P. v. Coats

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Filed 10/12/17 P. v. Coats CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM COATS,
Defendant and Appellant.
C081728
(Super. Ct. No. 07F01689)
Defendant William Coats appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Proposition
36 (Pen. Code,1 § 1170.126) petition for resentencing.2 He contends: 1) the trial court
erred in making factual findings beyond those established in the nature or basis of his
current convictions; 2) eligibility for resentencing is subject to the proof-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard; and 3) the court’s findings denied his right to a jury trial. We
affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the trial court deemed a
section 1170.126 petition and then denied. While this case was given a habeas corpus
case No. in the Sacramento County Superior Court, we agree with the trial court and
deem this an appeal from a section 1170.126 petition.

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BACKGROUND
We take the facts of defendant’s crimes from our prior opinion affirming the third
strike conviction which is the subject of his resentencing petition.3
“Defendant and the victim, Tammy G., have known each other for 30 years. On
New Year’s Eve 2006 and in early January 2007, they began a dating relationship that
included sexual activity. For two weeks to a month immediately prior to February 19,
2007, they lived together in the Sacramento area.
“On the afternoon of February 19, the couple traveled through Fair Oaks in
defendant’s car. Tammy was driving and defendant was in the front passenger seat. The
couple, who were both from the San Francisco Bay Area, began arguing because
defendant wanted Tammy to drive him to Redwood City but she did not want to do so.
She testified that he ‘was acting kind of like a child,’ and was having ‘a little tantrum fit.’
Their argument ‘got a little bit out of hand,’ and he hit her ‘[t]wo times’ on the mouth or
upper lip. After being struck, she wanted to get out of the car and tried to do so.
However, she was unfamiliar with the car and did not know how to unlock the door.
“Tammy remembered little about the incident, which had occurred nine months
prior to her testimony. She did not recall defendant doing anything to prevent her from
unlocking the door. She recalled a male approaching the car window and asking if she
needed help. She said, ‘yes, I need help. Please help me get out of this car.’ The man
tried to open the car but he could not do so. Tammy testified that following the man’s
attempt, ‘everything just kind of like went blank.’ She did not recall other people
approaching the car. She did not recall defendant pouring fingernail polish remover and
rubbing alcohol on her clothing; nor did she recall telling a police officer that he had done
so. She did not remember defendant stating that he ‘was going to light [her] on fire and
3 We take judicial notice of our opinions in cases Nos. C057674 and C073124.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)(2).)

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kill [her]’; nor did she remember telling an officer that he had said so. However, she did
remember that an officer had ‘forced’ her into an ambulance that took her to a hospital
where she refused treatment. Shown photographs of her injuries that had been taken
shortly after the incident, Tammy testified that, other than ‘two little tiny cuts’ on the top
of her lips, the injuries depicted could have been preexisting because she ‘was drinking’
and thus ‘fall[s] down a lot.’
“Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Jarred Hailey testified that he responded to
a disturbance call and found Tammy in an ambulance with facial injuries. Her face was
swollen and bruised, and she was bleeding from her mouth and nose. Hailey questioned
Tammy but she was uncooperative and reluctant to answer any of his questions.
“Eventually, Tammy told Deputy Hailey that defendant had become very angry
when she refused to drive him to Redwood City. As she drove down the street, he poured
fingernail polish remover and rubbing alcohol on her clothing and told her he was going
to ‘light her on fire’ and ‘was going to kill her.’ Defendant ignited a cigarette lighter, lit a
piece of paper on fire and threw it in Tammy’s direction. After throwing the burning
paper, defendant punched Tammy twice to the face and once to the back of the head,
causing her to stop the car on the roadway. Several motorists and pedestrians appeared
on the scene. Tammy tried to get out of the car but defendant stopped her and held onto
her. Eventually, people broke out the passenger window and restrained defendant,
allowing Tammy to escape.
“John Hernandez testified that while he and his family were driving through Fair
Oaks, the blue car ahead of them made several stops, reverse moves, and restarts. When
Hernandez pulled up alongside the car at a stop sign, he could see defendant, who was
sitting in the passenger seat, striking Tammy with the closed fist of his right hand, while
he held her hair with his left hand. Hernandez parked his car and told his passenger to
call ‘911.’ Then he approached the passenger side of the blue car and told defendant to
open the door; defendant did not respond and just kept on hitting Tammy. He appeared

