M.A. v. Superior Court CA1/3 filed 8/19/26

Filed 8/19/26 M.A. v. Superior Court CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

M.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Respondent;
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest.

A176781

(San Francisco City and County
Super. Ct. No. JD-26-3062)

M.A. (Mother) seeks extraordinary relief from a juvenile court order bypassing reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her infant son, A.R. Mother contendssubstantial evidence meeting the clear and convincing standard of proof did not support the court’s finding that she failed to make a reasonable effortto address the substance abuse problem that led to this and two prior dependency cases involving A.R.’s siblings. Mother further argues the court abused its discretion in concluding she did not demonstrate that reunification services would be in A.R.’s best interest. We deny the petition on the merits.
Factual and Procedural Background
Prior Dependency Proceedings
Mother and W.R. (Father), presumed father of A.R., have two older children, both of whom were previously removed from theircare. In August 2020, E.R. was born testing positive for opiates, and Motheradmitted to using fentanyl and benzodiazepines just before E.R.’s birth. The parents failed to reunify with E.R., and their parental rights were terminated in February 2022.
Three months later in May 2022, M.R. was born testing positive for fentanyl and methadone. During her pregnancy with M.R., Mother tested positive for amphetamines and admitted using fentanyl. Reunification services were terminated in June 2023, and parental rights as to M.R. were terminated in October 2023.
Meanwhile, A.R. was born in August 2024 with opiates in his system. He was detained in November 2024, and Mother entered inpatient treatment. In January 2025, A.R. was returned to Mother’s care with family maintenance services. In January 2026, the case was dismissed with full legal and physical custody of A.R. to Mother.Mother later graduated from family treatment court in March 2026.
Petition and Detention
Unless otherwise indicated, the events described from this point on took place in 2026.
On April 1, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of then-19-month-old A.R.,alleging the minor was at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness due to his parents’ domestic violence (count B-1), Mother’s substance abuse (count B-2) and mental health issues (countB-3), Father’s substance abuse (count B-4), and the parents’ refusal to make themselves and A.R. available for assessment (count B-5). The petition further alleged that the parents had previously lost custody and parental rights over their two older childrendue to neglect and substance abuse.
In its detention report, the Agency described multiple incidents in February and March in which neighbors reported hearingthe parents yelling, items banging and crashing, and a baby crying in Mother’s apartment. Nia Orta, the coordinator at Mother’s housing program, visited Mother’s unit several times and heard Father yelling and accusing Mother of using methamphetamines. Mother did not permit a social worker and housing program staff into the apartment, and “there was concern that the mother was under the influence.” During one visit by the social worker in March, Father answered the door and appeared to be under the influence. He did not admit the social worker to the apartment and claimed the sounds of a baby cryingwere coming from the television. In late March, the social worker attempted a wellness check with police, but no one answered the door. (CT21)~
A.R. was ordered detained on April 3, and a removal warrant was executed the following day.
Jurisdiction
The Agency filed its jurisdiction report in April. Protective services worker (PSW) Ja’Raya Martin spoke with Orta, who reported that Father was present in the unit with Mother and A.R. during each of Orta’s weekly checks in February; that he often appeared under the influence; and that during an argument, he accused Mother of using drugs around their son. Mother denied that she was in a relationship with Father and that he lived in the unit, but she later acknowledged he came to the apartment often, kept his belongings there, and was named on the lease.
On April 6, PSW Martin submitted a drug test referral for Mother and asked her to test as soon as possible. As of the date of the jurisdiction report (April 17), the Agency had not received any test results.
A contested jurisdiction hearing was held on April 23. The detention and jurisdiction reports were admitted without objection, and the juvenile court took judicial notice of “the entire case file” from the prior dependency proceeding regarding A.R. PSW Sashell Yates testified as to her March visit to Mother’s apartment during which Father appeared intoxicated and refused to allow her in.
PSW Martin testified that she believed Father had a substance abuse problem and was living with Mother, and that there was domestic violence between them. Martin was “not 100 percent sure” whether Mother had a substance abuse problem at the time of the hearing because Martin had not received any test results. Martin confirmed she had received one “no-show” notification regarding Mother from the drug testing site, dated April 22. When asked about visitation, Martin testified that Mother “only had one ... visit due to Mom’s phone number ... being switched and changed, and because of that the agency was not able to contact Mom to set up visits.” Martin said Mother was on a waiting list to receive more visits, and the Agency was working with a visitation center to schedule them.
