court to petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a previous order. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) The petitioning party has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests. (§388; In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120 (N.F.); In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 (Mickel O.).) A petitioner under section 388 “must show changed, not changing, circumstances.” (Mickel O., supra, p. 615.)
In determining whether a parent has made the necessary showing under section 388, “the juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case,” including “factors such as the seriousness of the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner.” (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530.) “In assessing the best interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.’” (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)
We review the denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s ruling unless it is “clearly established” that “‘“the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’” (Ibid.; see In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718, 728 [A juvenile court “‘abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or its factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence’”].)
Mother Failed to Demonstrate Changed Circumstances
With respect to the first showing required by section 388—changed, not changing circumstances—mother’s brief acknowledges that the problem that led to the instant dependency was her substance abuse. She then relies almost entirely on positive statements in the department’s February 27, 2025,addendum report recommending that reunification services be continued to the 12-month review, including for example that she “has been actively engaging withNA/AA meetings and has not missed a meeting since attending Archway,” that her counselor at Archway had “seenprogress in [mother’s] commitment to her sobriety,” and that “she [was] determined andcommitted to reunify with [L.R.]”
All of this evidence, however, describes the state of affairs in February of 2025, not the situation in January of 2026, when the hearing on mother’s section 388 petition took place. By that time, the court had before it evidence that mother had relapsed in early April 2025, shortly after graduating from Archway; had been inconsistent in her visitation with L.R. over the following months; and had committed new criminal offenses and been returned to custody in June, and then again to the Archway program at the end of October. As the social worker testified—and as the juvenile court found—over the course of the approximately 19 months that the dependency had then been ongoing, mother failed to demonstrate consistent sobriety outside the “construct of structuredsystems...like incarceration[] or residentialtreatment.” Except for an oblique reference to her “short relapse in April of 2025,” mother’s brief does not grapple with this subsequent history, which provides substantial evidence in support of the juvenile court’s conclusion that mother’s circumstances were “changing,” not “changed.”(Mickel O., supra, p. 615.)
Furthermore, “[i]n the context of a substance abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted treatment in the past, a showing of materially changed circumstances requires more than a relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet another program.” (N.F.,supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 120–121.)Given mother’s history of relapse, her 110 days of sobriety was “relatively brief” enough to support a finding that her circumstances had not yet changed. (See, e.g., N.F.,supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 121–122 [mother’s 90-day period of sobriety while in treatment program not changed circumstances given her history of relapse]; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [“recent efforts at rehabilitation [that] were only three months old” did not demonstrate changed circumstances]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423–424 [where father’s “periods of sobriety alternated with recurring drug use.. .200 days was not enough to reassure the juvenile court that the most recent relapse would be his last”]; In re Kimberly F.,supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, fn. 9 [“It is the nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform”].) Mother has failed to demonstrate error in the juvenile court’s denial of her section 388 petition.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Declining to Apply the
Beneficial Relationship Exception
“The beneficial relationship test is an exception to the presumptive rule of terminating parental rights after reunification efforts have failed, in order to free a child for adoption.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067.) To establish that the exception applies, a parent must demonstrate three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent”; and (3) “that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).) If the juvenile court concludes that the beneficial relationship exception does not apply, it is not required to recite specific findings as to “any or all of the three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the first two elements for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We review its ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing its factual determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion.” (In reEli B., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied determination that mother had not established the first Caden C. factor, “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) According to the department’s December 9, 2025section 366.26 report—and as mother admits—she “attended a total of 55 visits during the 15 months of the dependency . . . which is less than 50% of the twice weekly visitsoffered . . . during the reunification period.”Moreover, as the department observed, mother was consistent with visitation only during periods of incarceration or residential substance abuse treatment—when outside the structure of these environments, mother’s visitation was sporadic and inconsistent. And this is simply not enough to establish Caden C.’s first prong. (See, e.g.,In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [finding regular visitation requirement not satisfied where there were “periods of time when [mother] failed to regularly visit [the minor], particularly during Mother’s relapses”]; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554 [“Sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the parent-child relationship exception to adoption”]; In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [“significant lapses” in visitation “fatally undermine[s] any attempt to finding beneficial relationship exception”].)
