Marriage of Bennett and Gardner CA2/1 filed 7/28/26

Filed 7/28/26 Marriage of Bennett and Gardner CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of ANDREA BENNETT and REID GARDNER.

B338792

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19PSFL01940)

ANDREA BENNETT,

Respondent,

v.

REID GARDNER,

Appellant.

APPEAL from ajudgmentof the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kenneth M. Fuller, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall and Megan E. Dawson for Appellant.
Nelson Kirkman and Graham D. Kirkman for Respondent.
____________________________
Appellant Reid Gardner and respondent Andrea Bennett were married for approximately sixand a half years. After trial in this marital dissolution action, the familycourtissued a judgment awarding spousal support to Bennett pursuant to the parties’ stipulation,characterizingthe parties’ various assets as separate or community and valuing certain of those assets,orderingGardner to reimburse Bennett for funds he used to post bail, and awarding Bennett $70,000 in attorney fees and costs under Family Code section 271.Pursuant to these rulings, the court ordered Gardner to pay approximately $130,000 to Bennett.
Although Gardner timely requested a statement of decision andraised objections to the tentative decision, the family court erred in failing to issue a statement of decision that adequately explained the factual and legal bases for many of its property characterizations. Accordingly, in reviewing those orders, we cannot deem the court to have impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its rulings. For several of the property characterizations, we conclude the proper remedy is to remand to allow the court to issue an adequate statement of decision. We also order the court to reassess certain other property characterizations because we lack sufficient information to determine in the first instance whether, and, if so, to what extent, any of the intramarital earnings from Bennett’s separate property freelance writing business should have been apportioned to the community property estate. Further, we affirm the court’s valuation of Gardner’s USAA Federal Saving Bank account.We also conclude the court’s failure to issue an adequate statement of decision disclosing the legal and factual basis for its valuation of the community interest in one of Bennett’s bank accounts was harmless.
Next, we conclude thefamily court did not err in finding Gardner engaged in conduct sanctionable under Family Code section 271. The court, however, erred in awardingBennett $70,000 in attorney fees and costs in defending against Gardner’sultimately unsuccessful civil action because her civil counsel billed her only $54,108.37. We also order the court to determine whether Bennett used community funds to pay those attorney fees and costs, and, if she did, the court shouldadjust the equalization payment accordingly.
Lastly, we reject Gardner’s contention thathe did not owe Bennett any spousal support under the supportstipulationbecause he failed to earn a gross income ofat least $190,000 in any calendar year. Thestipulationobligated Gardner to pay spousal support to Bennett twice a month so long as Gardner retained his law license and met the annualgross income requirement. Under Gardner’s interpretation of thestipulation, he would not be required to make any support payments unless and untilenough time had elapsed for him to have earned $190,000 or more in a calendar year, at which point he would apparently owe supportarrears for the months in which he earned thatlevel of income. Gardner’s construction of thestipulation would thus undermine the objective of maintainingthe supported spouse’s standard of living. Accordingly, we conclude Gardner has not shown thefamily court erred in awarding Bennett spousal supportarrearsfor the months in which Gardner’s anticipated annual gross incomewas at least $190,000.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition of this appeal. We describe additional facts relevant to our analysis in our Discussion, post.
Bennett and Gardner were married on February 9, 2013. The couple separated on August 31, 2019; they were thus married for approximately six years and six months.
Gardner claims that during the marriage, he used his separate property to purchase a canine named Astro.According to Gardner, when Bennett “abruptly left the family home in San Diego” in September 2019, “she took Astro with her without [Gardner’s] consent.” Gardner was later arrested and charged with burglary for entering Bennett’s residence in the middle of the night to retrieve Astro.
On October 9, 2019, Bennett filed a petition for legal separation.On January 8, 2020, the parties executed and filed two stipulations: (1) a stipulation containing proposed orders requiring Gardner to pay spousal support to Bennett, provided certain conditions were met (support stipulation); and (2) a stipulationconcerning Astro (Astro stipulation). Bothstipulations were signed by the family court and issued as court orders. The Astro stipulation provided: (1) Gardner purchased Astro with separate property funds; (2) although Bennett claimed to “believe[ ] . . . [she] was withinher rights to take Astro,” the parties “agreed . . . Astro is the separate property of” Gardner; and (3) “because Astro has also become an emotional support dog for [Bennett’s] minor daughter from a prior relationship, the parties stipulate[d], and the [c]ourt d[id t]hereby find and [o]rder that Astro . . . be awarded to [Bennett].”
Gardner maintains that after the parties executed the Astro stipulation, (1)Bennett told the police she did not admit that Astro belonged to Gardner at the time he entered Bennett’s residence to retrieve the canine, and (2) Bennett testified at the preliminary hearing in the criminal case that Astro had been acquired as a family pet for her daughter.
In December 2021, Gardner moved in the family court to set aside the support and Astro stipulations on the grounds of perjury, fraud, and duress.
On February 18, 2022, Gardner filed a civil complaint against Bennett. Gardner alleged causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, tortious interference with contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and extortion.
On April 29, 2022, the familycourtfound Gardner’s allegations of perjury and fraud in his motion to set aside the support and Astro stipulations were untimely, but allowed Gardner to pursue his claim of duress at trial.
On November 18, 2022, the civil court sustained Bennett’s demurrer to Gardner’s complaint without leave to amendfor lack of jurisdiction. Gardner later reasserted in this family law case the same five causes of action he had raised in the civil action.
The familycourt conducted a trial in this matter on January 17,2024 and March 4 to 8, 2024.
On June 3, 2024, thefamilycourt issued a judgment that, inter alia, (1) awarded Bennett $26,582.83 pursuant to the supportstipulation; (2) ruled Gardner did not meet his burden of proof as to the five civil causesof action he reasserted in this family law action; (3) denied Gardner’s motion to set aside the support and Astro stipulations because he failed to meet his burden of proving duress; (4) awarded certain assets to Bennett and Gardner as their respective separate property; (5)determined certain assets belonged to the communityand the community had an interest in certain separate property assets; (6) awarded jewelry to the party currently in possession of the jewelry without offset or equalization; (7) ordered Gardner to reimburse Bennett $25,000 because the court found he used community funds to post bail; and (8) ordered Gardner to pay Bennett $70,000 in attorney fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to Family Code section 271. The net effect of the court’s rulings was an order requiringGardner to make an equalization payment toBennett of $134,491.43, with interest accruing at the legal rate of 10 percent per year starting on June1, 2024.
On May 10, 2024, Gardner filed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment. On August 1, 2024, Gardner filed another notice of appeal from the judgment. On August 16, 2024, this court granted Gardner’s motion to consider his premature appeal from the judgment and directed the court clerk to file Gardner’s second notice of appeal in the record for this appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gardner challenges many of the family court’s property characterizations (Discussion part B, post), the order requiring him to reimburse Bennett $25,000for Gardner’salleged use of community funds to post bail (Discussion, part C, post), the award of $70,000 in sanctions under Family Code section 271 (Discussion, part D, post), and the award of spousal support arrears and interest under the support stipulation (Discussion, part E, post). Before resolving these issues, we decide whether the court failed to issue an appropriate statement of decision.
The FamilyCourt Erred In Failing To Issue a Statement of Decision Explaining the Legal and Factual Bases for theProperty CharacterizationsGardner Challenges on Appeal
The law governing statements of decision
Ordinarily, “ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of implied findings, the reviewing court must infer, following a bench trial, that the trial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its decision.’ [Citation.]” (SeeThompson v. Asimos (2016) 6Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)“For the doctrine of implied findings to be disabled on appeal,” a party must follow“both steps of the two-step procedure [set forth by Code of Civil Procedure] section[s] 632 and 634 . . . .” (See Thompson, at pp.979, fn. 2, 983.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 provides in pertinent part: “(a) In superior courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial. The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision . . . .The request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. After a party has requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of the statement of decision. [¶] (b) The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subds. (a)–(b).)