After argument, the juvenile court sustained an amended petition and took jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), finding the allegations of domestic violence and the parents’ substance abuse to be true. The court set a contested disposition hearing for June 3. The court then heard from the parties regarding visitation.
PSW Martin explained the Agency was not able to facilitate regular visitation through normal channels because the visitation centers “only offer visits to parents who have first-time cases,” and this was not Mother’s first dependency case. Martin reported the Agency was committed to providing Mother with a minimum of six hours per week of supervised visits. Mother’s counsel argued it was “unacceptable” for the Agency to say “‘We are working on it. We don’t know how we are going to do it, but we are working on it.’” The court found the Agency had not deliberately failed to offer visits and was not “at fault for not providing a certain number of visits given the unique circumstances of this case.” The court ordered that both parents receive a minimum six hours per week of supervised visitation, with Father’s visitation rights conditioned on him presenting himself to the Agency for assessment.
Disposition
In the Agency’s May disposition report, PSW Martin reported she had been unable to meet with Mother despite six attemptsin April and May. According to Martin, Mother “provided limited responses and has not answered calls or met in person to provide additional information.” Martin was also unable to obtain updated information from Mother about her housing, parenting skills, social support system, physical and mental health, current substance abuse, or domestic violence. Martin reminded Mother on April 16, 20, and 24 about the pending drug test referral, but Mother had not completed a test as of the report date.
Regarding visitation, Martin reported the Agency had originally set up visits at Alternative Family Services (AFS) in San Francisco on Tuesdays and Thursdays for three hours each day, but Mother missed her visits on April 28 and 30. She was on a waitlist for East Bay Seneca Visitation Center. A.R. had been moved to a placement with his paternal great aunt, who had previously adopted A.R.’s older brother, M.R., and “expressed a strong desire to adopt” A.R. as well. The great aunt reportedly “maintained a comfortable environment for the minor and is able to meet his overall needs. In addition, the minor has been growing and thriving in this home.”
At an interim hearing on May 14, Mother’s counsel reported that Mother had drug tested on May 8 and 12, and the results were pending. Father appeared at the hearing and stated his intention to test the following day.
In late May, the Agency filed an addendum report indicating that Mother’s May 8 and 12 tests were “Confirmed Positive” for fentanyl. The toxicologist opined that although the second sample was more dilute, the levels were “consistent with active fentanyl use occurring during the days between the two tests.” And while a subsequent May 18 test returned negative, the toxicologist explained the sample had been collected six days after the May 12 test, by which time fentanyl was no longer detectable. In a May 19 phone call with PSW Martin, Mother claimed the test results were false positives and blamed the test service, Accurate C&S Services (Accurate), for the inaccurate results. Father tested positive for fentanyl on May 18.
Regarding visitation, Martin reported that Mother was offered virtual visitation facilitated by the great aunt. Mother attended one virtual visit on May 12, but had not participated since. The Agency was still attempting to arrange in-person visitation.
The contested disposition hearing was held on June 3. PSW Martin testified that the Agency recommended denial of reunification services to both parents and out-of-home placement for A.R. Martin had had no in-person contact with Father because he missed a scheduled appointment. Martin believed Father was not in a substance abuse treatment program even though he told her he would enter one. As to Mother, Martin testified she was not enrolled in a substance abuse program as of the hearing, even though Mother said she would enter Women’s HOPE on June 1. Martin explained that parents must enroll themselves into a residential treatment program. To that end, Martin had contacted Women’s HOPE, confirmed a bed was available, and encouraged Mother to enroll, but enrollment required first detoxing at a separate facility. Martin testified that Mother attributedher positive tests to inaccuracies at the Accurate testing site, and that the Agency had had Mother test at both Women’s HOPE and Accurate to compare the results—an arrangement dating back to Mother’s prior dependency case, when she had tested positive for substances at Women’s HOPE in 2024.
Regarding visitation, Martin testified the Agency had arranged twice-weekly visits for Mother, but she missed a visit on April 28, and then failed to appear on April 30 after confirming she would attend. Since A.R.’s placement with the great aunt, Mother had had no in-person visits and had only a weekly video visit every Tuesday for approximately one hour. Both parents remained on a waiting list for a visitation center.
