P. v. Jones CA2/8 filed 6/24/26

Filed 6/24/26 P. v. Jones CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIE JONES,

Defendant and Appellant.
B335833

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA159188)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of LosAngeles County. Connie Quinones, Judge. Affirmed as modified, remanded with directions.
Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,Noah P. Hill and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, forPlaintiff and Respondent.
* * * * * * * * * *
Defendant and appellant Willie Jones was found guilty by a jury of one count of first degree murder for which he received a sentence of 25 years to life. The court also imposed a 10-year upper term firearm enhancement, although the jury was not asked to consider, and did not render a finding, that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murder.
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 334regarding accomplice testimony. Defendant argues the jurors should have been instructed to resolve whether two of the prosecution’s primary witnesses, I.H. and S.T., were accomplices, and if they so found, that they must view their testimony with caution and must find corroborating evidence supported their testimony.
We conclude any instructional error was harmless. We further conclude, based on our review of the record, the 10-year firearm enhancement is unauthorized. We therefore strike the enhancement and affirm the judgment as modified. We also find the abstract of judgment contains a clerical error. Therefore, on remand, we direct the superior court to prepare a new abstract of judgment that deletes the enhancement and corrects the clerical error regarding the date of conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On October 30, 2022, Robert Waltonwas fatally shot in a residential neighborhood on South Clymar Avenue in Compton. Defendant and codefendant Emmanuel Mirrien Foster were arrested and charged with the premeditated murder ofWalton. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The People alleged defendant had served a prior prison term and also alleged four aggravating factors. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) & (3), (b)(1) & (3).) Codefendant Foster, who was alleged to be the shooter, is not a party to this appeal. Evidence at the joint jury trial established the following facts material to our discussion.
Testimony of I.H. and S.T.
I.H. testified that in October 2022, she had been dating Waltonfor about three years.Walton’s nickname was Nuskii, and he drove a white Mercedes-Benz. I.H. also knew defendant and Foster. I.H. had known defendant and most of his family since she was a child. Defendant was often called Nu-Nu or Tiny Hands. Defendant’s brother Lorenzo had been killed sometime in 2020. I.H. knew defendant had a motorcycle and had seen him riding it numerous times in the neighborhood, including on the afternoon of October30, 2022. As for Foster, who went by the moniker Active, I.H. knew him because he had once lived in her apartment complex.
I.H. knew the Fruit Town gang was active in her neighborhood. She said some of her family members were involved with the gang, but she denied any gang affiliation.
On October 30, 2022,Halloween festivities were held at Gonzalez Park in Compton, not far from South Clymar Avenue. Around 1:00 o’clock that afternoon, I.H.went to Gonzalez Parkwith her friend S.T. (who was dating Foster), Yolanda K. (I.H.’s halfsister), and Nikendra C. (a friend of Yolanda’s). Nikendra drove them. Over the course of the afternoon, they left briefly to go to a nearby marijuana shop and to pick up some takeout food. I.H. admitted to smoking weed that afternoon. Shesaid defendant and Foster were also at the park. I.H. recalled that Foster was wearing a red jacket, and defendant a black hoodie.
I.H. had been texting with Walton throughout the day, mostly arguing. Sometime around 6:00 p.m., the four women left the park and returned to the marijuana shop in Nikendra’s car. Walton drove up in his Mercedes. I.H. got out of the car to go see Walton, but he yelled at her from his window and threw a drink at her. I.H. threw her phone at his car as he drove off. The other women urged I.H. to get back in the car with them. She did briefly, but then asked to be let out of the car. She walked to Walton’s house to see if he had gone home, but his car was not there. As she was walking along South Clymar Avenue,she called Walton, and he drove up. They continued to argue and their argument escalatedto a point where Walton drove towards I.H. as if to hit her, and I.H. threw rocks at the car.
While they were still arguing, Yolanda, Nikendra and S.T. returned. Yolanda told I.H. to get back in the car with them, but I.H. told them to leave. I.H. tried to get into Walton’s car, but he pulled away before she could close the door and she fell to the ground. Shortly thereafter, I.H. heard six to seven gunshots, “spaced out.” Sheran to Nikendra’s car and got in. After they drove a short distance, I.H. said she was worried about Walton and wanted to go back. Nikendra refused and I.H. demanded to be let out. S.T. got out with her. I.H. ran back to South Clymar Avenue.
