Hochman v. Vanderbyl CA2/7 filed 7/22/26

Filed 7/22/26 Hochman v. Vanderbyl CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

BESSLYN HOCHMAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LANCE VANDERBYL,

Defendant and Appellant.

B338948

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.23STRO08275)
APPEAL from an orderof the Superior Court of LosAngeles County, Michael R. Powell, Judge. Affirmed.
Lance Vanderbyl, in pro. per.,for Defendant and Appellant.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Cheryl A. Orr and Richard S. Conn for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Lance Vanderbyl appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting his former girlfriend Besslyn Hochman and requiring Vanderbyl to stay 100yards away from Hochman, her home, and her workplace. Vanderbyl contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO because there was insufficient evidence of abuse. Vanderbyl also argues the court violated his due process rights by repeatedly interrupting his testimony and improperly excluding evidence of email communications between Hochman’s attorney and Vanderbyl. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hochman’s Request for a DVRO
On December11, 2023 Hochman filed a request for a DVRO seeking protection from Vanderbyl, with whom she had been in a relationship for more than 23years.At the time of Hochman’s request, Hochman was 75years old and Vanderbyl was 56years old.They lived together in Hochman’s condominium complex. In her supporting declaration signed under penalty of perjury, Hochman described “ongoing verbal abuse,” bullying, and “controlling behavior,” which had been occurring for many years but had increased in the past yearafter Hochman told Vanderbyl she wanted to end the relationship.
Hochman declared that Vanderbyl had been pressuring her to give him access to her financial accounts. He repeatedly requested that Hochman open a stock trading (brokerage) account for him to manage under her name and to put his name on her credit card. In June2023 Vanderbyl screamed at Hochman that she was a “‘selfish bitch’” for refusing his requests. Vanderbyl called Hochman incompetent and “‘stupid’” for how she handled her money, while repeatedly attempting to coerce her into giving him money. Hochman stated, “I am suffering from anxiety and fear from his constant bullying, threats, and harassment for money and access to my financial accounts.”
Hochman stated that Vanderbyl also bullied her about storage space for his belongingsin her condominium complex, even though he had no ownership interest in Hochman’s unit.Vanderbyl hoarded boxes of clothing and electronics in the condominium, piled high in the living room, dining room, office, and second bathroom (as shown in photographs attached to her declaration), limiting her use of the space. Hochman asked Vanderbyl to remove the boxes, but he refused. Vanderbyl also became involved in a dispute with the homeowners association (HOA) regarding his use of storage units in the building.Vanderbyl wanted Hochman to sue the HOA, and he told Hochman that if she did not cooperate, he would tell the HOAshe was “‘losing it’” to discredit her. Hochman felt Vanderbyl “‘was capable of causing [her] physical harm.’”
Hochman also stated, without specifying dates, multiple instances of Vanderbyl’s “abusive and frightening” behavior throughout their relationship. Vanderbyl once threw a television remote that put a hole in the bedroom door. Another time, Vanderbyl slammed a door so hard that it fell off its hinges. He repeatedly screamed at Hochman in an “uncontrollable rage.” Further, Vanderbyl isolated Hochman by discouraging her from maintaining friendships outside of their relationship.
Hochman explained that, as a result of these incidents, she suffered from anxiety and stress, and she was concerned for her safety and wellbeing. Hochman added that she avoidedbeing in her home during the day but stayed at night in fear of “making him angrier.”
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)on December12, 2023. The TRO was served on December19, 2023; Vanderbyl did not file a response.