As relevant here, Code of Civil Procedure section 634 provides: “When a statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue, or if the statement is ambiguous and the record shows that the omission or ambiguity was brought to the attention of the trial court . . . prior to entry of judgment . . . , it shall not be inferred on appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 634.)This statute requires a party to identify “[t]he alleged omission or ambiguity . . . with sufficient particularity to allow the trial court to correct the defect. [Citation.] ‘By filing specific objections to the court’s statement of decision a party pinpoints alleged deficiencies in the statement and allows the court to focus on the facts or issues the party contends were not resolved or whose resolution is ambiguous.’[Citation.]”(See Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 498 (Ermoian).)
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(d), (e), (f), and (g)implement Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634. (See Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p.982.)Rule3.1590(f) provides, as a general rule, “If a party requests a statement of decision . . . , the court must, within 30 days of announcement or service of the tentative decision, prepare and serve a proposed statement of decision and a proposed judgment on all parties that appeared at the trial . . . .” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule3.1590(f).) Rule 3.1590(g) in turn provides: “Any party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment.” (Id., rule3.1590(g).)
Although Gardner timely requested a statement of decision and timely objected to the familycourt’s proposed statement of decision, the court failed to issue an adequate statement of decision as tomany of itsproperty characterizations
The parties do not dispute that the family “court issued its tentative decision in writing via a Minute Order . . . . [that] was issued on March 13, 2024.”In the March 13, 2024 minute order, the courtmade property characterization rulings butdid not explain the court’s rationale for those rulings. For instance, the family court simply found Bennett had “met her burden of proof” in showing that certain assets (e.g., Chase Bank account nos. xxx5239 and xxx0210) “were either acquired before marriage or are otherwise [Bennett’s] separate property . . . .” The court clerk served notice of entry of the March 13, 2024 minute order on the parties’ counsel on the date the order was issued.
Gardner “served and filed a Request for Statement of Decision . . . on March 22, 2024,” that is, within the 10-day deadline for doing so. (See Discussion, part A.1, ante.)Gardner sought a statement of decision on, inter alia, the rulings that we address in Discussion, parts B.1 to B.6, post.
On May 10, 2024, thecourt issued two ordersdenying Gardner’s request for a statement of decision on the ground that the court’s March 13, 2024 minute order “explain[ed] the court’s factual and legal determinations sufficiently toconstitute the statement of decision.” Neither order issued on May 10, 2024 indicates the court directed the court clerk or either party to serve one or both of the orders on the parties. Therefore, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(g)’s15-day deadline for Gardnerto object to the rulingsincluded in the March 13, 2024 minute orderwas not triggered by the May 10, 2024 orders. (See Discussion, part A.1, ante [noting that rule3.1590(g) provides a 15-day deadline that commences upon service of a proposed statement of decision and judgment].)
On May 28, 2024, Gardner filed and served a document that construed the March 13, 2024 minute order as a proposed statement of decisionand levelled objections to that document.In particular, Gardner objected to the proposed statement of decision’s failure to explain the legal and factual basis for eachruling weaddress in Discussion, parts B.1 to B.4 and B.6, post.On June 3, 2024, the familycourt filed the judgment,which adopted the rulings provided in its March 13, 2024minute order.
In light of the procedural history described above, we conclude Gardner timely requested and objected to the court’s statement of decision.We also conclude the court failed to issue an adequate statement of decision. A “ ‘court’s statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.’ [Citations.] . . . ‘[T]he term “ultimate fact” generally refers to a core fact, such as an essential element of a claim.’ [Citation.]‘Ultimate facts are distinguished from evidentiary facts and from legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (See Thompson, supra, 6Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)As we noted above, the court’s property characterizations are only legal conclusions.We thus have “no means of ascertaining the [family] court’s reasoning [as to these rulings] or determining whether its findings on disputed factual issues support the judgment as a matter of law.” (See id. at p.982.)
Bennettargues Gardner was not entitled to a statement of decision because he “failed to timely submit a proposed statement of decision and written judgment.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) In advancing this argument, she relies upon California Rules of Court, rule3.1590(f),which states: “If a party requests a statement of decision . . . , the court must, within30days of announcement or service of the tentative decision, prepare and serve a proposed statement of decision and a proposed judgment on all parties that appeared at the trial, unless the court has ordered a party to prepare the statement. A party that has been ordered to prepare the statement must within 30 days after the announcement or service of the tentative decision, serve and submit to the court a proposed statement of decision and a proposed judgment. If the proposed statement of decision and judgment are not served and submitted within that time, any other party that appeared at the trial may within10days thereafter: (1) prepare, serve, and submit to the court a proposed statement of decision and judgment or (2) serve on all other parties and file a notice of motion for an order that a statement of decision be deemed waived.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(f), italics added.)
Bennett acknowledges that the“court did not order either party in this matter to prepare a statement of decision,” and that the court did not prepare and serve a proposed judgment prior to the expiration of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(f)’s 30-day deadline for doing so. Bennett argues, without any supporting record citation, that at an unspecified point in time, she “requested that the court enter an order deeming the statement of decision waived.” Further, she intimates the court’s failure to issue that order was harmless because we may deem Gardner to have waived his right to a statement of decision by not serving Bennett with a proposed statement of decision andjudgment within 10days after the expiration of the court’s 30-day deadline for serving a proposed statement of decision and judgment under rule3.1590(f).
We are unpersuaded.California Rules of Court, rule3.1590(f)authorizes a partyto serve and submit a proposed statement of decision and judgment or move for an order “deem[ing]” the statement of decision “waived,” either of which actions must occur “within 10 days” after the initial deadline to prepare and serve a proposed statement of decision and judgment elapses; that initial deadline is 30days after the court announces or serves its tentative decision. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule3.1590(f).)Adopting Bennett’s construction of rule3.1590(f) would put a party in the untenable position of filing a motion deeming the other party’s right to a statement of decision to have been waived before the other party would have waived that right by failing to timelyserve and submit a proposed statement of decision and judgment. We reject Bennett’s impractical construction of this rule. (See People v. Lofchie(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 240, 251(Lofchie) [“‘“We must... avoid an interpretation [of a statute] that would lead toabsurdconsequences.” ’ ”]; Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902 [“The ordinary principles of statutory construction govern our interpretation of the California Rules of Court.”].)Rather, we read rule 3.1590(f) as allowing a party to secure an order deeming another party to have waived the right to a statement of decision onlyif the court ordered the other party to serve and submit a proposed statement of decision and judgment but failed timely to do so. Because thecourt did not order Gardner to serve and submit a proposed statement of decision, Gardner did not waive his right to a statement of decision by failing to comply with rule 3.1590(f)’s deadline for doing so.
We next turn to the appropriate remedies for thecourt’s failure to issue an appropriate statement of decision.
Remanding To Allow theFamily Court To Issue the Required Statement of Decision Is the ProperRemedy as to Several of the Challenged Property Characterizations, Whereas Others Require a Different Disposition
“ ‘Characterization . . . refers to the process of classifying property as separate, community, or quasi-community.’ [Citation.] It ‘is an integral part of the division of property on marital dissolution.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91 (Ciprari).) “Under Family Code section 2550, the court must divide the community estate of the parties equally.” (In re Marriage of Campi (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1572, fn.omitted.) “The trial court’s findings on the characterization and valuation of assets in a dissolution proceeding are factual determinations which are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Ibid.)“ ‘In a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, the appellate court will “consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings]. [Citations.]” [Citation.] We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations. [Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Ciprari, at p. 94.)
Although Code of Civil Procedure section 634 bars us from invoking the doctrine of implied findings to review the property characterizations for which thecourt was required to — but did not — prepare an adequate statement of decision (see Discussion, part A, ante), the proper appellate remedy for that error is not denovo review of the evidence concerning those rulings. “The function of [a] . . . Court of Appeal is not to supplant the trial court as the forum for consideration of the facts and assessing the credibility of witnesses or to substitute its discretion for that of the trial court.” (See Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1437.)