Mother gave testimony by video from HealthRIGHT 360’s Walden House facility. She testified that after A.R.’s removal from her home in April, she “tried to” keep in contact with Martin and only “found out that she had been trying to get a hold of me from just listening from today.” Mother explained that A.R.’s removal “was a very, very traumatic experience for me,” and she sought to take care of her mental health first so that she could take of her son afterwards. Specifically Mother sought therapy to protect her mental health and avoid relapse and continued with an outpatient program at Mission Council. Mother reportedly drug tested at Mission Council and signed a release so that the results could be sent to PSW Martin.
Mother claimed that she, not Martin, had proposed residential treatment and called Women’s HOPE to reserve a bed. In the two days prior to the disposition hearing, Mother completed the intake prerequisites, including methadone maintenance, a physical, and tuberculosis and COVID-19 testing. Before she could transfer to Women’s HOPE, Mother had to checkinto the HealthRIGHT 360 facility to detox.
Mother further testified that she had had no in-person visits with A.R., and that she went to the great aunt to arrange weekly video visits. Mother further explained that an out-of-county visit had been cancelled and then uncancelled, causing her to miss it. Mother said she wanted A.R. to live with her at Women’s HOPE and thereafter move with him to her mother’s home in Arizona. She confirmed she and Father remained a couple but said he was not living with her.
After argument, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother and Father’s parental rights had been terminated as to A.R.’s siblings in two prior cases, and that the problemthat led to the siblings’ removal was the same as in A.R.’s case, namely,the parents’ substance abuse. The court further found that neither parent had made reasonable efforts to treat those problems; Father had made “no efforts,” and Mother’s efforts were “minimal,” “temporary,” and “not reasonable” given her inability to maintain sobriety. To the extent the testimony of Mother and PSW Martin conflicted, the court found Martin to be the more credible witness and further found it would have reached the same result even accepting Mother’s testimony.
The juvenile court further remarked that the Agency’s practice of identifying residential treatment programs and confirming availability, rather than making a formal residential referral on the parent’s behalf, was reasonable, and that the Agency’s failure to give Mother an explicit advisement about what she needed to do to avoid bypass did not render the services unreasonable given Mother’s experience with prior dependencies and her representation by counsel. In the court’s view, it “defies logic and common sense” that Mother would wait until the day of the disposition hearing to enter treatment if she believed she needed it. The court also emphasized that Mother “repeatedly refused to test,” missed tests, and tested positive twice in May, all while denying drug use and attempting to cast doubt on the accuracy of the test results, which the court found to be unpersuasive.
With regard to visitation, the juvenile court found that any failure to provide in-person visitation was due to Mother’s failure to attend visits and was not a reflection on the reasonableness of the services. The court noted that the Agency had offered virtual visits and that Mother had attended only one.
The juvenile court declined to exercise its discretion to offer services to Mother notwithstanding her lack of reasonable efforts, finding that “neither reunification nor reunification services are in the child’s best interests.”
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court ordered that reunification services be bypassed for both parents. The court approved A.R.’s placement with his paternal great aunt, ordered supervised visitation for the parents once per month, and scheduled the permanency planning hearing for September 30, 2026.
Petition for Extraordinary Relief
Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a petition for extraordinary writ relief and subsequently filed her petition challenging the juvenile court’s June 3 order bypassing reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing.On July 15, we issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted.
Discussion
Reunification servicesare normally provided to the parents of dependent children. (§361.5, subd.(a); M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, 174–175.) However, services “need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in [section 361.5, subdivision (b)] when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence” any of several statutorily-enumerated circumstances. (§361.5, subd.(b)(1)–(17).) Relevant here are the circumstances set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), which concern prior dependency proceedings involving a siblingor half siblingof a child currently before the juvenile court.
Under these provisions, reunification services may be bypassed where clear and convincing evidence shows that a juvenile court previously either terminated reunification services (§361.5, subd.(b)(10)(A)) or “permanently severed” the parental rights (id., subd.(b)(11)) of the same parent as to any sibling or half sibling of the child currently before the court, and that this parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling or half sibling.” (Id., subd.(b)(10)(A), (11)(A).)Where a bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3), (4), or (6) through (17), applies, the juvenile court “shall not order reunification” for the parent “unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (Id., subd.(c)(2).)