Given mother’s failure to establish Caden C.’s first prong, the juvenile court’s conclusion that the beneficial relationship exception was not in error. (SeeIn re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 322, fn. 10 [“[A] parent must prove all three components of the beneficial relationship exception. A failure of proof on any one of them is fatal”].)
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding the
Department’s ICWA Inquiry Adequate
ICWA, Cal-ICWA, and the Duty of Inquiry
The Indian ChildWelfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and the California Indian ChildWelfare Act (Cal-ICWA)(§ 224 et seq.) “are intended to protect Native Americanheritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of NativeAmerican ancestry, the best interests of Indian children, and the stabilityand security of Indian tribes and families.” (In re Dezi C.(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125 (Dezi C.).) Under these laws, “courts and child welfare agencies are chargedwith ‘an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child...is ormay be an Indian child’ in dependency cases.” (Ibid., quoting § 224.2,subd. (a).) “An ‘Indian child’ is defined as ‘any unmarried person who isunder age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) iseligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of amember of an Indian tribe.’ (25 U.S.C. §1903(4).)” (Dezi C., at p. 1129.)When ICWA applies, “ ‘the Indian child’s tribe shall have a right to intervene’” in a dependency proceeding “involving the removal of an Indian child fromtheir family.” (Dezi C., at p. 1129.)
“ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to follow beforeremoving Indian children from their families and placing them in foster careor adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (D.S.).)Section 224.2 subjects California agencies and courts to an expanded versionof the federal duty of inquiry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1131.) In particular, “section 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA independency proceedings.” (D.S., at p. 1052.) After a child welfare agency’sinitial contact with the minor and his or her family, “the statute imposes aduty of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be anIndian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if that initial inquiry creates‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall makefurther inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shallmake that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id., subd. (e), italics added.)Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to know the child is anIndian child, then the formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply.”(D.S., at p. 1052.)
The department’s initial ICWA inquiry “includes, but isnot limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and theparty reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, anIndian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian isdomiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) For these purposes, Cal-ICWAincorporates ICWA’s definition of an “extended family member” as a“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);§ 224.1, subd. (c)(1).) The initial inquiry mandated bysection 224.2, subdivision (b) “ ‘does not require the agency to “find” unknownrelatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to makereasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who arereasonably available to help the agency with its investigation into whetherthe child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’ ” (Dezi C.,supra, atp. 1140.)
Standard of Review
“We generally review the juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWAdoes not apply for substantial evidence.” (In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th793, 800.) In Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th 1112, ourSupreme Court declined to decide the “standard of review” applicable to ajuvenile court’s finding that “ICWA does not apply,” but explained that “thejuvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’[citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141; seeIn re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101 [“‘On a well-developed record,the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’sinquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of thecase’ ”].)
The Department’s ICWA Inquiry
According to the department’s July 25, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report, on May 29, a social worker “asked the mother if she had any Native American Indian ancestry or heritage. The mother said yes, her paternal grandparents were ‘full-blooded natives.’ When asked what tribe, the mother stated she does notknow, potentially Aztec Tribe.” After giving the name and approximate dates for the birth and death of the “maternal grandfather,” mother “stated not knowing if the ancestry was through his mother...or his father...[who] both passed away in Lindsay, CA, but their DOB, location of birth, and DOD is unknown. The mother stated she has all of this information somewhere in storage.”
On June 7, the social worker “asked the father if he had any Native American Indian ancestry or heritage,” and he “stated he does not, but his maternal great-uncle...may know” of such ancestry. Father stated that his maternal great-uncle “is from Mexico, and he does not know if the ancestry would be from Mexico or from the USA, or what tribe, if any. The father stated the paternal grandmother...may know more information, and provided her phone number.”
On June 26, the “paternal grandparents...denied...having any Native American ancestry,” and the report indicates that the social worker had “not been able to conduct further ICWA inquiry with the parents” since the detention hearing “due to neither of them making themselves available to meet” with the social worker, going on to conclude that “ICWA does not apply at this time.”
At the July 25jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply.
