Gonzalez v. The Regents of the U. of Cal. CA2/4 filed 7/7/26

Filed 7/7/26 Gonzalez v. The Regents of the U. of Cal. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

ANA GONZALEZ
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B341618

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV38966)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Timothy P. Dillon and Rolf M. Treu, Judges. Reversedin part, affirmed in part and remanded with directions.
Nosrati Law, Omid Nosrati, Rene Maldonaldo for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, H. Thomas Watson and Sheridan I. Caldwell; Burke, Williams & Sorenson, Daphne M. Anneet; Law Offices of Kathleen Rager and Kathleen Rager for Defendants and Respondents.

Ana Gonzalez appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the Regents of the University of California (Regents), and former supervisor, Frederick Bush (collectively, respondents). Gonzalez alleged claims for discrimination based on her gender, race, and disability, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code,
§ 12940 et seq.), as well as harassment by Bush and other related claims.
Gonzalez argues that the trial court failed to consider the totality of the evidence in support of her claims. She also contends that she raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether Bush’s harassment was severe or pervasive and whether she was constructively terminated. We agree with Gonzalez that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication as to her claims for discrimination and harassment based on her gender and race.However, we find that Gonzalez has not established that she was discriminated based on a disability. We therefore reversein part and affirm in part the order granting summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.Complaint
Gonzalez filed her complaint in December 2022. She alleged the following causes of action against the Regents: discrimination based on gender and race, harassment based on gender and race, discrimination based on disability, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations.She also alleged the two harassment claims against Bush.
Gonzalez’s complaint alleged the following. Throughout her employment, Bush “regularly displayed sexist, racist, and aggressive behavior directly to Plaintiff as well as other female employees.” She complained to the Regents about Bush’s behavior but they failed to properly investigate it. Gonzalez suffered from significant mental and physical distress as a result of Bush’s conduct. She took a medical leave and then worked remotely from May to August 2022. On August 17, the Regents denied her request for continued accommodations, stating that Bush would resume his role as her supervisor and Gonzalez was expected to work on-site two to three times per week, working directly with Bush. Gonzalez resigned, because she felt she had no other choice as she was subject to an unsafe working environment.
II.Summary Judgment
A. Evidence
1. Background
Bush and the Regents filed separate motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. As relevant to this appeal, the parties submitted the following evidence in support of their arguments on the motions.
The Regents hired Gonzalez, a Hispanic woman, in July 2020 as Director of Development at the UCLA School of Theater, Film & Television (TFT). Bush was an assistant dean at TFT and Gonzalez’s direct supervisor. The TFT team also included a development coordinator, a position first held by Camille Tsalik and then by Eric Larner.
Gonzalez’s job duties included raising money for TFT, soliciting donors, and attending donor events. Gonzalez worked remotely for TFT until the fall of 2021, because the UCLA campus was closed due to the COVID pandemic. When the campus reopened, Gonzalez worked a hybrid schedule, returning to the TFT office a few days a week. Bush’s and Gonzalez’s offices were next to each other.
2. Bush’s Misconduct
Gonzalez presented evidence that during her employment, Bush routinely made disparaging comments about their co-workers. In a discussion with Gonzalez over text, Bush referred to a female Hispanic co-worker as an “idiot,” “stupid,” and “a disaster.” Gonzalez agreed by text with Bush’s statements and responded with her own complaints about the co-worker's incompetence. Bush also “regularly” disparageda female board member, including commenting that the board member was unhappy “because nobody wants to fuck her.” He also regularly made comments about female subordinates’ appearances. Specifically, Gonzalez recalled that Bush commented on whether a female co-worker’s clothing was “too sexy.”