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to be hitting her as hard as he could. She was crying and attempting to cover her face.
Hernandez heard defendant tell Tammy, ‘I’m going to kill you.’
“Hernandez testified that a person from another car approached the driver’s side
window, tried to open the door, and evidently inquired if Tammy was okay. Hernandez
heard Tammy say, ‘no, I’m not okay. I need help.’
“Hernandez was convinced that ‘something was going to happen.’ He again told
defendant to open the door and warned that he would break the window if defendant did
not comply. Defendant continued to hit Tammy, so Hernandez retrieved a baseball bat
from his truck and broke the passenger window.
“Stephen Miele, a telephone lineman who was working in the area, overheard
commotion and hollering. He drove to the scene and arrived as Hernandez was removing
the baseball bat from his truck.
“At about this time, Courtney Wyrick and her boyfriend Randy Crawford noticed
the commotion and stopped their car to help. Wyrick observed defendant hitting
Tammy’s face repeatedly with a closed fist. Tammy was crying but not fighting back.
Wyrick observed Tammy trying to unlock the car door and roll down her window.
Defendant would roll the window back up and relock the door. Crawford saw defendant
strike Tammy when she tried to unlock the door.
“After Hernandez broke open the car’s front passenger window, Miele grabbed the
hood of defendant’s sweatshirt and pulled him away from Tammy. Thus thwarted from
hitting Tammy with his fists, defendant resorted to kicking her arms and face.
Eventually, Crawford and Miele pulled defendant part way through the shattered window
and pinned him with his arms behind his back. After Tammy managed to unlock the
driver’s side door, Wyrick opened the door and helped Tammy get out of the car. Wyrick
noticed that Tammy’s face was covered with blood and that she had purple bruises
around her eyes. Wyrick tried to talk to Tammy but she was hysterical and trembling.

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Wyrick then returned to the driver’s side of the car to turn off its ignition. Defendant
kicked her.
“During the altercation Miele heard defendant say, ‘I’m going to kill her. Get
your hands off of me. I’m going to kill her.’ Crawford heard Tammy say, ‘help me, he’s
going to kill me.’
“Hernandez flagged down a passing fire truck. Defendant went limp and appeared
to play dead when emergency personnel arrived. Defendant was removed from the car
and placed on the asphalt. He resumed fighting, and it took six emergency personnel to
hold him down. Eventually defendant was turned over to law enforcement.
“Wyrick and Crawford both noticed that there was a very strong odor of an
unknown substance in the interior of the blue car.
“Crime scene investigators collected several items from the car’s interior including
tissue paper, a partially burned tissue paper roll, empty bottles of fingernail polish
remover and rubbing alcohol, and three cigarette lighters.
“A Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District investigator took Tammy’s blouse and
slacks into evidence. When the investigator first took possession of the clothes, he noted
that they felt damp. The investigator testified that rubbing (isopropyl) alcohol and
fingernail polish remover (acetone or ethyl acetate) are flammable liquids.
“A state Department of Justice criminalist found residues of ethyl acetate and
isopropyl alcohol on Tammy’s blouse.” (People v. Coats (Oct. 14, 2008, C057674)
[nonpub. opn.] at pp. 2-7, fn. omitted.)
A jury found defendant guilty of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant,
criminal threats, and false imprisonment, and sustained three serious felony and strike
allegations in a bifurcated proceeding. (People v. Coats, supra, C057674, at pp. 1-2.)
Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life plus 15 years. (Id. at p. 2.) On appeal to this
court, we affirmed the judgment and ordered correction of the abstract of judgment. (Id.
at p. 24.)

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In December 2012, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking
relief under section 1170.126. (People v. Coats (Oct. 21, 2013, C073124) [nonpub. opn.]
at p. 2.) The trial court construed the habeas petition as a section 1170.126 resentencing
petition, which it denied. (People v. Coats, supra, C073124, at p. 2.) We affirmed the
trial court on appeal. (Id. at p. 3.)
In February 2016, defendant filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in
which he sought relief pursuant to section 1170.126, which the trial court construed the
petition to be another section 1170.126 petition. The court declined to determine whether
it could reconsider its previous denial or whether relief was available for counts stayed
pursuant to section 654 “because petitioner has not shown good cause to entertain the
petition.” Relying on the summary of facts in our affirmance of defendant’s conviction,
the trial court found defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he was armed with
a deadly weapon and with the intent to inflict great bodily injury on the victim during the
commission of the offenses.
DISCUSSION
I
Eligibility For Resentencing
Section 1170.126, enacted as part of Proposition 36, allows defendants serving a
life term for a third strike to petition for resentencing. (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) Eligibility
for resentencing is initially limited to defendants serving life terms for felonies that are
neither serious nor violent. (Id., subd. (e)(1).) Other factors can render a defendant
ineligible for resentencing. One of the disqualifying factors, as cross-referenced in
section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2), renders an offense ineligible for recall of sentence if
“[d]uring the commission of the current offense, the defendant used a firearm, was armed
with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another
person.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii).)

