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21-2039•Pedro J. Amaro v. State of New Mexico
21-2039Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitAug 19, 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
PEDRO J. AMARO,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO; SUSANA
MARTINEZ, Governor for the State of
New Mexico; BILL RICHARDSON,
former Governor for the State of New
Mexico; HECTOR H. BALDERAS,
Attorney General for the State of New
Mexico; GARY R. KING, former Attorney
General for New Mexico; DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; GREGG
MARCANTEL; JOE WILLIAMS,
Secretary of Corrections; JERRY ROARK,
Director of Adult Prisons; TIM
LEMASTER, Deputy Secretary of
Operations; LARRY PHILLIPS, NMCD
Grievance/Disciplinary Appeals; JAMES
R. BREWSTER, General Counsel;
ANGELA M. MARTINEZ, Health
Services Administrator; Y. RIVERA,
A.C.A. Monitor/Administrator for New
Mexico; G. CHAVEZ; GEO GROUP,
INC., a corporation registered to do
business in New Mexico; JOE R.
WILLIAMS, employed by GEO Group;
FNU LNU, Wardens; FNU LNU, Chief of
Security; FNU LNU, Grievance
Lieutenants; CORIZON, LLC, a foreign
corporation registered to do business in
New Mexico; LISA STABER, M.D.;
KATHY ARMIJO, employed by Corizons
No. 21-2039
(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00993-KG-JHR)
(D. N.M.)
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 19, 2021
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 21-2039 Document: 010110563831 Date Filed: 08/19/2021 Page: 1
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as Health Services; FNU LNU, John/Jane
Does,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Plaintiff Pedro Amaro, a New Mexico state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals
from the district court’s decision dismissing his amended civil rights complaint
without prejudice. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm
the district court’s decision.
I
At all times relevant to this case, Amaro was confined at the Guadalupe
County Correctional Facility (GCCF) in Santa Rosa, New Mexico. GCCF is
purportedly operated by The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), under contract with the State
of New Mexico. ROA at 31.
On the morning of December 28, 2012, Amaro was allegedly “subjected to a
near-fatal episode of acute Carbon Monoxide Poisoning.” Id. Amaro was allegedly
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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also “subjected to additional and cumulative episodes of Carbon Monoxide Exposure
and/or Poisoning” on January 4, 2013, January 19, 2013, and January 21, 2013. Id.
In addition, on February 6, 2014, he was “pale/wane, vomiting, and otherwise
mentally affected and/or neurologically distressed/disoriented.” Id. According to
Amaro, since the first episode on December 28, 2012, he has suffered from “varying
degrees of anxiety” and has had “trouble going to sleep” out of fear “if he will wake
up or not.” Id. at 33. Amaro also alleges that he “has not felt the same mentally and
has become somewhat ‘disabled’ in regards [sic] to his mental faculties” since the
December 28, 2012 episode. Id.
On September 2, 2016, Amaro initiated these federal proceedings by filing a
complaint against the State of New Mexico, a host of named and unnamed state
officials and employees, GEO, various named and unnamed officers and employees
of GEO, including named and unnamed officers and employees at GCCF, and various
unnamed individuals responsible for the design, engineering, construction, and
ongoing maintenance of GCCF. The complaint recounted Amaro’s alleged exposures
to carbon monoxide, and also alleged generally that prisoners confined at GCCF were
being exposed to and poisoned by carbon monoxide. The complaint, which set forth
seven specific counts, sought relief “under the Federal Civil Rights Act and the
Constitutions of the United States and the State of New Mexico,” as well as “under
New Mexico civil and/or common law,” including the New Mexico Tort Claims Act
(NMTCA). Id. at 20.
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On September 15, 2017, the district court dismissed Amaro’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and entered final judgment in the case. In
doing so, the district court reached the following conclusions regarding the
allegations in Amaro’s complaint:
• Amaro documented only “one incident of carbon monoxide
exposure” that “occur[red] on December 28, 2012” at GCCF, but “did
not file his civil rights Complaint until September 2, 2016,” id. at 100;
• Amaro’s complaint did include allegations of an incident on
February 6, 2014, when he was sick, but “d[id] not allege . . . an event
of exposure to carbon monoxide on that date,” id. at 108;
• “To the extent Amaro” was “seek[ing] relief on claims other than
his own, the Complaint fail[ed] to state a claim for relief and those
claims w[ould] be dismissed,” id. at 102;
• “Although [Amaro] identifies specific individuals, specifies their
official positions, and generally alleges that they acted under color of
law, he makes almost no factual allegations of any act or omission by
any individual defendant,” and thus “[t]he allegations of the Complaint
are insufficient to state any plausible Section 1983 claim against any
named individual defendant,” id. at 106;
• The allegations in the complaint were insufficient “to impose
supervisory liability on any individual defendant,” id.;
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• “[A]ll of Amaro’s claims are barred by the two-year statute of
limitations of the NMTCA and the three-year statute of limitations
governing Section 1983 claims,” id. at 109;
• Because “Amaro’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations,” “any amendment of those claims would also be subject to
immediate dismissal,” and thus “leave to amend . . . would be futile,” id.
at 110.