Gonzalez detailed several instances in which she felt “tokenized” as a Hispanic person.Bush told her he was recommending her to serve as the Development Liaison to the Chancellor’s Council of the Arts because “the council was too white, I was Latina, and had a background fundraising in the arts.” He also asked her to attend a Latino donor event.In another instance, Bush handed her a list of potential Hispanic donor leads and asked if she knew any of the donors. According to Bush,he did not make the decision to recommend Gonzalez for the council position. He asked Gonzalez to accompany him to a Mexican American Cultural Foundation event in 2021 because “it was our job to attend these types of events, not because she is Latina.” Gonzalez admitted that Bush also invited her to attend events for donors of other races.
Gonzalez stated thatthere were instances when she would refer to Latino communities in Los Angeles and Bush would react with distaste. For instance, Bush told Gonzalez, “I don’t go to the East Side of LA, it’s too Latino.”
In November 2021, Bush interrupted Gonzalez and took over her presentation during a meeting. Afterward, he texted her, “Sorry to have to mansplain. It didn’t look like [another femalemeeting participant] understood what was going on.” Gonzalez responded with a “thumbs up” emoji. The following month, Bush again interrupted her during a meeting and then apologized for “mansplaining.”
In December 2021, Bush invited Gonzalez to a theatrical performance of “Love Actually.” She asked if it was family-friendly because she would be bringing her six-year-old daughter. Bush said that it was. However, Gonzalez and her family left during the show “due to the performance’s sexually explicit pornographic scene and explicit language.”
Gonzalez witnessed Bush display “terrifying and violent outbursts of aggression.” Specifically, she saw Bush engage in incidents of road rage toward other drivers on two occasions while he was driving her to events.
On February 3, 2022, Gonzalez and Bush were on a Zoom call with two female colleagues. During a discussion about soliciting a donation from the foundation run by filmmaker George Lucas and his wife, Bush said that they should solicit the wife directly, because “this could be her little pet project.” Gonzalez said that she strongly disagreed with Bush.
A few minutes after the call ended, Bush came into Gonzalez’s office. She “stumbled back” to avoid being hit by the door, which he closedbehind him. They were standing very close together and Bush started yelling at her. He yelled, “Don’t ever contradict me again,” with his fists clenched at his side. Gonzalez backed away from him and sat behind her desk. Bush also sat down. Gonzalez apologized so that Bush would calm down.
TFT employee Larner, who was present near Gonzalez’s office at the time, did not hear any yelling. Afterward, Gonzalez told him that Bush had spoken to her in a “very stern manner.” Larner had heard from severalother female employees that they did not feel comfortable working with Bushand that he was intimidating. Larneralso related that in his own experience, Bush spoke disrespectfully about female employees and acted in an intimidating manner toward them.
3. Complaints and leaves of absence
Gonzalez verbally complained about the February 3 incident on February 10, 2022 to the director for Equity, Diversion, and Inclusion at UCLA External Affairs. Gonzalez also complained about Bush's retaliation to the human resources director for External Affairs. The human resources directortold Gonzalez to take off from work for a few days, which she did. Gonzalez submitted a formal written complaint on March 1, 2022. She also filed a police report with university police regarding the February 3 incident.
On March 9, Gonzalez’s doctor told her to refrain from working with Bush. She provided the doctor’s note to External Affairs and requested as an accommodation that she no longer be required to work with Bush. She went on leave in early April “due to the psychological stress and anxiety that I suffered as a result of Bush’s attack and resulting retaliatory treatment.” She returned to work remotely on May 2, 2022. On May 13, her doctor diagnosed her with anxiety and acute stress disorder. Gonzalez’s doctor opined that she could continue working remotely as long as she did not have to work with Bush. According to the program manager for UCLA’s Employee Disability Management Services (EDMS), TFT was “willing to accommodate [Gonzalez’s] request for remote work temporarily.”