The Hearing on the Request for a DVRO
On April18, 2024 the trial courtheld a half-day hearing on Hochman’s request for a DVRO. Hochman was represented by counsel; Vanderbyl represented himself. At the outset of the hearing, the court explained it conducted hearings by “ask[ing] questions first before I allow counsel to ask questions so that I can get to the heart of the matter.” Neither party objected.
The trial courtasked Hochman whether everything in her request for a DVRO was truthful and accurate, and she said yes. The court then asked Hochman what she would like to add to the account in her declaration. Hochman testifiedthat in October or November2023 she told Vanderbyl that she wanted to separate and for him to move out of her condominium.At that time Vanderbyl was still pressuring her to open a brokerage account and credit card that he would control. Around Thanksgiving, Vanderbyl yelled at Hochman again for refusing to open a credit card for him to use. He also threatened to sue her if she did not cooperate, telling her, “I’ll embarrass you, and you’ll be crying andcrying and crying, and you will never get over it. I will embarrass you. I know things.”
Throughout 2023 Hochman had many disagreements with Vanderbyl regarding his accumulation of boxes in the condominium and building storage areas. Vanderbyl purchased more than200boxes of clothing, shoes, and electronics that he stored in her condominium unit. The boxes were piled “floor to ceiling” and prevented access to the balcony.In January 2023 Hochman learned from the HOA that Vanderbylhad taken possession of fivestorage areas and a storage room in the building. Hochman suggested they move Vanderbyl’s items to public storage, but he refused.Vanderbyl wanted to pursue legal action against the HOA; he “pressured [her] and got very, very angry” when she refused to let him represent her against the HOA.
The disagreement about the storage units escalated over the next several months.On April6, 2023 Vanderbyl yelled at Hochman, stating, “If you don’t support me in this and fight the HOA, I’m going to spend the rest of my life to destroy you.” Hochman said the incident was a “shock to [her]system.” That same month, Vanderbyl threatened to “tell everybody [she was] losing it” if she did not support his storage areaclaims. In the months leading up to Hochman’s request for a DVRO, Vanderbylalso demanded that Hochman stop seeing her friends.
Hochman filed her request for a DVRO because she was worried about her safety. Vanderbyl’s behavior had caused Hochman “tremendous stress” and affected her mental and emotional state. Further, Vanderbyl continued to contact her after the trial court issued the TRO. According to Hochman, a day or two after Vanderbyl was served with the TRO, Vanderbyl called Hochmanand said she was a “monster.” In February2024 Hochman’s telephone rang “about 30times.” She did not answer the phone but believed Vanderbyl was calling because her phone indicated the caller was at the hotel where he was staying.
Vanderbyladmitted in his testimony that he had asked Hochman to open a brokerage account for him for “many years.” The trial court inquired why he continued to discuss with Hochman a brokerage account and credit card in her name instead of his own. Vanderbyl responded that he had been very successful in the stock market,but he no longer had legal immigration status to work or open a brokerage account or credit card in his own name. He and Hochman had been together for 24years, and he believed they were in love and would be together forever. He had been working as Hochman’s assistant at a real estate company, but he wanted to invest in the stock market toachieve financial independence.After Hochman refused his requests, he became homeless and realized she was “micromanaging me.”
Vanderbyl admitted he was “hoarding the boxes” in the condominium; the boxescontained women’s apparel from job lots at high-end department stores. He had purchasedthe items to sell and support himself. Hochman asked him to remove the boxes, which he intended to do, but as they were opening the boxes Hochman said he should not throw the boxes in the trash because they contained luxury women’s apparel. Vanderbyl acknowledged he never moved the boxes.
The trial courtasked Vanderbyl whether there was anything else he wanted to say regarding Hochman’s allegations. Vanderbyl responded that he could not“say more,” explaining, “[S]he’s made what I say in this court to you contingent on me getting any financial support.” Vanderbyl did not deny that he had pressured, yelled, or threatened Hochman.