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Defendant first contends the trial court erred in by finding him ineligible for
resentencing based on facts beyond those that establish the nature or basis of his
convictions. We find this contention is inconsistent with a recent California Supreme
Court decision.4
In his opening brief, defendant argued People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343
applied to section 1170.126 eligibility determinations. According to defendant, “the
cases establish that the eligibility determination was intended to a straightforward legal
question.” He claimed that Guerrero “decided how such determination should be made.”
This, according to him, precluded “ ‘relitigation’ of the circumstances of the crime.”
Instead, a court was limited to determining “ ‘the nature or basis’ ” of the conviction.
However, in a case decided after briefing in this case was complete, the California
Supreme Court concluded that for Proposition 36 the court is not so limited. People v.
Estrada (2017) 3 Cal.5th 661, 665 (Estrada) addressed whether a trial court could rely on
the underlying facts of a previously dismissed count to determine whether a defendant
was ineligible for resentencing because he or she was armed with a firearm or deadly
weapon during the commission of the offense. The defendant in Estrada pled guilty to
grand theft from the person and admitted two strikes; under the plea agreement a personal
use of a firearm enhancement and charges of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment
by violence, all related to the grand theft charge, were dismissed, as were other unrelated
charges. (Id. at pp. 665-666.) He was sentenced to 25 years to life, and subsequently
filed a section 1170.126 petition. (Estrada, at p. 666.) Relying on evidence at the
preliminary hearing related to the dismissed charges and enhancement, the trial court
4 Since the trial court addressed the merits of defendant’s petition and did not
determine whether he was procedurally barred from filing, we decline to address the
People’s claim that defendant’s contention is time barred. (See § 1170.126, subd. (b)
[resentencing petition must be filed within two years of effective date of Proposition 36
absent a showing of good cause].)

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denied the petition on the ground that the defendant was armed during the commission of
the offense, which the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal. “What we hold is that a trial
court may deny resentencing under the act on the basis of facts underlying previously
dismissed counts.” (Estrada, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 665.) The Supreme Court derived
this conclusion from the intent and purpose of Proposition 36. It noted that “section
1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C)(iii) is best read as excluding from resentencing ‘broadly
inclusive categories of offenders who, during commission of their crimes--and regardless
of those crimes’ basic statutory elements--used a firearm, were armed with a firearm or
deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury to another person.” (Estrada, at
p. 670.) Specifically on point as to defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court also found
“it more faithful to Proposition 36’s crucial distinction to interpret its conception of
violent offenders as including not only those inmates convicted of inherently violent
offenses but also those who committed nonviolent offenses in a violent manner.”
(Estrada, at p. 671, italics added.)
Additional support for the Supreme Court’s holding was found in the initiative’s
structure. Proposition 36 incorporated the disqualifying categories directly into the three
strikes law. (Estrada, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 671.) Since a prosecutor had little incentive
before Proposition 36 to prove conduct that would disqualify a defendant from
resentencing, the Supreme Court thought “it unlikely that it was part of the Act’s design
to prevent courts reviewing a recall petition from considering conduct beyond that
implied by the judgment. Given the importance of the Act’s distinction between violent
and nonviolent criminal conduct, it seems implausible that the Act is best understood to
condition ineligibility on an indicator of violence that the prosecution had no incentive to
incorporate into the judgment. Accordingly, section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C)(iii)
would be substantially underinclusive were we to interpret it to apply only to cases in
which the judgment implies disqualifying conduct.” (Estrada, at pp. 671-672.)

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The defendant in Estrada also cited Guerrero and argued that this approach was
“inconsistent with our approach to sentence enhancements for prior convictions.”
(Estrada, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 672.) The Supreme Court summarily rejected this
contention. “Even assuming that Estrada’s interpretation of those cases is correct,
nothing in Proposition 36 or any material we might examine to understand its purpose
suggests the Act incorporated such a substantive limitation. Precluding a court from
considering facts not encompassed within the judgment of conviction would be
inconsistent with the text, structure, and purpose of sections 1170.12, subdivision
(c)(2)(C)(iii) and 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2)--and would, by consequence, impose an
unnecessary limitation.” (Estrada, at p. 672.)
We asked for supplemental briefing on Estrada. Defendant claims in his
supplemental brief that Estrada is distinguishable because “[u]nlike Estrada, appellant
relies on Guerrero as the focus of his argument,” specifically, that Guerrero prevents the
prosecution “from relitigating the circumstances of the crime committed years ago.” To
the extent we interpret Estrada as rejecting his claims, defendant asks us “to more fully
address the limitation imposed by Guerrero in determining his eligibility for resentencing
under Proposition 36.” We reject this narrow reading of Estrada.
This case involves a narrow application of Estrada’s rule. Unlike Estrada, this
case does not involve a trial court’s reliance on preliminary hearing testimony regarding
dismissed charges, but our summary of the trial testimony5 regarding charges for which
he was convicted and now seeks resentencing. As the trial court correctly noted, those
facts establish that during the commission of his current offenses, defendant was armed
with a deadly weapon, a flammable liquid and a cigarette lighter, and with the intent to
5 Our summary of the facts of defendant’s crime in our prior opinion is part of the
record of conviction. (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455.)