“Where a reviewing court determines that a trial court’s failure to issue a properly requested statement of decision was prejudicial,” e.g., if reversal is “ ‘ “require[d] . . . in order for the appellate court to effectively perform a review of the material issues[,]” ’ ”“the usual remedy is to remand with instructions to issue a proper statement of decision.” (See Alafi v. Cohen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 46, 62, 71–72 (Alafi).)“To the extent the trial judge has no immediate independent recollection of the matter he must take whatever steps are available to refresh his recollection to perform his duty” to prepare a statement of decision setting forth the legal and factual bases for the court’s rulings. (See Karlsen v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1531.)
Gardner asks us todirect thecourt to issue a modified judgment in his favor on the disputed property characterizations.To obtain that appellate relief, Gardner must demonstrate, as a matter of law, he is entitled to the modified judgment he seeks. (See Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 370 (Regalia) [indicating that an “ ‘appellate court can reverse with directions to enter [a] judgment or order’ ” if it is persuaded “ ‘the record indicates what the proper judgment or order should have been’ ”]; Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,94Cal.App.5th at p. 792 [holding that a reviewing court does not make arguments for the parties].) As we explain below, Gardner fails to discharge that burden. (See Discussion, parts B.1–B.7, post.)
As for the court’s award ofChase Bank account nos.xxx0210 and xxx5239, Schwab accountnos. xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324, Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574, and aRolex watch to Bennett as her separate property, we reverse those rulings and instruct the court to reconsider the characterization of those assets on remand in light of the issues we address in Discussion, parts B.1–B.3, post.
We further conclude there is a possibility that the following rulings could be supported by substantial evidence: (1)the award of the wedding ring to Bennett without offset or equalization, and (2) the award of Fidelity IRA account no. xxx2240 to Bennett as her separate property. (See Discussion, parts B.4 & B.6, post.) Remand, however, is still necessary because the court failed toprovide us with its rationale for those determinations.
Because Gardner’s objection regarding USAA Federal Saving Bank account no. 937-4 was inadequate (see fn. 6, ante),the familycourt did not err in declining to issue a statement of decision articulating the legal and factual basis for its rulingthe community had an interest of $15,420.39 in that account. We thus review that ruling under the doctrine of implied findings (ibid.), and affirm the court’s valuation of the community’s interest in the account because substantial evidence supports it (see Discussion, part B.5, post).
Lastly, assuming arguendo the court failed to articulate sufficiently its rationale for declining toadd $5,500 to the community’s interest in Bennett’s Chase Bank account no.xxx7946, that error was harmless. (See Discussion, part B.7, post [explaining that the community’s interest in the $5,500 intramarital transfer from Chase Bank account no. xxx7946 toan IRA account will be accounted for in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)].) Consequently, we affirm the court’s valuation of the community interest in Chase Bank account no.xxx7946. (See Alafi, supra, 106Cal.App.5th at pp.63–64 [noting that “the failure to issue a requested statement of decision is not reversible per se, but instead is subject to harmless error analysis”].)
The court erred in awarding Chase Bank account nos. xxx5239 and xxx0210 to Bennett as her separate property
The court awarded to Bennett as her separate property her “S-Corp, inclusive of Chase Bank Account No. xxx5239 and Chase Bank Account No. xxx0210.” The court did not articulate its reasoning for this ruling.We conclude the court erred in failing to determine whether some portion of the S-Corporation’s profits contained within these accounts should be apportioned to the community.
According to Bennett’s testimony at trial, prior to her marriage to Gardner, she opened Chase Bank account nos. xxx0210 (a checking account) and xxx5239 (a savings account), and her initial deposits into account no. xxx5239 consisted ofan inheritance from her late first husbandtotaling an amount greater than $50,000 but lower than $100,000.Bennett testified she thereafter deposited into those two accounts the payments she earned as a freelance writer through her S-Corporation titled “Andrea Bennett, Inc.,” which business she claimed to have incorporated in 2011.Bennett further testified she earnedincome from this business both before and during her marriage to Gardner.Neither side directs us to any evidence showing the balances of Chase Bank account nos. xxx0210 and xxx5239 on the date of Bennett’s marriage to Gardner.
Bennettalso testified that prior to her marriage to Gardner, Bennett saved $195,000in Chase Bank account no.xxx5239 (the savings account), which she asserted were separate propertyfunds “inclusive of money [she] inherited from [her] first marriage and money earned from [her] S-Corp prior to [her] marriage” to Gardner. She admitted at trial she did not have any documentary proof supporting her assertion she had saved $195,000 prior to marrying Gardner. Bennett stated that on June 30, 2014, she used the $195,000 in premarital savings from her Chase Bank account no. xxx5239 toopen Schwab account no. xxx1094. (See Discussion, partB.2, post [discussing the family court’s characterization of Schwab accountno. xxx1094].)
On appeal, Gardner argues, “The profits from [Bennett’s] business during marriage” deposited into Chase Bank account nos. xxx0210 and xxx5239 “are community property.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.)Gardner claims the funds Bennett deposited into these accounts are “community property earnings during marriage,” and that she “commingl[ed]” those funds “with her claimed separate property savings before marriage.” Further, according to Gardner, “the evidence established that during the marriage, account #0210 dropped to $507.98 [citation], and account #5239 dropped to $10.95,” whereas “[a]s of October1,2019, shortly after the date of separation, account#0210 had a balance of $95,997.60 and account #5239 had a balance of $37,091.89.” Gardner thus maintains he “is entitled to one half of the balances in the[se two a]ccounts as of the date of separation” because the funds therein consisted of “income from [Bennett’s] personal services as a freelance writer during the marriage” that had been commingled with separate property funds, the latter of which “had been exhausted during the marriage.”
Bennett acknowledges that “any . . . monies in [these two] account[s]” deposited after the initial pre-marriage deposits totaling “between $50,000.00 and $100,000.00” were “earned from [her] separate property business[,] specifically, from freelance writing payments received . . . .” Bennett, however, intimatesthere was no community interest in the two accounts because Bennett’s “opinion was [that] the value of the business was [the] same at trial as at date of [the] marriage.” The portion of the reporter’s transcript cited by Bennett contains the following colloquy:
“Q. . . . Is your opinion of the value of Andrea Bennett, Inc., today the same as when you were married, your date of marriage February 2013?
“A. I don’t know the amount that is in the account now versus the amount that was there on the date of my marriage. The value of the business is likely the same, but the amount of money in the accounts is likely different.
“Q. In your opinion, why is the value of the business the same from 2013 to today’s date?
“A. Because that’s a business that I’ve maintained for nearly 25 years.”
As noted above, each party takes a maximalist approach, with Gardner asserting the earnings from Bennett’s freelance business during the marriage are entirely community property, and Bennett claiming they areentirely separate property.
The court declared the business, inclusive of Chase Bank account nos. xxx0210 and xxx5239, to be Bennett’s separate property. Because the court failed to issue a statement of decision explaining its rationale for this award to Bennett, we cannot review its ruling under the doctrine of implied findings. (See Discussion, part A, ante.)
Furthermore, we lack sufficient information to determine in the first instance whether, and if so, to what extent, the community has an interest in the two accounts. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17Cal.App.4th 842, 851 [indicating that if “a [spouse] owns a separate property business and devotes [the spouse’s] efforts to the enterprise,” then “an apportionment of the profits” between the separate and community estates is appropriate]; Beam v. Bank of America (1971) 6 Cal.3d 12, 18 [holding that a court “ ‘may select [whichever method of allocation of profits] will achieve substantial justice between the parties’ ”].)Although Gardner acknowledges the family court “must ‘determine what portion of the profits . . . arises from the use of [the spouse’s] capital and what part arises from the activity and personal ability of the spouse[,]’ ” he offers no analysis or citation to authority to support his position that none of Bennett’s business income during marriage isher separate property. Similarly, Bennett offers no citation to authority supporting herclaim that because she opined the value of the business was the same at trial as it was at the date of marriage,the community has no interest inthe earnings from her freelance writing business.