I.H. saw a black motorcycle with a big front headlight and two people on it, driving down South Clymar Avenue. She recognized the motorcycle as defendant’s bike. She could not see the faces of the people on the motorcycle, but I.H. believed the back passenger was Foster based on his size and the thick hair sticking out of his hoodie. The driver was wearing a black jacket and black beanie.
When I.H. finally got to the end of South Clymar Avenue, she saw Walton’s car crashed into a light pole. Walton was not inside the car.Shortly thereafter, S.T. arrived. She called 911 and stayed with I.H. until the police arrived.
I.H. spoke with the police several times about what happened. She said she was scared and did not want someone to “do something” to her for talking, so she initially did not say much. But she later told the detectives what she saw that day, including that defendant had been at the park on his motorcycle. She said there were a lot of people on motorcycles at the park that day.
I.H. also testified she was no longer friends with S.T., Nikendra, and Yolanda because she felt they had “betrayed” her.
S.T. testified she knew defendant rode a motorcycle. She had a video on her cell phone of defendant on the bike, but could not recall when the video was taken. She confirmed knowing defendant, Foster, I.H., Yolanda, Nikendra, and Walton.
S.T. was asked several times about any conversations the women may have had with defendant and Foster upon returning to the parkafter going to the marijuana shop and picking up food. When asked if they told defendant or Foster about comments Walton made earlier in the day when he was arguing with I.H., including “Fuck y’all dead homies,” S.T. said, “I don’t believe so.” She said they just told defendant and Foster that I.H. and Waltonhad been arguing. S.T. admitted she called Foster on their way back to the park because she was looking for him and wanted to know where he was.
S.T. eventually explained she never wanted to talk to the police about any of the events that day, but that her parents pressured her to do so. During her third interview, she told the detectives they had driven back to the park after Walton had yelled comments at them from his car, including something to the effect of “Fuck y’all dead homies.” Defendant and Foster were at the park when they returned. S.T. said they may have told them something to the effect that Walton “was tripping” but that was “normal behavior for them. Normal. It happens all the time, every day.” When the women left the park again, she believed a motorcycle followed them out, but then it passed them and “kept going.” S.T. denied telling the detectives that she knew the motorcycle was defendant’s bike. She expressed distress at having to testify, saying she could be killed for being “a part of any of this.”
S.T. admitted hearing gunshots ring out on South Clymar Avenue when she and I.H. walked back looking for Walton, and she also heard the sound of a motorcycle. However, S.T. said she did not see any motorcycle and could not identify the shooter. S.T. said she felt pressured by the detectives to “say something” and that is why she told them that Foster had killed Walton, even though that was wrong and she had not seen what happened. She denied being in a serious relationship with Foster.
Other evidence
Two residents on South ClymarAvenue also testified. D.B. had lived on South Clymar Avenue for many years, and was at home with her sister on October 30, 2022. She recalled hearing a lot of screaming, a loud crash, and “some popping” noises which she and her sister believed to be gunshots or firecrackers. They got down and stayed away from the windows. Afterward, a bullet hole was found in the wall of her front porch near the garage.
S.A. testified he was with his children in his car outside his home, getting ready to leave when he saw a young woman on the street yelling and arguing with a man in a white car. They got fairly loud and animated, so S.A. was waiting for them to leave before he drove off. He then heard gunshots and initially thought the man in the white car had shot at the woman because she started running. At that point, he saw the headlight of a motorcycle heading in the same direction as the car. The car eventually crashed, and S.A. heard some additional gunshots. S.A. gave the video footage from the security cameras on his house to the police.
When officers arrived on the scene, they found a white Mercedez-Benz crashed into a light pole near the intersection of South Clymar Avenue and 145th Street.There was no one inside the car. Walton’s body was eventually located near a residence farther up the street. It was later determined that Walton died from multiple gunshot wounds, including to the right neck, right chest, and left arm.
Several expended shell casings and live rounds were recovered at the scene and tested for DNA. Foster was determined to be a contributor to the DNA found on oneof the casings, along with two other unknown contributors. All of the fired shell casings and live rounds were the same caliber: 5.7 by 28 millimeters. The most common manufacturers of firearms that used that size ammunition were FN and Ruger. All of the live rounds recovered at the scene had blue tips.