External Affairs initiated an investigation on March 10 and placed Bush on paid investigatory leave. Gonzalez was assigned a different supervisor during the investigation. Based on “a careful and thorough review of all the evidence,” the human resources director for External Affairs determined there was insufficient evidence that Bush engaged in serious misconduct or violated UCLA’s policies. On June 24, 2022, External Affairs informed Gonzalez that it had concluded the investigation, and that Bush would be returning to work on June 27. Gonzalez submitted an updated doctor’s note stating that she was permanently precluded from contact with Bush and should continue working remotely for the remainder of 2022.
Bush returned briefly to the office on July 11, 2022, before taking a leave until September 15. That day, he emailed Gonzalez asking her to add him back to the team Slack channel. Gonzalez felt his request was harassment, because Bush had multiple options to make this request, but he chose to “target” her. She submitted another written complaint to UCLA’s human resources department on July 15, 2022.
4. Resignation
In July, EDMS reviewed the updated recommendations from Gonzalez’s doctor and scheduled an interactive process meeting to discuss Gonzalez’s request for accommodations. On August 17, the EDMS program manager emailed Gonzalez that Bush would be returning to work from leave and resuming his role as supervisor. The program manager also stated that “all Development Officers are expected to be on site, as needed, approximately 2-3 times per week and that there is a possibility that you [and Bush] will need to attend the same event.” The program manager asked for any “ideas or accommodation options that would enable you to successfully perform your essential job functions.”
Gonzalez participated in the interactive process meeting on August 26, 2022 with EDMSand External Affairs staff. According to Gonzalez, during the meeting the EDMS program manager informed her that Bush was returning as her supervisor; that they could not stop him from contacting her, interacting with her, or being on campus at the same time; and that if Bush asked to speak to her and she declined, she would be cited for insubordination. They also denied her request to continue working remotely full time.
EDMS emailed Gonzalez on August 30, summarizing the meeting as follows.They had reviewed the work preclusions recommended by Gonzalez’s doctor, including indefinitely having no contact with Bush in any capacity, and continuing to work remotely, if feasible, for the remainder of 2022. They had “discussed the need for on-site work citing importance of collaboration with other development teams, interactions with students and faculty, stewardship and in person attendance at events.”They suggested a hybrid schedule with two days per week on site, to start by September 6. They had reviewed other possible accommodations to address Gonzalez’s “discomfort” with Bush, including (1) reassignment to a comparable development position in another group; (2) modified communication style, e.g., email versus in person or by phone between Gonzalez and Bush; (3) moving Gonzalez’s campus work location; (4) including a third person for in-person meetings between Gonzalez and Bush; and (5) leave of absence. Gonzalez had rejected these options, but the EDMS program manager had encouraged her to “take some time to reconsider” and propose additional ideas.
Gonzalez did not recall being offered other alternatives, but she would not have accepted an offer to be reassigned to a different development position in another department. She did not have a suggestion for what the Regents could have done to accommodate her, other than that they should have properly investigated Bush.
Gonzalez felt “forced to resign” on August 30, 2022 because she felt that “working with Bush subjected me to an unsafe work environment.”
UCLA’s office of Staff, Diversity & Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance (SD&C) also investigated Gonzalez’s complaints against Bush regarding gender.The SD&C interviewed Gonzalez several times, as well as Bush and multiple other witnesses. In its April 2023 report, the SD&C concluded that there was insufficient evidence to find Bush violated UCLA policies against discrimination, harassment, and sex-based misconduct.
5. Statements from former employees
While she was on leave in mid-2022, Gonzalez spoke to several former employees regarding Bush. Kristen Stankowski, who was supervised by Bush at TFT from 2016 to 2019, stated that Bush regularly harassed her due to her hearing impairment. She also believed that Bush discriminated against and harassed her because of her gender. She filed a complaint against Bush in 2020.
Patricia Biggi, another former employee, stated that Bush “displayed a sexist attitude toward women” and made fun of her because she was Native American. Biggi testified that Bush made discriminatory comments about women and was more confrontational with female employees because they were “more passive” than men.