We thusleave thisproperty characterization and valuation issue to the court to resolve on remand.The court is directed to articulate the legal and factual basis for its ruling as to Chase Bank account nos. xxx5239 and xxx0210. Nothing in our opinion bars the court from requesting further argument and evidence from the parties regarding whether and to what extent the community has an interest in these two accounts.
The court erred in awardingSchwab account nos. xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324 and Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574 to Bennett as her separate property
The court awarded Bennett, as her separate property,Schwab account nos. xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324, along with Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574.
The record contains evidence tending to show the source of the funds for all four accounts was the initial $195,000 deposit from Chase Bank account no. xxx5239 to Schwab account no.xxx1094 on June 30, 2014. (See Discussion, part B.1, ante[discussing evidence relating to the initial deposit into Schwab account no. xxx1094].) Bennett testified that in August2014, she opened Schwab account no. xxx6584 with a $100,000 deposit from Schwab account no. xxx1094.Gardner acknowledges in his opening brief that Bennett opened Schwab account no.xxx4324 in 2016; Bennett testified at trial the initial source of the funds for Schwab account no. xxx4324 was the $195,000 deposit into account no.xxx1094. Similarly, Gardner acknowledges Bennett opened Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574 in 2017,which Bennett testified she opened with funds originating from the initial $195,000 deposit.
Because the court did not issue a statement of decision explaining why the court awarded all four Schwab accounts to Bennett as her separate property, we cannot infer the court credited this evidence connecting these four accounts to the $195,000 deposit from Chase Bank account no.xxx5239 in June2014. (See Discussion, part A, ante.)Additionally,if the court did rely upon Bennett’s testimonyconnecting the Schwab accounts to Chase Bank account no.xxx5239when the court awardedthese Schwab accounts to Bennett as her separate property, we cannot presume the court determined whether, and to what extent, the freelance writing payments earned during marriage that Bennett deposited intoChase Bank account no.xxx5239 should be allocated to the community. (See Discussion, part B.1, ante.)That determination as to the community’s potential interest in the freelance payments could ultimately affect the value of any community interest in the four Schwab accounts.Accordingly, we reverse the award of the four Schwab accounts to Bennett as her separate property, and direct the court to determine upon remand whether, and, to what extent, the community has an interest inthe Schwab accounts.
Gardner advocates the proper appellate remedy is todirect the familycourt to “modify the [j]udgment to reflect” that Schwab account nos. xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324 and Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574 “and any funds they contain are community property.” He invokes Family Code section 760’s “basic presumption that, except as otherwise provided by statute, all property acquired by a married person during marriage, while domiciled in California, is community property.” (See Ciprari, supra,32 Cal.App.5th at p.91.) According to Gardner, to overcome this presumption, “[Bennett] was required to trace her separate property before marriage (inheritance and saved earnings), as well as the withdrawal or transfer during the marriage to the Schwab Accounts and Schwab IRA.” He contends Bennett “failed to produce any such evidence and her testimony alone does not meet this exacting burden” because her testimony was not corroborated by any “records or expert testimony . . . .” As we explain below, Gardner has not shown the heightened recordkeeping requirement to rebut the community property presumption applies to Chase Bank account no. xxx5239 — which Bennett claimed was the source of the $195,000 deposit into Schwab account no. xxx1094 — or to any of the four Schwab accounts at issue.
“The need for specific records and documents to trace funds”to rebut “the general presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property”“arises when there is a commingled account,” that is, the “commingling of separate and community funds . . . .”(See In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217Cal.App.4th 10, 25 (Ficke).) “A burden of recordkeeping logically arises out of the very act of commingling funds during marriage so the general community property presumption is not thwarted.” (See ibid.) “ ‘[I]f the separate property and community property interests have been commingled in such a manner that the respective contributions cannot be traced and identified, the entire commingled fund will be deemed community property pursuant to the general community property presumption of [Family Code] section 760.’ [Citations.]” (See Ciprari, supra, 32Cal.App.5th at pp. 91–92& fn. 5,italics added.)
“ ‘Generally, either of two tracing methods may be used to characterize disputed property interests [and thereby rebut the general community property presumption]—“direct tracing”or “family living expense tracing”’ [citation].” (See Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 95–96.) The first method “requires (a)documentary proof that sufficient separate property funds were available in the account at the time of purchase and (b)proof that the spouse making the purchase intended to use separate, rather than community, funds.” (See ibid.) The second method requires a “showing that . . . all community property funds were exhausted at the time the purchase or payment at issue was made [such that] separate property funds necessarily must have been used.” (See id. at p. 96.)
Conversely, acourt may rely solely on the “testimony of a single witness, even a party in a divorce case,” that separate property funds in an account were not commingled with community funds, such that heightened recordkeeping requirements are inapplicable. (See Ficke,supra, 217Cal.App.4th at p.27.)
In arguing that Bennett could not rely upon her testimony to trace the initial deposit of $195,000 inSchwab account no.xxx1094 to Chase Bank account no. xxx5239, Gardner appears to treat Chase Bank account no. xxx5239 as if it were a commingled account, the contents of which are presumptively community property unless Bennett complies with heightened recordkeeping requirements. Indeed, in connection with Chase Bank account nos. xxx5239 and xxx0210, he claims all “the profits from [Bennett’s] business during marriage are community property” (boldface & some capitalization omitted), and because Bennett supposedly “commingl[ed] . . . her community property earnings during marriage with her claimed separate property savings before marriage,” the full balances of both Chase Bank accounts belong to the community.
In our Discussion, part B.1, ante, wehave rejected Gardner’s argument as to the S-Corporation’s twoChase Bank accounts. Further, even if the community doeshave an interest in the two Chase Bank accounts,this case stillwould not involve the paradigm of commingling in which a spouse deposits intramaritalsalary and other employment compensation into an account containing separate property funds. (See, e.g., Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp.89–91, 101 [describing such a scenario and noting the husband in that case offered a “detailed tracing analysis” in an attempt to rebut the general community property presumption].) At no point on appeal does Gardner address whether heightened recordkeeping tracing requirements apply when the alleged source of separate property funds is an account thatmaycontain an unapportioned community interest in intramarital business profits (i.e., Chase Bank account no.xxx5239).
Accordingly, Gardner has not shown he is entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment awarding to the community the entirety of Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574 and Schwab account nos. xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324 pursuant to the general community property presumption. We express no opinion on how the court should characterize these accounts.We simply concludeGardner has not met his burden of demonstrating he is entitled to an order directing the court to characterize these accounts as community property.(See Discussion, part B, ante [noting at the outset of this part that Gardner bears the burden of showing his entitlement to judgment in his favor as a matter of law].)
In sum, we reverse the award of Schwab account nos.xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324 and Schwab IRA account no.xxx1574 to Bennett as her separate property, and remand the matter to the court for further proceedings to ascertain the characterization of these accounts and issue a statement of decision articulating the factual and legal bases for its characterizations of these accounts.
The court erred in awarding the Rolex watch to Bennett as separate property
The family court ruled, “With respect to all . . . jewelry [other than the parties’ wedding rings], the court finds all [such] other jewelry to be the separate property of the spouse in possession of such jewelry and awards all [such] other jewelry to the spouse presently in possession of said jewelry without offset o[r] equalization.”
At trial, the court heard evidence that Bennett purchased a Rolex watch on August 19, 2013,that is, approximately six months into her marriage to Gardner. (Factual & Procedural Background, ante [noting the parties were married in Feb. 2013].) Bennett testified she traded in jewelry from her first marriage to cover $1,945.80 of the purchase price. Bennett also provided testimony indicating thatshepaid the remaining $7,567 of the purchase price out of one or both of her bank accounts associated with her S-Corporation,that is Chase Bank account nos.xxx0210 and/orxxx5239. (See Discussion, part B.1, ante [identifying those two accounts].)Additionally, it can be inferred from Bennett’s testimony that her income during the first six months of her marriage would not have been sufficient for her to purchase the watch, thereby suggesting she used at least some premarital funds for the acquisition.
