Aminu Inuwa v. LONNIE LAWSON, Warden

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
AMINU INUWA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
LONNIE LAWSON, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 21-6115
(D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00440-C)
(W.D. Okla.)
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Aminu Inuwa, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 petitioned for relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to
dismiss the petition without prejudice. To appeal this ruling, Mr. Inuwa seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). See Montez v.
McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867-68 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2000) (a state prisoner bringing a
§ 2241 claim must obtain a COA before being heard on the merits of the appeal).
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss the matter.
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 Because Mr. Inuwa appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will
not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 3, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 1

-- 1 of 5 --

2
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Inuwa is serving a 23-year sentence for his 2007 convictions for robbery with
a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In his § 2241 petition, he
claimed the warden’s failure to apply earned good-time credits to his sentence violated
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The magistrate judge held that Mr. Inuwa had no due process liberty interest in
earned credits because they may not be applied to his sentence for robbery with a firearm
under Oklahoma law until April 10, 2026, when he will have served 85 percent of his
sentence. Inuwa v. Lawson, 2021 WL 3892751, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. July 28, 2021); see
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(8). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal without
prejudice because, without a liberty interest, Mr. Inuwa has not suffered a due process
violation. Inuwa, 2021 WL 3892751, at *2.
The district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed this matter without
prejudice. Inuwa v. Lawson, 2021 WL 3906984 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2021). It also
denied a COA. Dist. Ct. Doc. at 23.
II. DISCUSSION
To obtain a COA, a petitioner generally must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), by “showing that reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 2

-- 2 of 5 --

3
In his brief, Mr. Inuwa argues that amendments to Oklahoma law in 2015 show he
has a liberty interest in his earned credits. Aplt. Br., Attachment at 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 n.1. The
district court rejected this argument, stating Mr. Inuwa “does not identify what law
changed, and the Court’s research has uncovered no change in [the] laws cited by
Petitioner that would alter the result reached by [the magistrate judge].” Inuwa, 2021
WL 3906984, at *1. Here, Mr. Inuwa again does not point to a specific change in the
statute that would alter the result.
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1(8) provides that
Persons convicted of . . . [r]obbery with a dangerous weapon .
. . shall be required to serve not less than eighty-five percent
(85%) of any sentence of imprisonment imposed by the
judicial system prior to becoming eligible for consideration
for parole. Persons convicted of [this offense] shall not be
eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits which
have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence to less
than eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.
In a footnote at the end of his brief, Mr. Inuwa states, “In approx. 2015, in an effort to
reduce prison overcrowding, at the behest of former Oklahoma Gov. Mary Fallin[,] Okla.
Stat. tit[.] 21 § 13.1 was amended by the Okla. State Legislature making certain crimes
eligible to receive earned sentence credits.” Aplt. Br., Attachment at 8 n.1. But
according to the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated (2018 and 2021 Cum. Suppl.), the only
amendments in 2015 were to §§ 13.1(10) and 13.1(16), not § 13.1(8), and those
amendments did not affect the 85 percent language.
Also in his brief, Mr. Inuwa quotes from an Oklahoma Department of Corrections
provision on sentence administration, which appears under the heading “Conditions
Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 3

-- 3 of 5 --

4
Where Credits Are Restricted or Not Awarded” and tracks the statutory language quoted
above:
Effective March 1, 2000, 21 O.S., Section 13.1 provided that
inmates who are convicted of certain crimes must serve
eighty-five percent (85%) of their sentence of imprisonment
before becoming eligible for parole consideration and shall
not be eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits
which have the effect of reducing the length of the sentence to
less than 85% of the sentence imposed. Therefore inmates
serving a sentence for any of the crimes listed below
committed on or after March 1, 2000 are eligible to earn
credits during the first 85 [percent] of the sentence; however,
said credits will not be applied towards the sentence until the
inmate has served 85% of said sentence.
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, “Sentence Administration, Section-06
Classification and Case Management, OP-060211” II.D.1.c. (effective date Oct. 15,
2020) (attached to Appellant’s brief). The provision then lists the “affected crimes,”
which include “Robbery with a Dang. Weapon, 21 O.S. § 801 (eff. 3/1/2000),” id., one of
Mr. Inuwa’s conviction offenses.
This administrative provision does not help Mr. Inuwa. It states that he “shall not
be eligible for earned credits or any other type of credits which have the effect of
reducing the length of the sentence to less than 85% of the sentence imposed.” This
passage is consistent with the district court’s conclusion that he lacks a state-law-
recognized liberty interest. But even if the statute and administrative provision could be
read to establish a liberty interest in earned credits, the next passage of the administrative
provision shows Mr. Inuwa has not been deprived of them: “Therefore inmates serving a
sentence for any of the crimes listed below committed on or after March 1, 2000 are
Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 4

-- 4 of 5 --

5
eligible to earn credits during the first 85 [percent] of the sentence; however, said credits
will not be applied towards the sentence until the inmate has served 85% of said
sentence.”
Mr. Inuwa argues that “even if the credits are withheld until 85% completion and
as the Court[’]s [r]uling seems to infer, the fact still remains that a ‘deprivation’ is still
imminent and will occur because these credits are a vested right, due to the fact petitioner
has earned them in accordance with the law(s).” Aplt. Br., Attachment at 6-7. This
argument fails because the administrative provision states only that “credits will not be
applied . . . until the inmate has served 85% of said sentence,” and Mr. Inuwa has made
no showing that, once he has served 85 percent of his sentence, his earned credits will not
be applied. He thus has not shown an imminent deprivation, let alone a deprivation at all
that would constitute a violation of his due process rights. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (prohibiting deprivation of a liberty interest).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Inuwa has not demonstrated that
reasonable jurists would debate the correctness of the district court’s rejection of Mr.
Inuwa’s due process claim and its dismissal of his § 2241 petition. We therefore deny his
request for a COA and dismiss this matter. We also deny his request to proceed in forma
pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
Appellate Case: 21-6115 Document: 010110626364 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 5

-- 5 of 5 --