Camille Tsalik, who worked as Bush’s assistant from 2018 to November 2021, testified that Bush regularly bullied her, including referring to her as the “token Jew.” She also experienced Bush’s road rage while driving with him. Bush made racist remarks regarding Tsalik’s boyfriend, who was Mexican. Bush stated that he thought the boyfriend would drive a “lowrider” car and “have his hair slicked back,” both stereotypes of Mexican individuals. Tsalik testified that starting in mid-2019 she spoke to co-workers, including Gonzalez, about Bush’s conduct toward her.
Bush was ultimately terminated by UCLA in November 2023, as a result of the complaints by Stankowski and Biggi.
B.Briefing
In his motion, Bush argued that he was entitled to summary judgment of the harassment claims against him because the alleged conduct did not constitute gender or racial harassment, but was based only on Gonzalez’s speculation. Further, to the extent Gonzalez provided evidence of harassing conduct, it was not severe or pervasive and thus could not establish a hostile work environment.
In their motion, the Regents argued that Gonzalez was not constructively terminated, that the alleged conduct did not constitute gender or racial harassment and was not severe or pervasive, that she did not have a qualifying disability, and that the remaining claims failed for the same reasons.
In opposition, Gonzalez argued that Bush engaged in severe and pervasive harassment based on her gender and race to create a hostile work environment. Regarding gender, she pointed to evidence of a pattern of abuse of women by Bush, including disparaging comments and intimidating conduct.Gonzalez also argued that Bush’s disparaging comments about Hispanic people created a triable issue of fact as to whether Bush created a hostile work environment on the basis of Gonzalez’s race.
Gonzalez further argued that she was constructively terminated due to “Bush’s history of discriminatory harassment” and the Regents’ failure to meet her accommodation requests or guarantee her safety on campus. She also contended that her diagnoses of anxiety and acute stress disorder constituted a qualifying disability to establish her claim for disability discrimination because they limited her ability to work.
Along with their reply, respondents submitted lengthy objections to Gonzalez’s evidence. They objected on relevance grounds to evidence of Bush’s alleged comments regarding employees unrelated to being female and/or Hispanic,and to evidence of other purported comments by Bush that Gonzalez did not witness.
C. Hearings and Rulings
Following a May 2024 hearing on Bush’s motion, the court granted summary adjudication for Bush on the third and fourth causes of action for gender and race harassment. As an initial matter, the court sustained Bush’s objections to Gonzalez’s evidence regarding Bush’s statements toward employees unrelated to being female and/or Hispanic.The court otherwise overruled Bush’s evidentiary objections.
Regarding Gonzalez’s gender harassment claim, the court found that Gonzalez failed to show that Bush’s alleged conduct was based on her gender. Although Gonzalez contended “she considered Bush’s actions ‘sexist,’ [Gonzalez] does not specify how Bush’s actions were based on [Gonzalez] being a woman and that Bush would not have taken such actions if [Gonzalez] was not a woman.” The court further found that the purported disparaging comments Bush made were not sufficiently severe or pervasive. A number of the comments about other employees “appear to be offensive utterances but do not appear to be ‘severe’ such as by being physically threatening, epithets or slurs.” Further, much of the other alleged conduct directed at Gonzalez was not based on her gender and/or was an isolated incident. The court noted it did not find Gonzalez’s proffered evidence by other female employees “very persuasive” as to Bush’s motive, as the statements were conclusory. The court also rejected Gonzalez’s argument that the February 3 incident was sufficiently severe on its own to constitute harassment.
The court similarly found that Gonzalez could not establish a claim for harassment based on her race. Although Bush had made some raciallybased comments, the court found they were “occasional” and not severe or pervasive. The court also found that Bush’s comments did not constitute ethnic slurs or other abusive language and thus, while offensive to Gonzalez, they could not establish a triable issue of harassment.