The video footage from several security cameras recovered during the investigation captured some of the events on South Clymar Avenuethat evening, including the argument between I.H. and Walton. Another video showed the arrival of a dark motorcycle with two riders. The footage recovered did not show the shooting or the car crash, but some footage captured an individual running across the front yard of a home and eventually jumping onto the back of the motorcycle, which then sped from the scene. Another video that also contained audio captured Walton leaning out of the window of his car and yelling toward I.H. and the other women, “Fuck y’all dead homies.” Additional footage captured a motorcycle with two passengers accelerating at a high rate of speed down South Clymar Avenue, the sound of screeching tires, followed by gunshots and the sound of a car crashing.
Mapping of cell phone data showed that both defendant’s and Foster’s cell phones were using cell towers in the vicinity of the murder scene during the timeframe when the shooting occurred. The records also showed that a phone call was made from Nikendra’s phone to Foster’s phone shortly before the shooting. Additional records also demonstrated that defendant cancelled the service for his cell phone three days after the murder.
Detective Robert McGaughey of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, one of the lead detectives in the case, testified that during I.H.’s second interview, she identified defendant as the driver of the motorcycle and Foster as the back passenger. In addition, the detectives wereable to recover defendant’s motorcycle from the home of Candy F., the mother of one of defendant’s children, in Las Vegas, Nevada. The motorcycle was black. It matched the appearance of the motorcycle in S.T.’s cellphone video of defendant, and the motorcycle captured in the video footage from security cameras on South Clymar Avenue. The motorcycle had the same large front headlight with two small foglights, the same tailpipes and grips, and the same reflective stripping on the saddlebags near the seat. Additional testimony confirmed that defendant’s brother Lorenzo was fatally shot in December 2020.
Perkins statements by defendant and Foster
Detective McGaughey testified about the pretrial statements made by defendant and Foster during two separate undercover operationscommonly referred to as Perkins operations. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 (Perkins).) Detective McGaughey explained the two Perkins operations occurred about a month apart. During each operation, defendant andFoster were separately placed into holding cells with an informant “posing as an inmate.” We will refer to the informant as the Perkins agent for clarity. After being given information about the Walton shooting, the Perkins agent was told to attempt to have a conversation about it with defendant and Foster, respectively. Both the holding cell in which the operationsoccurred and the Perkins agent were equipped with recording devices to capture any conversations. The recordingswere played for the jury.
During thePerkins operation involving defendant, he repeatedly denied any involvement in the shooting, and asserted that others must be “snitching and shit. [¶] … [¶] … [including] a homegirl, she was talking to a Bounty Hunter nigger and all that.” Defendant said his brother had been killed by a Bounty Hunter, that a lot of stuff had been going on for two years since then, “[b]ut this one, I didn’t do it.”Portions of the conversation are difficult to follow, but at one point, defendant mentioned he was “driving” and the other guy “just jump [sic] off and started doing it himself. … he chased the nigger all in the back yard, gunned him down.”
Later in the conversation, defendant told the Perkins agent the detectiveswere “just throwing some shit” and asking him “‘What’s up with Active? … You all know what’s up … He in jail.’” The Perkins agent responded by asking defendant whether he thought Foster “might be saying something.” Defendant said he did not know, but that Foster “can’t say nothing unless he just rat his self out with this to try to get me to do time with him.” Defendant continued, saying “And he’s the one that did it. I ain’t did shit.”
A detective interrupted the conversation, telling defendant he was going to be charged in the murder of Nuskii. Defendant said he did not know Nuskii. The detective said Nuskii was I.H.’s “man.” Defendant acknowledged knowing I.H., calling her his “little homegirl” but maintained he did not know Nuskii. The detective told him they had already spoken to I.H., Yolanda, Nikendra, Foster, and Foster’s “girl” S.T. who had given them a picture of defendant on his motorcycle. The detective then left and said he would be back shortly to take defendant to an interview.
Defendant resumed talking with the Perkins agent who said that it sounded like someone put defendant’s name “in the mix.” Defendant continued to deny any involvement. He said he was not at the park for Halloween, he was at a nightclub in downtown the night Nuskii was killed. Defendant insisted he did not drive Foster anywhere and did not pull the trigger. Defendant also claimed he sold his motorcycle. Defendant told the Perkins agent he needed the “paperwork” showing everyone who snitched on him.
