Juan José Lantigua-Núñez v. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; UNITED STATES; TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-2067
JUAN JOSÉ LANTIGUA-NÚÑEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; UNITED STATES; TODD BLANCHE, Acting
Attorney General,
Defendants, Appellees,*
MIKAEL M. ALLERT; PAUL CHAHAL; MATTHEW B. LANE; JOFFREY BAGWELL;
JOHN DOE 1 THROUGH 5,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Bruce J. McGiverin, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Thompson, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
Josué Emanuel Castellanos-Otero, with whom Rafael
González-Vélez Lawyers, P.S.C. was on brief, for appellant.
David L. Peters, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, with whom Yaakov M. Roth, Acting Assistant
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche is automatically substituted
for former Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi as appellee.

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Attorney General, and Charles W. Scarborough, Appellate Staff,
Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief, for
appellees.
May 1, 2026

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GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Juan José
Lantigua-Núñez ("Lantigua-Núñez") initiated this action against
the United States Coast Guard (USCG) under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA)'s law enforcement proviso. He alleged USCG agents used
unlawful force when they fired several gunshots at a vessel he was
helming, two of which hit him and caused serious injuries to his
left arm. The USCG moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court
granted the USCG'S motion, reasoning that Lantigua-Núñez's claim
fell under maritime jurisdiction and was therefore exclusively
governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA). The court then
denied his request to amend his complaint to add an SIAA claim
because that claim would have been time-barred. He now asks this
Court to reverse the district court's decision.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
We draw our facts from the operative complaint. Legal
Sea Foods, LLC v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 36 F.4th 29, 30 (1st Cir.
2022). On April 27, 2021, a USCG helicopter and "cutter"1
1 "A 'Cutter' is [] any CG vessel 65 feet in length or greater,
having adequate accommodations for crew to live on board."
Assistant Commandant for Capability (CG-7) Office of Cutter Forces
(CG-751), U.S. Coast Guard, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-

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approached a "go-fast vessel"2 ("the vessel") in international
waters off the coast of Puerto Rico. Lantigua-Núñez, a citizen of
the Dominican Republic, was operating the vessel with two other
individuals aboard. The USCG first fired warning shots in the
direction of the vessel and then, when it failed to stop, fired
live rounds at the engine to disable it. Two of those rounds
struck Lantigua-Núñez in his left arm. After being struck the
second time, Lantigua-Núñez fell to the vessel's deck, causing him
to release the accelerator and the vessel to stop. He remained on
the deck, bleeding for thirty minutes, before the USCG cutter
arrived. He was then helicoptered to the Centro Médico Hospital
in San Juan, Puerto Rico. As a result of this incident,
Lantigua-Núñez sustained serious and permanent injuries. Most
notably, his arm is permanently disfigured and has limited
functionality.
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Capability-CG-7/Office-of-
Cutter-Forces-CG-751/Coast-Guard-Cutter-Fleet/
[https://perma.cc/PM2C-X2FR].
2 We provide the following context for the reader:
"[G]o-fast boats," also known as "pangas," [] are small
boats customized with additional engines and fuel tanks
for added speed and range. Go-fast boats are designed
to cut through the water with less friction so that they
can travel at higher speeds. Because they have lower
profiles than fishing boats and frequently run without
navigation lights, they are more difficult to detect.
196 Am. Jur. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (2022).

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B. Procedural History
On April 4, 2023, Lantigua-Núñez filed an FTCA
administrative claim. That claim was denied on May 22, 2023. He
then filed this lawsuit on November 22, 2023, in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Lantigua-Núñez
alleged constitutional claims against the individual USCG
officers, along with a tort claim against the federal government
under the "law enforcement proviso"3 of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
More specifically, Lantigua-Núñez contended that the USCG used
unlawful force during the incident in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and that it failed to promptly procure
medical assistance. However, he later voluntarily dismissed those
constitutional claims.
The Government then filed a motion to dismiss
Lantigua-Núñez's remaining FTCA claim under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who issued
a Report and Recommendation to grant the motion to dismiss. The
magistrate judge reasoned that the FTCA did not apply because the
3 The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States'
sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by federal
employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The "law enforcement proviso"
of the FTCA sets out exceptions to § 1346(b)(1)'s waiver of
sovereign immunity, creating a means to sue the federal government
for intentional torts. The proviso includes "[a]ny claim arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

