P. v. Tucker

Filed 1/17/17 P. v. Tucker CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PHILLIP TUCKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
B267255
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA093473)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard R. Romero, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Mark S. Devore, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Timothy L.
O’Hair, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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A jury found Phillip Tucker guilty of assault by means
likely to produce great bodily injury and willful infliction of
corporal injury. On appeal Tucker contends: (1) the corporal
injury charge must be reduced or retried because the jury may
have based the conviction on a legally insufficient theory; (2) the
trial court erred in denying his request for a free trial transcript
to help him prepare a motion for new trial; (3) the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte revoke Tucker’s in
propria persona status; and (4) a one-year prior prison term
enhancement (Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b)) must be
stricken because the underlying conviction was designated a
misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 during the pendency of
this appeal.1 The People argue the abstract of judgment must be
amended to include two fines that were orally pronounced in
court. We order that the abstract of judgment be amended and
otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tucker and Cheryl Byone dated for three years and lived
together for two of those years. Their relationship ended in
February 2014. Byone began a new romantic relationship with
Reynald Perodin.
On May 19, 2014, Byone and Perodin boarded a Metro Blue
Line train at the Anaheim Street Station, heading to Long Beach.
Byone noticed Tucker was in the same train car. While Byone
was attempting to make eye contact with Perodin to alert him to
Tucker’s presence, Tucker walked across the train car and sat
next to Byone. Tucker then began to punch Perodin repeatedly,
asking him, “You know who I am?” Byone stood up between
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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Perodin and Tucker; she told Tucker to stop punching Perodin.
As Perodin retreated to the end of the train, Tucker followed him,
continuing to ask, “Don’t you know who I am?” Byone pushed the
train’s emergency button to call for help. She then again placed
herself between Tucker and Perodin, asking Tucker, “What are
you doing? You don’t even know who he [Perodin] is.”
As the train arrived at the next station, Tucker grabbed
Byone’s bag from her seat. When Tucker refused to return the
bag, Byone grabbed one side to get it away from him. Tucker
pulled the bag free from Byone’s grasp and exited the train.
Bystanders on the station platform saw Tucker and Byone
struggling over the bag; several admonished Tucker to release
the bag. Tucker then threw the bag at Byone. The 10- or 15-
pound bag hit Byone in the face, opening a two-inch laceration on
her lip that began to bleed. As Tucker began running away,
Byone called him a “bitch.” Tucker then turned around, re-
boarded the train and chased Byone down the middle of the aisle
until he was able to push her to the ground. She slid 20 or 30
feet across the train. Her knees and hands were sore. Tucker
then exited the train and ran away. Video cameras on the train
recorded the incident. Byone’s lip and Perodin’s injuries were
photographed following the incident. Neither Byone nor Perodin
sought medical treatment.
On June 5, 2015, the People filed an amended information
charging Tucker with assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and willful infliction of
corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2). The information also
alleged Tucker had two prior “strike” convictions and six “prison
prior” convictions.

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The trial court granted Tucker’s motion to represent
himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
The jury found Tucker guilty on both counts; he subsequently
waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations.
Following a bench trial, the court found the prior conviction
allegations to be true. The court sentenced Tucker to a total
prison term of 14 years.2 Tucker timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Reversal of the Corporal Injury Conviction is Not
Warranted
The jury found Tucker guilty of one count of violating
section 273.5, subdivision (a). Tucker contends the conviction
must be reversed because the jury may have found him guilty on
a legally insufficient theory suggested by the prosecutor. We find
no basis for reversal.
A. Background
The trial court instructed the jury that the People were
required to prove Tucker inflicted an injury on Byone resulting in
a “traumatic condition,” which was defined as “a wound or other
bodily injury, whether minor or serious, caused by the direct
application of physical force.” In closing argument, the
prosecutor argued the section 273.5, subdivision (a) crime could
be committed “by throwing an object at someone and causing the
physical injury by throwing that object. So [Tucker] throwing the
purse at [Byone], if that caused the cut to her lip, then that’s
2 The 14-year sentence was comprised of eight years on the
assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury count (four
years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law); a consecutive
two years on the corporal injury count; and four one-year prior
prison term enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b).