Defendant was subsequently interviewed by detectives and read his Miranda rights. Defendant talked with the detectives without requesting counsel. Defendant acknowledged his brother Lorenzo had been killed by members of the Bounty Hunter gang a few years earlier, and he knew that I.H. was dating someone from that gang. Defendant also said his family was from “Fruit Town.”Defendant continued to deny any involvement in the shooting, reiterating that he was in downtown and not at GonzalezPark that Halloween weekend. Defendant later admitted he may have been at the park, but it was only during the daytime and he denied seeing Foster. When the detectives said they knew he was not the shooter, Defendant said he also was not the driver. Defendant said his bike may have been used in the crime, but he was not there and did not do anything.
Foster made various admissions during his Perkins operation. After being placed in the holding cell, Foster casually spoke with the Perkins agent for a period of time.Detective McGaughey then stopped by the cell to tell Foster that his partner was running late, but that once he arrived they would be talking to him about the murder of Nuskii that had taken place before Halloween. The detective told Foster he had already spoken to I.H., S.T., Yolanda, Nikendra, and defendant.
Once Detective McGaughey left, Foster and the Perkins agent resumed talking. There were periods of silence and lots of unintelligible comments not clearly picked up by the recording device. But at one point, the Perkins agent told Foster, “It sounds like somebody telling.” Foster said, “He’s gonna ask where was I at that night, all that type of shit.” The Perkins agent asked Foster if he had any “shit at your house that puts you there” like a “Strap and all that?” Foster responded, “Nothing. None of that.” When asked if any license plates could place him at the scene, Foster said, “I wasn’t driving.”
The Perkins agent repeated at several different points in the conversation that it sounded like someone must be snitching or talking. After some largely unintelligible conversation, Foster said, “[T]hat’s what I’m telling you. I shut that nigga up.” Foster was then removed from the cell for an interview with the detectives.
After returning to the cell, the Perkins agent told Foster again he hoped he got rid of the “whip.” Foster said the other guy got rid of it, that it was not even “[his] shit,” and referenced being on a motorcycle. When asked if the motorcycle had been dealt with, defendant said the detectives told him the motorcycle was at defendant’s “baby mama’s house.” At some point, Foster asked the Perkins agent if he knew of a firearm called an “FN,” and ammunition called “five sevens” with blue tips.
Foster said the detectives were talking like they had a bunch of evidence, but they “didn’t show [him] nothing.” He said he told the detectives he smoked a lot of weed that day and did not remember anything.
There is another section of largely unintelligible comments, followed by Foster telling the Perkins agent that “this nigga, he said ‘[f]uck the dead homies.’ … [H]e go and say, ‘Fuck the dead homies’ … because he got into it with his bitch … I’m tired of that shit, bro.” The Perkins agent asked if the victim died at the scene and Foster said “[h]ell yeah.” A detective returned to the cell and showed Foster a photograph with defendant. After the detective left, the Perkins agent asked Foster about the photograph and he said “that’s the nigga that was driving when we hit Nuski[i].”
Verdict and sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. Ina bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found true all four aggravating factors.
The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the murder, and imposed a 10-year upper term enhancement for personal firearm use under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The court awarded defendant 384 actual days of presentence custody credits.No objection was raised in the trial court to the imposition of the firearm enhancement.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
CALCRIM No. 334
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 334. Defendant argues the jurors should have been instructed to decide whether I.H. and S.T. were accomplices to the murder, and that if they so found, they must then view their testimony with caution and must find sufficient corroborating evidence.
A trial court must sua sponte instruct on the principles of law governing accomplices, including the need for corroboration, whenever there is substantial evidencethat a witness is an accomplice.(People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331; accord, People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982.) The question of whether a witness qualifies as an accomplice is ordinarily a fact question for the jury to resolve.(People v. Fauber (1992) 2Cal.4th 792, 834.) Only when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law may the trial court make the factual determination and decline to instruct on accomplice liability. (Ibid.; People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 302 (Gonzales).)
Defendant contends there was substantial evidence that both I.H. and S.T. were accomplices.
An accomplice is someone who is liable “for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” (§ 1111; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1155.)To be chargeable with an identical offense, a witness must be considered a principal under section 31, and must act to assist or encourage the offense with a mental state that is “at least that required of the direct perpetrator.”(People v. McCoy (2001) 25Cal.4th 1111, 1118(McCoy).)