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claim was instead based in admiralty law and, for the claim to be
viable, Lantigua-Núñez needed to bring the action under the SIAA.
Lantigua-Núñez sought to amend his complaint to add an SIAA claim,
but the magistrate judge recommended denying that request because
the claim would have been time-barred by the SIAA's two-year
statute of limitations.
Lantigua-Núñez filed a timely objection to the
magistrate judge's finding that the FTCA did not apply to his
claims. He did not, however, seek review of the finding that his
claims would have been time-barred by the SIAA. The District Court
dismissed the case with prejudice, adopting the Report and
Recommendation. Lantigua-Núñez now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Lantigua-Núñez raises, on appeal, several challenges to
the district court's decision. He first posits that the law
enforcement proviso of the FTCA provides jurisdiction for claims
against federal law enforcement officers, regardless of location.
Lantigua-Núñez then asserts that the SIAA's exclusive control of
maritime claims does not "supplant" the FTCA in his case because
"the essence of the claim is unlawful police-type conduct." And
lastly, he claims that the strict application of the SIAA would
leave him without a remedy and provide "a loophole through which
federal law enforcement could do at sea what they could never
lawfully do on land, without civil accountability." The Government

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opposes these claims and argues that the district court correctly
held that Lantigua-Núñez's claims "sound in admiralty" and are
therefore governed exclusively by the SIAA. For the reasons stated
below, we find Lantigua-Núñez's arguments unconvincing and affirm.
We review motions under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) de
novo. Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995).
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, we "construe the Complaint
liberally and treat all well-pleaded facts as true, according the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Id. At the
same time, when a defendant challenges subject matter
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
jurisdiction. Id. In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must
determine whether the plaintiff asserted sufficient "factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). The court must not "forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of
success on the merits . . . ." Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2011). Instead, "[t]he
relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of
liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the
facts alleged in the complaint." Id. at 13.
We conclude that Lantigua-Núñez's claim sounds in
admiralty against the United States, and the SIAA provides a remedy

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for that claim. Lantigua-Núñez argues that the law enforcement
proviso of the FTCA provides grounds for relief for "any"
intentional torts committed by law enforcement agents, and from
this, suggests that "Congress intended a broad remedy for law
enforcement abuses, which logically encompasses abuses at sea."
But he ignores the "unambiguous language" of the FTCA, which
"should be regarded as conclusive." See United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). Specifically, the FTCA expressly
excludes from its waiver of sovereign immunity "[a]ny claim for
which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 . . . of title 46 -- that
is, the SIAA -- "relating to claims or suits in admiralty against
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d). To the extent
Lantigua-Núñez's claims arise under the SIAA, then, the FTCA
excepts them from its waiver of sovereign immunity. See Guidry v.
Durkin, 834 F.2d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the
FTCA is unavailable for admiralty claims governed by the [SIAA]").
Lantigua-Núñez ignores the consensus of circuits (identified by
the USCG) who have held that, if a claim is covered by the SIAA,
the FTCA cannot serve as alternate grounds for a claim. Anderson,
317 F.3d at 1237; Ayers v. United States, 277 F.3d 821, 825 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("Claims for which a remedy is available under [SIAA]
are not cognizable under FTCA." (citation modified)); McCormick v.
United States, 680 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that
"appellants' assertion of jurisdiction under the FTCA is correct