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sufficient.” The prosecutor subsequently argued the People had
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Tucker inflicted an injury
on Byone when he threw the bag at her and cut her lip. He
continued: “[Tucker] also caused injury to [Byone] by pushing her
down which caused pain to her legs. It’s irrelevant if the injury is
minor. So long as there’s some injury, that’s sufficient for him to
be guilty of this crime. And, therefore, the evidence established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of this
crime.” Tucker did not object to this argument.
B. Discussion
Under section 273.5, subdivision (a), “[a]ny person who
willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition
upon a victim described in subdivision (b) is guilty of a
felony. . . .” Subdivision (d) defines “traumatic condition” as “a
condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal
injury, including, but not limited to, injury as a result of
strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious
nature, caused by a physical force.” (§ 273.5, subd. (d).) Evidence
the victim has suffered only pain, but no accompanying injury, is
insufficient to establish the victim suffered injury resulting in a
traumatic condition. (People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
1078, 1086; People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 137-138.)
Tucker contends on appeal that the prosecutor’s argument
allowed the jury to find him guilty of a violation of section 273.5,
subdivision (a) based on the legally inadequate theory that he
pushed Byone and caused her to suffer pain, but not an “injury
resulting in a traumatic condition.” The People contend the issue
is one of factual inadequacy only.3
3 The People do not argue on appeal that the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to conclude Tucker’s act of pushing Byone

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Both factual and legal inadequacy concern the sufficiency of
the evidence. But the terms refers to two different types of cases:
“(a) those in which ‘a particular theory of conviction . . . is
contrary to law,’ or, phrased slightly differently, cases involving a
‘legally inadequate theory’; and (b) those in which the jury has
merely been ‘left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate
theory,’ or, also phrased slightly differently, cases in which there
was an ‘insufficiency of proof.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Guiton
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128 (Guiton), citing Griffin v. United
States (1991) 502 U.S. 46, 59.)
As explained in Guiton, “[i]f the inadequacy of proof is
purely factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect,
reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict
remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the
verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground. But if the
inadequacy is legal, not merely factual, that is, when the facts do
not state a crime under the applicable statute, as in [People v.
Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, abrogated on another ground in People
v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239], the Green rule requiring
reversal applies, absent a basis in the record to find that the
verdict was actually based on a valid ground.” (Guiton, supra,
4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.)
However, as the California Supreme Court explained in
People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34 (Morales), both Guiton and
Green involved cases in which “the court presented the state’s
case to the jury on an erroneous legal theory or theories.”
(Morales, at p. 43.) In contrast, in Morales, as in this case, the
court did not present to the jury a case premised on a legally
caused her an injury resulting in a traumatic condition to her leg
or knee.

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incorrect theory. Instead, the prosecutor, arguably incorrectly,
suggested the evidence of Byone’s pain after being pushed was
sufficient to establish Tucker’s conduct caused her to suffer an
injury resulting in a traumatic condition. As the Morales court
explained: “The prosecutor arguably misstated some law, but
such an error would merely amount to prosecutorial misconduct
[citation] during argument, rather than trial and resolution of the
case on an improper legal basis.” (Ibid.) The same is true here.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the applicable law,
and it cannot be said a legal theory unsupported by the evidence
was presented to the jury in the very trying of the case.
Morales further clarified the holding of Green: “[Green]
stands for the proposition that the prosecution may present a
case in which jurors may have been (1) legally misled by
instructions or evidence, i.e., presented an ‘alternate theory [that]
is legally erroneous’ [citation] because it is based on (a) incorrect
instructions or (b) inadmissible evidence; or (2) factually misled
by evidence, ‘i.e., when the reviewing court holds the evidence
insufficient to support the conviction’ [citation]. Properly
understood, Green reasons that in cases suffering from
insufficient evidence, deficient instructions, or other errors made
in presenting evidence or giving instructions, ill-advised remarks
by the prosecutor may compound the trial’s defects.” (Morales,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 48.)
There were no such errors here. As a result, Green is not
controlling. Only the prosecutor’s closing argument suggested
Byone’s leg pain was evidence of an injury resulting in a
traumatic condition. At most, this was a misstatement of the law
to the extent it conflated pain with “injury” under section 273.5,

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subdivision (a). Viewed as prosecutorial misconduct, we find no
reversible error.
As an initial matter, Tucker forfeited any claim of
prosecutorial misconduct by failing to object below. (People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577 (Clark); People v. Nguyen (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1015, 1046-1047.) Even had Tucker preserved the
argument it would fail. There is no basis to conclude the
prosecutor’s conduct infected the trial with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process, or that he made use
of deceptive methods and it is reasonably probable that without
such misconduct Tucker would have received a more favorable
outcome. (Clark, at pp. 576-577.)
The prosecutor’s argument that Byone’s leg pain was
sufficient to establish an “injury resulting in a traumatic
condition” was a minor point, secondary to the argument he made
twice, which was that the lip injury Tucker caused satisfied the
elements of section 273.5, subdivision (a). Further, the evidence
of the lip injury was undisputed. The jury had no basis to reject
the evidence establishing a “traumatic condition” based on the lip
injury, while also accepting the argument that Tucker’s act of
pushing Byone caused her to suffer an injury resulting in a
traumatic condition. Even if the prosecutor’s argument was
misleading or incorrect, it is not reasonably probable that absent
the statement the outcome would have been more favorable to
Tucker.
Moreover, even if we consider Tucker’s argument in the
context of Guiton and Green, we would still conclude reversal is
not warranted. Green concerned a legally erroneous instruction.
(People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 351 [Green involved a
legally erroneous instruction; Guiton involved legally correct