In other words,for an individual to be deemed an accomplice, there must be substantial evidence the individual acted “‘“with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” [Citation.] When the offense charged is a specific intent crime, the accomplice must “share the specific intent of the perpetrator”; this occurs when the accomplice “knows the full extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”’”(McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4that p.1118; accord, In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 585.)
Here, in order for the trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct to arise, there must have been substantial evidence supporting a finding that I.H. and/or S.T. engaged in acts to assist or encourage defendant and Foster in the shooting of Walton, and that they did so with the specific intent that Walton be killed, or with a conscious disregard that the shooting could result in Walton’s death.(See, e.g., People v. Reyes (2023) 14Cal.5th 981, 991; CALCRIM No. 520.)
Defendant says there was such evidence, pointing chiefly to the evidence relied upon by the prosecutor to argue motive for the Walton murder. The prosecutor urged the jury to conclude that Walton’s “dead homies” comment, yelled at I.H. and the other women from his car, was relayed to defendant and Foster. Defendant and Foster in turn retaliated against Walton for disrespecting the Fruit Town gang, and belittling the death of defendant’s brother who was a member of the gang. Defendant says Walton’s words of disrespect carried special import to individuals like I.H. and S.T., who associated with gang members and knew that such disrespect among rival gang members would be a catalyst for violence and retaliation.
There was no direct testimony that Walton’s exact words were told to either defendant or Foster. But there was evidence that after Walton made those remarks, Nikendra, Yolanda, and S.T. returned to Gonzalez Park and spoke with defendant and Foster. The cell phone records showed a call was made from Nikendra’s phone to Foster during this time period.S.T. admitted during her testimony that she also called Foster on the way back to the park.S.T.saidshe did not recall exactly what was talked about when they returned to the park, but she admitted they did see defendant and Foster, that Nikendra and Yolanda did most of the talking, and that they mainly reported that Walton was “tripping.” S.T. also confirmed that a motorcycle followed them out of the park, but she denied knowing whether it was defendant’s motorcycle.Moreover, I.H.’s testimony about feeling betrayed by the three women, while lacking any further clarity, raised an inference she felt the other women may have relayed information to defendant and Foster that resulted in Walton getting killed.
With respect to I.H., there is no substantial evidence in the record supporting a finding she was an accomplice. I.H. was Walton’s girlfriend, and while the evidence showed they were verbally arguing all day long, there is no evidence to reasonably infer I.H. wanted Walton killed.Further, I.H. testified she refused to get back into the car with the other women, despite them “begging” her to get into the car. There is no evidence I.H. returned to the park with the other women to relay any comments made by Walton to defendant and Foster. The evidence shows that after Walton made those comments and drove off, I.H. was focused on tracking him down, including walking back to his house and trying to call him.
The evidence regarding S.T. is somewhat stronger. As the Peopleaptly note, there is no evidence S.T. knew Foster or defendant had a gun or that either ever verbalized an intent to shoot Walton.But the evidence discussed above arguably raises disputed factual inferences about S.T.’s involvement in the shooting that should have been resolved by the jury.(Gonzales, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 302.)
Nevertheless, even assuming the jury should have been instructed to resolve whether S.T. was an accomplice, the instructional error was harmless. It is wellsettled that a failure to instruct on accomplice testimony is harmless if the record contains “‘sufficient corroborating evidence.’”(People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 95 (Manibusan); accord, People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 411; People v. Lewis (2001) 26Cal.4th 334, 370 (Lewis).)
Defendant urges us to find this harmless error standard does not apply on these facts. Defendant parses the language of CALCRIM No. 334. He says the “view with caution” language of CALCRIM No. 334 serves a purpose “distinct” from the corroboration required by section 1111. Defendant does not define what the appropriate standard should be, but he says that in assessing prejudice, we should treat the so-called “corroboration requirement” differently from the “ ‘view with caution’ requirement,”and that the mere presence of corroboration cannot dispense with the need to view an accomplice’s testimony with caution.
We are not persuaded this alters the outcome of the prejudice analysis. Corroboration of accomplice testimony isrequired because accomplice testimony may be biased and unreliable, hence the need to view it with caution. However, once there is sufficient corroborating evidence from independent sources that supports the reliability of the accomplice’s testimony, then the jury may rely on it to support its verdict.