Gardner asks us to “modify the [j]udgment to reflect a community property interest of $7,567 in the Rolex watch.” He contends, “[Bennett] did not offer any documentary evidence establishing the date of the alleged transfer or tracing the funds to a separate property source.” Gardner further contends, “[E]ven if [Bennett] had established the funds came from” one or both of the Chase Bank accounts associated with her SCorporation, those accounts were “commingled” such that the Rolex watch acquired with the funds should be deemed community property.
As we explained in our Discussion, partB.1, ante, the court must determine in the first instance on remand whether to allocate to the community a portion of the intramaritalfreelance writing paymentsdeposited into the two Chase Bank accounts.Because Bennett testified she used $7,567 from one or both of those accounts to acquire the Rolex watch, on remand,the lower court must determine whether to credit that testimony andto what extent, if any, the community has an interest in the watch.
Gardnerfails to showBennett’s testimony would not be a legally sufficient basisupon which the court could find the Chase Bank accounts were the source of funds used to purchase the Rolex.The statutory community property presumption required Bennett to produce specific records tracing the watch to separate property only if the funds used to purchase that asset came from a commingled account. (See Discussion, part B.2, ante.) Gardner has not shown that the funds in the Chase Bank accounts were subject to that heightened recordkeeping tracing requirement. (See ibid.) Therefore, he fails to demonstrate,as a matter of law, that he is entitled to a judgment awarding the community an interest of $7,567 in the Rolex watch. We express no opinion on who would prevail upon remand regarding whether the community has an interest in the watch.
We thus reverse the family court’s finding that the Rolex watch is entirely Bennett’s separate property, and direct the court to reconsider that determination after assessing whether Bennett’s earnings from her S-Corporation during marriage should be apportioned in whole or in partto the community.
Remand is necessary as to the court’s award of the wedding ring to Bennett as her separate property
Family Code section 852, subdivision (a) provides: “A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected.” (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a).) Subdivision (c) of the statute states in relevant part: “This section does not apply to a gift between the spouses of . . . jewelry . . . that is used solely or principally by the spouse to whom the gift is made and that is not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage.” (Id., subd. (c).)
The court found that Gardner and Bennett “exchanged wedding rings with one another after marriage,” the two “gave and received the aforementioned wedding rings as gifts,” and, because the “wedding rings are gifts within the meaning of Family Code §852(c)[,] . . . [Bennett’s] wedding ring and [Gardner’s] wedding ring [were] awarded to the party [then] in possession of said ring without offset or equalization.” The court did not find that Gardner made the written declarationas specified in Family Code section 852, subdivision (a).
On appeal, Gardner does not dispute the court’s finding that both wedding rings were gifts. Instead, he correctly points out the court did not make “any express finding as to whether the ring was or was not a ‘gift of substantial value’ ” such that there was a valid transmutation under Family Code section 852, subdivision (c),“nor [did the court] cite to any evidence supporting such a finding.” Because the court failed to explain its rationale for awarding the wedding ring to Bennett without offset or equalization, we cannot apply the doctrine of implied findings to the order awarding the wedding ring to Bennett.(See Discussion, part A, ante.)
Gardner argues we should “modify the [j]udgment to reflect a reimbursement to [Gardner] for his separate property contribution of $17,300 to the purchase of [Bennett’s] wedding ring.”
On appeal, Gardnerclaims he testifiedthat “he contributed approximately $17,300 in separate property funds to the purchase of [Bennett’s] wedding ring.” (Italics added.) In the excerpts of his testimony he cites,however, Gardner did notidentify the source of those purported separate propertyfunds. Additionally, under the substantial evidence standard, the court did not have to credit Gardner’s testimony. (See Ciprari, supra, 32Cal.App.5th at p. 94[“ ‘In a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, . . . .[w]e may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.’ ”].)
Next, on appeal, Gardnercontends Bennett testified, “[T]he circumstances of the marriage were such that the Rolex watch she purchased shortly after marriage for $7,000was substantial in value because she would not have earned enough money to cover it during the first six months of her marriage.”He apparently contends this testimony conclusively establishes “[Gardner’s] contribution of $17,300[towards the wedding ring] shortly after the marriage wouldalso be substantial in value.” BecauseGardner does not sufficiently analyzethe couple’s financial circumstances at the time of the purchase ofBennett’s wedding ring, he fails to demonstrate affirmativelythe absence of substantial evidence of transmutation under Family Code section852, subdivision(c).
Accordingly, Gardner has not shown his entitlement,as a matter of law,to reimbursement of $17,300 for Bennett’s wedding ring.We direct the family court to prepare a revised statement of decision setting forth its factual and legal findings regardingthe wedding ring.
We affirm the familycourt’s determination that the community had an interest of $15,420.39in Gardner’s USAA Federal Saving Bank account no. xxx937-4
The parties agree their date of separation was August31, 2019. “The earnings and accumulations of a spouse... after the date of separation of the spouses[ ] are the separate property of the spouse.” (See Fam. Code, § 771, subd.(a).)
The family court found the community had an interest of $15,420.39 in Gardner’s USAA Federal Saving Bank account no. xxx937-4.Gardner argues, “This amount came from [Gardner’s] Schedule of Assets and Debts, filed December 9, 2019. [Citation.] However, during trial,the court admitted into evidence an account statement for the period ending September5, 2019 (shortly after separation) reflecting a balance of $5,771.67.” According to Gardner, because “[t]he September 5 statement is the best documentary proxy for the date-of-separation value,” “the judgment should be modified to reflect a community interest of $5,771.67 in account #937-4.”
Gardner does not dispute—and thus tacitly agrees with—Bennett’s assertions that (1) the USAA Federal Saving Bank statement for the account as of September 5, 2019 was only “a partial [account] statement” and (2) Gardner offered no testimony explaining “the nearly $10,000.00 difference between” the $15,420.39 balance shown on his December 9, 2019schedule of assets and debts and the $5,771.67 balance shown on the September 5, 2019 partial account statement.These undisputed facts constitute substantial evidence thatthe September 5, 2019 partial account statement was not reliable evidence of the balance of the account as of August 31, 2019. Put differently,a reasonable factfinder could infer that Gardner may have transferred certain funds out of that account after August31,2019 and redeposited them into the account prior to December 9, 2019.(See Ciprari, supra,32 Cal.App.5th at p. 94 [holding that under the substantial evidence standard, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the judgment and the reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence].)
We thus reject Gardner’s assertionthe courthad to believe the $5,771.67 balance in the September5, 2019 partial account statement.Rather, applying the doctrine of implied findings (see fn. 6, ante), weconclude the court rejected Gardner’s reliance on the September5, 2019 partial account statementand thatsubstantial evidence supported the court’sdecision not to rely on that partial statement.We affirm the court’s rulingthat the community has an interest of $15,420.39 in USAA Federal Saving Bank account no.xxx937-4.
Remand is necessary as to the court’s award ofFidelity IRA account no.xxx2240to Bennett as her separate property
The court awarded Fidelity IRA account no. xxx2240 to Bennett as her separate property. In her final declaration of disclosure dated October 20, 2023 that was admitted into evidence as trial exhibit No. 2, Bennett stated she opened this account in 2018. Gardner acknowledges in his opening brief Bennett testified at trial that “the Fidelity IRA was a rollover account from a job she had prior to marriage, and that she made no deposits during the marriage.” The court’s failure to provide an adequate statement of decision prevents us from inferring it relied on Bennett’s testimony.
Gardner maintains we should direct the court to modify the judgment to designate the Fidelity IRA account as community property because Bennett’s testimony is insufficient, as a matter of law, to overcome Family Code section760’s community property presumption. As we explained in our Discussion partB.2, ante,“The need for specific record tracing arises when there is a commingled account.” (See Ficke, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p.25.) Gardner does not direct us to any evidence showing this Fidelity IRA account, or the retirement account from which the funds deposited into the Fidelity IRA account originated, contained commingled funds. We thus cannot conclude on this record that Family Code section 760 required the court to characterize the Fidelity IRA account as community property.We thus direct the court on remand to provide an adequate statement of decision on the characterization of this Fidelity IRA account.