After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration, Amaro appealed from the
district court’s order of dismissal.
On June 13, 2018, this court issued an order and judgment affirming in part
and reversing in part. In particular, this court affirmed “the dismissal of . . . all
claims premised on the December 2012 or January 2013 incidents or the grievance
process associated with those incidents,” but reversed Amaro’s claims arising out of
the “February 2014 incident” and remanded those “claims with instructions for the
district court to provide [Amaro] an opportunity to amend his complaint” to allege
“sufficient individual specificity to state a valid claim for relief under § 1983.” Id.
at 179.
On remand, the district court granted Amaro leave to amend his complaint.
The district court emphasized that “[t]he amended complaint must be limited to [his]
claims against individual state officials and prison employees for [the] alleged
February 2014 incident and related grievance proceeding.” Id. at 182. Amaro filed
an amended complaint on September 26, 2018.
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On May 28, 2020, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order
dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice “for failure to comply with the
Court’s Order and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 328. The
district court noted, in pertinent part:
Far from complying with the Court’s orders, Plaintiff Amaro’s
Amended Complaint is 144 pages long. (Doc. 69). He names in excess
of 300 defendants, up to and including “the owners of the real property
bearing the street address of 1039 Agua Negra Rd, Santa Rosa, New
Mexico.” (Doc. 69) at 57-58. The allegations expressly include official
capacity claims and claims against defendants that were previously
dismissed by this Court. (See, e.g., Doc. 69 at 7, 9, 10). He asserts 39
claims covering a 10-year period (Doc. 69 at 63, 60-141) and makes
generalized allegations . . . .
Id. at 331. The district court also “t[ook] notice that Amaro ha[d] a pattern of
making grossly overbroad and unsupported claims,” noting in support that in 2017
“Amaro filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking to have all
criminal convictions by New Mexico’s Ninth Judicial District Court from 1979
through 2013 set aside and all convicted prisoners released from custody.” Id. The
district court emphasized that its “dismissal [wa]s without prejudice,” and it noted
that “[i]f Plaintiff Amaro believes he has civil rights claims, he may institute a new
case by filing a new complaint that complies with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8 and 11 . . . .” Id. at 333.
Amaro filed a motion for relief from judgment, which was denied by the
district court on March 23, 2021. Amaro then filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II
Amaro argues on appeal that “the district court’s overall conduct,” including
its reference to his 2017 habeas litigation, “clearly articulates a prejudicial
‘anti-prisoner’ and/or ‘anti’-Pro Se Plaintiff posture both directly and tacitly . . . .”
Aplt. Br. at 4. Amaro further argues that the district court’s order granting him leave
to amend his complaint “did not comport with this Court’s Mandate on reversal and
remand, but prejudicially limited [him] to only one cause of action, with disregard for
the ‘continuing injury’ constituted by the unabated risk of harm from the underlying
conditions, in violation of the 8th Amendment.” Id. at 5. Ultimately, Amaro argues
that his amended complaint complies with both this court’s mandate and with the
district court’s order on remand granting him leave to amend his complaint, and
therefore should not have been dismissed by the district court.
We review the district court’s decision to dismiss Amaro’s amended complaint
for an abuse of discretion. See United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah,
Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 8(a) dismissals are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion”); Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1161
(10th Cir. 2007) (“We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b) for an
abuse of discretion.”). Because Amaro is proceeding pro se, we construe his
pleadings liberally, but he remains obligated to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil and Appellate Procedure, and we may not act as his advocate. Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
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In dismissing Amaro’s amended complaint, the district court effectively relied
on Rules 8 and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 outlines the
“General Rules of Pleading” and, as relevant here, requires a complaint to set forth “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 41(b) authorizes the involuntary dismissal of an action
or claim “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with” the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure “or a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41(b) “has long been
interpreted to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to
. . . comply with the . . . court’s orders.” Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3
(10th Cir. 2003).
After examining the record on appeal, including in particular Amaro’s
amended complaint, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice. As a threshold matter, there is
little question that the amended complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Instead
of the “short and plain statement” required by Rule 8(a)(2), the amended complaint is
approximately 142 pages in length and includes 1,031 paragraphs of allegations and
claims. Further, and as the district court emphasized in its order of dismissal, the
amended complaint fails to comply with the district court’s July 26, 2018 order
granting Amaro leave to amend. Rather than focusing on the alleged February 2014
incident and related grievance proceedings, as this court’s mandate anticipated and as
the district court directed in its order granting Amaro leave to amend, the amended
complaint outlines a host of claims spanning multiple years. For example, the
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amended complaint purports to set forth claims related to Amaro falling from his cell
bunk in October 2014, ROA at 264, for a March 27, 2018 exposure to carbon
monoxide, id. at 265, for “[d]efective construction of a correctional facility,” id.
at 266, and for an unspecified “assault/battery with bodily intrusion,” id. at 268.
Lastly, we reject Amaro’s argument that the district court was “anti-prisoner,”
“anti-pro se,” or otherwise biased against him. To be sure, the district court
referenced a prior habeas action that was filed by Amaro. But we are not persuaded
that this reference demonstrated any bias on the part of the district court.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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