The court held a hearing on the Regents’ summary judgment motion on June 7, 2024 and thereafter granted the motion. Once again, the court sustained the objections as to Gonzalez’s evidence of discrimination against employees unrelated to being female and/or Hispanic. The court found for the Regents on the third and fourth causes of action for harassment on the same grounds on which it had granted Bush’s motion.
Turning to the discrimination claims, the court found that Gonzalez had not established she was constructively terminated. She could not rely on the evidence of harassment, as the court had rejected those claims. In addition, the court found that the Regents had offered “five different reasonable alternatives” that would have allowed Gonzalez to remain in her job rather than resigning. As such, Gonzalez had not shown that objectively intolerable working conditions led to her constructive termination.
The court also found for the Regents on the disability discrimination claim for the additional reason that Gonzalez had not “established that her anxiety and stress constituted a FEHA-recognized mental disability.” Moreover, because Gonzalez had not established her discrimination claims, the Regents were entitled to summary adjudication of the remaining claims for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment and failure to provide reasonable accommodation.
The court entered judgment in favor of respondents in August 2024. Gonzalez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Gonzalez challenges the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment to respondents. She contends the court erred in sustaining respondents’ objections to evidence from other former employees and failed to consider the totality of the evidence supporting her harassment claims. With respect to her discrimination claims, she argues that she established a triable issue as to whether she was constructively terminated.
I.Standard of Review
“On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been granted, we review the record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).) A defendant moving for summary judgment must show “that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “[W]e must view the evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff as the losing party, liberally construing [his or] her evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing defendants’ own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff's favor.” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) We accept as true both the facts shown by the losing party’s evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856.)
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc.
§ 437c, subd. (c).) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence and inferences therefrom would allow a reasonable juror to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850, 856.) “We will affirm an order granting summary judgment . . . if it is correct on any ground that the parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court.” (Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 115, 120.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on evidentiary objections for an abuse of discretion. Although a few of our sister courts have held that some or all written evidentiary objections should be reviewed de novo (see Pipitone v. Williams (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450–1451; Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 796, 816–817), we agree with the majority of courts holding that the abuse of discretion standard applies. (See Schmidt v. Citibank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1118 [“We will follow the weight of authority and apply the abuse of discretion standard”]; see also Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149, 161 (Martin).)
II.Harassment Claims
A. Legal Standards
The FEHA prohibits harassment of an employee on the basis of specified categories, including sex and race. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) “Harassment includes ‘[v]erbal harassment’ such as ‘epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis enumerated in [FEHA].’” (Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney's Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 627 (Bailey).)Under the statute, “‘harassment’ because of sex” includes sexual harassment and gender harassment. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C).) “To establish a prima facie case of unlawful harassment under FEHA, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) [s]he was a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was subjected to unwelcome ... harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [the plaintiff's membership in an enumerated class]; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with h[er] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) [the employer] is liable for the harassment.’” (Martin, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 170, quoting Thompson v. City of Monrovia (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 876.)
Hostile work environment harassment is a type of sexual harassment that “‘has the purpose or effect of either interfering with the work performance of an employee, or creating an intimidating workplace.’” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 878 (Beltran); see also Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 627 [“harassment claims focus on ‘situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee’”].)
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, “an employee must show he or she was subjected to harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome, (2) because of sex or gender, and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. (Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 627; see also Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043 (Hughes).) “‘The working environment must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances.’” (Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 628.) “‘The required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)”’ are not sufficient to create an actionable claim of harassment.” (Ibid.; see also Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462.) “The objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.” (Bailey, at p. 629.)
Prior to 2019, the requirement to establish harassment that was “severe or pervasive” was “quite a high bar for plaintiffs to clear, even in the context of a motion for summary judgment.” (Beltran, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.) Effective January 1, 2019, however, the Legislature added section 12923, which provided that “[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” (§ 12923, subd. (b).) Section 12923, subdivision (a) also “clarified that a hostile work environment exists ‘when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's personal sense of well-being.’ The plaintiff is not required to show a decline in productivity, only ‘that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to “make it more difficult to do the job.”’” (Beltran, at p. 878, citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 25 (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.); see also Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663, 693.)