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instructions on a theory for which there was an inadequacy of
proof].) Tucker does not contend the jury was improperly
instructed on the law in this case. Instead, his argument
concerns one of factual inadequacy—the prosecutor argued
alternate theories, one of which was unsupported by the
evidence, namely that Tucker inflicted injury on Byone, resulting
in a traumatic condition to her knee or leg.
Reversal is not required because there was a valid ground
upon which to base the conviction and no affirmative indication
that the jury’s verdict rested on the factually inadequate ground.
(Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) The evidence was
undisputed that Tucker threw a heavy bag at Byone, causing a
laceration on her lip that bled and became swollen. Byone’s
testimony about the injury was corroborated by the testimony of
a police officer who observed the injury. This evidence was
sufficient to support the “traumatic condition” element, and there
was no basis for the jury to reject it. Thus, reversal is not
warranted.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Tucker’s
Request for a Free Trial Transcript
Following the trial, Tucker submitted written and oral
motions requesting a free, complete trial transcript. Tucker
argued he needed the transcript to prepare a motion for new
trial. He also argued he needed the transcript as an
accommodation because he did not have a “perfect memory” and
did not take notes during the trial. The trial court denied the
request. Tucker now contends the denial violated his rights to
due process and a fair trial. He additionally asserts the denial
violated the court rule regarding disability accommodations.
We disagree.

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In general, “[e]qual protection principles require that the
government provide an indigent criminal defendant with a free
reporter’s transcript of prior proceedings if the transcript is
needed for proper appellate review or for an effective defense.
[Citations.] The policy behind this rule is to ensure that an
indigent defendant receive ‘the basic tools of an adequate defense
or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other
[defendants].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Markley (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 230, 240 (Markley), citing Griffin v. Illinois (1956)
351 U.S. 12, 18-19 and Britt v. North Carolina (1971) 404 U.S.
226, 227-230.)
However, “[a]n indigent defendant ‘is not entitled, as a
matter of absolute right, to a full reporter’s transcript of his trial
proceedings for his lawyer’s use in connection with a motion for a
new trial; but, since a motion for a new trial is an integral part of
the trial itself, a full reporter’s transcript must be furnished to all
defendants . . . whenever necessary for effective representation by
counsel at that important stage of the proceeding.’ [Citation.]
There are no mechanical tests for deciding when the denial of
transcripts for a motion for new trial is so arbitrary as to violate
due process or to constitute a denial of effective representation.
Each case must be considered on its own peculiar facts and
circumstances.” (People v. Bizieff (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1689,
1700 (Bizieff).) “[A]ppellant must show that the requested
transcripts are necessary for effective representation by counsel
on the motion for new trial.” (Id. at p. 1702.)
Here, Tucker failed to show a full reporter’s transcript was
necessary for effective representation on the motion for new trial.
His initial argument was that he was entitled to the transcript
and needed it to prepare a motion because he did not have a

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“perfect memory.” He later argued he needed the transcript to
“effectively cross-examine the witnesses” and to “build an
effective defense for appeal.” He asserted he had new evidence
with which to impeach Byone and that the trial court improperly
prevented him from impeaching Perodin. He also argued Byone,
Perodin, and a detective all committed perjury at trial, and the
person who testified as Perodin on the first day was not, in fact,
Perodin. As we understand the argument he made in the trial
court, he further contended a new trial was warranted due to
prosecutorial misconduct.
None of these arguments articulated a specific or
particularized need for a full trial transcript with respect to a
motion for new trial. (Markley, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 242;
Bizieff, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1702.) While Tucker asserted
he did not take notes and did not have a “perfect memory,” he
was present for the entirety of the trial, which lasted only two
days and involved the testimony of only four witnesses. Tucker’s
argument to the trial court demonstrated he recalled enough of
the evidence to discuss the issues he wished to challenge in the
new trial motion. Further, the issues Tucker intended to raise
did not require a detailed recollection of the evidence at trial.
Effectively presenting an argument regarding newly discovered
evidence was possible with general details about the evidence
adduced at trial, particularly since the judge who presided over
the trial would also hear the new trial motion. (People v. Lopez
(1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 78, 82.) The argument that the trial court
erred by limiting Tucker’s impeachment of Perodin also did not
require significant detail beyond what Tucker demonstrated he
was able to recall without the aid of a trial transcript. He also
recounted the basis for his prosecutorial misconduct claims

