P. v. Evans CA2/2 filed 8/12/26

Filed 8/12/26 P. v. Evans CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARNELL EVANS,

Defendant and Appellant.

B341423

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.XSWYA022214)

APPEAL from an orderof the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,Scott T. Millington, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.
Daniel Milchiker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield andCharles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________

Defendant Carnell Evans appeals from the judgment after resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.Evans contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss one of his prior “strike” convictions.Evans additionally arguesthe court erroneously denied his motion fordiscovery of a peace officer’s personnel records under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 andPitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 based on its conclusion that a Pitchess motion cannot be made in section 1172.75 proceedings.
The People do not dispute Evans may movefor discovery of potential Brady material under the circumstances of this case.
We accept the People’s implicit concession. Becausethe trial court did not make any findings as to whether relevant and discoverable evidence exists, we conditionally reverseand remand for further proceedings on the motion.
BACKGROUND
On June 30, 1994, as Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officers Joseph Chavez and Michael Harrington turned their unmarked patrol car into an intersection, they observed Evans standing with four other men in front of a restaurant.Officers Chavez and Harrington then saw Evans pull out a gun,fire at their car, run into a liquor store, and throw the gun over the food shelves.Officers Chavez and Harrington apprehended Evans in the store and retrieved the gun.
In 1996, a jury convicted Evans of two counts of assault with a firearm (§245, subd. (a)(2)) and found true as to each count that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury also found Evans had three prior convictions that qualified as strikes under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds.(b)–(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)) and prior serious felonies(§ 667, subd. (a)). The jury also found Evans had one prior prison term (§667.5, former subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Evans to an aggregate term of 71 yearsfour months to life.
In 2022, Evans became eligible for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) andsection1172.75.
On November 30, 2023, Evans filed a resentencing brief asking the trial court to (1) strike the prior prison term enhancement; (2) conduct a full resentencing to apply any other ameliorative changes to the law enacted since the time of his original sentence; and (3) exercise its discretion under section1385 and Romero to strike one of his prior strikes and impose a second-strike sentence. The People opposed, asking the court to only strike the prior prison term enhancement.
On January 26, 2024, Evans’s attorney received an e-mail from the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (LADA) after it learned Evans had filed a resentencing petition. In pertinent part, the e-mail stated:“[LADA] requested possible ‘Brady’ information in personnel files from [LAPD] concerning officers who are potential witnesses in open criminal prosecutions. Based upon this request, LAPD advised LADA that [Officer Chavez] has information in [his] personnel file that may be ‘potentially exculpatory or used for impeachment.’ [¶] [T]his notification is a ‘tip’ that the officer’s personnel file may contain disclosable Pitchess/Bradyinformation . . . . [Citation.] [¶]Disclosure of this information is not an endorsement of the validity of any allegation of misconduct, nor a concession as to the possible admissibility of the underlying information at a future date. LADA’s Discovery Compliance Unit has no further information related to the content of this officer’s personnel file. [¶][I] am notified that there may be conduct dating back to 1994. I have no further information. Please let me know when you file a Pitchess motion, and I will join.”
On April 18, 2024, Evans filed a Pitchess motion seeking potential Brady material fromOfficer Chavez’s personnel file. The LAPD opposed, arguing among other things that section1172.75 does not confer a right to discovery of an officer’s personnel file.
At a hearing on May 17, 2024, the trial court expressed its view that Pitchess motions cannot be made in section 1172.75 proceedings. The LAPD’s counsel appeared and stated she would submit on the opposition, but she also noted that in a different proceeding a Pitchess motion may be appropriate.The court agreed with the LAPD’s position but stated it would conduct an in camera hearing out of an abundance of caution to develop a record for the Court of Appeal. Because the custodian of records was not present, the court continued the hearing to August 6, 2024. On August 6, the court held an in camera hearing anddenied Evans’s motion on the sole basis that Pitchess motions cannot be made in section 1172.75 proceedings.
On September 5, 2024, the trial courtrecalled Evans’s sentence.The court struckall of the enhancements but declined to dismiss the prior strike conviction.It resentenced Evans to an aggregate term of 50 years to life consecutive to a five-yearsentence in another case.
Evans timely appealed.
After Evans commenced this appeal, he filed a postjudgment discovery motion pursuant to section 1054.9 again seeking Brady material in Officer Chavez’s personnel file. Adifferent trial court heard the motion and denied it on the mistaken belief that the first trial court held an in camera hearing and found there was nothing to disclose.
DISCUSSION