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inflict great bodily injury on the victim. Applying Estrada, we conclude that the trial
court could rely on those facts in determining him ineligible for resentencing.
II
Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Defendant contends that ineligibility for resentencing must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt as a matter of due process.6
Defendant relies primarily on People v. Arevalo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 836. The
defendant in Arevalo was convicted in a bench trial of grand theft auto and driving a
vehicle without the owner’s consent and sentenced to an indeterminate term under the
three strikes law. (Id. at p. 841.) The trial court acquitted the defendant of the charge of
felon in possession of a firearm and found an armed with a firearm allegation not true.
(Ibid.) The defendant subsequently petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.126.
(Arevalo, at p. 841.) Applying the preponderance standard, the trial court found the
defendant ineligible for resentencing because he was armed in the commission of his
offenses. (Id. at pp. 841-842.) In reversing, the Court of Appeal held: “Under a properly
applied ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard, Arevalo’s acquittal on the weapon
possession charge, and the not-true finding on the allegation of being armed with a
firearm, are preclusive of a determination that he is ineligible for resentencing
consideration. As a matter of law, therefore, Arevalo is eligible for resentencing.” (Id. at
p. 842.)
The Arevalo court found that the consequences to the defendant of an ineligibility
finding, a potentially much greater sentence than if he were found eligible, required a
heightened standard of proof as a matter of due process. (People v. Arevalo, supra,
6 This issue is currently before the California Supreme Court. (See People v.
Frierson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 788, review granted Oct. 19, 2016, S236728; People v.
Newman (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 718, review granted Nov. 22, 2016, S237491.)

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244 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; see People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1349-
1350 (conc. opn. of Raye, P. J.).) While the Bradford concurrence found the clear and
convincing standard appropriate (see Bradford, at p. 1350 (conc. opn. of Raye, P. J.), the
Arevalo court required application of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. “[I]n
order to safeguard the intended parallel structure of the Act--the heightened standard of
proof should be beyond a reasonable doubt. Under a lesser standard of proof, nothing
would prevent the trial court from disqualifying a defendant from resentencing eligibility
consideration by completely revisiting an earlier trial, and turning acquittals and not-true
enhancement findings into their opposites.” (Arevalo, at p. 853.)
We need not determine whether to apply Arevalo’s reasoning because this case is
distinguishable from Arevalo; the trial court here did not state it was applying the
preponderance standard7 and used facts from the charges upon which he sought
resentencing, rather than conduct underlying an acquittal and a not-true enhancement
finding. The trial court relied on our summary of facts from our affirmance of
defendant’s conviction to find he was armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore
ineligible. The trial court’s finding was correct under any standard of proof.
7 We reject defendant’s claim that we should presume the trial court applied the
preponderance standard because “the generally accepted rule . . . is that the
preponderance of evidence standard applies for determining eligibility.” (See, e.g.,
People v. Newman, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 729 [cited for potentially persuasive value
only]; People v. Osuna (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1040; see also Evid. Code, § 115
[preponderance is the general standard of proof].) When the trial court denied the
petition on March 10, 2016, there was a conflict as to what standard of proof should
apply to a finding that rendered a defendant ineligible, as the Bradford concurrence and
Arevalo had both been rendered by that time. There is no reason to presume the trial
court applied the preponderance standard when it was silent regarding the standard of
proof.

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III
Right To A Jury Trial
Relying on Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. ___ [186 L.Ed.2d 314],
defendant asserts the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial
when it found him ineligible for relief based on facts not found true by a jury.
The cases addressing this issue have uniformly held that a defendant is not entitled
to a jury trial on the eligibility finding. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
812, 822, fn. 10; People v. Brimmer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 782, 803-805; People v.
Guilford (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 651, 662-663 [rejecting argument defendant makes in
this case based on Alleyne v. United States]; People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
1042, 1060 [Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] and its
progeny do not apply to a determination of eligibility for resentencing under the Three
Strikes Reform Act].) Although Estrada did not address this issue, the fact that our
Supreme Court upheld a finding of ineligibility based on evidence at a preliminary
hearing related to dismissed charges is consistent with the numerous decisions rejecting
this claim.
Defendant gives us no reason to depart from these decisions. His claim is without
merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
Hoch, J.
/s/
Renner, J.

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