On review from an order bypassing reunification services, we determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that a bypass provision applies. (See In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262.) “Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (Ibid.; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996 (O.B.).) “[I]n making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., at p.996.)
We review a juvenile court’s assessment of what is in the child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion. (In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1273 (Jayden M.).)
Finding that Mother Did Not Make Reasonable Effort to Treat Her Substance Abuse Problems
Pursuant to section 361.5, the child welfare agency bears the initial “burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the juvenile court had ordered termination of reunification services (under § 361.5, subd. (b)(10)) or had severed parental rights (under § 361.5, subd. (b)(11)) in a prior case involving a sibling or half sibling of the child in the current case; (2) the ‘problem[] that led to removal’ of the sibling or half sibling is the same problem at issue in the current case, insofar as the problem involves the same ‘theme’ even if it is not identical; and (3) the parent has ‘not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat th[at] problem[].’ ” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.)
There is no dispute the record contains substantial evidence meeting the clear and convincing standard of proof that Mother failed to reunify with and lost parental rights over A.R.’s siblings in prior dependency proceedings. It is likewise undisputed the problem that led to the removal of the siblings—Mother’s abuse of substances, e.g., opioids—is the identical problem at issue here.
Mother’s challenge involves the third element of the Agency’s burden: whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not make a reasonable effort to treat her substance abuse problem. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272–1273.)On this score, Mother emphasizes that during the prior dependency case involving A.R., she successfully completed inpatient programming and achieved 14 months of verified sobriety, resulting in A.R.’s return to her custody and dismissal of the case.She further argues that despite a “brief relapse” during the current case, she undertook reasonable efforts to treat her drug addiction by proactively engaging in detox services and making arrangements to enter residential treatment. We find these points unpersuasive and conclude the record contains substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could find by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not make a reasonable effortto treat her drug addiction.
“[I]n assessing whether a parent made a reasonable effort to address a problem from a prior dependency case involving the current child’s sibling or half sibling and where reunification services or parental rights were terminated under subdivision (b)(10) or (11) of section 361.5, the juvenile court should consider the entire time span between, at the one end, the earliest time a sibling or half sibling was removed from the parent’s custody due to that problem and, at the other end, the dispositional hearing in the current case.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p.1274.)“The question is not whether the parent has ‘“‘cure[d]’”’ or ‘“abolished”’ the problem [citations], or whether the parent has ‘attained’ a ‘“certain level of progress”’ [citation]. Instead, the focus is on the parent’s effort. It is not enough to show ‘any’ effort, even a genuine one. [Citation.] ‘[L]ackadaisical or half-hearted efforts’ will also not do. [Citation.] Instead, the effort must be reasonable, and reasonableness is assessed by looking to (1)the duration of the parent’s effort, (2)the ‘extent and context’ of the parent’s effort, and (3)other factors related to the ‘quality and quantity of those efforts.’ [Citation.] The parent’s progress, or lack thereof, ‘both in the short and long term’—while not dispositive—is nevertheless relevant ‘to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made.’ ” (Id.at p.1276, italics omitted.)
Here, the relevant time span for assessing Mother’s progress is from August 2020, when sibling E.R. was removed, to June 2026, when the juvenile court bypassed reunification services as to A.R. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p.1274.)As Mother emphasizes, this time frame included a 14-month period of sobriety during the first dependency proceeding involving A.R. We acknowledge this was not a fleeting moment, and we applaud Mother for having taken steps in the right direction. That said, it was still a fraction of the almost six-year time frame as a whole, which included four nearly consecutive dependency proceedings stemming from Mother’s substance abuse.Furthermore, once Agency involvement ended in January 2026, Mother’s sobriety became short-lived, as she tested positive for fentanyl just four months after regaining full custody of A.R. and two months after graduating from family treatment court. On this record, the juvenile court could permissibly conclude, and substantial evidence would support, that Mother’s effort to maintain sobriety “was not reasonable against the backdrop of her entire drug history dating back to” 2020. (Jayden M., at p.1276.)