“ ‘Under Brady . . . and its progeny, the prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose to the defense material exculpatory evidence, including potential impeaching evidence.’ ” (In re Jenkins (2023) 14 Cal.5th 493, 504.) Although “Brady is essentially a trial right,” our “courts have acknowledged that ‘the People’s obligations under Brady are ongoing, even postjudgment.’ ” (People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1058–1059 (Nuno); see alsoIn re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1246 [“ ‘ “[Even] after a conviction[,] the prosecutor . . . is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority of . . . information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction” ’ ”]; Canion v. Cole (2005) 210 Ariz. 598, 599 [the state has a continuing Brady duty to disclose evidence that “comes to its attention” after sentencing], cited with approval in Jenkins, at p. 505.) Thus, for example, a convicted defendant may seek discovery of Brady material to support their habeas corpus claim (Jenkins, at p. 512) or to aid their defense at a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing (Nuno, at pp. 1061–1062).
“In Pitchess[,]the California Supreme Court ‘recognized that a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to defend against a criminal charge. “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as ‘Pitchess motions’ ...through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.” ’ ” (Nuno, supra, 105Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.)
“A Pitchess motion may be used to obtain Brady material contained in a peace officer’s confidential personnel file.” (Nuno, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055.)“However, because the ‘ “ ‘Pitchess process’ operates in parallel with Brady and does not prohibit the disclosure of Brady information,” ’ all information that the trial court finds to be exculpatory and material under Brady must be disclosed, notwithstanding” the limitations of the Pitchess process. (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61Cal.4th 696, 720 (Johnson).)
Here, Evans’s Brady rights appear to be implicated.Indeed, after the LADA learned of Evans’s section 1172.75 petition, it gave him a strong “tip” that Officer Chavez’s personnel file contains potential Brady material and stated it would join aPitchess motion. Further, although the LAPD opposed Evans’s motion below, it also acknowledged that the motion may be appropriate in a different criminal proceeding.And importantly,the People implicitly concede on appeal that Evans appropriately made a discovery motion for Brady material in connection with his resentencing petition.
Although the proceeding below was a resentencing hearing, Bradymaterial may have some relevance. Where, as here, section“1172.75 applies, it requires full resentencing, not simply striking the now-invalidated priors.” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17Cal.5th 1050, 1067, fn. 3.) This entails applying “any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Under the resentencing procedures set forth in section1172.1, subdivision (a)(5), the trial courtmust consider “evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice,” which may include “evidence that the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings related to the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other evidence that undermines the integrity of the underlying conviction or sentence.” (Ibid.)
Further, at a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, thetrial court may exercise its power under section 1385 and Romero to dismiss a prior strike conviction in furtherance of justice. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 361–364.) When exercising this power, the court may consider, among other things, the nature and circumstances of a defendant’s conviction. (People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 586.)
Thus, whetherPitchess motions are relevant as a matter of course undersection 1172.75, in the circumstances of this casethe trial court should have considered the Brady component of Evans’s motion. (Nuno, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055; Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720.)Here, the People indicated Brady material may exist, and the material may be relevant to factors to be considered at Evans’s full resentencing.
Because the record contains no findings regarding the Bradyissue,a conditional reversal and remand isappropriate to allow the court to make those findings in the first instance. (Nuno, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 1062.)If, after reviewing Officer Chavez’s personnel records, the court decides that nothing needsto be disclosed under Brady principles, it should state its reasonsand reinstate the judgment. (Nuno, at p. 1062.) If the court determines that information must be disclosed to Evans under Brady principles, the court should order disclosure and allow Evans an opportunity to demonstrate whether there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his resentencing would have been different had the information been disclosed. (Nuno, at pp. 1056, 1062–1063.)If Evans demonstrates prejudice, the court should hold a new section 1172.75 resentencing hearing. (Nuno, at pp. 1062–1063.)
The parties ask us to review the sealed transcripts of the in camera proceeding to determine whether there is any discoverable material,but we decline to do so as that is an issue for the trial court in the first instance. Accordingly, we take no position on whether relevant and disclosable evidence exists, whether Evans was prejudiced, and, if there is prejudice, how the court should exercise its discretion in resentencing Evans.
Finally, because the trial court may resentence Evans if it determines the denial of the Pitchess motion caused him prejudice, we need not and do not consider the parties’ arguments as to whether the court abused its discretion in denying Evans’s Romero motion.
DISPOSITION
The orderis conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:

LUI,P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.