Moreover, the statute expressly provides that “[h]arassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.” (§ 12923, subd. (e).) This language affirmed the earlier decision in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 286, which held that because “many employment cases present issues of intent, and motive, and hostile working environment, issues not determinable on paper,” such cases “are rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.” (See Beltran, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 878; see also Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 634, fn. 7.)
B. Gender
Gonzalez alleges that she was harassed by Bush based on her gender, and that this conduct created a hostile work environment that interfered with her ability to do her job.
As an initial matter, Gonzalez claims that the trial court erred by excluding statements by former employeesunrelated to being female and/or Hispanic. Specifically, the trial court excluded evidence of Bush’s purported harassment of Tsalik for being Jewish, Stankowski for her hearing disability, and Biggi as a NativeAmerican.
We agree with Gonzalez that the exclusion of this evidence was an abuse of discretion. “‘[M]e too’ evidence, that is, evidence of gender bias against employees other than the plaintiff, may be admissible evidence in discrimination and harassment cases.” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 871; citing Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109-110 [plaintiff could introduce evidence the defendant had verbally abused and inappropriately touched other female employees, in addition to her]; Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 767 [declarations of other female employees terminated while pregnant were relevant to the plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination claim].) The trial court found that Bush’s statements regarding protected categories other than gender was not relevant to Bush’s harassment of Gonzalez because she was a woman. Butall of these employees were women and there was evidence in the record to suggest that Bush had a pattern of targeting women with his disparaging comments.Thus, although the subject matter of Bush’s statements was not directly related to gender, a jury could find that he made the harassing comments because of the employee’s gender. (See Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 613 (Thomas).)As such, the trial court erred in excluding it.
The trial courtdid not exclude thestatements by these witnesses that Bush also harassed them based on their gender.However, the court indicated that it did not find this evidence persuasive given the conclusory nature of the statements. We disagree. For example, Biggi discussed her experience with Bush being more confrontational with women and making derogatory statements toward them.As discussed further below, taken together with the other evidence presented by Gonzalez, testimony by multiple former female employees that Bush bullied them and made harassing comments based on their gender was probative of Gonzalez’s claim that he mistreated her in the same fashion. It also was relevant to Gonzalez’s perception of a hostile work environment. (See Beyda v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 511, 519 [“a reasonable person may be affected by knowledge that other workers are being sexually harassed in the workplace, even if he or she does not personally witness that conduct”].)As such, we consider the “me too” evidence presented here as relevant to Gonzalez’s harassment claims.
On the other hand, we agree with the trial court that several pieces of evidence relied on by Gonzalez did not show conduct by Bush based on gender. For example, Gonzalez does not explain how Bush’s invitation to attend a performance of “Love Actually” and assurance that the show was family-friendly was made because she was a woman. Nor does she link Bush’s displays of road rage toward other, unspecified, drivers to hostile conduct toward her based on her gender. Although Gonzalez correctly notes that hostile acts need not be “overtly sex- or gender-specific in content” to constitute harassment (Thomas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 613), she must still establish “that the harassing conduct took place because of the plaintiff's sex.” (Ibid.)
Even without thisunrelated evidence,we conclude that Gonzalez has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether actionable sexual harassment occurred. As explained in Miller v. Department of Corrections, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462, the court may consider factors including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Consistent with testimony from multiple employees that Bush engaged in bullying and confrontational behavior toward women, Gonzalez presented evidence that Bush undermined her during two meetings by interrupting her and suggesting that he needed to “mansplain” the material to another woman attendee. During the February 3, 2022 incident, Gonzalez testified that Bush yelled at and physically threatened her and she feared he would strike her. She was sufficiently frightened after this incident that she filed a police report and subsequently took a medical leave for anxiety and stress.