Mother’s attempt to downplay her drug use in May 2026as “a brief relapse following the trauma of [A.R.’s] re-removal” is unavailing.The juvenile court could reasonably reject this self-interested characterization of the record, and substantial evidence would support a finding that Mother’s drug use was more sustained. As the record reflects, the staff at Mother’s housing program heard Father accusing Mother of substance abuse in February and March 2026, and the Agency documented the staff members’ “concern that the mother was under the influence.” Upon A.R.’s removal in April 2026, Mother failed to drug test despite multiple referrals and reminders, and it was reasonable to infer that Mother was refusing to test in order to conceal her continued drug use. (See, e.g., In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1384 [avoiding or refusing to take drug tests without adequate justification, is “ ‘properly considered the equivalent of a positive test result’ ”], disapproved on other grounds in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560.) Meanwhile, Mother continued to live with Father despite his own unresolved substance abuse problems, and she tested positive for fentanyl twice in May 2026, with levels consistent with activeuse. On this record, the court could reasonably conclude the positive tests in May were not a brief, isolated relapse, but were consistent with persistent drug use both before and after A.R.’s second removal.
In re Z.G. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 373 (Z.G.) does not compel a contrary conclusion. There, the Supreme Court held the mother’s purported relapse would not preclude a finding of reasonable effortgiven the specific timeline and facts of that case. (Id.at p.390.) Viewing the mother’s conduct over the two-and-a-half-year span of the dependency case, the Supreme Court concluded her efforts “were not ‘lackadaisical or half-hearted’ ” because “[s]he was demonstrably sober for over a year and a half; she completed her initial case plan, including participating in all mandated substance abuse treatment services; and she had custody of Z.G. and safely cared for her for over 18 months.” (Ibid.) The same cannot be said here, as Mother’s performance over the six-year span applicable here was not largely positive. Shefailed to reunify with both of A.R.’s siblings, resisted meaningful contact with the Agency in this case, refused to initially drug test and then tested positive twice (while continuing to deny use), and then hurriedly entered detox treatment on the eve of the disposition hearing. On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude Mother’s positive tests in May 2026 were not merely isolated “ ‘slip[] up[s] on the road to recovery’ ”(Z.G., at p.390), but were reflective of ongoing and unresolved struggles with substance abuse.
Mother nevertheless maintains her response to the May 2026 relapse reflected a reasonable effortto achieve sobriety because she “took immediate, proactive, and independent action.” As Mother sees it, she “[r]ecogniz[ed] her misstep,” and “independently contacted the director of Women’s HOPE to secure a bed for readmission,” “voluntarily checked herself into HealthRIGHT 360 (Walden House) for a multi-day detox process so she could transition directly back into the inpatient program,” and then testified at the disposition hearing from the facility, “proving she had already taken concrete steps to treat her relapse without waiting for an Agency mandate or court order.” We are unpersuaded by these points. Mother’s immediate response to the positive tests was not to acknowledge her mistake and undertake efforts to address it, but to dispute the accuracy of the results. We are not aware of any evidence in the record substantiating her claims of inaccuracies (e.g., the results of comparator tests taken at Women’s HOPE), and notably, Mother no longer takes the position that the May 2026 results were, in fact, false positives. On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude Mother’s denial of drug use in the face of two positive tests raised concerns over her lack of self-awareness of the problem that led to this and the prior dependency proceedings.
Equally unavailing is Mother’s claim that she undertook “immediate, proactive, and independent” steps to achieve sobriety. PSW Martin testified it was she, not Mother, who contacted a residential treatment facility and confirmed availability for Mother before repeatedly encouraging Mother to enroll. We defer to the juvenile court’s express finding that Martin was more credible on this score. (SeeO.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 996.) Meanwhile, throughout April and May 2026, Mother was evasive with Martin and did not provide updated information about her housing, social support system, and current substance use. Nor didshe take preliminary steps to enter residential treatment until just days before the June 3 disposition hearing. On this record, the court reasonably concluded Mother’s eleventh-hour attempt at treatment was not a genuine effort to confront her long history of drug addiction. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p.1276.)
In sum, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in concluding the Agency carried its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removals of A.R. and his siblings. (§361.5, subd.(b)(10)(A), (11)(A).)
Finding that Reunification Services Are Not in A.R.’s Best Interest
Once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, “the general rule favoring reunification is replaced with a legislative presumption that reunification services would be ‘“an unwise use of governmental resources.”’” (In re Allison J. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1112.) To overcome this presumption, an affected parent must make an appropriate showing “by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd.(c)(2).)