Any failure on the part of the court to articulatesufficiently its rationale forvaluing the community interest in Chase Bank account no.xxx7946at $21,698 was harmless
The court ruled the community has an interest of $21,698.00 in Chase Bank account no. xxx7946. Gardner complains the court “failed to credit the community interest in [this account] by $5,500 for [Bennett’s] intra-marital transfer to her Vanguard IRA [account].”
In response, Bennett claims, inter alia,she had transferred the $5,500 to Vanguard IRA account no. xxx9925. She correctly points out the court had ordered the community interest in this IRA account to be divided pursuant to a QDRO.Bennett maintains, “Said division will result in a division of any community interest in this account, including any deposits or transfers made during the marriage.” Put differently, according to Bennett, “upon completion of the [QDRO] for Vanguard IRA [account no.] xxx9925, [Gardner] will be fully compensated [as to] his requested $5,500.00 reimbursement. . . .”
In his reply, Gardner does not rebut Bennett’s contentions (1)she deposited the $5,500 into Vanguard IRA account no.xxx9925, and (2) he will be fully compensated for that transfer upon the completion of the QDRO.
Because we deem the parties to have agreed the court didnot erroneously exclude $5,500 from the community estate because the Vanguard IRA will be subject to a QDRO (see fn.12,ante), any failure bythe court to set forth sufficiently the legal and factual basis for not increasing the community’s interest in Chase Bank account no. xxx7946 by $5,500 was harmless. (See Discussion, part B, ante [noting at the outset of this part the failure to issue a statement of decision can constitute harmless error].) We thus affirm this ruling.
TheFamilyCourt Erred In Ordering Gardner To Reimburse Bennett $25,000 for Bail
On appeal, Gardner argues the family court erred in ordering him to reimburse Bennett $25,000 for his posting bail. He contendsBennett did not satisfy her burden ofshowing he used community funds to post bail.Indeed, he asserts, “[N]o testimony was offered [showing] that such [bail] payment was made from community funds . . . .”
Thecourt found “[Gardner] posted bail in the amount of $50,000.00 to obtain pre-trial release from jail following his arrest” and “[Gardner] was unable to trace the payment of this bail money to a separate property source.” The court thus placed the burden on Gardner to show he paid the bail with his separate property funds. This was error. Bennett bore the burden of demonstrating Gardner misappropriated or misused community assets for his personal benefit. (See In re Marriage of Feldner (1995) 40Cal.App.4th 617, 625 [holding that “the aggrieved spouse” seeking“reimbursement to the community for losses caused by separate conduct of one spouse” must make an “affirmative showing” the spouse who incurred the losses engaged in“intentional conduct not benefiting the community”].)She didnot satisfy that burden.
In her appellate brief, Bennett does not direct us to any evidence Gardner used community property funds to post bail.Instead, she cites her testimonythat she “believe[d]” the amount of bail paid was $50,000, but she did not specify the source of the payment. She also citesGardner’s testimony that (1) he paid only $25,000 for bail, (2) he made the payment from certain unspecified separate property investments, but (3)he could not otherwise“remember where [he] got the money.”
Bennett’s failure to identify any evidence tracing Gardner’sbail payment to a community source is fatal to her claim for reimbursement. We thus reverse the order requiring Gardner to reimburse Bennett $25,000 for the bail payment and direct the court to issue a modified judgment omitting that order. (See Regalia, supra,172 Cal.App.4th at p. 370 [“ ‘If the record indicates what the proper judgment . . . should have been, the appellate court can reverse with directions to enter that judgment . . . .’ ”].)
Although We Affirm the Court’s Decision To Award a Sanction UnderFamily Code Section 271, We Reverse the Amount of the Sanction and, to the Extent Bennett Used Community Funds To Pay Her Civil Attorneys, the Court Must Adjust Any Equalization Payment Accordingly
Family Code section 271, subdivision (a) provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.” (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a).)
The family court awarded Bennett $70,000 in sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271, which the court found were theattorney fees and costs Bennett incurred “with her civil counsel, Freedman & Taitelman,” in defending against Gardner’s civil action. The court identified three independent bases for its decision, each of which “merit[ed] sanctions”: (1) the civil action Gardner brought against Bennett “frustrated the public policy of the state to promote settlement of litigation[ and was] frivolous”; (2)Gardner’s motion to set aside the support and Astro stipulations likewise“frustrated the public policy of the state to promote settlement of litigation[and was] frivolous”; and (3)Gardner’s failure to respond to a settlement offer from Bennett from January 14, 2020 to May 2023 “frustrated the public policy of the state to promote settlement of litigation....”
We conclude Gardner fails to demonstrate the court erred inruling Bennett was entitled to sanctions under Family Code section 271 based on its finding the civil action and motion to set aside the stipulations were frivolous.(Discussion, partD.2, post.)We, however, hold the courterred in setting the sanction at $70,000 in contravention of the lower amount her civil attorneys billed her. (Discussion, part D.3, post.) Finally, on remand the court must adjust any equalization payment if Bennett used community funds to pay her civil attorneys. (Discussion, partD.4, post.) Before discussing these issues, we set forth the standard governing our review of the sanctions award.
The applicable standard of review
“We review an award of attorney fees and costs under [Family Code] section 271 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] . . . We review any factual findings made in connection with the award under the substantial evidence standard.” (In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 282, fn. 1, 291 (Fong).)An aspect of the substantial evidence standard is “ ‘the doctrine of implied findings[,]’ ” which provides that “ ‘the reviewing court must infer . . . that the trial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary to support its decision.’ [Citation.]” (SeeThompson,supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p.981.) Furthermore, “ ‘regardless of the applicable standard of review[,]’ ” “ ‘ “ ‘ “it is the appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error” ’ ” by “ ‘ “supply[ing] the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (See Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.)
Gardner argues the doctrine of implied findings does not apply here because the court did not issue an adequate statement of decision.
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires the issuance of a timely requested statement of decision for the“trial of issues that could have been raised in the pleadings,” and not for an award of “attorney fees and costs under [Family Code] section 271 . . . .” (See Fong, supra,193 Cal.App.4th at pp.278, 294, 296–297.)Thus, even as to sanctions imposed under Family Code section 271after holding “an extensive evidentiary hearing,”no statement of decision is required to support the sanctions award. (See Fong, at pp.294, 296–297.)Fong reasonedCode of Civil Procedure section 632’s “references to ‘trial’ suggest that a statement of decision is required only in the event of a trial, as that term is commonly understood.” (See Fong, at p.294, italics added.)
Although thefamilycourt heard evidence supporting Bennett’s request for sanctions under Family Code section 271attrial,Gardner does not argue cogently that adjudication ofBennett’s sanctions request wasa “trial of a question of fact” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 632. (See Code Civ. Proc., §632; see also Fong, supra, 193Cal.App.4th at p. 294 [“Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires a statement of decision, if one is timely requested, only ‘upon the trial of a question of fact by the court.’”].)It is alsonot apparent to usthe applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section632 hinges on the mere happenstance the court did not elect to consider Bennett’s request for sanctions in a separate hearing.
In sum, we conclude Gardner fails to discharge his appellate burden to establish thefamily court erred in declining to issue a statement of decision regarding its award of attorney fees and costs under Family Code section271. It follows the doctrine of implied findings applies to our review of that award.
Gardner fails to show the court erred in concluding his civil action and motion to set aside the stipulations merited sanctions under Family Code section 271
As we noted in our Factual and Procedural Background, ante, Gardner moved to set aside the Astro and support stipulationsand filed a civil action against Bennett alleging causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, tortious interference with contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and extortion.To establish the court erred in finding Gardner’s civil action and motion to set aside were frivolous, Gardner must affirmatively demonstrate there is no substantial evidence demonstrating that the civil action and motion were “‘so devoid of merit that no reasonable person would have pursued [them].’[Citation.]” (See Featherstone v. Martinez (2022) 86Cal.App.5th 775, 785, fn. 8 [discussing the type of frivolous conduct that may give rise to sanctions under Fam. Code, § 271]; see also Discussion, part D.1, ante [explaining that Gardner must affirmatively demonstrate the absence of substantial evidence supporting the familycourt’s findings].) Gardner fails to make that showing.