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without the aid of a transcript. Tucker did not show a complete
trial transcript was necessary for effective representation with
respect to the new trial motion he was contemplating.
We also conclude the trial court did not err in denying the
request under California Rules of Court, rule 1.100 (rule 1.100).
Rule 1.100 sets forth a procedure for a litigant to request a
disability accommodation and for the court to consider and rule
on the request. Under rule 1.100(c)(2), requests for
accommodations must include “a statement of the impairment
that necessitates the accommodation.” Tucker described himself
as requiring a free trial transcript as an accommodation for a
disability, but he explained this request only by stating that he
did not have a “perfect memory.” Tucker offered no other
information that would have permitted the trial court to conclude
he had a disability within the meaning of the Americans with
Disabilities Act or California Civil Code section 51 et seq. (Rule
1.100(e)(1) [“In determining whether to grant an accommodation
request . . . the court must consider . . . California Civil Code
section 51 et seq., the provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.), and other
applicable state and federal laws.”].) A trial court may properly
deny an accommodation request when it determines the
applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements of the rule.
The trial court did not err in denying Tucker’s request for a
free trial transcript.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Failing to Sua Sponte Revoke Tucker’s Self-
Representation
Tucker also argues the trial court erred when it failed to
sua sponte revoke his in propria persona status. We disagree.

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Tucker contends the court should have terminated his self-
representation because he made comments in front of the jury
alleging witnesses and the prosecutor were lying; he asserted the
court was biased against him and made racially-motivated
rulings; he claimed the proceedings were unfair; he asked
Perodin irrelevant questions about his alleged HIV status; and he
asserted two different people had claimed to testify as Perodin.
Tucker further contends the need to terminate his self-
representation was apparent after the jury rendered its verdict
because he then repeated his claim that two people had testified
as Perodin; he asserted his former public defender and the
prosecutor conspired to question his competency; and he made
several comments, using profanity, indicating he no longer
wished to participate in the proceedings.
“A trial court may revoke self-representation if the
defendant engages in disruptive or obstructionist behavior.
[Citations.] But a trial court is not compelled to revoke self-
representation in such cases. ‘The trial court possesses much
discretion when it comes to terminating a defendant’s right to
self-representation and the exercise of that discretion “will not be
disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] The fact a defendant does a bad job, or
even fails to contest the case, is not a basis to revoke self-
representation.” (People v. Weber (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1041,
1060.)
Although Tucker had several outbursts during the trial in
which he complained about the proceedings and used profanity,
he responded to the trial court’s admonishments. The trial court
could reasonably conclude Tucker was not out of control and his
behavior did not impair the orderly progress of the trial. Tucker

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at times attempted to pursue irrelevant lines of questioning, and
he accused witnesses of lying during examinations, but he also
asked many pertinent questions and legitimately challenged the
People’s case. He largely kept his outbursts limited to
discussions with the court and prosecutor that were outside the
presence of the jury. The record offers no basis for this court to
conclude Tucker’s behavior adversely impacted the core integrity
of the trial (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 9), such that the
court was required to terminate his self-representation.
Tucker suggests the trial court should have been more
aware of the potential need to terminate his self-representation
because of questions regarding his competency that were raised
at the outset of the case. However, the record does not indicate
Tucker engaged in behavior suggesting he suffered from a mental
illness so severe that he was unable to carry out the basic tasks
needed to present a defense without the help of counsel. (People
v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 530.) Tucker was at times very
frustrated with the criminal process and he displayed an
unfamiliarity with the rules of evidence. Yet, he clearly
understood the process and, while he expressed his displeasure
and frustration, he was generally able to actively participate in
the trial and carry out his defense. (See People v. Ramos (2004)
34 Cal.4th 494, 508 [to be deemed incompetent defendant “must
exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a
preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the
question of whether the defendant can assist his defense
counsel.”].)
Although Tucker engaged in some disruptive or improper
behavior, our review of the record does not reveal that his
behavior was so detrimental to the integrity of the trial that the