Gonzalez also stated that Bush would punish female employees who were not “nice” to him and would complain to her about female employees he disliked. Bush also frequently criticized one female employee, calling heran “idiot,” and “dumb.” This evidence was further supported by Larner’s testimony that Bush often spoke disrespectfully about female employees. While Bush’s repeated reference to a female employee as “dumb” and a “disaster” is not inherently gendered, a reasonable juror viewing all of the evidence could conclude that Bush was using derogatory language based on her gender.
Additionally, Bush made repeated sexual comments to Gonzalez, including his statement that a female board member was upset because no one “wants to fuck her” and his reference to female employee’s dress as “too sexy.” While respondents contend these statements were vulgar at worst, a reasonable juror could find they were derogatory and based on sex. (See Thomas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 613[evidence of “pervasive bullying behavior” toward women created hostile work environment].) Bush’s intimidating and inappropriate conduct raised a triable issue as to whether Gonzalez “‘would not have been treated in the same manner’ if she were a man.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, Gonzalez’s evidence showed that she was subject to this conduct by Bush over the relatively short time period of about six months, another factor supporting her claims. (See Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 574-575 [harassing comments made over the course of a year raised triable issue].) While, as the trial court found, some of Bush’s individual comments might not appear to be intimidating or sufficiently severe or pervasive, a reasonable juror could find that the cumulative effect of Bush’s conduct toward Gonzalez and other female employees so altered working conditions as to make it more difficult for Gonzalez to do her job. (See Beltran, supra, at p. 878.)
Looking at the totality of the circumstances and construing the evidence in favor of Gonzalez as we must, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the complained-of conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment or create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to Gonzalez because of her gender.

C.Race
We similarly conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate as to Gonzalez’s claim for racial harassment. In support of her claim, she points to the evidence of Bush’s derogatory comments about a co-worker, his statements to Gonzalez that certain areas of Los Angeles were “too Latino,” his comments about Tsalik’s Mexican boyfriend driving a “lowrider” and having “slicked back hair,” treating Gonzalez like a “token” Hispanic employee by appointing her to a council that was “too white” and inviting her to a Latino donor event, and his conduct during the February 3 incident. We find a triable issue of fact as to whetherthese incidents were sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a harassment claim.
Several of Bush’s comments were racially derogatory toward Hispanic people. Made by Gonzalez’s supervisor, these demeaning remarks alone were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to a hostile work environment. (See Dee v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30, 36 [finding that a single racial slur by a supervisor can create a hostile work environment]; see also Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn., supra37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 574-575 [hostile work environment where supervisor stated that Filipino employees were “‘old dummies and they don't speak English’”].) In addition, Bush treated Gonzalez differently because of her race—assigning her to certain positions and asking her to review a list of donors because she was Hispanic. A reasonable juror could find that this evidence demonstrated that Bush engaged in a pattern of racial harassment of Gonzalez that created a hostile work environment.
III.Discrimination Claims
Gonzalez contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to her discrimination claims based on gender, race, and disability (her first, second, and fifth causes of action).
A. Legal Standards
The FEHA prohibits an employer from subjecting an employee to an adverse employment action based on the employee's protected status.
(§ 12940, subd. (a).) For summary judgment of an employment discrimination claim, an employer may meet its initial burden by presenting evidence that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking, or the employer acted for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. (Zamora v. Security Industrial Specialists, Inc.(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 32; Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1181.) The elements of a prima facie case generally require the plaintiff to provide “evidence that (1) [she] was a member of a protected class, (2) [s]he was qualified for the position [s]he sought or was performing competently in the position [s]he held, (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.)