First, the court found it had previously addressed many of the allegations underlying Gardner’s civil action in denying his prior request for a domestic violence restraining order. It is undisputed the court denied Gardner’s request for the restraining order on April1,2021, long before (1) he filed the civil action in February 2022, and (2) the 2024 trial of those claims in the family law action. (See Factual & Procedural Background, ante [discussing the procedural history of the case].) Gardner does not contest the court’s finding that his civil claims were based in part on allegations supporting his unsuccessful request for a restraining order, nor does he explain why that finding does not support the court’s rulinghis civil action was frivolous.
Second,it is undisputedGardner’s civil claim for tortious interference with contractual relationswas based in parton his allegation that “[Bennett]interfered with [Gardner’s] then-existing employment with Morrison Foerster” by “fabricating that [Gardner] burglarized [Bennett’s] home.” There is no dispute that at trial, Gardner’s former supervisor at Morrison Foerster testified the firm terminated him on January28, 2020because of a poor annual performance evaluation.This evidence tends to prove Gardner should have known the tortious interference claim lacked merit after he saw that annual performance evaluation.
Third, the family court found theperjury and fraud allegations Gardner offered in support of his motion to set aside the Astro and supportstipulations were “clearly” time-barred. Gardner does not challenge this finding,which lends further support to the court’s finding his motion to set aside the stipulations was frivolous.
Lastly, the only evidence Gardner cites in support of his claim that the civil action and motion to set aside the stipulationswere not frivolous ishis former family law attorney’s “testimony regarding [Gardner’s] claim of duress and civil extortion.” Although Gardner acknowledges on appeal his former counsel admitted “no one made an explicit threat” to elicit Gardner’s consent to the stipulations, he claims his former attorney testified that“the risk of prosecution directly impacted [Gardner’s] livelihood and was the basis on which he agreed to terms that heavily favored [Bennett].” Gardner contends his attorney testified that in her “opinion as a certified Family Law Specialist, [Gardner] gave up more spousal support rights than he would have had to relinquish ‘on his worst day in court,’ and did so solely ‘in exchange’ for [Bennett’s] acknowledgement of his ownership of Astro.” Gardner asserts Bennett later “ ‘completely reneged on what had been agreed upon’ ”bytelling law enforcement Astro was not Gardner’s separate property andtestifying at the preliminary hearing in the burglary case that Astro was a family pet.
Gardner’s former attorney’s testimony arguablywould have been relevant to his allegations of perjury and fraudhad the claims not beentimebarred. Yet, Gardner provides no legal analysis or citation to authoritysupporting the proposition thatevidence(1) Gardner signed the stipulations to avoid criminal liability and(2) Bennett later purportedlyfrustrated that purpose give rise to colorable claims for duress and civil extortion. He thus fails to rebut the presumption of correctness accorded to the court’s finding that those claims were frivolous. (SeeCruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 954 (Cruz)[“To ‘rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision,’ the appellant must ‘“‘“supply[ ] the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” ’ ” ’ ”].)
In sum, Gardner has not shown the court erred in ruling his civil action and motion to set aside were frivolous or in awarding sanctions under Family Code section 271 for such frivolous litigation.
Thefamily court erred in awarding Bennett $70,000 in attorney fees and costs
We conclude that no reasonable factfinder could findBennett incurred more than $54,108.37 in attorney fees and costs in the civil action. As noted earlier, the court found Bennett “incurred approximately $70,000.00 in attorney fees and costs with her civil counsel, Freedman & Taitelman.” Bennett’s appellate briefing indicates the sole basis for this finding was her testimony, found at page 1257 of volume 5 of the reporter’s transcript, that she paid “around $70,000” to her civil attorneys. Bennettso testified immediately after she made the following remark when asked to identify trial exhibit No. 12: “These were statements of the amounts that I paid civil attorneys.” Trial exhibit No. 12, in turn,consists of invoices from Freedman and Taitelman, LLP for legal work performed from May 2022 to November 2022.
Gardner correctlypoints out the total attorney fees and costs billed in trial exhibit No. 12is only $54,108.37.Bennett didnot testify the invoices in trial exhibit No. 12 correspond only to some of the attorney fees and costs she incurred in the civil action; she testified these documents reflected “the amounts” she paid her civil counsel. (Italics added.)Under these circumstances, thecourt could not reasonably rely on Bennett’s testimony approximating the attorney fees and costs incurred in the civil action to have been $70,000. The only reasonable inference the court could have drawn is that Bennett incurred no more than $54,108.37 in attorney fees and costs in the civil action. (See Inre Carlos J. (2018) 22Cal.App.5th 1, 6[“ ‘ “Substantial evidence” is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value. [Citation.] “Substantial evidence ... is not synonymous with ‘any’ evidence.”’”].)
We, however, reject Gardner’s argument that Freedman and Taitelman billed Bennett for“unnecessary or duplicative work.” Gardner supports this position with the following general statement: “For example, the bills reflect certain work which [Bennett’s] family law attorneys would have otherwise performed, such as issuing subpoenas to [Gardner’s] former law firm and efforts to obtain court records and transcripts which she ultimately offered into evidence in the family law trial.”Gardner does not provide any analysisof the law firm’s bills to support his conclusory argument. Wetherefore decline to address his contention any further. (See Cruz, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp.953–954.)
Further, Bennett fails to salvage thecourt’s $70,000 sanction award. In her appellate brief, Bennett argues she testified,“[T]he amount that she incurred to resist or otherwiseaddress [Gardner’s] sanctionable conduct . . . was ‘ . . . in excess of $100,000.’ ” In fact, she testified the latter figure was an “estimate” that included the $70,000 she claims to have incurred in the civil action. It is not apparent to us that a rational factfinder could set an attorney fee and costs award based on such a vague overall “estimate” of fees and costs that includes a $70,000 figurethat itself contradicts the lesser amount her attorneys billed her.
Gardner contends, “[T]he amount of the award was not tethered to actual attorney fees and costs incurred” because if “the civil court [had not] sustained [Bennett’s] demurrer to [Gardner’s] complaint for lack of jurisdiction, . . . . the matter would have proceeded in civil court entirely outside the family law proceeding. In that scenario, any work performed on that case would have been necessary regardless of the family law matter. Moreover, [Gardner’s] willingness to stipulate to his civil claims being heard in family court[ ] likely reduced the fees that would have ultimately been incurred in the civil case.”Gardner’s profferedscenario has no apparent relevance here.The fact remains that Bennett had to defend against Gardner’s frivolous civil claims in two fora. (See Factual & Procedural Background, ante; Discussion, part D.2, ante.)Thus, the attorney fees and costs Bennett incurred in defending the civil action are attributable to Gardner’s sanctionable conduct.
If Bennett used community funds to pay her civil attorney fees and costs, the court must adjust the equalization payment on remand accordingly
At trial, Bennett testified she withdrew a total of $50,000 from Schwab account no.xxx6584 to pay fees she owed to her civil counsel. We explained in our Discussion partB.2, ante, that the familycourt erred in awardingthe entirety of Schwab account no. xxx6584 to Bennett as her separate property. Accordingly, on remand, the court must determine to what extent, if any, Bennett usedcommunity property to pay the $54,108.37 in attorney fees and costs shewas billed for the civil action, andif so, adjust any equalization payment to her accordingly.
Gardner Fails To Demonstrate the Court Erred In Awarding Bennett $26,582.83 Pursuant to the Parties’ Support Stipulation
The support stipulation and the court’s award of spousal support arrears
On January 8, 2020, the parties and their respective counsel executed and filed the support stipulation. The support stipulation, which was signed by the family court on the date it was filed,states it is a court order.