Section 1111 provides in relevant part that “[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” (Ibid.) CALCRIM No.334 embraces this principle, telling the jury that if it decides “that a [witness] was an accomplice, then you may not convict the defendant of [murder]based on his or her (statement/[or] testimony) alone. You may use a (statement/[or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant to convict the defendant only if: [¶] 1.The accomplice’s(statement/[or] testimony) is supported by other evidence that you believe; [¶] 2.That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s (statement/[or] testimony); [¶] AND [¶] 3.That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime[s].” (CALCRIM No. 334.)
CALCRIM No. 334 goes on to explain that supporting, corroborative evidence “may be slight.It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the [murder], and it does not need to support every fact (mentioned by the accomplice in the statement/[or] about which the accomplice testified).” (Ibid.) Corroboration may be entirely circumstantial and need not establish every element of the charged offense. “ ‘It is “sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.” ’”(Manibusan, supra, 58Cal.4th at p. 95, italics added.)
The instruction’s concluding paragraph contains the “view with caution” language: “Any (statement/[or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/[or] testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.” (CALCRIM No. 334.)
Thus, if there is some credible evidence from nonaccomplice sources that connects the defendant to the commission of the crime, any error in failing to instruct on the law of accomplice liability is harmless. (Manibusan, supra, 58Cal.4th at p. 95.)
As for the corroboration here, defendant concedes the record contains corroborative evidence of I.H.’s and S.T.’s testimony “in the form of circumstantial evidence of [defendant’s] involvement.” Indeed, there is ample corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the Walton murder independent of S.T.’s testimony.
Defendant himself admitted to a motive for retaliating against Walton. He knew Walton was a member of the Bounty Hunter gang, and defendant’s brother had been killed by a member of that gang. During the Perkins operation, defendant directly connected himself to the events, acknowledging that he had been driving when Foster “just jump [sic] off and started doing it himself. … he chased the nigger all in the back yard, gunned him down.” In addition, defendant’s conduct in cancelling his cell phone immediately after the shooting and taking his motorcycle to be hidden at the Las Vegas home of his girlfriend reflected a consciousness of guilt. There were cell phone records showing defendant’s cell phone was in the vicinity of the murder at the time it occurred. I.H. told the detectives that defendant was the driver of the motorcycle that night, and the surveillance video captured footage of a motorcycle matching the description of defendant’s bike.
Finally, as defendant concedes, defense counsel argued to the jury that neither I.H. nor S.T. was credible because of their association with defendant and Foster. The jury was asked to focus specifically on, and make an assessment of, I.H.’s and S.T.’s credibility. The jury was also properly instructed with CALCRIM No. 105 regarding its role as the sole judge of each witness’s credibility, and that in doing so, they should consider whether the witness’s testimony was “influenced by a factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how the case [was] decided.” The jury was aware of its obligation to assess the veracity of the witnesses and any potential biases each witness might have—that is, to view the testimony with the caution it was due. (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 371.)
The firearm enhancement
Our review of the record revealed the personal firearm use allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), was pled only as to codefendant Foster. No firearm allegation was alleged as to defendant under any statute.The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Foster was the shooter, and defendant was a direct aider and abettor. The jury was not asked to consider any firearm use allegation as to defendant, and made no findings of firearm use by defendant in rendering its verdict. Nevertheless, at defendant’s sentencing hearing on February 7, 2024, the trial court imposed a 10-year upper term enhancement for personal firearm use under section 12022.5. No objection was raised in the trial court to the imposition of this enhancement, and no contention was raised on appeal regarding the sentencing error.
We issued a letter under Government Code section 68081, allowing the parties the opportunity to brief the issue before exercising our authority to strike the enhancement as unauthorized.Both defendant and the People filed supplemental briefs conceding the enhancement is unauthorized and should be stricken.
We agree the 10-year firearm use enhancement is unauthorized and must be stricken.(People v. Scott (1994) 9Cal.4th 331, 354.) On remand, the trial court is directed to prepare a modified abstract of judgment that deletes the enhancement. The trial court is also directed to include the correct date of conviction in the modified abstract, as the current abstract erroneously lists the date of the shooting (October 30, 2022) instead of the date of conviction.
DISPOSITION
We modify the judgment of conviction by striking the 10year upper term firearm enhancement imposed under Penal Code section 12022.5. We otherwise affirm the judgment of conviction as modified.
On remand, the superior court is directed to prepare a new abstract of judgment with the enhancement deleted and which includes the correct date of conviction. After making those corrections, the superior court is directed to forward the modified abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.