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court abused its discretion by not sua sponte terminating his self-
representation.
IV. Proposition 47 Does Not Require this Court to Strike
Tucker’s Prison Prior Enhancement
The trial court found true the allegation that Tucker
suffered several prior convictions within the meaning of section
667.5, subdivision (b) (prison priors).4 One of the prison priors
was an April 19, 2001 conviction for a violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a), in case No. NA043014.
On August 27, 2015, the trial court sentenced Tucker to a 14-year
prison term in the instant case. One component of the sentence
was a one-year enhancement for the prison prior based on the
April 19, 2001 conviction. Tucker filed a notice of appeal on
September 10, 2015. On September 21, 2016, the trial court
redesignated the April 19, 2001 conviction in case No. NA043014
4 Under section 667.5, subdivision (b), when a “new offense is
any felony for which a prison sentence or a sentence of
imprisonment in a county jail under subdivision (h) of Section
1170 is imposed or is not suspended, in addition and consecutive
to any other sentence therefor, the court shall impose a one-year
term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term
imposed under subdivision (h) of Section 1170 or when sentence
is not suspended for any felony; provided that no additional term
shall be imposed under this subdivision for any prison term or
county jail term imposed under subdivision (h) of Section 1170 or
when sentence is not suspended prior to a period of five years in
which the defendant remained free of both the commission of an
offense which results in a felony conviction, and prison custody or
the imposition of a term of jail custody imposed under subdivision
(h) of Section 1170 or any felony sentence that is not suspended.”

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as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd.
(g)).5
Briefing in this appeal was completed in late September
2016. However, at Tucker’s request, we granted the parties leave
to file supplemental briefs regarding the validity of the prison
prior enhancement based on the April 19, 2001 conviction.
Tucker argues this court should strike the one-year prison prior
enhancement because the underlying conviction is now a
misdemeanor and may no longer form the basis of the
enhancement. The People ask us to reject this argument,
contending striking the prison prior enhancement would require
retroactive application of Proposition 47. The People argue the
language of Proposition 47, the voters’ intent, and existing
caselaw all fail to provide a basis for a “retroactive” application of
the law that would eliminate the collateral consequences of prior
felony convictions. We conclude Proposition 47 does not require
us to strike the prison prior enhancement.
Proposition 47 changed certain drug- and theft-related
offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors. (People v.
Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108.) Defendants who have
completed their sentence for a crime that is now a misdemeanor
may apply to have the felony conviction re-designated as a
misdemeanor. (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).) While Proposition 47
indicates redesignated convictions are to be considered
misdemeanors for “all purposes” (§ 1170.18, subd. (k)), the statute
contains no express language explaining how redesignation is
intended to affect prior prison term enhancements imposed based
on a redesignated conviction.
5 We have granted Tucker’s two unopposed requests for
judicial notice.

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This issue--whether a defendant is eligible for resentencing
on the penalty enhancement for serving a prior prison term on a
felony conviction, after the trial court has redesignated the
underlying felony as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47--is
currently under review by the California Supreme Court. (People
v. Valenzuela, S232900, rev. granted March 7, 2016.) However,
we may still cite recent published cases while review is pending
for any potential persuasive value (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(e)(1)), and we find persuasive value in People v. Acosta
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1072 (Acosta), review granted August 17,
2016, S235773.
Acosta interpreted section 667.5, subdivision (b) as
affording additional punishment based on the service of a prior
prison term, rather than the status of the conviction or the
underlying criminal conduct. We agree with this reasoning.
Under section 667.5, subdivision (b), a defendant’s sentence is
enhanced based on his service of a prior prison term or county jail
term. The enhancement is “based on the defendant’s status as a
recidivist.” (People v. Gokey (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 932, 936.)
The fact that the defendant served a prison term is not changed
or eliminated after a redesignation of the underlying offense
pursuant to Proposition 47. We therefore conclude the one-year
enhancement imposed in this case, as to Tucker’s conviction and
prison term served in case No. NA043014, is still valid.
V. The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Corrected
The People argue the abstract of judgment must be
corrected to accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of
sentence.6 At sentencing, the trial court imposed various fees
6 Tucker did not respond to the People’s argument in his
reply brief.

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and assessments, including the court facilities assessment
pursuant to Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1),
in the amount of $30 per count, and the court security fee under
section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1), in the amount of $40 per count.
(People v. Woods (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 269, 272.) The abstract
of judgment reflects the assessment and fee for only one count,
rather than the total amount assessed for both convictions. We
agree that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect
the oral pronouncement of the court. (People v. Scott (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of
judgment reflecting a total assessment of $60 pursuant to
Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1), and a total
fee of $80 pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision
(a)(1), and to forward a copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
BIGELOW, P.J.
We concur:
RUBIN, J.
FLIER, J.

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