The TrialCourt’s Ruling
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial courtgrantedHochman’s request for a DVRO. The court found Vanderbyl had an expectation that Hochman would take the financial steps he requested—to open a brokerage account and put his name on a credit card. But Hochman decided not to take these steps because the relationship was ending. The court explained to Vanderbyl that Hochman “said no, and she kept on saying no, and you kept on asking over and over and over again. That is a form of harassment.” The court found Hochman credible, stating“I don’t believe that she’s making that up. . . . [S]he told her story consistently.” The court observed that during her testimony, Hochman “was trembling” and “talked about begging for you to stop.” The court added, “She was very upset when she was talking about the [storage] cages. She repeatedly asked you. She said that you told her that you were going to destroy her.”
The trial court continued, “You may be upset because you were going to be homeless. You were upset because you weren’t getting what you wanted to get . . . . I’m not saying that you are a spousal abuser in the traditional sense that you hit her or anything like that. It involves power and control. . . . You were trying to get control” and “you were going to do that by saying to her you need to do this.”Vanderbyl interjected, “I never demanded anything from her.” The court responded, “Sir, this isn’t about who gets to speak last or whatever. Don’t interrupt me. . . .”
The trial court found Vanderbyl’s “attempts to coerce [Hochman] with the financial issues was abusive.” In addition, Vanderbyl’s calling Hochman after he was served with the restraining order was abusive. The court continued, “Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that abuse has been shown under Family Code section[s]6203 and 6320.”
The trial court issued a one-year DVRO requiring, among other things, Vanderbylnot harass, strike, assault, threaten,annoy byphone or other electronic means (including repeatedly contact), or disturb the peace. The order explained that to “‘[d]isturb the peace’” meant “to destroy someone’s mental or emotional calm,” which “includes coercive control.” The order required Vanderbyl to stay at least 100yards away from Hochman, her home, her workplace, andher vehicle. The order also required Vanderbyl to immediately move out of Hochman’s condominium.
Vanderbyl timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Governing Law and Standard of Review
Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; §6200 et seq.), “a court may issue a protective order ‘“to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.”’” (In re Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29Cal.App.5th 220, 225 (Davila & Mejia); accord, Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227Cal.App.4th 774, 782; see §§6220, 6300.) The purpose of the DVPA is “to prevent acts of domestic violence . . . for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§6220.) “The court shall consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a petition for relief.” (§6301, subd.(d).)
The DVPA defines domestic violence, as relevant here, as abuse perpetuated against “a person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.” (§6211, subd.(c).) “Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (§6203, subd.(b).) Abuse includes “plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another” or “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section6320.” (Id., subd.(a)(3), (4).) Conduct that may be enjoined under section6320, subdivision(a), includes “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,. . . harassing, telephoning,. . . destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party.” (See Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16Cal.App.5th 833, 839.)
“‘[D]isturbing the peace’” of the other party “refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§6320, subd.(c).) Subdivision(c) provides further, “This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.”Subdivision(c) provides as examples of“coercive control,” unreasonably engaging in conduct aimed at, among other things, “(1)Isolating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources of support,” “(3)Controlling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services”; and “(4)Compelling the other party by force, threat of force, or intimidation, including threats based on actual or suspected immigration status, to engage in conduct from which the other party has a right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the other party has a right to engage.” (See Hatley v. Southard (2023) 94Cal.App.5th 579, 583 [abuse includes “attempts to control, regulate, and monitor a spouse’s finances, economic resources, and access to communications”].)
“We review the grant or denial of a request for a DVRO for abuse of discretion.” (Davila & Mejia, supra, 29Cal.App.5th at p.226; accord, Hatley v. Southard, supra, 94Cal.App.5th at p.589; In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trialcourt exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (In re Marriage of G., at p.780.)
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33Cal.App.5th 212, 223; Davila & Mejia, supra, 29Cal.App.5th at p.226; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.) “‘“We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.’”’” (Evilsizor, at p.1424; accord, Herriott, at p.223.) We defer to the trial court’s evaluation of credibility. (Herriott, at p.223 [“It was for the trial court to weigh the evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of the witness, as ‘credibility issues [are] routinely resolved by [the] trier[ ] of fact.’”]; Evilsizor, at pp.1426-1427 [“the trial court was in the best position to evaluate credibility and to resolve factual disputes”].)

Vanderbyl’s Appeal Is Not Moot
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’”(In re D.P. (2023) 14Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant [the appellant] any effect[ive] relief.”’[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ tworequirements must be met. First, [the appellant] must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”(Ibid.) In other words, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, [the appellant] must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in legal status.”(Id. at p.277.)
Hochmancontends Vanderbyl’s appeal is moot because the DVRO expired in April2025. Vanderbyl responds that his appeal is not moot because issuance of the DVRO “triggers a 5-year prohibition on obtaining” a license to have a firearm, which “directly affects immigration and green card eligibility.”He also argues issuance of the DVRO will be a part of his permanent record in the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) database, which “creates a permanent record affecting interactions with police, border crossings, and government agencies.” Further, the DVRO will appear on any future background checks, which could affect his employment and housing applications, professional licensing, and educational opportunities.
Vanderbyl has not provided any legal or factual support for hiscontentions regarding the continuing impact of the DVRO on him. However, as the Court of Appeal explained in SanDiego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86Cal.App.5th 560, 564, an expired restraining order may have collateral consequences in future proceedings, and further, a one-year restraining order typically will evade appellate review by expiring before the appeal is decided.(See Cardona v. Soto (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 141, 148 [appeal from expired DVRO was not moot because it “will have consequences for [the parent] in future proceedings involving custody of daughter”].)For these reasons, regardless of whether Vanderbyl’s appeal is moot, we exercise our discretion to consider it on the merits. (See In re D.P.,supra,14Cal.5th at p.282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.”].)