At issue here is the trial court’s finding that Gonzalez did not establish the adverse employment action element of her prima facie case. Gonzalez contends that she was constructively discharged, which occurs when an employee is “‘forced to resign due to actions and conditions so intolerable or aggravated at the time of [her] resignation that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have resigned.’” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1245 (Turner).) The requisite “intolerable conditions” “must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer. The proper focus is on whether the resignation was coerced, not whether it was simply one rational option for the employee.” (Id. at p. 1246.) Thus, our Supreme Court has cautioned that “‘[a]n employee is protected from . . . unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess of those faced by his [or her] co-workers. [S]he is not, however, guaranteed a working environment free of stress.’” (Id. at p. 1247.)
B. Analysis
Gonzalez asserts that the severe and pervasive harassment by Bush resulted in conditions so intolerable that she was constructively discharged. In addition, she contends that she was forced to resign due to the Regents’ failure to properly investigate her complaints and denial of her accommodation requests to continue working remotely through the end of the year and permanently have no contact with Bush.
“Whether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee's decision to resign is normally a question of fact.” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 827, quoting Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1056.) We have concluded that Gonzalez established a triable issue as to whether Bush engaged in severe or pervasive harassment. This included physical intimidation, derogatory comments, and bullying of female employees. Gonzalez can rely on the same evidence to establish a triable issue of fact whether Bush’s harassment created objectively intolerable working conditions. Moreover, at the time she resigned, the Regents had concluded the initial investigation and informed Gonzalez that Bush would be returning to his position and she would have to return to the office two days per week. The Regentsalso informed Gonzalez that if she wanted to keep her position in TFT, she would have to be supervised by Bush and have contact with him. Gonzalez also knew that several other employees had complained about Bush’s conduct but he had not been subject to any discipline. Based on this evidence, a juror could find that a reasonable employee would have felt the conditions were so intolerable that they had no reasonable alternative except to quit.
Respondents argue that Gonzalez cannot establish a triable issue of fact as to her constructive discharge because she was offered several accommodations, including a transfer to a comparable position in a different department. However,Gonzalez testified that a transfer would not be reasonablebecause she had invested significant time and energy into her career in TFT and would have had to start over in a new department with a new set of donors. In addition, respondents’ evidence shows that the Regents did not promiseto eliminate all contact between Gonzalez and Bush even if she took another position, or even that they had any particular “comparable” position to offer. As such, respondents fail to meet their initial summary judgment burden to establishthat Gonzalez was not subject to intolerable conditions because she was offered a comparable position.Gonzalez has established a triable issue that she was constructively discharged. Thus, we reverse summary adjudication as to her claims for discrimination based on her race and gender.
With respect to Gonzalez’s disability discrimination claim, respondents contend that Gonzalez failed to establish two additional elements of her prima facie claim—that she was subject to a qualifying disability and that she was subject to an adverse employment action because of that disability. (See Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1006 [for a prima facie case of disability discrimination, plaintiff must show “he suffered a physical disability within the meaning of the FEHA, he was otherwise qualified for his job, and he suffered an adverse employment action because of the physical disability”]; see alsoKing v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 432.) Gonzalez challenges only the issue of a qualifying disability on appeal. She presents no evidence or argument to establish a triable issue that she was constructively terminated as a result of her anxiety and stress disorders or accompanying medical leave. (See
§ 12940, subd. (a).) We therefore find that Gonzalez failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination and respondents are entitled to summary adjudication of this claim. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the additional issue of whether Gonzalez established that she suffered from a qualifying disability under the FEHA.
Finally, Gonzalez contends that her derivative claims—her sixth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment and her seventh cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation—survive if her underlying discrimination or harassment claims survive. Because we have reversed summary adjudication as to Gonzalez’s discrimination and harassment claims based on gender and race, we also reverse as to the derivative claim for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment. Conversely, Gonzalez’s reasonable accommodation claim fails along with her claim for disability discrimination.

DISPOSITION
The order granting summary adjudication is reversed as to Gonzalez’s claims for discrimination and harassment based on gender and race, as well as her claim for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment. The order is otherwise affirmed. We remand the matter for further proceedings. Appellant is entitled to hercosts on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COGLIATI, J.*

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

MORI, J.