The support stipulation contains several handwritten provisions including, as pertinent here:
“1. On the express condition [Gardner] maintains his licence [sic] to practice law and continues to earn an annual gross income of $190,000.00, the following stipulation is made:
“(a) Commencing January 1, 2020, [Gardner] shall pay to [Bennett], as [and] for spousal support, the amount of $4,300.00 per month. Said support shall be payable one-half on the first of the month, and one-half on the fifteenth of the month through June 30, 2023, which represents one-half the length of the marriage. Said support is non-modifiable as to the amount and duration and shall only terminate on the death of either party, the marriage of [Bennett], or June 30, 2023, whichever shall first occur.
“(b) [Gardner] waives his right to receive spousal support from [Bennett].
“(c) On July 1, 2023, the Court’s jurisdiction to award spousal support to either party shall terminate.
. . .
“3. The conditional language set forth in paragraph1 . . . above shall not apply if [Gardner] retires or quits his job without being forced to do so (i.e., employer states, quit or you will be terminated).”
Based on the support stipulation, the courtawarded Bennett spousal support arrears of $26,582.83, which is comprised of five and a half months of spousal support totaling $23,650 and interest at the legal rate of 10 percent totaling $2,932.83. The court reasoned: (1)Gardner “maintained his license to practice law throughout the pendency of this action”; (2) Gardner “was employed and earning in excess of $190,000.00 annually in January 2020 from his then employer with Morrison Foerster;” and (3) Gardner “was employed and earning in excess of $190,000.00 annually from February 2023 through June 2023 from a combination of sources, including his current employer Reyes Coca-Cola Bottling, his rental income from 5829 Pirate Ship Drive, North Las Vegas, Nevada . . . ,and monthly income received from the United States Military.” The court also foundGardner paid only $2,150 in spousal support in January2020 (instead of $4,300) and failed to make the five monthly payments of $4,300 owed from February 2023 to June2023.
Gardner’s argument on appeal and the applicable standard of review
On appeal, Gardner argues, “[T]he undisputed evidence established that [Gardner] did not reach the annual gross income threshold in any given year during the term of the [s]upport [s]tipulation and therefore was not obligated to pay spousal support.” He contends, “[T]he record is clear that [Gardner] lost his job at Morrison and Foerster on January 28, 2020 and was unemployed through much of the remainder of the year. [Citation.]Accordingly, he did not earn an annual gross income of $190,000 and his spousal support obligation did not accrue. As to February through June 2023, [Gardner’s] W-2 for 2023 established his gross income as $154,114.20. In addition, he received approximately $3,408 from military disability pay ($284/month) and a maximum of $1,536 from rental income ($128/month). Thus, his annual gross income for 2023 did not exceed $160,000.”
Gardner acknowledges Bennett argued below that“if [Gardner’s] monthly income were extrapolated over 12 months, [Gardner] met the threshold for January 2020 and February through June2023.”As a factual matter, Gardner does not dispute that if his monthly income for January2020, and February through June 2023, respectively, were extrapolated over 12 months, his annual gross income during those timeframes would meet or exceed $190,000. Instead, he argues, “The phrase ‘continues to earn an annual gross income of $190,000’ is clear and explicit and refers to annual gross income, not monthly gross income, and not monthly gross income extrapolated over a calendar year. Had the parties intended that to be the case, they could have used words to that effect. The trial court erred in interpreting the annual income requirement as a monthly income requirement and the spousal support order should be reversed.”
Because Gardner’s claim of error restssolely on his interpretation ofthe text of the support stipulation, it presents a question of law we review de novo. (See Enmark v. KF Community Care, LLC(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 463, 471 [“[W]e review de novo any questions of law—such as the interpretation of a written instrument [citation]—as well as the application of that law to undisputed facts . . . .”].) We resolve that issue below.Further, because Gardner’s claim presents a purely legal issue, we need not determine whether the family court’s statement of decision sufficiently described the legal and factual basis for its award of spousal support arrears to Bennett. (See Davenport v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1696,1700 [holding that because the appellant’s claim of error presented only “a question of law” subject to the appellate court’s “independent[ ] review,”“the absence of a statement of decision [was] not prejudicial to [the appellant]”].)
We reject Gardner’s interpretation of the support stipulation
Gardner argues the support stipulation did not obligate him to pay the second half of themonthly spousal support forJanuary 2020 because his termination from Morrison Foerster on January 28, 2020 precluded him from earning a total annual gross income of $190,000 that year. Likewise, he claims he did not owe Bennett spousal support in February, March, April, May, and June 2023 because he ultimately earned no more than $160,000 during that calendar year. His argument hinges on what he deems to be “the plain meaning” of the phrase “continues to earn an annual gross income of $190,000.00” in the support stipulation, and the absence of any text allowing his monthly income to be extrapolated to determine whether he satisfies that condition in any given month.
A principal purposeof spousal support is maintaining the recipient’s standard of living. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 4320, subd.(d) [providing that in ordering spousal support, a court shall consider, inter alia, “[t]he needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage”].) To achieve that objective, the support stipulation provides that if the income and law license conditions were satisfied, then Gardner had to make monthly payments of $4,300 — $2,150 due on the 1st of the month and $2,150 on the 15th of the month.
Gardner’s literal interpretation of the phrase “continues to earn an annual gross income of $190,000.00” would subvert that purpose by suspending Bennett’s right to monthly spousal support unless and until Gardner has, in fact, earned a gross income of $190,000 or more in a given year, at which point he would apparently owe support arrears to Bennett. Additionally,Gardner’s spousal support obligation terminatedno later thanJune 30, 2023, and yet the parties would not know whether he did in fact earn a gross income of at least $190,000 during calendar year 2023 until months later or perhaps the end of the year. In the interim, Bennett alone would bear the burden of maintaining her standard of living each month, even if Gardner’s projected gross annual earnings met or exceeded the $190,000 threshold.Accordingly, we reject Gardner’s proffered construction.
In sum, Gardner fails to demonstrate thefamilycourt erred in annualizing his gross monthly income to determine whether he owed spousal support under the stipulation in any given month. We thus affirm the court’s award ofspousal support arrears for one-half of the payment owed for January 2020 and the full payments owed for February2023 to June 2023, along with the interest thereon totaling $2,932.83. (Discussion, part E.1, ante [observing the court awarded spousal support arrears and interest].)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the following parts of the familycourt’s judgment: (1) the award of Chase Bankaccount nos. xxx0210 and xxx5239 to respondent Andrea Bennett as her separate property; (2) the award of Schwab account nos. xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324, and Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574 to Bennett as her separate property; (3) the award of the Rolex watch to Bennett as her separate property; (4) the award of the wedding ring to Bennett as her separate propertywith no offset or equalization;(5) the award of Fidelity IRA account no. xxx2240 to Bennett as her separate property; (6)the order requiring appellant Reid Gardner to reimburse Bennett $25,000for bail; and (7)the award of $70,000 in sanctionsto Bennett under Family Code section 271.
Weremand the matter with instructions to: (1) determine whether, and if so, towhat extent, the community has an interest inChase Bankaccount nos. xxx0210 and xxx5239,Schwab account nos.xxx1094, xxx6584, and xxx4324, Schwab IRA account no. xxx1574, and the Rolex watch; (2) prepare a statement of decision explaining the legal and factual basis for the court’s (a) award of the wedding ring to Bennett as her separate propertywithout equalization or offset,and (b) award of Fidelity IRA account no. xxx2240 to Bennett as her separate property; (3) issue a modified judgmentomitting the provision requiring Gardner to reimburse Bennett $25,000 for bail; (4)determine the amount ofattorney fees and costs Bennett paid to her civil attorneys, which is awardable as a sanction under Family Code section 271 and shall not exceed $54,108.37; (5)adjust the equalization payment if the court findsBennett used community funds to pay the attorney fees and costs awarded under Family Code section271;and (6) conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.