The TrialCourt Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Issuing the DVRO
Vanderbyl contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Hochman’s request for a DVRO by relying only on Hochman’s testimony and failing to consider his testimony “that directly contradicted” Hochman’s evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion.
As discussed, Hochman testified that during 2023 Vanderbyl repeatedly pressured her to open a brokerage account and credit card for his use, and when she refused, he screamed at her, threatened to sue her, and told her he would embarrass her and cause her to be “crying and crying” because he “know[s] things.” Vanderbyl also tookcontrol of multiple storage areas in the condominium building and hoarded hundreds of boxes in Hochman’s condominium unit. When he became embroiled in a dispute with the HOA, he pressured Hochman to sue the HOA, and when she resisted, he became angry, threatened to “destroy” her, and said he would tell everyone she was “losing it.” And just days after Vanderbyl was served with the TRO, he violated its terms by contacting Hochman and calling her a “monster.” Hochman testified Vanderbyl’s conduct caused her anxiety and “tremendous stress” and affected her mental and emotional state. She filed for a restraining order because she feared for her safety.
The trial courtfound Hochman’s account credible, noting she was trembling as she testified and appeared scared and upset by Vanderbyl’s conduct.We defer to the court’s credibility findings. (Herriott v. Harriott, supra, 33Cal.App.5th at p.223; Inre Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 703; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney, supra, 237Cal.App.4th at pp.1426-1427.)
Hochman’s testimony provided substantial evidence of Vanderbyl’s abuse based on his repeated pressure and threats to Hochman to force her to acquiesce to his demands and by causing her to fear for her safety. (See §§6320, subds.(a) [abuse includes “harassing” and “disturbing the peace of the other party”], (c) [“‘disturbing the peace’” includes destroying the mental or emotional calm of the other party and “‘coercive control’” of the other party]; Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1Cal.App.5th 389, 398 [affirming renewal of DVRO against ex-boyfriend based on multiple phone calls and textsregarding trial court issues despite prior DVRO, explaining“‘protective orders can be issued because of persistent unwanted phone calls or letters—which fall into the same category as “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, [or] harassing” the protected party’”]; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144 [ex-boyfriend’s continued contact with plaintiff by phone, email, text, and unannounced visit to her home to beseech her to renew the relationship constituted abuse based on his “‘disturbing the peace’” of the plaintiffunder the DVPA].)
Vanderbyl argues it was error for the trial court to grant the request for a DVRO by “exclusively relying” on Hochman’s testimony.(Boldface and capitalization omitted.)But “[t]he court may issue an order . . . based solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (§ 6300, subd.(a); see Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34Cal.4th 319, 334 [“[e]vidence of even one credible witness ‘is sufficient for proof of any fact’”]; In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14Cal.3d 604, 614 [“‘The testimony of a witness, even the party himself [or herself], may be sufficient.’”].)Further, Vanderbyl admitted that he had repeatedly asked Hochman to open a brokerage account and that he had stored the boxes in Hochman’s apartment, even after Hochman asked him to move them to public storage. Most significantly, he never denied that he had pressured, threatened, and yelled at Hochman.