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only if their claims do not fall within the coverage of the
[SIAA]"); Callas' Est. v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 619 n.7
(7th Cir. 1982) ("Claims for which a remedy is available under the
SIAA are not cognizable under the FTCA.").
We must therefore determine whether Lantigua-Núñez's
claim falls within the SIAA's maritime jurisdiction. The SIAA
waives sovereign immunity for intentional maritime torts against
the federal government. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d). It also states
that "[i]f a remedy is provided by this chapter, it shall be
exclusive of any other action arising out of the same subject
matter . . . ." 46 U.S.C. § 30904. That is, a claim falling under
the SIAA may not be pursued under another non-maritime statute.
See id.
"[A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim
must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with
maritime activity." Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). A claim satisfies the
location element when the injury "occurred on navigable water" or
was "caused by a vessel on navigable water." Florio v. Olson, 129
F.3d 678, 680 (1st Cir. 1997). The connection element depends on
two issues: whether the "'general character' of the activity giving
rise to the incident" has "a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity" and whether the incident has "a

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potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce." Id. (quoting
Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534). When defining a defendant's conduct,
plaintiffs may not hypergeneralize to "eliminat[e] the maritime
aspect of the tortfeasor's activity from consideration." Grubart,
513 U.S. at 542.
Here, Lantigua-Núñez concedes that the "location"
element is satisfied because the incident in the present case
"occurred on navigable water"; however, he says the "connection"
element isn't satisfied mainly because he was shot from a USCG
helicopter, and that aerial attack -- as well as the USCG's more
general law enforcement duties -- cannot constitute "maritime
activity.". But his attempt to favorably construe the USCG's
conduct outside of maritime jurisdiction resembles the exact
"hypergeneralization" the Supreme Court warned against in Grubart.
Id. Lantigua-Núñez conveniently glosses over the involvement of
multiple water vessels and the USCG's domain over maritime
activity. See id. Moreover, the USCG's actions bear "a
significant relationship" to its "traditional maritime activity"
of patrolling and enforcing the law on the waters. See Kelly v.
United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining
"[i]t would be impossible to find an agency of our government with
a closer relationship to maritime activity [than the USCG]").
Given the USCG's duty to enforce the laws on the waters, its own
failure to follow the law, such as by employing unlawful force

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against crewmen navigating the waters, would also have a
potentially disruptive effect on maritime commerce. Thus,
Lantigua-Núñez's claim satisfies both the location and connection
elements of a maritime claim and thus falls under maritime
jurisdiction. And because the SIAA applies and the FTCA exempts
from its reach those cases that could be brought under the SIAA,
he cannot bring suit under the FTCA. 46 U.S.C. § 30904; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(d); Anderson v. United States, 317 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Thus, if admiralty jurisdiction exists
for Anderson's claim, it cannot be brought under the FTCA.").
In a similar vein, Lantigua-Núñez argues that the SIAA
does not provide him with an adequate remedy because his is "not
the sort of claim envisioned when the SIAA was enacted or amended;
it is not about the operation of vessels or maritime commerce at
all, except incidentally by location." However, the SIAA's
unambiguously exclusive control over maritime claims entails that
the location of the cause of action is not "incidental" by any
means but is a deciding factor in determining jurisdiction. 46
U.S.C. § 30904. We agree with the district court that
Lantigua-Núñez's arguments on congressional intent do not overcome
the clear statutory language.
Lantigua-Núñez attempts to avoid the reality that he
cannot sue under the FTCA by arguing that the SIAA's exclusivity
provision does not apply because he does not have a remedy under

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the SIAA (recall that his SIAA claim was time-barred). But that
argument does not hold water. Lantigua-Núñez had a proper means
to pursue his remedy (the SIAA), he just failed to timely file
that claim. And he, of course, cannot now turn around and say
that his failure to file a timely SIAA claim is actually the
reason that the SIAA doesn't apply. See United States v. Carroll,
105 F.3d 740, 744 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Wherever possible, statutes
should be construed in a commonsense manner . . . honoring plain
meaning . . . and avoiding absurd or counter-intuitive
results . . . ." (internal citations omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision
to dismiss the case with prejudice.

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