According to the January 9, 2025 status review report, on June 28, 2024, the social worker spoke with L.R.’s paternal aunt and uncle, who “denied having Native American ancestry.”
On October 11, the social worker again spoke with mother, who “made statements about being raised with ‘natives,’”but “provided no further context about her comments.” On October 30, the social worker “followed up with [mother]about her statements,” and mother “declined to have any information about Native American ancestry and stated, ‘I don’t know yet, I would have to look further into it.’”
On November 15, the social worker spoke with a paternal aunt, Sonia R., who “reported that she is not aware of any native or American Indian ancestry andthat there are no known stories of the family being of native ancestry. The paternal aunt reported not knowing any family that has lived on a reservation and did not know of any family that had any tribal memberships.” On November 19, “a Child and Family Team Meeting was held for [L.R],” at which the paternal grandparents and paternal aunt Sonia R. were present. When “asked...about Native Ancestry...all the paternal relatives stated that they were from Mexico. They reported that they are unaware of any native ancestry in their family.”
On March 16, 2025, a social worker again asked mother “about any Native Ancestry.”This time, mother “reported that she has no ICWA ancestral heritage and does not know any family members whomight have information regarding this. Therefore, ICWA does not apply at this time.”
Mother Has Not Demonstrated Error With Respect to the
Department’s ICWA Inquiry
In arguing that the department’s ICWA inquiry was inadequate, mother relies entirely on two pages of the July 25, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition report, where the department listed various relatives considered for placement, including Blaze R., a maternal cousin; Emee R., a maternal aunt;Marcos R.,a paternal half-sibling; Gabriel R. and Adan J., paternal great cousins; and Esteban S., apaternal stepuncle. She asserts that the department “had the names and contact information” for these relatives, but that “in all of its communication [with them], the Department never inquired about ICWA.”
With respect to Marcos R., Gabriel R., and Esteban S., the department’s report indicates that “oral notification” was “attempted” on June 28, 2024, but there was “no response.” With respect to Marcos R. and Gabriel R., the report indicates there was no “[w]ritten notification” because the department had “no contact info,” although written notification to Esteban S. was apparently completed on July 22, 2024.We cannot agree with mother that there was any errorin the juvenile court’s ICWA findings based on the department’s failure to make inquiry of extended family members with whom the department tried unsuccessfully to speak, or had no contact information.(See In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082 [“we cannot ask the agency to...to interview individuals for whom no contact information has been provided”]; In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 [“[r]equiring the Department to track down information about extended family members beyond that offered by participants in the proceedings would impose an undue burden on the Departmentand necessarily reduce the resources it has to otherwise protect the welfare of dependent children”].)
The department apparently did speak with Adan J., a paternal great cousin, as the report indicates that he was “[i]nterested in ongoing contact” with L.R., but not “in providing placement.” And it likewise was in contact with Emee R., a maternal auntand Blaze R., a maternal cousin—indeed, the record indicates that the department considered placing L.R. with Emee R. and held an in-person meeting with her and her children so that she could meet L.R. And the record does not indicate that the department asked any of Adan J., Blaze R., or Emee R. about possible Native American ancestry. But under these circumstances, we cannot agree that the department’s apparent failure to do so requires reversal and remand. (See In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 385 [finding ICWA investigation “reasonably thorough” despite failure to consult with four extended family members]; In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140 [reversal not required “in all cases in which every possible extended family member has not been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry”].)
Mother was repeatedly asked about Native American ancestry, and she never provided any elaboration or documentation regarding her initial claim that her paternal grandparents were “‘full-blooded natives’”—nor has she done so on appeal. The final and most recent time she was asked, she denied having any “ICWA ancestral heritage” and stated that she “does not know any family members whomight have information regarding this.” (See In re Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083, [no abuse of discretion in concluding ICWA did not apply where father initially stated “that he might have Cherokee ancestry, [but] later disavowed this statement”].) The department asked numerous of L.R.’s relatives about ICWA, and mother’s initial claim was the only evidence the department uncovered suggesting that L.R. had any Native American ancestry. On this record, we conclude that the juvenile court’s “broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent” was not abused. (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1101.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s ordersare affirmed.

RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P.J.

MILLER, J.

(A175558N)