The TrialCourt’s Conduct During the Hearing Did Not Violate Vanderbyl’s Due Process Rights
Vanderbyl contends the trial court violated his due process rights by questioning witnesses and preventing Vanderbyl from presenting relevant evidence. He also argues he was denied the right to testify and to cross-examine witnesses. Vanderbyl’s contentions lack merit.
As discussed, at the outset of the hearing, the trial court explained it would question the witnesses prior to counsel.Vanderbyl contends this “unilateral alteration of procedure” allowed the court to “exclusive[ly] control” the proceeding.However, courts have substantial discretion in controlling the conduct of proceedings, including by questioning witnesses. (See People v. Nieves (2021) 11Cal.5th 404, 494 [“‘A trial court has both the discretion and the duty to ask questions of witnesses, provided this is done in an effort to elicit material facts or to clarify confusing or unclear testimony.’”].) This is particularly true in DVRO proceedings, which often include self-represented litigants, where the court is“necessarily expected to play a far more active role in developing the facts, before then making a decision whether or not to issue the requested permanent restraining order.” (Ross v. Figueroa (2006) 139Cal.App.4th 856, 861.)
With respect to Vanderbyl’s argument that he could not testify, cross-examine Hochman, or submit documents, he cites to page8 of the reporter’s transcript, which includes thetrialcourt’s introductory comments preceding Hochman’s testimony. As discussed, the court explained that it intended to ask questions before Hochman’s attorney would examine her. Nowhere on that page (or elsewhere in the record) did the court tell Vanderbyl that he could not cross-examine Hochman, he could not testify, or that he could not submit documents.
After Hochman concluded her testimony, Vanderbyl did not request to ask Hochman any questions. It is true that once he was sworn in, the trialcourt proceeded to ask him questions (as the court had done with Hochman). At one point Vanderbylstated he “will say no more” out of a concern that if he opposed issuance of the DVRO, Hochman would cut off her financial support for him. The court encouraged Vanderbyl to present his version of what had happened in response to Hochman’s alleged grounds for a restraining order. At that point Vanderbyl provided extensive testimony about what had transpired with respect to his requests for Hochman to set up a brokerage account and the storage of the boxes.
Vanderbyl relies on the portion of the transcript at the end of the hearing during which the trial court explained its decision to grant the DVRO as an example of how the court silenced him and prevented him from testifying.The court stated, “I’m going to grant the restraining order. And I will tell you why. I think that there was an expectation that you had and—” Vanderbyl interrupted, “She told me she would do these things.” The court responded, “Okay. It’s my turn to talk. Thank you.” The court continued with its reasoning, stating (directed to Vanderbyl) that when Hochman decided not to allow Vanderbyl to have a brokerage account in her name, “you decided that you were going to not accept that.” Vanderbyl again interjected, “No. That is not true. I did accept it.” The court then continued, “Well, I don’t think you did, and I will tell you why.” The court further explained its reasoning, and Vanderbyl again interjected, “No, no, no. That never happened after.”The court attempted to continue, and Vanderbyl interrupted again. At this point the court said “Sir, sir, please, just don’t talk anymore.” The court completed its ruling (with additional interruptions). In no way does this portion of the transcript, during which the court attempted to explain the basis for its ruling, show that Vanderbyl was denied a full opportunity to testify.
Finally, Vanderbyl fails to point to any evidence that he was not allowed to submit(other than the email the trialcourt excluded, which we discuss below). On this record, there was no due process violation.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding an Email from Hochman’s Counsel
Vanderbyl contends the trial courtabused its discretioninexcluding an email that Hochman’s attorney sent to him asking Vanderbyl to “‘not oppose’” issuance of the DVRO and to “remain silent at the trial.” (Italics omitted.) Vanderbylcontends the email would have shown “threats and blackmail to silence [Vanderbyl] at trial.” When Vanderbylshowed the email to Hochman’s attorneyand sought to have it admitted, Hochman’s attorney objected that the email was a “settlement negotiation communication.” Vanderbyl responded that Hochman’s attorney was “lying” and “there [are] no settlement negotiations going on.” He added that the court should consider the email because it would affect whether he could “speak or not.”
The trial court clarified that Vanderbyl could testify at the hearing, and the only reason not to speak would be if he wanted to assert a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Thus, the court explained, the email was not relevant because the only issue at the hearing was whether Vanderbyl committed domestic violence, and Vanderbyl could testify about whether he engaged in the conduct that Hochman alleged.Notwithstanding this clarification, when the court initially asked whether Vanderbyl’s requests to open a brokerage account had “been going on for some time,” Vanderbyl responded, “I will say no more,” explaining he was told that if he opposed issuance of the DVRO, he would lose the promised financial support.At this point the court excluded the email, explaining it contained hearsay and was inadmissible as a settlement communication.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulingsfor an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of M.P. & M.C. (2025) 116Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107 [explaining with respect to DVRO that appellate courts review evidentiary rulings for an “‘abuse of discretion’”]; Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99Cal.App.5th 583, 593 [“‘“Broadly speaking, an appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.”’”].)Because the email is not in the record, we cannot evaluate whether it was a settlement communication. Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the email was not relevant because Vanderbyl had an opportunity to testify at the hearing, and the discussions between Hochman’s attorney and Vanderbyl after service of the TRO had no relevance to whether Vanderbyl’s behavior prior to issuance of the TRO constituted harassment under the DVPA.
DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Hochman is to recover her costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.