In exercising its discretion to order reunification services in the child’s best interest, a juvenile court may consider “a variety of factors, . . . including (1)the parent’s ‘“‘current efforts and fitness,’”’ (2)the parent’s ‘“‘history,’”’ (3)the ‘“‘gravity of the problem’”’ that led to the assertion of dependency, (4)the ‘“strength of the bonds”’ between the child and the parent and between the child and the current caregiver, and (5)the ‘“‘child’s need for stability and continuity.’”’ [Citation.] One factor that is essential—and hence necessary—to the assessment of a child’s best interest is whether there is ‘“some ‘reasonable basis to conclude’”’ that reunification is possible; if it is not, offering reunification services that are destined to fail is not in the child’s best interest.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp.1272–1273.)
On the record before us, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Mother failed to carry her burden to show reunification services were in A.R.’s best interest. The court could reasonably base its decision on numerous relevant factors, including Mother’s unsatisfactory efforts at treating her drug addiction, the gravity andextensive history of her substance abuse, A.R.’s need for stability and continuity(especially given his young age), and the fact he was thriving in his placement with his great aunt and older brother. Furthermore, because this was the third of Mother’s children removed due to her ongoing substance abuse problems, and she remained in an abusive relationship with Father, who had unresolved substance abuse problems of his own, the court could reasonably conclude reunification was not possible and, thus, continued services were not in A.R.’s best interest. (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp.1272–1273.)
Mother insists the juvenile court erred by failing to recognize the strong bond that existed between her and A.R. after she had parented him for the majority of his life. In support, Mother appears to rely on portions of the record from the prior dependency case involving A.R., specifically, a status report in which the Agency purportedly acknowledged Mother’s “ ‘legitimate behavior change’ ” and “strong parenting skills.”We find this argument unavailing for several reasons. First, it appears the cited report from A.R.’s prior dependency case was not included in the record before us.It is Mother’s burden as the petitioner seeking extraordinary relief to support the substantive issues raised in the petition with an adequate record. (Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 582.) Second, even assuming Mother’s summary of the record is accurate, Mother fails to demonstrate the juvenile court failed to consider it. The court expressly took judicial notice of the entire file from A.R.’s prior dependency case,and we may thus infer the court considered the Agency’s report of Mother’s progress in her behavior and parenting skills but concludednumerous other factors outweighed it. Finally, the Agency’s one-time acknowledgment of Mother’s improved behavior and parenting skills does not compel the conclusion that she and A.R. shared such a strong bond thatreunification services werenecessarily in the child’s best interest.
Mother next contends she was “severely prejudiced” in her ability to demonstrate her bond with A.R. by the Agency’s failure to implement in-person visitation. According to Mother, the juvenile court’s finding that Mother was to blame for the lack of in-person visitswas “completely unsupported by substantial evidence” and “flatly contradicted by the record,” as PSW Martin admitted at the disposition hearing that Mother was permitted only a single one-hour video call per week while she was on a waiting list for a visitation center. We cannot agree. While it is true the Agency was unable to fully implement in-person visitation due to visitation center policies and a long waitlist,the record demonstrates that Mother failed to take advantage of the Agency’s other efforts to facilitate visitation. For instance, when A.R. was in an AFS home, the Agency arranged twice-weekly in-person visits in late April 2026, but Mother missed the first appointment and failed to appear for the second despite confirming she would attend. Mother was also offered virtual visits by the great aunt in May 2026but attended only one. On this record, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Mother did not take advantage of the visitation opportunities offered to her.
Furthermore, in-person visitation was not the only means by which Mother could have demonstrated a strong parent-child bond. ThoughMother could have discussed her relationship with A.R. during her testimony at the disposition hearing, she did not. Nor did she offer the testimony of any other witness who could attest to the strength of their relationship. Mother provides no reason why she could not have offered such evidence in lieu of in-person visitation logs to demonstrate a strong parent-child bond. As such, we cannot accept Mother’s contention that she was severely prejudiced by the lack of in-person visitation in this case.
Disposition
The petition is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd.(l)(1)(C), (4)(B); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).) The request to stay the permanency planning hearing set for September 30, 2026, is denied. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.*

M.A. v. San Francisco City & CO Sup. Ct. (A176781)